Part III (part 1)

MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS PERTAINING TO COMPANY TRAINING AND INSTRUCTION

Chapter I

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COMPANY TRAINING AND INSTRUCTION

917. Object of Training and Instruction. The object of training and instructing a company is to thoroughly knit together its different parts, its various elements (individuals, squads and platoons), into a complete, homogeneous mass, a cohesive unit, that will under any and all conditions and circumstances respond to the will of the captain—a cohesive unit that knows how to march, that knows how to live properly in camp, that knows how to fight and that can be readily handled tactically on the field of battle. In short, the object of training and instruction is to make out of the company an efficient, wieldy fighting weapon, to be manipulated by the captain. There is but one way this object can be obtained, and that is by work, work, work—and then more work—by constant care, attention and pains—by coöperation, by team work, among the officers, the noncommissioned officers and the privates.

918. Method and Progression. Arrangement is an essential of sound teaching. Training and instruction in order to be easily understood and readily assimilated—in order to give the greatest results in the shortest time—must be carried on according to a methodical and progressive plan. Each subject or subjects upon a knowledge of which depend the proper understanding and mastering of another, should be studied and mastered before taking up the other subject, and the elementary and simpler aspects of a given subject must be mastered before taking up the higher and more difficult phases of the subject, which means that individual training and instruction must precede, and provide a sound foundation for, collective training and instruction—that is to say, for the higher tactical training and instruction of the company as a unit. These basic, fundamental principles of successful training and instruction apply to practical as well as theoretical training. For instance, in the subject of entrenchments we would first instruct the men individually in the use of the tools and in the construction and use of the trenches, after which we would pass on to the tactical use of entrenchments by the company. Also, in training and instructing the company in fire discipline, we would first explain to the men the power and tactical value of the rifle, and instruct them in their duties on the firing line as regards adjustment of sights, attention to commands, economy of ammunition, etc.; we would explain to the platoon commanders and guides their duties as regards control of fire, enforcement of fire discipline, etc., after which we would practice the company as a unit in fire action, and fire control, ending up with an exercise showing the tactical application of the rules and principles explained. And again, in the training and instruction of the company in the attack, we would first train and instruct the company in all the formations and operations that naturally precede an attack (patrolling, outposts, advance guard, rear guard), and also in those that form an inherent part of an attack (extended order, field firing, use of cover, etc.).

919. Program. The training and instruction of a company, whether practical or theoretical, should be carried on in accordance with a fixed, definite program, in which the subjects are arranged in a natural, progressive order.

920. Simultaneous Instruction and Training. The next question that presents itself is: Should instruction and training in each branch be completed before proceeding to the next, or should instruction and training be carried on simultaneously in two or more different subjects, as one, for example, are taught mathematics, French and history at the same time, a different hour of the day being devoted to each subject? In other words, should we, for instance, devote one hour of the day to attack, one hour to defense, and one hour to the service of security, thus preventing the soldier from getting weary of doing the same thing that whole day? Our answer is:

1st. If the instruction and training is being given on the ground where the application of the principles of any given subject is varied so much by the type of the ground and the nature of the situation, each type of ground affording a different solution of the problem, it is thought the best results can be obtained by finishing each subject before proceeding to the next, thus not losing the "atmosphere" of one subject by switching to the next, and also confusing the minds of the men with different principles.

2nd. However, if the instruction and training be theoretical and the time available each day be several hours, better results can be obtained by studying two or more subjects simultaneously. This would also be the case if the work be practical, but if it be such that the type of the ground and the nature of the situation will not of themselves afford variety in the application of the same principles.

921. Responsibility. The Army Regulations and War Department orders hold the company commander responsible for the training and instruction of the company. The subject is a most important one and should receive serious thought and study. Before admonishing one of your men for not knowing a subject, always ask yourself, "Have I made an effort to teach it to him?"

922. Interest. Special effort should be made to make the training and instruction of the company interesting, so that the work will not become monotonous and irksome, and thus cause the men to lose interest and get stale. To accomplish this, these points should be borne in mind:

Variety. Inject variety into the work. Do not keep the men too long at one thing.

Clearness. Every exercise, lesson or lecture should have in view a well-defined object, the meaning and importance of which must be explained to, and understood by, the men at the beginning of the exercise, lesson or lecture. In other words, at the beginning, explain the main, governing idea of the subject, and then take pains to explain in a simple, conversational way each phase as you come to it. Give the reasons for everything. You can not expect men to take an interest in things the meaning of which they do not understand and the reason for which they do not see. Make sure by asking questions of different ones as you go along that your explanations are understood.

Thoroughness. Every lecture, talk, drill or exercise should be carefully planned and arranged beforehand. Remember, that the men who are going to listen to your talk—the men who are going to go through the exercise—have the right to expect this of you, and you have no right to compel them to listen to lots of disconnected, half-baked statements, or make them go through a disjointed exercise or drill. In the case of tactical exercises always, if practicable, visit and examine the terrain beforehand. Of course, all this will mean work—additional work—but remember the government pays you to work.

Reality. Make all practical work as real as possible—do not permit the commission of absurdities—do not let men do things which manifestly they would not be able to do in actual practice—and you yourself be sure to make your exercises and tactical scheme as like real conditions of warfare as possible.

923. Individual Initiative. The effective range and great power of modern firearms cause troops in battle to be spread out over large areas, thus decentralizing control over men and operations, and consequently increasing the value and importance of individual initiative. The company commander should, therefore, practice, accustom and encourage the privates, noncommissioned officers and lieutenants in the development and exercise of individual initiative and responsibility. This should be borne in mind in all training and instruction.

Officers, noncommissioned officers and privates must not "lay down" just because they have no specific orders. Remember, the one thing above all others that counts in war, is action, initiative. Indeed, 'tis better to have acted and lost than never to have acted at all. Listen to what the Chief of Staff of the Army has to say about this in the preface to the Field Service Regulations: "Officers and men of all ranks and grades are given a certain independence in the execution of the tasks to which they are assigned and are expected to show initiative in meeting the different situations as they arise. Every individual, from the highest commander to the lowest private, must always remember that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error in the choice of means."

924. Determination and Individual Intelligence. While the value of discipline can hardly be overestimated, there are two other factors in battle that are fully as important, if not more so, and they are, determination to win, and individual intelligence, which, in war, as in all other human undertakings, almost invariably spell success. Therefore, make these two factors one of the basic principles of the instruction and training of the company, and do all you can to instill into your men a spirit of determination, and to develop in them individual intelligence. Every human being has in his soul a certain amount of determination, even though it be only enough to determine upon the small things of life. Some people are born with more determination than others, but it is a mistake to suppose that a man must remain through life with the same amount of determination that he brought into it. The attributes of the human mind, such as determination, bravery, ambition, energy, etc., are all capable of improvement and also of deterioration. It is essential therefore, for us to endeavor by all means in our power to improve our strength of character—our determination. It is, of course, useless for us to learn the art of war if we have not sufficient determination, when we meet the enemy, to apply the principles we have studied. There is no reason, however, why every officer, noncommissioned officer and private should not improve his determination of character by careful training in peace. It can only be done by facing the difficulties, thoroughly understanding the dangers, and asking ourselves repeatedly whether we are prepared to face the ordeal in war. Let us not think, in a vague sort of a way, that in war we shall be all right and do as well as most people. We know that we are not gifted with tremendous personal courage, and we know that, whatever happens, we shall not run away. But that is not enough. We must train ourselves to understand that in the hour of trial we can harden our hearts, that we can assume the initiative, and retain it by constant advance and constant attack; unless we can fill our hearts with the determination to win, we can not hope to do our full duty on the field of battle and acquit ourselves with credit.

925. The Human Element. No system of training and instruction that does not take into account human nature, can be thoroughly effective. The human element probably enters into war more than it does into any other pursuit. The old idea of turning a human being into a machine, by means of discipline, and making him dread his captain more than the enemy, died long ago, especially with the American people. In modern war success depends to a great extent upon the initiative, the individual action of the soldier and this action is greatly influenced by the soldier's state of mind at the moment, by the power that can be exercised over his mind by his comrades and those leading him. The company commander should, therefore, study the characteristics of the human mind with the object of ascertaining how he can influence the men under his command, so that in battle those human attributes which are favorable to success, may be strengthened and those which are favorable to defeat may be weakened. Of the former, courage, determination, initiative, respect, cheerfulness, comradeship, emulation and esprit de corps, are the principal ones; of the latter, fear, surprise, disrespect, and dejection, are the leading ones. By means of good, sound discipline, we can create, improve and foster the qualities mentioned that are favorable to success, and we can eliminate to a considerable extent, if not entirely, those that are detrimental to success.

926. Fear. The emotion of fear acts more powerfully upon the feelings of the individual soldier than any other emotion, and it is also probably the most infectious. Fear in a mild form is present in every human being. Nature wisely put it there, and society could not very well get along without it. For example, we stop and look up and down a crowded street before starting to cross, for fear of being run over; in going out in the cold we put on our overcoats, for fear of catching cold. In fact, we hardly do anything in life without taking a precaution of some kind. These are all examples of reasonable fear, which, within bounds is a perfectly legitimate attribute of a soldier in common with other human beings. For example, we teach the men to take advantage of cover when attacking, and we dig trenches when on the defense, in both cases for fear of being shot by the enemy. It is the unreasoning type of fear that plays havoc in war, and the most deadly and common form of it is a vague, indefinite, nameless dread of the enemy. If the average man was to analyze his feelings in war and was to ask himself if he were actually afraid of being killed, he would probably find that he was not. The ordinary soldier is prepared to take his chance, with a comfortable feeling inside him, that, although no doubt a number of people will be killed and wounded, he will escape. If, then, a man is not unreasonably afraid of being killed or wounded, is it not possible by proper training and instruction to overcome this vague fear of the enemy? Experience shows that it is. If a soldier is suffering from this vague fear of the enemy, it will at least be a consolation to him to know that a great many other soldiers, including those belonging to the enemy, are suffering in a similar manner, and that they are simply experiencing one of the ordinary characteristics of the human mind. If the soldier in battle will only realize that the enemy is just as much afraid of him as he is of the enemy, reason is likely to assert itself and to a great extent overcome the unpleasant feelings inside him. General Grant, in his Memoirs, relates a story to the effect that in one of his early campaigns he was seized with an unreasonable fear of his enemy, and was very much worried as to what the enemy was doing, when, all at once, it dawned upon him that his enemy was probably worrying equally as much about what he, Grant, was doing, and was probably as afraid as he was, if not even more so, and the realization of this promptly dispelled all of his, Grant's, fear. Confidence in one's ability to fight well will also do much to neutralize fear, and if a soldier knows that he can shoot better, march better, and attack better, than his opponent, the confidence of success that he will, as a result, feel will do much to dispel physical fear. By sound and careful training and instruction make your men efficient and this efficiency will give them confidence in themselves, confidence in their rifles, confidence in their bayonets, confidence in their comrades and confidence in their officers.

The physical methods of overcoming fear in battle are simply to direct the men's minds to other thoughts by giving them something for their bodies and limbs to do. It is a well-known saying that a man in battle frequently regains his lost courage by repeatedly firing off his rifle, which simply means that his thoughts are diverted by physical movements. This is no doubt one of the reasons why the attack is so much more successful in war than the defense, because in the attack the men are generally moving forward and having their minds diverted by physical motion from this vague dread of the enemy.

927. Courage. Courage, like all other human characteristics, is very infectious, and a brave leader who has no fear of the enemy will always get more out of his men than one who is not so well equipped in that respect. However, it is a well-known fact that a man may be brave far above his fellows in one calling or occupation, and extremely nervous in another. For example, a man may have greatly distinguished himself in the capture of a fort, who would not get on a horse for fear of being kicked off. Courage of this kind is induced chiefly by habit or experience—the man knows the dangers and how to overcome them, he has been through similar experiences before and he has come out of them with a whole skin. This type of courage can be developed by careful training during peace, and it can be increased by self-confidence—by so training the soldier that he knows and feels he will know what to do in any emergency which may arise, and how to do it; he will not be surprised by the unexpected event, which invariably occurs, and he will understand others besides himself are being troubled by unpleasant feelings, which it is his duty as a man and a soldier to overcome.

928. Surprise. Surprise may be said to be the mother of a panic, which is the worst form of fear. In such a case unreasoning fear sometimes turns into temporary insanity. Panic is most infectious, but, on the other hand, a panic can often be averted or stayed by the courageous action of one or more individuals, who can thus impose their will on the mass and bring the people to a reasonable state of mind. Teach every man in the company that when surprised the only hope of success is to obey at once and implicitly the orders of his immediate commander.

Surprises in war are not limited to the ordinary acceptance of the term, such as a sudden attack from an unexpected direction. The soldier who goes into battle, for instance, and hears the whiz of a bullet, or sees a shell burst in front of him, is surprised if he has not been taught in peace that these things have to be faced, and that for one bullet that hurts anyone thousands have to be fired. Similarly, a man sees a comrade knocked over; the horrors of war are immediately brought to him, and his courage begins to ebb—he has been surprised, because he has not realized in peace that men are bound to be killed in war. The whole atmosphere of the battlefield is a surprise to the average soldier with no previous experience—the enemy is everywhere, behind every bush, and lurking in every bit of cover, the air is full of bullets, and any advance towards the formidable-looking position held by the enemy is suicidal. However, if the soldier is properly trained and instructed in peace, he will not be greatly surprised at his novel surroundings; he will know that the enemy is not everywhere, and that one bullet sounds much more dangerous than it really is. A bullet sounds quite close when it is fifty yards away, and there is a popular saying that a man's weight in lead is fired for every man that is killed in war.

929. Respect. It is a mistake to imagine that all that is required from a soldier is respect to his officers and noncommissioned officers. Self-respect is fully as important. A soldier is a human being; if he possesses self-respect he will respect all that is good in his comrades, and they will respect all that is good in him. A man who respects himself knows how to respect other people. These are the men that form the backbone of the company, and are the best material on which to work in order to raise the general standard of courage in Battle. From a purely military point of view, it is absolutely necessary for an officer, noncommissioned officer, or private to possess some marked military qualifications in order to gain respect from others.

This respect engenders confidence in others. Self-respect in the individual can be encouraged, not by fulsome praise, but by a quiet appreciation of the good military qualities displayed by him, and by making use of those qualities whenever an opportunity occurs. For example, if a soldier is seen to do a good piece of scouting or patrolling, the first opportunity should be taken to give him a similar task, if possible in a more responsible position or on a more important occasion. Knowledge is a powerful factor in creating respect, and is probably second only to determination of character. It is essential, therefore, that all officers and noncommissioned officers should have a thorough knowledge of their duties—that they should be "on to their jobs."

930. Cheerfulness. Cheerfulness is a valuable military asset in war, and like all other characteristics of the human being, is very infectious, and in times of depression, such as during a long siege, or after the failure of an attack, it does more than anything else to restore the fighting power of the men.

931. Contentment. Contentment amongst troops in war is dependent upon these main factors: good leading, good food, and sufficient shelter and sleep. Of these, good leading is by far the most important, because it has been proved time and again that badly fed and badly quartered troops, who have suffered great hardships, will still be content and will fight in the most gallant and vigorous manner, provided they are well led. Although good leading emanates in the first instance from the highest military authorities, a great deal depends upon the company officers and noncommissioned officers. A good leader as a rule is careful of the comforts of his men; he obtains the best food and best shelter available, he does not wear out the men by unnecessary movements or unnecessary work, either in the field or in camp, and consequently when he does order them to do anything they know at once that it is necessary and they do it cheerfully.

932. Comradeship. Comradeship is a very valuable military characteristic. What a world of meaning there is in the words, "Me and my bunkie." A soldier may have many acquaintances and a number of friends, but he has but one "bunkie." In times of great danger two men who are "bunkies" will not shirk so easily as two independent men. The best in one man comes out to the surface and dominates any bad military points in the other. They can help each other in countless ways in war, and if one is unfortunately killed or wounded, the other will probably do his best to get even with the enemy at the earliest possible opportunity. This spirit may not be very Christianlike, but it is very human and practical, and helps to win battles, and to win battles is the only reason why soldiers go to war.

Art of Instruction on the Ground

933. Advantages. Whenever practicable, training and instruction should, in whole or in part, be imparted on the ground, as this gives the instruction a practical aspect that is most valuable, and enables the soldier to grasp and apply principles that he would not otherwise understand. Knowledge that a man can not apply has no value.

934. Different Methods. Instruction on the ground may be given according to one of these three methods:

1st Method. By means of a talk or lecture prepare the minds of the men for the reception and retention of the subject to be explained later on the ground. In other words, first explain the principles of the subject and then put a "clincher" on the information thus imparted by taking the men to some suitable ground, assuming certain situations and then by quizzing different men see how they would apply the principles just explained in the talk or lecture. For example, after a lecture on the selection of fire-positions take the men to some suitable nearby place and explain to them that the company is attacking toward that house and is being fired upon from that direction. Then continue:

Captain: Remember what I told you about the selection of good fire-positions during the advance. We want to use our rifles with effect, so we must be able to see the position of the enemy. On the other hand, we want to avoid being hit ourselves, if possible; so, we would like to get as much cover as possible. Now, Smith, do you think where we are at present standing is a good place for a fire-position?

Smith: No, sir.

Captain: Why not?

Smith: We can see the enemy from here, but he can see us better than we can see him, and can hit us easier than we can hit him.

Captain: Jones, can you choose a better place, either to the front or rear of where we are now standing?

Jones: I would choose a position along that row of bushes, about fifty yards to the front.

Captain: Why?

Jones: Because, etc., etc.

Twenty minutes' instruction in this manner, after a lecture, will firmly fix in the brains of the men the principles explained in the lecture.

It is a good plan to repeat the salient points of the lecture in the questions, as was done in the first question asked above, or to do so in some other way.

If a man can not give an answer, or choose a suitable place, explain the requirements again and help him to use his common sense.

2d Method. By practicing the men on the ground in the subject about which the talk or lecture was delivered.

3d Method. This may be called the ocular demonstration method, which consists in having a part of the company go through the exercise or drill, while the rest of the company observes what is being done. This method is illustrated by the following example:

935. Attack. The company commander has just delivered a talk to the company on the second stage of the attack, and has marched the company to a piece of ground suitable for practicing this particular operation, and which the company commander has himself visited beforehand (The ground should always be visited beforehand by the company commander, who should be thoroughly familiar with it. If possible, ground suitable for practicing the operation in question should always be selected.) The operation should begin about 1200 yards from the enemy's position. After pointing out the enemy's position to the company, the particular part of his line it is intended to assault and the direction the company is to advance, the company commander would then proceed something like this: "We are part of a battalion taking part in a battle, and there are companies to our right and left, with a support and reserve in our rear. So far we have been advancing over ground that is exposed to hostile artillery fire (or not exposed to hostile artillery fire, according to the actual country). We have just come under the enemy's infantry fire also, and consequently we must change our method of advancing. Our immediate object is to get forward, without expending more ammunition than is absolutely necessary, to a position close enough to the enemy to enable us to use our rifles with such deadly effect that we will be able to gain a superiority of fire. Now, is this place sufficiently close for the purpose? No, it is not—it's entirely too far away. Is that next ridge just in front of us close enough? No, it is not; it is at least 1,000 yards from the enemy's position. As a rule, we must get from eight to six hundred yards from the enemy's position before the real struggle for superiority of fire begins.

"The following are the main points to which attention must be paid during this part of the advance:

"1. We must halt in good fire position from which we can see and fire at the enemy, and from which we can not be seen very clearly.

"2. We must advance very rapidly over any open ground that is exposed to the enemy's artillery or rifle fire.

"3. We must find halting places, if possible under cover, or under the best cover available, so as to avoid making our forward rushes so long that the men will get worn out, and begin to straggle long before they get close enough to the enemy to use their rifles with deadly effect.

"4. Whenever possible, company scouts should be sent on ahead to select fire-positions."

Of course, the above points will have been explained already in the lecture, but this short summary is given in order to focus the minds of the men upon the action that must be taken by the privates, and squad leaders and the platoon commanders.

We now take one platoon and the remainder of the company looks on. The platoon commander is reminded that he is under artillery and infantry fire, and is then directed to advance, in proper formation, to the first fire-position available.

We will suppose there is a gentle slope up to the next ridge or undulation of the ground, and that there are no obstructions to the view except those afforded by the ground itself. The platoon now advances, the captain remaining with the rest of the company, pointing out mistakes as well as good points, and asking the men questions, such as:

Captain: Corporal Smith, should the whole platoon have gone forward together, or would it have been better to advance by squads?

Corporal Smith: I think it should have advanced by squads.

Captain: No, it was all right to advance as they did. At this distance the enemy's infantry fire would not be very deadly, the platoon is well extended as skirmishers, it would take considerably longer to go forward to the next position by successive squads and we want to advance at this stage as rapidly as possible; for, the longer we took, the longer would the men be exposed to fire, and consequently the greater would be the number of casualties.

Captain: Sergeant Jones, why did the platoon advance at a run when moving down the slope, and begin to walk just before reaching the foot of the slope?

Sergeant Jones: Because the slope is exposed and it was necessary to get over it as quickly as possible. They began to walk just before reaching the foot of the slope, because they struck dead ground and were covered from the enemy's fire by the ridge in front.

Captain: Corporal Adams, shouldn't the platoon have halted when it reached cover, so as to give the men a rest?

Corporal Adams: No, sir; the men had not run very far and walking gave them sufficient rest. It would have been an unnecessary loss of time to halt.

Captain: Harris, why did that man run on ahead as soon as the platoon halted?

Pvt. Harris: So he could creep up the crest of the ridge and lie down in exactly the spot that is the best fire-position—that is, where he can just see to fire over the crest and where the enemy can not see him.

Captain: Yes, that's right. All the men in the platoon might not stop at the best fire-position and in the hurry and excitement of the moment the platoon commander might also fail to do so, but if a man goes forward and lies down, the whole platoon knows that they must not go beyond him. Individual men who, owing to slight undulations of ground, may not be able to fire when they halt in line with this man, can creep up until they can see. Others who, for the same reason as regards the ground, find that if they get up on a line with the man they will be unduly exposed, will halt before that time.

Captain: Sergeant Roberts, is it necessary for another platoon to provide covering fire during the advance of the platoon?

Sergeant Roberts: No sir. At this range the enemy's infantry fire would not be very effective, and it is important to husband our ammunition for the later stages of the attack.

Having asked any other questions suggested by the situation or the ground, the captain will then take the rest of the company forward over the ground covered by the platoon, halting at the place where the platoon changed its pace from a rush to a walk, so that the men can see for themselves that cover from fire has been reached. He will then move the rest of the company forward and tell them to halt and lie down in what each man considers to be the best fire-position, not necessarily adopting the same position as that chosen by the leading platoon. The platoon commanders will then go along their platoons and point out any mistakes.

The leading platoon will now join the company and another platoon will be deployed in the fire position, the platoon commander being directed to advance to the next fire-position.

As we are now about 1,000 yards from the enemy's position the question will again arise as to whether covering fire is necessary.

If the enemy's rifle fire were heavy and accurate it might be necessary, but it should be avoided if possible, on account of the expenditure of ammunition.

We will suppose that the ground falls gently towards the enemy and is very exposed to view for about 300 yards, and half this distance away there is a low bank running parallel to the front of the attack and with a small clump of three or four trees on the bank directly in front of the platoon. Four hundred yards away is the bottom of the valley covered with bushes and shrubs. On the far side the ground rises with small undulations and low foot hills to the high ground occupied by the enemy.

There appears to be no marked fire-position which will afford any cover except the bank 150 yards away. The second platoon advances in the same manner as did the first and the captain with the commanders of the remaining platoons will continue to ask questions and point out what has been done right or wrong by the leading platoon. The first question which will arise is whether the platoon can reach the fire position offered by the bank in one rush, and secondly, whether the bank is a good fire-position. A former question will again crop up as to whether the whole platoon should go forward at once or whether the advance should be made by squads.

A hundred and fifty yards is a long way to advance without a halt, and if a halt is made on such exposed ground fire must be opened. Probably three advances, each of about fifty yards, would be made, covering fire being provided by the other platoons, which will be occupying the fire-position which the leading platoon has just left. This covering fire would not endanger the leading platoon as it would be delivered from just behind the crest and the leading platoon would be over the crest and out of sight and therefore out of fire from the platoon in rear.

The selection of a fire-position during this advance would depend upon very minute folds of the ground, or very low bushes, grass, etc., which might give a certain amount of cover from view, and therefore make it difficult for the enemy to aim or range accurately. We will suppose that the leading platoon has halted to fire about fifty yards in front, the remaining platoons, in turn, should then be taken forward, examining the ground very carefully as they go, and each platoon commander asked to halt his platoon in what he considers to be the best place.

The possibility of using a scout to select a fire-position would be considered, and a fire-position selected by one platoon would be compared with that selected by another.

The third platoon would then lead during the advance to the next fire-position, and so on with the fourth platoon, if necessary, until the bank was reached. The bank will afford a good deal of material for discussion. Is it a good fire-position or is it not, should it be occupied as such or should it be avoided altogether?

If we ask an artillery officer his opinion about the matter, he will tell us that by means of the clump of trees the defenders' artillery will be able to range with absolute accuracy on that bank. The direction of the bank is parallel to their front, and therefore they can fire at any part of it for some distance right and left of the clump without materially altering their range, and if any infantry occupy the bank they can bring a very deadly fire to bear against them.

There appears to be no doubt, from an artillery point of view, that our platoon should avoid occupying it and get out of its neighborhood as rapidly as possible.

There is another drawback as regards the bank: it is some 850 yards from the enemy's position and may be expected to be under an effective rifle fire. It is no doubt a good mark for the enemy, and, now we come to the crux of the whole matter; his artillery and infantry fire might not do us much damage so long as we remain behind the bank, but they might make it very unpleasant for us directly we try to leave this cover and advance further.

Before finally deciding what to do we must consider human nature, which is entirely in favor of halting behind the bank, and if allowed to remain there long, will be opposed to leaving it. We cannot hope to gain superiority of fire over the enemy at a range of 850 yards, so that a long halt at the bank is out of the question. But it appears to be an extraordinary thing, when we are searching everywhere for cover, that we should be doubtful about occupying such good cover when we find it.

If we decide not to occupy it, the logical conclusion is that, when preparing a position for defense, we should construct a good fire-position for the attack some 850 yards away, which is the last thing we should think of doing.

There is no doubt about it, that with badly-trained troops such a fire-position would be liable to become a snare, and that if they once occupied it, there would be great difficulty in getting them forward again, and probably the attack would be brought to a standstill at a critical time.

The answer appears to be found in the simple solution of good training. We must teach our men that when they get into such positions they must use the cover afforded, but for no longer than any other fire-position, and that they must get into the habit in peace of looking upon such localities with suspicion, and with the knowledge that they are not suitable for lengthy occupation in war, if the battle is to be won.

We now come to a still more difficult question of training, namely, how far can the company get forward from the bank without being compelled to stop in order to gain superiority of fire over the defense? In war we want to get as close as possible; the moral effect on the defense is greater, our fire is more effective, and we are likely to gain our object more rapidly. In peace there is no fire to stop us, and we move forward to ridiculous positions which we could not possibly reach in war without first gaining superiority of fire. The result of this is that we try to do the same thing when first we go to war, and we are stopped, probably much further back than we should have been if we had studied the question in peace.

Even on the most open ground we must get to within 600 yards of the enemy, and if the ground affords any cover in front, the exposed space must be rushed and the more forward position gained. Having pointed out this difficulty to the company during the previous lecture, and reminded them of it on the ground, we can now extend the whole company and move forward from the bank, using covering fire and letting each platoon commander decide how far he can get to the front after a series of rushes, the company acting as a whole.

The captain can then go down the line and discuss with each platoon the position it has reached. Whilst he is doing this, the remaining platoons can be trained in fire direction and control, which should be carefully watched and criticized by the platoon commanders. One platoon, owing to the nature of the ground in front of it, can get forward further than other platoons, and this should be brought home to each platoon, so as to avoid the possibility of playing the game of follow your leader, and one platoon halting merely because another has halted.

If there is still time available, and the ground is suitable, the company can be moved to a flank to choose a similar fire-position where the ground is more favorable to an advance, and where the company could get within 300 yards of the enemy, or even less, before it would be absolutely necessary to stop in order to gain superiority of fire.

If there is still time available, and the ground is suitable, the whole operation can be carried out in the opposite direction or in some other direction, and the platoons can thus be trained to appreciate that fire-positions which are good in one place are bad in another.

936. Defense. Demonstrations in defense can be carried out in a similar manner, the captain explaining to the company the general line of defense to be taken up, the portion allotted to the company, and the probable direction of the enemy's attack.

The coöperation of the artillery and infantry will have been pointed out in the previous lecture: how some part of the enemy's advance will be dealt with by artillery alone, some part by both artillery and infantry, and some part by infantry alone.

This can now be pointed out to the men on the ground. Having considered the assistance provided by the artillery, the next point to decide upon is the exact position of the fire trench. The best way to proceed is to allot a certain portion of the front occupied by the company to each platoon and to let the platoon commanders take charge of the operations. The platoon commander can direct one of his squads to select a position for the trench, and that squad can lie down there. The remaining squads will then select a position in turn. If two squads select the same they can lie down together. The platoon commander will then fall in his platoon, and make them lie down in the most retired position chosen; he will ask the squad leader why the squad chose that locality in preference to any other, why they did not go ten yards further forward or ten yards further back; and he will explain to the whole platoon the advantages and disadvantages of selecting this locality. He will then move the whole platoon forward to the next position chosen by another squad and deal with that locality. Finally, he will select the position he thinks the best, giving his reasons why he has decided upon it, and place the whole platoon on it. When all the platoons have decided upon their line of defense, the captain will move the whole company in turn from the ground occupied by one platoon to that occupied by another, asking the platoon commander in each case to explain why the position was chosen in preference to any other.

He will give his decision as regards each platoon, and he will finally arrange for the position to be occupied by the whole company. One platoon, for some good reason, may have chosen a place which it would not be safe to occupy, owing to the fire of another platoon on the flank. Another platoon may have chosen a place which was very good as regards the field of fire in a direction which was already adequately defended by another platoon, but which had a bad field of fire over ground which no other platoon could fire upon. The company commander would adjust all these matters, and in the end one or more platoons might not be placed in the best position as regards their own particular front, but in the best as regards the whole company.

Having decided upon the exact site of the trenches and the general distribution of fire, the next matter to consider is the amount of clearing that is necessary, and the position and nature of any obstacles which may be required. Each platoon commander having been allotted a definite fire zone, can point out to his platoon what clearance is necessary; he can then ask each squad, as before, to choose the position for the obstacle. The company commander can then take the whole company to the position occupied by each platoon and tell the platoon commander to explain what ground they propose to clear, where they propose to place their obstacle, the material available for its construction, and in every case the reason why the decision has been arrived at. If digging is permitted, the trenches will now be constructed, and care will be taken that they are actually finished. It is far better to work overtime than to construct trenches which would be of little use in war and could not be properly defended. It is the exception rather than the rule to see trenches properly finished, fit for occupation, and capable of resisting a heavy attack. If the trenches cannot be dug the company can be taken to another part of the same position, where the ground in front is totally different, and the exercise can be repeated, the platoon and company commanders pointing out why a fire trench which was well sited in the first case would be badly sited if a similar position was selected in the second case.

937. Outpost. We can now turn to the method of training the company in outpost duty, making use of the same system of demonstration. Having pointed out to the company the locality where the main body is bivouacked, the fighting position which the main body will occupy in case a heavy attack is made against the outposts, and the general line of the outposts, the company commander will indicate on the ground the extent of front which is to be guarded by his company, stating whether imaginary companies continue the position on one or both flanks. He will point out the possible avenues of approach from the direction of the enemy to that portion of the position to be occupied by the company, and state from which direction the enemy is most likely to advance and why.

The first point to decide is the number of outguards and their exact position. In war this would always be done by the company commander, but if it is desired to give the junior officers of the company some instruction in this important detail, they should be sent out before the company arrives on the ground to reconnoiter the position and make their decisions. The exact siting of the trenches for the outguards, the construction of obstacles, and the clearance of the foreground having been decided upon and the positions selected for each outguard discussed, and a definite site selected, the next question to decide is the number and position of the sentries.

The platoon commander would then take each scheme in turn, visit with the whole platoon each position selected for the sentry, and decide finally what it would be best to do, giving, as usual, his reasons.

Having decided upon the positions of the sentries, and their line of retreat, so as not to mask the fire of the outguard, the next matter to consider would be the number of patrols that are required, and the particular areas of ground that must be examined by them periodically. The necessary trenches, obstacles, etc., would then be constructed.

Finally, the whole company should be assembled, marched to the position chosen for each outguard and the reasons for selecting the position explained by the company commander. The company should then be told off as an outpost company, and divided into outguards, supports, if any, and the necessary sentries over arms, patrols, etc., and marched to their respective posts.

If there is still time available each platoon commander can reconnoiter the ground for suitable positions for his outguards by night, take the outguards there, explain why the change of position is desirable, and direct the outguard commanders with their outguards to select positions for the sentries, following the same procedure as by day.

Although it is quite correct to select positions for night outposts during daylight, when possible, they should never be definitely occupied by the company before dark, when the forward movement could not be observed by the enemy. To practice night outposts by day is bad instruction, outguards and sentries are placed in positions which appear ridiculous to the ordinary mind, and the men get confused ideas on the subject. When it is desired to practice day and night outposts as an advanced exercise it is advisable to commence work in the afternoon, establish the day outposts, reconnoiter for the night outposts, make the change after dark and construct the necessary trenches, obstacles, etc., after dark.

It is, however, extremely important that the patrols should get to know their way about the country in front during the daylight, when possible, so that they will have some practice in recognizing land marks by night.

It frequently occurs, when training the company in outpost duties, that periods elapse during which the outguards are doing nothing. These opportunities should be taken to instruct the men in their duties when ordered to patrol to the front, the same system of demonstration being employed. For instance, the officer or noncommissioned officer commanding a piquet can select three men, point out certain ground in front which the sentries cannot see and which must be examined by a patrol, and proceed to instruct the whole picket in the best manner of carrying out this work. We will suppose that the patrol is working by day and that the ground to be visited is behind a small hill some 500 yards in front of the sentry. The commander of the picket will then explain to the men that the first object of the patrol is to reach the ground to be examined without being seen by any hostile patrols which may be moving about in front. Before proceeding further it is necessary for the patrol to decide upon the best line of advance. The various lines of advance will be discussed and the patrol asked to decide which they would select. Three other men can then be asked to give their opinion, and so on until all the men of the picket have expressed their views. The commander of the picket will then state which he considers the best line and give his reasons.

The next matter to decide is the method of advance to be adopted by the patrol. Are the three men to march past the sentry in one body and walk straight over the hill in front? If they do this there may be a hostile patrol hiding just behind the crest, watching the movements of our patrol, and directly the latter reach the hill they will be covered by the rifles of the hostile patrol at a few yards' range and will be captured or shot.

If the patrol is not to advance in one body how is it to act? There is plenty of time available, so that there are no objections to deliberate methods. The patrol should advance from cover to cover with one man always going forward protected by the rifles of the remaining two men who have halted in a good position to fire on any enemy that can fire on the leading man. The leading man having readied the cover in front will signal back all clear, and the two men in the rear will join him. They will then make their next advance in a similar manner.

By looking at the hill the patrol can make a good guess at the locality which a hostile patrol would select if it was on the hill. It would be a place where it could get a good view towards our outpost line, and where the patrol could not be seen itself from the outpost line. If the hill was quite bare with nothing but grass on it and flat round top, the best place for the enemy's patrol would be exactly on the top just behind the crest. In such a position he could not be seen by any sentry to the right or left of our picket. For example, if the hostile patrol chose a place on the side of the bare slope of the hill and looked over the crest line it would not be seen by our sentry, but it might be seen by another one on the flank.

The object of our patrol would be to approach the hill, not direct from the outguard, but either from the left or right of the hill and thus come on the flank of the enemy's patrol if he was there.

The whole picket can then be taken out to the front and follow the movements of the patrol from cover to cover until the hill is reached.

The next step will be to ascertain if there is any one on the top of the hill. If the hill is perfectly bare with a somewhat convex slope, it would be best for the three men to extend to about twenty yards interval and move forward together, prepared to drop on the first sign of the enemy, so that they can creep up and open fire on him without exposing themselves. Three men with magazine rifles extended in this manner, opposed to a hostile patrol collected in one party, should be able to deal with the latter without much difficulty. Their fire would be converging, and coming from different directions would confuse the hostile patrol, especially if the advance was made from a flank. The men of the patrol when creeping up the hill should avoid exposing themselves in the direction of the ground behind the hill, if possible, because they want to examine that ground later on, and if seen by the enemy they might fall into an ambuscade. If it is impossible to avoid being seen from the ground beyond, it would be best for the patrol to retire as though they were going back to the outposts, and then move round the flank of the hill and advance to the ground beyond from an unexpected direction. All this would be considered by the officer or noncommissioned officer commanding the picket, together with many other points.

Sufficient has been said to explain how this system of demonstration can be worked in connection with any class of operation in the field. It is certainly slow, and takes a long time, but no one is ever idle and every one is constantly learning something fresh, for the simple reason that, although one may know every detail of the subject, the ground constantly differs and requires to be dealt with in a common sense and skillful manner. The men are interested throughout, and one morning spent on this kind of work is worth several days of practice in the ordinary manner.

It should be remembered that this system of demonstration is only required to teach the men their work; when they have once learned it and thoroughly understand the necessary details they must be practiced in it, the company or platoon commander indicating what has been well done, what has been badly done, and what requires improvement. (See "Outposts," Par. 1051.)

Other Examples of the Ocular Demonstration Method

938. The following illustrations will suggest other examples of the employment of the ocular demonstration method of instruction:

The advantages and disadvantages of close and extended order. Send a lieutenant or a noncommissioned officer with two or three squads of the older soldiers some distance to the front of the company, and have them advance toward the company, first in close order and then in extended order.

By ocular demonstration show the men who are watching the approach of the company how easy it would be even for the poorest shots to land bullets in the thick of a closed body, but how much of a less distinct target the extended order offers and how many spaces there are in the skirmish line for the bullets to pass through; also, how much more easily cover can be employed and the rifle used in the extended order. Let them see also how much more difficult it is for the officers and noncommissioned officers to maintain control over the movements of troops in extended order, and the consequent necessity and duty of every soldier, when in extended order, doing all he can, by attention and exertion, to keep order and help his officers and noncommissioned officers to gain success.

939. The Use of Cover. Send a lieutenant or noncommissioned officer with a couple of squads of old soldiers a few hundred yards to the front and have them advance on the company as if attacking, first without taking advantage of cover and then taking advantage of all available cover, the part of the company that is supposed to be attacked lying down and aiming and snapping at the approaching soldiers. Then reverse the operation—send the defenders out and have them advance on the former attackers. Explain that the requisites of good cover are: Ability to see the enemy; concealment of your own body; ability to use the rifle readily. Then have a number of men take cover and snap at an enemy in position, represented by a few old soldiers. Point out the defects and the good points in each case.

940. Practice in Commanding Mixed Squads. In order to practice noncommissioned officers in commanding mixed firing squads, and in order to drill the privates in banding themselves together and obeying the orders of anyone who may assume command, it is good training for two or more companies to practice reënforcing each other by one company assuming a given fire-position and the other sending up reënforcements by squads, the men being instructed to take positions anywhere on the firing line where they may find an opening. However, explain to the men that whenever possible units should take their positions on the firing line as a whole, but that in practice it is very often impossible to do this, and that the drill is being given so as to practice the noncommissioned officers in commanding mixed units on the firing line and also to give the privates practice in banding themselves into groups and obeying the command of any noncommissioned officer who may be over them.

941. Operating Against Other Troops. There is no better way of arousing interest, enthusiasm, and pride in training troops than by creating a feeling of friendly rivalry and competition amongst the men, and the best way to do this is to have one part of the company operate against the other in all such practical work as scouting, patrolling, attacking, etc. Whenever practicable, blank ammunition should be used. One of the sides should wear a white handkerchief around the hat or some other distinguishing mark. The troops that are sent out must be given full and explicit instructions as to just exactly what they are to do, so that the principles it is intended to illustrate may be properly brought out.

Chapter II

GENERAL COMMON SENSE PRINCIPLES OF APPLIED MINOR TACTICS

942. To begin with, you want to bear in mind that there is nothing difficult, complicated or mysterious about applied minor tactics—it is just simply the application of plain, every-day, common horse sense—the whole thing consists in familiarizing yourself with certain general principles based on common sense and then applying them with common sense. Whatever you do, don't make the mistake of following blindly rules that you have read in books.

943. One of the ablest officers in the Army has recently given this definition of the Art of War:

• One-fifth is learned from books;
• One-fifth is common sense;
• Three-fifths is knowing men and how to lead them.

The man who would be successful in business must understand men and apply certain general business principles with common sense; the man who would be a successful hunter must understand game and apply certain general hunting principles with common sense, and even the man who would be a successful fisherman must understand fish and apply certain general fishing principles with common sense. And so likewise the man who would lead other men successfully in battle must understand men and apply certain general tactical principles with common sense.

Of course, the only reason for the existence of an army is the possibility of war some day, and everything the soldier does—his drills, parades, target practice, guard duty, schools of instruction, etc.—has in view only one end: The preparation of the soldier for the field of battle.

944. While the responsibilities of officers and noncommissioned officers in time of peace are important, in time of battle they are much more so: for then their mistakes are paid for in human blood.

What would you think of a pilot who was not capable of piloting a boat trying to pilot a boat loaded with passengers; or, of an engineer who was not capable of running a locomotive trying to run a passenger train? You would, of course, think him a criminal—but do you think he would be more criminal than the noncommissioned officer who is not capable of leading a squad in battle but who tries to do so, thereby sacrificing the lives of those under him?

You can, therefore, appreciate the importance, the necessity, of every officer and noncommissioned officer doing everything that he possibly can during times of peace to qualify himself for his duties and responsibilities during times of war.

If we are going to have a good army we must have good regiments; to have good regiments we must have good battalions; to have good battalions we must have good companies—but to have good companies we must have efficient company officers and noncommissioned officers.

As stated before, everything in the life of the soldier leads to the field of battle. And so it is that in the subject of minor tactics all instruction leads to the battle. First we have map problems; then terrain exercises; next the war game; after that maneuvers, and finally the battle.

945. Map Problems and Terrain Exercises. In the case of map problems you are given tactical problems to solve on a map; in the case of terrain exercises you are given problems to solve on the ground. (The word "Terrain," means earth, ground.) These are the simplest forms of tactical problems, as you have only one phase of the action, your information is always reliable and your imaginary soldiers always do just exactly what you want them to do.

946. War Game. Next comes the war game, which consists of problems solved on maps, but you have an opponent who commands the enemy—the phases follow one another rapidly and the conditions change—your information is not so complete and reliable. However, your men being slips of cardboard or beads, they will, as in the case of your imaginary soldiers in the map problems and terrain exercises, go where you wish them to and do what you tell them to do—they can't misunderstand your instructions and go wrong—they don't straggle and get careless as real soldiers sometimes do.

Map problems, terrain exercises and war games are but aids to maneuvers—their practice makes the maneuvers better; for you thus learn the principles of tactics and in the simplest and quickest way.

947. Maneuvers. In the case of the maneuver the problem is the same as in the war game, except that you are dealing with real, live men whom you can not control perfectly, and there is, therefore, much greater chance for mistakes.

948. The battle. A battle is only a maneuver to which is added great physical danger and excitement.

General rules and principles that must be applied in map problems, terrain exercises, the war game and maneuvers

949. Everything that is done must conform in principle to what should be done in battle—otherwise your work is wasted—your time is thrown away.

In solving map problems and in the war game, always form in your mind a picture of the ground where the action is supposed to be taking place—imagine that you see the enemy, the various hills, streams, roads, etc., that he is firing at you, etc.—and don't do anything that you would not be able to do if you were really on the ground and really in a fight.

Whether it be a corporal in command of a squad or a general in command of an army, in the solution of a tactical problem, whether it be a map problem, a terrain exercise, a war game, maneuver or battle, he will have to go through the same operation:

• 1st. Estimate the situation;
• 2d. Decide what he will do;
• 3d. Give the necessary orders to carry out his decision.

At first these three steps of the operation may appear difficult and laborious, but after a little practice the mind, which always works with rapidity in accustomed channels, performs them with astonishing quickness.

The child beginning the study of arithmetic, for example, is very slow in determining the sum of 7 and 8, but later the answer is announced almost at sight. The same is true in tactical problems—the process may be slow at first, but with a little practice it becomes quick and easy.

950. Estimating the Situation. This is simply "sizing up the situation," finding out what you're "up against," and is always the first thing to be done. It is most important, and in doing it the first step is to determine your MISSION—what you are to do, what you are to accomplish—the most important consideration in any military situation.

Consider next your own forces and that of the enemy—that is, his probable strength and how it compares with yours.

Consider the enemy's probable MISSION and what he will probably do to accomplish it.

Consider the geography of the country so far as it affects the problem—the valleys to cross, defiles to pass through, shortest road to follow, etc.

Now, consider the different courses open to you with the advantages and disadvantages of each.

You must, of course, in every case know what you're up against before you can decide intelligently what you're going to do.

In making your plan always bear in mind not only your own MISSION, but also the general mission of the command of which you form a part, and this is what nine men out of ten forget to do.

951. The Decision. It is important that you should come to a clear and correct decision—that you do so promptly and then execute it vigorously.

The new Japanese Field Service Regulations tell us that there are two things above all that should be avoided—inaction and hesitation. "To act resolutely even in an erroneous manner is better than to remain inactive and irresolute"—that is to say do something.

You are now ready to come to a decision, which is nothing more or less than a clear, concise determination of what you're going to do and how you're going to do it. Frederick the Great, expressed the same idea in fewer words: "Don't haggle."

Having settled on a plan, push it through—don't vacillate, don't waver. Make your plan simple. No other has much show. Complicated plans look well on paper, but in war they seldom work out. They require several people to do the right thing at the right time and this under conditions of excitement, danger and confusion, and, as a result, they generally fail.

952. The Order. Having completed your estimate of the situation and formed your plan, you are now ready to give the orders necessary to carry it out.

You must first give your subordinates sufficient information of the situation and your plan, so that they may clearly understand their mission.

The better everyone understands the whole situation the better he can play his part. Unexpected things are always happening in war—a subordinate can act intelligently only if he knows and understands what his superior wants to do.

Always make your instructions definite and positive—vague instructions are sometimes worse than none.

Your order, your instructions, must be clear, concise and definite—everyone should know just exactly what he is to do.

A Few General Principles

953. The man who hunts deer, moose, tigers and lions, is hunting big game, but the soldier operating in the enemy's territory is hunting bigger game—he's hunting for human beings—but you want to remember that the other fellow is out hunting for you, too; he's out "gunning" for you. So, don't fail to be on the alert, on the lookout, all the time, if you do he'll "get the drop" on you. Remember what Frederick the Great said: "It is pardonable to be defeated, but never to be taken by surprise."

Do not separate your force too much; if you do, you weaken yourself—you take the chance of being "defeated in detail"—that is, of one part being defeated after another. Remember the old saying: "In union there is strength." Undue extension of your line (a mistake, by the way, very often made) is only a form of separation and is equally as bad.

While too much importance can not be attached to the proper use of cover, you must not forget that sometimes there are other considerations that outweigh the advantages of cover. Good sense alone can determine. A certain direction of attack, for instance, may afford excellent cover but it may be so situated as to mean ruin if defeated, as where it puts an impassable obstacle directly in your rear. And don't forget that you should always think in advance of what you would do in case of defeat.

What is it, after all, that gives victory, whether it be armies or only squads engaged? It's just simply inflicting on the enemy a loss which he will not stand before he can do the same to you. Now, what is this loss that he will not stand? What is the loss that will cause him to break? Well, it varies; it is subject to many conditions—different bodies of troops, like different timbers, have different breaking points. However, whatever it may be in any particular case it would soon come if we could shoot on the battlefield as we do on the target range, but we can not approximate it.

There are many causes tending to drag down our score on the battlefield, one of the most potent being the effect of the enemy's fire. It is cited as a physiological fact that fear and great excitement cause the pupil of the eye to dilate and impair accuracy in vision and hence of shooting. It is well established that the effectiveness of the fire of one side reduced proportionately to the effectiveness of that of the other.

Bear in mind then these two points—we must get the enemy's breaking point before he gets ours, and the more effective we make our fire the less effective will be his.

Expressed in another way—to win you must gain and keep a fire superiority.

This generally means more rifles in action, yet a fire badly controlled and directed, though great in volume, may be less effective than a smaller volume better handled.

The firing line barring a few exceptional cases, then, should be as heavy as practicable consistent with the men's free use of their rifles.

This has been found to be about one man to the yard. In this way you get volume of fire and the companies do not cover so much ground that their commanders lose their power to direct and control.

If it becomes necessary to hold a line too long for the force available, it is then better to keep the men close together and leave gaps in the line. The men are so much better controlled, the fire better directed, the volume the same, and the gaps are closed by the cross fire of parties adjacent.

Chapter III

GENERAL PLAN OF INSTRUCTION IN MAP PROBLEMS FOR NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND PRIVATES—INSTRUCTION IN DELIVERING MESSAGES

(The large wall map to be used for this instruction can be obtained from the George Banta Publishing Co., Menasha, Wis., at a cost of $1.50.)

954. The noncommissioned officers and the privates of the squad, section, platoon or company are seated in front of the instructor, who, with pointer in hand, is standing near the map on the wall.

The instructor assumes certain situations and designates various noncommissioned officers to take charge of squads for the purpose of accomplishing certain missions; he places them in different situations, and then asks them what they would do. He, or the noncommissioned officer designated to perform certain missions, designates certain privates to carry messages, watch for signals, take the place of wounded noncommissioned officers, etc. For example, the instructor says: "The battalion is marching to Watertown (see Elementary Map in pocket at back of book) along this road (indicating road): our company forms the advance guard; we are now at this point (indicating point). Corporal Smith, take your squad and reconnoiter the woods on the right to see if you can find any trace of the enemy there, and rejoin the company as soon as you can. Corporal Jones, be on the lookout for any signals that Corporal Smith may make."

Corporal Smith then gives the command, "1. Forward, 2. March," and such other commands as may be necessary.

Instructor: Now, when you reach this point (indicating point), what do you see?

(Corporal Smith holds his rifle horizontally above his head.)

Corporal Jones: Captain, Corporal Smith signals that he sees a small body of the enemy.

Corporal Smith: Lie down. Range, 700. 1. Ready; 2. AIM; 3. Squad; 4. FIRE. 1. Forward; Double time; 2. MARCH, etc.

The noncommissioned officers and the privates who are thus designated to do certain things must use their imagination as much as possible. They must look at the map and imagine that they are right on the ground, in the hostile territory; they must imagine that they see the streams, hills, woods, roads, etc., represented on the map, and they must not do anything that they could not do if in the hostile territory, with the assumed conditions actually existing.

955. The general idea of this system of instruction is to make the noncommissioned officers and the privates think, to make them use common sense and initiative in handling men in various situations, in getting out of difficulties. By thus putting men on their mettle in the presence of their comrades and making them bring into play their common sense and their powers of resourcefulness, it is comparatively easy to hold the attention of a whole squad, section, platoon or company, for those who are not actually taking part in the solution of a particular problem are curious to see how those who are taking part will answer different questions and do different things—how they will "pan out."

956. Everything that is said, everything that is done, should, as far as practicable, be said and done just as it would be said and done in the field. The commands should be actually given, the messages actually delivered, the reports actually made, the orders and instructions actually given, the signals actually made, etc., just the same as they would be if the operations were real. Of course, sometimes it is not practicable to do this, and again at other times it would be advisable not to do so. If, for instance, in the solution of a problem there were a great many opportunities to give commands to fire, to make signals, to deliver messages, etc., and if these things were actually done every time, it would not only become tiresome but it would also delay the real work and instruction. Common sense must be used. Just bear this in mind: In the solution of map problems the noncommissioned officers and the privates are to be given proper and sufficient instruction in giving commands, making signals, sending and delivering messages, making reports, etc., the instructor using his common sense in deciding what is proper and sufficient instruction. In carrying out this feature of the instruction it would be done thus, for instance:

Instead of a platoon leader saying, "I would give the order for the platoon (two, three or four squads) to fire on them," he would say, for instance, "I would then give the command, 'AT LINE OF MEN. RANGE, 600. FIRE AT WILL,' and would continue the firing as long as necessary." Should the instructor then say, for instance, "Very well; the enemy's fire has slackened; what will you do now?" The platoon leader would answer, for instance, "I would signal: 1. By squads from the right; 2. RUSH."

Instead of saying, for instance, "I would advance my squad to the top of this hill at double time," the squad leader should say, "I would give the command: '1. Forward, double time; 2. MARCH,' and upon reaching the top of this hill, I would command, '1. Squad; 2. HALT,' cautioning the men to take advantage of cover."

Instead of saying, "I would signal back that we see the enemy in force," the squad leader should take a rifle and make the signal, and if a man has been designated to watch for signals, the man would say to the captain (or other person for whom he was watching for signals): "Captain, Corporal Smith has signaled that he sees the enemy in force."

Instead of saying, "I would send a message back that there are about twenty mounted men just in rear of the Jones' house; they are dismounted and their horses are being held by horseholders," say, "Smith, go back and tell the captain (or other person) there are about twenty mounted men just in rear of the Jones' house. They are dismounted and their horses are being held by horseholders." Private Smith would then say to the captain (or other person), "Captain, Corporal Harris sends word there are about twenty men just in the rear of the Jones' house. They are dismounted and their horses are being held by horse holders."

957. For problems exemplifying this system of instruction, see Par. 1017.

The instruction may be varied a little by testing the squad leaders in their knowledge of map reading by asking, from time to time during the solution of the problem, such questions as these:

Captain: Corporal Smith, you are standing on Lone Hill (See Elementary Map), facing north. Tell me what you see?

Corporal: The hill slopes off steeply in front of me, about eighty feet down to the bottom land. A spur of the hill runs off on my right three-fourths of a mile to the north. Another runs off on my left the same distance to the west. Between these two spurs, down in front of me, is an almost level valley, extending about a mile to my right front, where a hill cuts off my view. To my left front it is level as far as I can see. A quarter of a mile in front of me is a big pond, down in the valley, and I can trace the course of a stream that drains the pond off to the northwest, by the trees along its bank. Just beyond the stream a railroad runs northwest along a fill and crosses the stream a mile and a half to the northwest, where I can see the roofs of a group of houses. A wagon road runs north across the valley, crossing the western spur of this hill 600 yards from Lone Hill. It is bordered by trees as far as the creek. Another road parallels the railroad, the two roads crossing near a large orchard a mile straight to my front.

Captain: Can you see the Chester Pike where the railroad crosses it?

Corporal: No, sir.

Captain: Why?

Corporal: Because the hill "62," about 800 yards from Lone Hill, is so high that it cuts off my view in that direction of everything closer to the spur "62" than the point in the Salem-Boling road, where the private lane runs off east to the Gray house.

Captain: Sergeant Jones, in which direction does the stream run that you see just south of the Twin Hills?

Sergeant: It runs south through York, because I can see that the northern end starts near the head of a valley and goes down into the open plain. Also it is indicated by a very narrow line near the Twin Hills which becomes gradually wider or heavier the further south it goes. Furthermore, the fact that three short branch streams are shown joining together and forming one, must naturally mean that the direction of flow is towards the one formed by the three.

Captain: Sergeant Harris, does the road from the Mason farm to the Welsh farm run up or down hill?

Sergeant: It does both, sir. It is almost level for the first half mile west of the Mason farm; then, as it crosses the contour marked 20 and a second marked 40, it runs up hill, rising to forty feet above the valley, 900 yards east of the Mason farm. Then, as it again crosses a contour marked 40 and a second marked 20, it goes down hill to the Welsh farm. That portion of the road between the points where it crosses the two contours marked 40, is the highest part of the road. It crosses this hill in a "saddle," for both north and south of this summit on the road are contours marked 60 and even higher.

Captain: Corporal Wallace, you are in Salem with a patrol with orders to go to Oxford. There is no one to tell you anything about this section of the country and you have never been there before. You have this map and a compass. What would you do?

Corporal: I would see from my map and by looking around me that Salem is situated at the crossing of two main roads. From the map I would see that one leads to Boling and the other was the one to take for Oxford. Also, I would see that the one to Boling started due north out of Salem and the other, the one I must follow, started due west out of Salem. Taking out my compass, I would see in what direction the north end of the needle pointed; the road running off in that direction would be the one to Boling, so I would start off west on the other.

Captain: Suppose you had no compass?

Corporal: I would look and see on which side of the base of the trees the moss grew. That side would be north. Or, in this case, I would probably not use a compass even if I had it; for, from the map, I know that the road I wish to start off on crosses a railroad track within sight of the crossroads and on the opposite side of the crossroads from the church shown on the map; also, that the Boling road is level as far as I could see on the ground, while the Chester Pike crosses the spur of Sandy Ridge, about a half mile out of the village.

Captain: Go ahead, corporal, and explain how you would follow the proper route to Oxford.

Corporal: I would proceed west on the Chester Pike, knowing I would cross a good sized stream, on a stone bridge, about a mile and a half out of Salem; then I would pass a crossroad and find a swamp on my right, between the road and the stream. About a mile and a half from the crossroad I just mentioned, I would cross a railroad track and then I would know that at the fork of the roads one-quarter of a mile further on I must take the left fork. This road would take me straight into Oxford, about a mile and three-quarters beyond the fork.

Captain: Sergeant Washington, do the contours about a half mile north of the Maxey farm, on the Salem-Boling road, represent a hill or a depression?

Sergeant: They represent a hill, because the inner contour has a higher number 42, than the outer, marked 20. They represent sort of a leg-of-mutton shaped hill about 42 feet higher than the surrounding low ground.

Variety and interest may be added to the instruction by assuming that the squad leader has been killed or wounded and then designate some private to command the squad; or that a man has been wounded in a certain part of the body and have a soldier actually apply his first aid packet; or that a soldier has fainted or been bitten by a rattlesnake and have a man actually render him first aid.

958. The privates may be given practical instruction in delivering messages by giving them messages in one room and having them deliver them to someone else in another room. It is a good plan to write out a number of messages in advance on slips of paper or on cards, placing them in unsealed envelopes. An officer or a noncommissioned officer in one room reads one of the messages to a soldier, then seals it in an envelope and gives it to the soldier to hand to the person in another room to whom he is to deliver the message. The latter checks the accuracy of the message by means of the written message. Of course, this form of instruction should not be given during the solution of map problems by the men. (For model messages, see par. 980.)

The same slips or cards may be used any number of times with different soldiers. A soldier should never start on his way to deliver a message unless he understands thoroughly the message he is to deliver.

Chapter IV

THE SERVICE OF INFORMATION

(Based on the Field Service Regulations.)

Patrolling

959. Patrols are small bodies of infantry or cavalry, from two men up to a company or troop, sent out from a command at any time to gain information of the enemy and of the country, to drive off small hostile bodies, to prevent them from observing the command or for other stated objects, such as to blow up a bridge, destroy a railroad track, communicate or keep in touch with friendly troops, etc. Patrols are named according to their objects, reconnoitering, visiting, connecting, exploring, flanking patrols, etc. These names are of no importance, however, because the patrol's orders in each case determine its duties.

960. The size of a patrol depends upon the mission it is to accomplish; if it is to gain information only, it should be as small as possible, allowing two men for each probable message to be sent (this permits you to send messages and still have a working patrol remaining); if it is to fight, it should be strong enough to defeat the probable enemy against it. For instance, a patrol of two men might be ordered to examine some high ground a few hundred yards off the road. On the other hand, during the recent war in Manchuria a Japanese patrol of 50 mounted men, to accomplish its mission marched 1,160 miles in the enemy's country and was out for 62 days.

961. Patrol Leaders. (a) Patrol leaders, usually noncommissioned officers, are selected for their endurance, keen eyesight, ability to think quickly and good military judgment. They should be able to read a map, make a sketch and send messages that are easily understood. Very important patrols are sometimes lead by officers. The leader should have a map, watch, field glass, compass, message blank and pencils.

(b) The ability to lead a patrol correctly without a number of detailed orders or instructions, is one of the highest and most valuable qualifications of a noncommissioned officer. Since a commander ordering out a patrol can only give general instructions as to what he desires, because he cannot possibly forsee just what situations may arise, the patrol leader will be forced to use his own judgment to decide on the proper course to pursue when something of importance suddenly occurs. He is in sole command on the spot and must make his decisions entirely on his own judgment and make them instantly. He has to bear in mind first of all his mission—what his commander wants him to do.

Possibly something may occur that should cause the patrol leader to undertake an entirely new mission and he must view the new situation from the standpoint of a higher commander.

(c) More battles are lost through lack of information about the enemy than from any other cause, and it is the patrols led by noncommissioned officers who must gather almost all of this information. A battalion or squadron stands a very good chance for defeating a regiment if the battalion commander knows all about the size, position and movements of the regiment and the regimental commander knows but a little about the battalion; and this will all depend on how efficiently the patrols of the two forces are led by the noncommissioned officers.

962. Patrols are usually sent out from the advance party of an advance guard, the rear party of a rear guard, the outguards of an outpost, and the flank (extreme right or left) sections, companies or troops of a force in a fight, but they may be sent out from any part of a command.

The commander usually states how strong a patrol shall be.

963. Orders or Instructions—(a) The orders or instructions for a patrol must state clearly whenever possible:

1. Where the enemy is or is supposed to be.

2. Where friendly patrols or detachments are apt to be seen or encountered and what the plans are for the body from which the patrol is sent out.

3. What object the patrol is sent out to accomplish; what information is desired; what features are of special importance; the general direction to be followed and how long to stay out in case the enemy is not met.

4. Where reports are to be sent.

(b) It often happens that, in the hurry and excitement of a sudden encounter or other situation, there is no time or opportunity to give a patrol leader anything but the briefest instructions, such as "Take three men, corporal, and locate their (the enemy's) right flank." In such a case the patrol leader through his knowledge of the general principles of patrolling, combined with the exercise of his common sense, must determine for himself just what his commander wishes him to do.

964. Inspection of a Patrol Before Departure. Whenever there is time and conditions permit, which most frequently is not the case, a patrol leader carefully inspects his men to see that they are in good physical condition; that they have the proper equipment, ammunition and ration; that their canteens are full, their horses (if mounted) are in good condition, not of a conspicuous color and not given to neighing, and that there is nothing about the equipment to rattle or glisten. The patrol leader should also see that the men have nothing with them (maps, orders, letters, newspapers, etc.) that, if captured, would give the enemy valuable information. This is a more important inspection than that regarding the condition of the equipment.

Whenever possible the men for a patrol should be selected for their trustworthiness, experience and knack of finding their way in a strange country.

965. Preparing a Patrol for the Start. The patrol leader having received his orders and having asked questions about anything he does not fully understand, makes his estimate of the situation (See Par. 950.) He then selects the number of men he needs, if this has been left to him, inspects them and carefully explains to them the orders he has received and how he intends to carry out these orders, making sure the men understand the mission of the patrol. He names some prominent place along the route they are going to follow where every one will hasten if the patrol should become scattered.

For example: An infantry company has arrived at the town of York (See Elementary Map). Captain A, at 2 P. M., calls up Corporal B and three men of his squad.

Captain A: Corporal, hostile infantry is reported to be at Oxford. Nothing else has been heard of the enemy. The company remains here tonight. You will take these three men and reconnoiter about two miles north along this road (indicates the Valley Pike) for signs of a hostile advance in this direction.

Stay out until dusk.

Corporal C has been sent out that road (points east along the county road).

Send messages here. Do you understand?

Corporal B: Yes, sir; I am to—(here he practically repeats Captain A's orders, the three men listening). Is Corporal C to cover that hill (points toward Twin Hills)?

Captain A: No; you must cover that ground. Move out at once, corporal. (Corporal B quickly glances at the men and sees that they have their proper equipment.)

Corporal B (to his men): You heard the captain's orders. We will make for that hill (points to Twin Hills). Jones, I want you to go 150 yards in advance of me; Williams, follow me at 100 yards; Smith, you'll stay with me. Jones, you'll leave this road after crossing the creek and march on that clump of trees. I want both you and Williams to be on the alert and watch me every minute for signals. In case we become scattered, make for that hill (points to Twin Hills).

Private Jones: Corporal, shall I keep 150 yards from you or will you keep the correct distance?

Corporal B: You keep the correct distance from me. Forward, Jones.

Of course, the patrol leader makes all these preparations if he has time; but, as we have said before, there will be a great many occasions when he is required to start out so promptly that he will not have any time for the inspection described and he will have to make an estimate of the situation and give his detailed orders to the members of his patrol as they start off.

966. Co-ordination Before Departure. Every member of a patrol should notice for himself the direction taken and all landmarks that are passed, and every man should keep his eyes and ears open all the time. Before leaving an outpost position or other place to which it is to return, the patrol commander should "co-ordinate" himself—he should see where he is with respect to certain mountains, high buildings and other prominent objects, and after the patrol has left, he should frequently turn his head around and see what the starting point looks like from where he is. This will help him to find his way back without difficulty.

The Principles of Patrolling

967. Paragraphs 967 to 1015 describe the methods of leading a patrol—the points a patrol leader should fully understand. In other words, they state the principles of patrolling. When you first study this chapter, simply read over these principles without trying to memorize any of them. Whenever one of the principles is applied in the solution of any of the problems on patrolling given in this book you will generally find the number of the paragraph which states that principle enclosed in brackets. Turn back and study the paragraph referred to until you thoroughly understand its meaning and you feel sure that you know how to apply that principle whenever the occasion might arise in actual patrolling. Try to impress its common sense meaning (never the mere words) on your mind, so that when a situation arises requiring the sort of action indicated in the principle, YOU WILL NOT FAIL TO RECOGNIZE IT.

968. Formation of Patrols.

(a) Figure 1 gives some examples of various ways of forming patrols. These are merely examples for the purpose of giving a general idea of the arrangement of the men. In practice common sense must dictate to the patrol leader the best formation in each case.

(b) In very small patrols the leader is usually in advance where he can easily lead the patrol, though not always (See E, Figure 1.) The distance between men depends upon the character of the country and the situation. In L, Figure 1, it might be anywhere from 150 to 400 yards from the leading man to the last, the distance being greater in level or open country. Some such formation as G, Figure 1, could be used in going through high brush, woods, or over very open country.

(c) The men must be so arranged that each man will be within signaling distance of some member of the patrol and the escape of at least one man, in case of surprise, is certain.

It must be remembered that the patrol may have to march a long distance before it is expected that the enemy will be encountered, or it may have a mission that requires it to hurry to some distant point through very dangerous country. In such cases the patrol will probably have to follow the road in order to make the necessary speed, and it will not be possible for flankers to keep up this rate marching off the road. The formation in such cases would be something like those shown in F, II and O.

Marching off the road is always slow work, so when rapidity is essential, some safe formation for road travel is necessary, as in F, L and O.

If, from the road the country for, say one-half mile on each side, can be seen, there is absolutely no use in sending out flankers a few hundred yards from the road. Use common sense.

969. Rate of March. (a) Patrols should advance quickly and quietly; be vigilant and make all practicable use of cover. If rapid marching is necessary to accomplish the mission, then little attention can be paid to cover.

(b) Returning patrols, near their own lines, march at a walk, unless pressed by the enemy. A patrol should not, if possible, return over its outgoing route, as the enemy may have observed it and be watching for its return.

970. Halts. A patrol should be halted once every hour for about ten minutes, to allow the men to rest and relieve themselves. Whenever a halt is made one or two members of the patrol must advance a short distance ahead and keep a sharp lookout to the front and flanks.

971. Action Upon Meeting Hostile Patrol. If a patrol should see a hostile patrol, it is generally best to hide and let it go by, and afterwards look out for and capture any messenger that may be sent back from it with messages for the main body. And when sent back yourself with a message, be careful that the enemy does not play this trick on you—always keep your ears and eyes open.

972. Scattered Patrols. A scattered patrol reassembles at some point previously selected; if checked in one direction, it takes another; if cut off, it returns by a detour or forces its way through. As a last resort it scatters, so that at least one man may return with information.

Occasionally it is advisable for the leader to conceal his patrol and continue the reconnaissance with one or two men; in case of cavalry the leader and men thus detached should be well mounted. If no point of assembly was previously agreed upon, it is a good general rule to reassemble, if possible, at the last resting place.

973. Return by Different Route. A patrol should always make it a rule to return by a different route, as this may avoid its being captured by some of the enemy who saw it going out and are lying in wait for it.

974. Guard Against Being Cut off. When out patrolling always guard against being cut off. Always assume that any place that affords good cover is held by the enemy until you know that it is not, and be careful not to advance beyond it without first reconnoitering it; for, if you do, you may find yourself cut off when you try to return.

975. Night Work. Patrols far from their commands or in contact with the enemy, often remain out over night. In such cases they seek a place of concealment unknown to the inhabitants, proceeding thereto after nightfall or under cover. Opportunities for watering, feeding and rest must not be neglected, for there is no assurance that further opportunities will present themselves. When necessary the leader provides for subsistence by demand or purchase.

976. Civilians: In questioning civilians care must be taken not to disclose information that may be of value to the enemy. Strangers must not be allowed to go ahead of the patrol, as they might give the enemy notice of its approach. Patrol leaders are authorized to seize telegrams and mail matter, and to arrest individuals, reporting the facts as soon as possible.

977. Patrol Fighting. (a) A patrol sent out for information never fights unless it can only get its information by fighting or is forced to fight in order to escape. This principle is the one most frequently violated by patrol leaders, particularly in peace maneuvers. They forget their mission—the thing their commander sent them out to do—and begin fighting, thus doing harm and accomplishing no important results.

(b) A patrol sent out to drive off hostile detachments has to fight to accomplish its mission. Sometimes a patrol has orders both to gain information and to drive back hostile patrols. In this case it may be proper to avoid a fight at one moment and to seek a fight at another. The patrol leader must always think of his mission when deciding on the proper course to follow, and then use common sense.

978. Signals. The following should be clearly understood by members of a patrol:

Enemy in sight in small numbers: Hold the rifle above the head horizontally.

Enemy in force: Same as preceding, raising and lowering the rifle several times.

Take cover: A downward motion of the hand.

Other signals may be agreed upon before starting, but they must be simple and familiar to the men; complicated signals must be avoided. Signals must be used cautiously, so as not to convey information to the enemy.

The patrol leader should see that all his men thoroughly understand that whenever they are away from the center of the patrol they must look to the nearest man for signals at least once every minute. It should never be necessary for the patrol leader to call to a man in order to get his attention. All movements of men at a distance should be regulated by signals and the men should constantly be on the lookout for these signals.

979. Messages. (a) The most skillful patrol leading is useless unless the leader fully understands when to send a message and how to write it.

(b) A message, whether written or verbal, should be short and clear, resembling a telegram. If it is a long account it will take too much time to write, be easily misunderstood, and if verbal, the messenger will usually forget parts of it and confuse the remainder.

(c) Always state when and where things are seen or reported. If haste is required, do not use up valuable moments writing down the day of the month, etc. These data are essential as a matter of future record for formal telegrams and should be put in patrol messages only when time is abundant, but never slight the essential points of information that will give valuable help to your chief. Always try to put yourself in his place—not seeing what you see and read your message—and then ask yourself, What will he want to know?

(d) The exact location of the enemy should be stated; whether deployed, marching or in camp, his strength, arm of the service (cavalry, infantry or artillery), and any other detail that you think would be valuable information for your chief. In giving your location do not refer to houses, streets, etc., that your chief in the rear has no knowledge of. Give your direction and distance from some point he knows of or, if you have a map like his, you can give your map location.

(e) Be sure your message is accurate. This does not mean that something told you should not be reported, but it should be reported, not as a fact, but as it is—a statement by somebody else. It is well to add any information about your informant, such as his apparent honesty, the probability of his having correct information, etc.—this may help your chief.

(f) A message should always end with a short statement of what you are going to do next. For example: "Will remain in observation," "Will continue north," "Will work around to their rear," etc. Time permitting, the bearer of a verbal message should always be required to repeat it before leaving.

(g) The following is a reproduction of a message blank used in field service. The instructions on the envelope are also given. A patrol leader will usually be furnished with a pad of these blanks:

The heading "From" is filled in with the name of the detachment sending the information, as "Officer's Patrol, 7th Cav". Messages sent on the same day from the same source to the same person are numbered consecutively. The address is written briefly, thus, "Commanding Officer, Outpost, 1st Brigade". In the signature the writer's surname only and rank are given.

This blank is four and a half by eight inches, including the margin on the left for binding. The back is ruled in squares and provided with scales for use in making simple sketches explanatory of the message. It is issued by the Signal Corps in blocks of forty with duplicating sheets. The regulation envelope is three by five and one fourth inches and is printed as follows:

Model Messages

980. 1. Verbal. "Four hostile infantrymen one mile north of our camp, moving south. I will continue north."

2. Verbal. "About one hundred hostile infantrymen two miles north of our camp at two o'clock, marching south. Will observe them."

3. Verbal. "Long column of troops marching west in Sandy Creek Valley at two o'clock. Will report details later."

4. Verbal. "Just fired on by cavalry patrol near Baker's Pond. Will work to their rear."

5. Written.

Patrol from Support No 2.
Lone Hill,
26 Mch. 11, 8–15 A. M., No. 1.

C. O.,
Support No. 2.

See hostile troop of cavalry halted at x-roads, one mile S. of our outguards. Nothing else in sight. Will remain here in observation.

James,
Corporal.

6. Written (very hurriedly).

Lone Hill, 8–30, No 2.

C. O.,
Support No. 2.

Column of about 300 hostile cavalry trotting north towards hostile troop of cavalry now halted at x-roads one mile south of our outguards. Will remain here.

James,
Cpl.

7. Written.

Patrol from 5th Inf.,
S. E. corner Boling Woods,
3 Apl. 11, 2–10 P. M., No. 2.

Adjutant,
5th Inf., near Baker House.

Extreme right of hostile line ends at R. R. cut N. E. of BAKER'S POND. Entrenchments run S. from cut along crest of ridge. Line appears to be strongly held. Can see no troops in rear of line. Will reconnoiter their rear.

Smith,
Sergeant.

8. Written (from cavalry patrol far to front).

Patrol from Tr. B, 7th Cav.,
Boling,
14 June, 12, 10 A. M., No. 3.

To C. O.,
Tr. B, 7th Cav.,
S. on Chester Pike.

No traces of enemy up to this point. Telegraph operator here reports wires running north from Boling were cut somewhere at 8–30 A. M. Inhabitants appear friendly. Will proceed north.

Jones,
Sergeant.

9. Written (from cavalry patrol far to front).

Patrol from Tr B, 7th Cav.,
Oxford,
8 July, 12, 10–15 A. M., No. 2.

To C. O.,
1st Sq. 7th Cav.,
On Valley Pike, S. of York.

Bearer has canteen found in road here, marked "85 CAV.—III CORPS." Inhabitants say no enemy seen here. They appear hostile and unreliable. No telegraph operator or records remain here. Roads good macadam. Water and haystacks plentiful. Will move rapidly on towards CHESTER.

Lewis,
Sergeant.

Patrol from Support No. 3,
On Ry. 3/4 mi. N. of County Road,
2 Aug. 12, 9–15 P. M., No. 1.

C. O.,
Support No. 2,
Near Maxey House.

R. R. crosses creek here on 80-foot steel trestle. Hostile detachment is posted at N. end. Strength unknown. Creek 5 ft. deep by 60 ft. wide, with steep banks, 5 ft. high. Flows through meadow land. Scattered trees along banks. R. R. approaches each end of trestle on 10-foot fill. R. R. switch to N. E. 700 yds. S. of bridge. (See sketch on back.) I will cross creek to N. of bridge.

Brown,
Corporal.

981. A message should be sent as soon as the enemy is first seen or reported. Of course, if the enemy is actually known to be in the vicinity and his patrols have been seen, etc., you must by all means avoid wasting your men by sending them back with information about small hostile patrols or other things you know your chief is already aware of and did not specifically tell you to hunt for.

If you have properly determined in your own mind what your mission is then you will have no trouble in deciding when to send messages. For example, suppose your orders are "To reconnoiter along that ridge and determine if the enemy is present in strength," and you sight a patrol of eight men. You would waste no time or men sending back any message about the patrol, for your mission is to find out if strong bodies of the enemy are about. But suppose that while working under the above orders you located a hostile battalion of infantry—a large body of troops. In this case you would surely send a detailed message, as your mission is to determine if the enemy was present in strength.

Again, suppose that while moving towards the ridge indicated by your chief in his orders, you saw his force suddenly and heavily fired on from a new and apparently unexpected quarter, not a great distance from you, but not on the ridge referred to. You know or believe none of your patrols are out in that neighborhood. In this case you should realize instantly, without any order, that your mission had changed and you should hasten to discover the size and position of this new enemy and send the information back to your chief, first notifying him of your intended change of direction.

Never forget your mission in the excitement of leading your own little force.

982. Absence of the Enemy. It is frequently just as important to send a message to your chief that the enemy is not in a certain locality as it is to report his actual whereabouts. You must determine from your mission when this is the case. For example, if you were ordered "To patrol beyond that woods and see if any hostile columns are moving in that direction," and on reaching the far side of the woods you had a good view of the country for some distance beyond, it would be very important to send a message back telling your chief that you could see, say, one-half mile beyond the woods and there was no enemy in sight. This information would be of the greatest importance to him. He might feel free to move troops immediately from that vicinity to some more dangerous place. You would then continue your reconnaissance further to the front.

Suggestions for Gaining Information About the Enemy

983. Enemy on the March. (a) The patrol should observe the march of the column from a concealed position that hostile patrols or flankers are not apt to search (avoid conspicuous places). Always try to discover if one hostile detachment is followed by another—if what can be seen appears to be an advance guard of a larger body not yet in view. The distance between the detachments, their relative size, etc., is always important.

(b) Estimating Strength of Column. The strength of a column may be estimated from the length of time it takes to pass a selected point. As infantry in column of squads occupies half a yard per man, cavalry one yard per horse and artillery in single file twenty yards per gun or caisson (ammunition wagon), a selected point would be passed in one minute by 175 infantry; 110 cavalry (at a walk); 200 cavalry at a trot and 5 guns or caissons. If marching in columns of twos, take one-half of the above figures.

(c) Dust. The direction of march, strength and composition (infantry, cavalry or artillery) of a column can be closely estimated from the length and character of the cloud of dust that it makes. Dust from infantry hangs low; from cavalry it is higher, disperses more quickly, and, if the cavalry moves rapidly, the upper part of the cloud is thinner; from artillery and wagons, it is of unequal height and disconnected. The effect of the wind blowing the dust must be considered.

(d) Trail of Column. Evenly trodden ground indicates infantry; prints of horseshoes mean cavalry and deep and wide wheel tracks indicate artillery. If the trail is fresh, the column passed recently; if narrow, the troops felt secure and were marching in column of route; if broad they expected an action and were prepared to deploy. A retreating army makes a broad trail across fields, especially at the start.

Always remember that the smallest or most insignificant things, such as the number of a regiment or a discarded canteen or collar ornament, may give the most valuable information to a higher commander. For example, the markings on a discarded canteen or knapsack might prove to a general commanding an army that a certain hostile division, corps, or other force was in front of him when he thought it had not been sent into the field. The markings on the canteen would convey little or no meaning to the patrol leader, but if he realized his duty he would take care to report the facts. Cavalry patrols working far ahead of the foot troops should be most careful to observe and report on such details.

(e) Reflection of Weapons. If brilliant, the troops are marching toward you, otherwise they are probably marching away from you.

Enemy in Position. (a) If an outpost line, the patrol locates the line of sentinels, their positions, the location and strength of the outguards and, as far as possible, all troops in rear. The location of the flanks of the line, whether in a strong or weak position, is of the utmost importance. Places where the line may be most easily penetrated should be searched for and the strength and routes of the hostile patrols observed.

As outposts are usually changed at dawn this is the best time to reconnoiter their positions.

(b) A hostile line of battle is usually hard to approach, but its extent, where the flanks rest and whether or not other troops are in rear of these flanks, should be most carefully determined.

Information as to the flanks of any force, the character of the country on each flank, etc., is always of the greatest importance, because the flanks are the weakest portions of a line. In attacking an enemy an effort is almost always made to bring the heaviest fire or blow to bear on one of his flanks. Naturally all information about this most vulnerable part of an enemy is of great importance.

984. Prisoners. When a patrol is ordered to secure prisoners they should be questioned as soon as captured, while still excited and their replies can in a way be verified. Their answers should be written down (unknown to them) and sent back with them as a check on what they may say on second thought.

Prisoners should always be questioned as to the following points: What regiment, brigade, division, etc., they belong to; how long they have been in position, on the march, etc.; how much sickness in their organization; whether their rations are satisfactory; who commands their troops, etc. Always try to make the prisoners think the questions are asked out of mere curiosity.

985. Camp Noises. The rumble of vehicles, cracking of whips, neighing of horses, braying of mules and barking of dogs often indicate the arrival or departure of troops. If the noise remains in the same place and new fires are lighted, it is probable that reënforcements have arrived. If the noise grows more indistinct, the troops are probably withdrawing. If, added to this, the fires appear to be dying out, and the enemy seems to redouble the vigilance of the outposts, the indications of retreat are strong.

986. Abandoned Camps. (a) Indications are found in the remains of camp fires. They will show, by their degree of freshness, whether much or little time elapsed since the enemy left the place, and the quantity of cinders will give an indication of the length of time he occupied it. They will also furnish a means of estimating his force approximately, ten men being allowed to each fire.

(b) Other valuable indications in regard to the length of time the position was occupied and the time when it was abandoned may be found in the evidence of care or haste in the construction of huts or shelters, and in the freshness of straw, grain, dung or the entrails of slaughtered animals. Abandoned clothing, equipments or harness will give a clue to the arms and regiments composing a retreating force. Dead horses lying about, broken weapons, discarded knapsacks, abandoned and broken-down wagons, etc., are indications of the fatigue and demoralization of the command. Bloody bandages lying about, and many fresh graves, are evidences that the enemy is heavily burdened with wounded or sick.

987. Flames or Smoke. If at night the flames of an enemy's camp fires disappear and reappear, something is moving between the observer and the fires. If smoke as well as flame is visible, the fires are very near. If the fires are very numerous and lighted successively, and if soon after being lighted they go out it is probable the enemy is preparing a retreat and trying to deceive us. If the fires burn brightly and clearly at a late hour, the enemy has probably gone, and has left a detachment to keep the fires burning. If, at an unusual time, much smoke is seen ascending from an enemy's camp, it is probable that he is engaged in cooking preparatory to moving off.

If lines of smoke are seen rising at several points along a railway line in the enemy's rear, it may be surmised that the railroad is being destroyed by burning the crossties, and that a retreat is planned.

988. Limits of vision. (a) On a clear day a man with good vision can see:

• At a distance of 9 to 12 miles, church spires and towers;
• At a distance of 5 to 7 miles, windmills;
• At a distance of 21/2 miles, chimneys of light color;
• At a distance of 2,000 yards, trunks of large trees;
• At a distance of 1,000 yards, single posts;
• At 500 yards the panes of glass may be distinguished in a window.

(b) Troops are visible at 2,000 yards, at which distance a mounted man looks like a mere speck; at 1,200 yards infantry can be distinguished from cavalry; at 1,000 yards a line of men looks like a broad belt; at 600 yards the files of a squad can be counted, and at 400 yards the movements of the arms and legs can be plainly seen.

(c) The larger, brighter or better lighted an object is, the nearer it seems. An object seems nearer when it has a dark background than when it has a light one, and closer to the observer when the air is clear than when it is raining, snowing, foggy or the atmosphere is filled with smoke. An object looks farther off when the observer is facing the sun than when he has his back to it. A smooth expanse of snow, grain fields or water makes distances seem shorter than they really are.

Suggestions for the Reconnaissance of Various Positions and Localities

989. Cross roads should be reconnoitered in each direction for a distance depending on how rapidly the patrol must continue on, how far from the main road the first turn or high point is, etc. The main body of the patrol usually remains halted near the crossroads, while flankers do the reconnoitering.

990. Heights. In reconnoitering a height, if the patrol is large enough to admit of detaching them, one or two men climb the slope on either flank, keeping in sight of the patrol, if possible. In any case, one man moves cautiously up the hill, followed by the others in the file at such distance that each keeps his predecessor in view.

991. Defiles. On approaching a defile, if time permits, the heights on either side are reconnoitered by flankers before the patrol enters. If the heights are inaccessible or time is urgent, the patrol passes through, in single file at double time. The same method is adopted in reconnoitering a railroad cut or sunken road.

992. Bridges and Fords. At a bridge or ford, the front of the patrol is contracted so as to bring all the men to the passage. The leading patrolers cross first and reconnoiter the far side to prevent the possibility of the enemy surprising the main body of the patrol as it is crossing the bridge. The patrol then crosses rapidly, and takes up a proper formation. A bridge is first examined to see that it is safe and has not been tampered with by the enemy.

993. Woods. The patrol enters a wood in skirmishing order, the intervals being as great as may be consistent with mutual observation and support on the part of the members of the patrol. On arriving at the farther edge of the wood, the patrol remains concealed and carefully looks about before passing out to open ground. When there is such a growth of underbrush as to make this method impracticable, and it is necessary to enter a wood by a road, the road is reconnoitered as in case of defile, though not usually at double time.

994. Enclosures. In reconnoitering an enclosure, such as a garden, park or cemetery, the leading patrolers first examine the exterior, to make sure that the enemy is not concealed behind one of the faces of the enclosure. They then proceed to examine the interior. Great care is taken in reconnoitering and entering an enclosure to avoid being caught in a confined or restricted space by the enemy.

995. Positions. In approaching a position, but one man advances (one is less liable to be detected than two or more), and he crawls cautiously toward the crest of the hill or edge of the wood or opening of the defile, while the others remain concealed in the rear until he signals them to advance.

996. Houses. When a house is approached by a patrol, it is first reconnoitered from a distance, and if nothing suspicious is seen, it is then approached by one or two men, the rest of the party remaining concealed in observation. If the patrol is large enough to admit of it, four men approach the house, so as to examine the front and back entrances at the same time. Only one man enters the door, the others remaining outside to give the alarm, should a party of the enemy be concealed in the house. The patrol does not remain in the vicinity of the house any longer than necessary, as information relative to its numbers and movements might be given to the enemy, if a hostile party should subsequently visit the place. Farmhouses are searched for newspapers and the inhabitants questioned. If necessary to go up to a building, wood or hill, where an enemy is likely to be concealed, run for the last couple of hundred yards, having your rifle ready for instant use, and make for some point that will afford you cover when you get close up. In the case of a building, for instance, you would make for one of the corners. Such a maneuver would probably be disconcerting to anyone who might be lying in wait for you, and would be quite likely to cause them to show themselves sooner than they intended, and thus give you a chance to turn around and get away. If they fired on you while you were approaching at a run, they would not be very likely to hit you.

997. Villages. (a) In approaching a small village one or two men are sent in to reconnoiter and one around each flank, but the main body does not enter until the scouts have reported. In small patrols of three to six men so much dispersion is not safe and only one section of the village can be reconnoitered at a time.

(b) If the presence of the enemy is not apparent, the patrol enters the village. A suitable formation would be in single file at proper distance, each man being on the opposite side of the street from his predecessor, thus presenting a more difficult target for hostile fire and enabling the men to watch all windows.

(c) If the patrol is strong enough, it seizes the postoffice, telegraph office and railroad stations, and secures all important papers, such as files of telegrams sent and received, instructions to postmasters, orders of town mayor, etc., that may be there. If the patrol is part of the advance guard, it seizes the mayor and postmaster of the place and turns them over to the commander of the vanguard with the papers seized.

(d) While searching a village sentinels are placed at points of departure to prevent any of the inhabitants from leaving. Tall buildings and steeples are ascended and an extensive view of the surrounding country obtained.

(e) At night a village is more cautiously approached by a small party than by day. The patrol glides through back alleys, across gardens, etc., rather than along the main street. If there are no signs of the enemy, it makes inquiry. If no light is seen, and it seems imprudent to rouse any of the people, the patrol watches and captures one of the inhabitants, and gets from him such information as he may possess.

(f) The best time for the patrol to approach a village is at early dawn, when it is light enough to see, but before the inhabitants are up. It is dangerous in the extreme for a small patrol to enter a village unless it is certain that it is not occupied by the enemy, for the men could be shot down by fire from the windows, cellarways, etc., or entrapped and captured. As a rule large towns and cities are not entered by small patrols, but are watched from the outside, as a small force can not effectively reconnoiter and protect itself in such a place.

Facts Which Should Be Obtained by Patrols Regarding Certain Objects

998. Roads. Their direction, their nature (macadamized, corduroy plank, dirt, etc.), their condition of repair, their grade, the nature of crossroads, and the points where they leave the main roads; their borders (woods, hedges, fences or ditches), the places at which they pass through defiles, cross heights or rivers, and where they intersect railroads, their breadth (whether suitable for column of fours or platoons, etc.).

999. Railroads. Their direction, gauge, the number of tracks, stations and junctions, their grade, the length and height of the cuts, embankments and tunnels.

1000. Bridges. Their position, their width and length, their construction (trestle, girder, etc.), material (wood, brick, stone or iron), the roads and approaches on each bank.

1001. Rivers and Other Streams. Their direction, width and depth, the rapidity of the current, liability to sudden rises and the highest and lowest points reached by the water, as indicated by drift wood, etc., fords, the nature of the banks, kinds, position and number of islands at suitable points of passage, heights in the vicinity and their command over the banks.

1002. Woods. Their situation, extent and shape; whether clear or containing underbrush; the number and extent of "clearings" (open spaces); whether cut up by ravines or containing marshes, etc.; nature of roads passing through them.

1003. Canals. Their direction, width and depth; condition of tow-paths; locks and means of protecting or destroying them.

1004. Telegraphs. Whether they follow railroads or common roads; stations, number of wires.

1005. Villages. Their situation (on a height, in a valley or on a plain); nature of the surrounding country; construction of the houses, nature (straight or crooked) and width of streets; means of defense.

1006. Defiles. Their direction; whether straight or crooked; whether heights on either side are accessible or inaccessible; nature of ground at each extremity; width (frontage of column that can pass through).

1007. Ponds and Marshes. Means of crossing; defensive use that might be made of them as obstacles against enemy; whether the marshy grounds are practicable for any or all arms.

1008. Springs and Rivulets. Nature of approaches; whether water is drinkable and abundant.

1009. Valleys. Extent and nature; towns, villages, hamlets, streams, roads and paths therein; obstacles offered by or in the valley, to the movement of troops.

1010. Heights. Whether slopes are easy or steep; whether good defensive positions are offered; whether plateau is wide or narrow; whether passages are easy or difficult; whether the ground is broken or smooth, wooded or clear.

Suggestions for Patrols Employed in Executing Demolition

(Destruction or blocking of bridges, railroads, etc.)

1011. Patrols never execute any demolition unless specifically ordered to do so. Demolition may be of two different characters: Temporary demolition, such as cutting telegraph wires in but a few places or merely burning the flooring of bridges, removing a few rails from a track, etc., and permanent demolition, such as cutting down an entire telegraph line, completely destroying bridges, blowing in tunnels, etc. Only temporary demolition will be dealt with in this book.

1012. Telegraph Line. To temporarily disable telegraph lines, connect up different wires close to the glass insulators, wrap a wire around all the wires and bury its ends in the ground (this grounds or short circuits the wire), or cut all the wires in one or two places.

1013. Railroads. To temporarily disable railroads remove the fish plates (the plates that join the rails together at the ends) at each end of a short section of track, preferably upon an embankment, then have as many men as available raise the track on one side until the ties stand on end and turn the section of track so that it will fall down the embankment; or, cut out rails by a charge of dynamite or gun cotton placed against the web and covered up with mud or damp clay. Eight to twelve ounces of explosive is sufficient. Or blow in the sides of deep cuts or blow down embankments. Bridges, culverts, tunnels, etc., are never destroyed except on a written order of the commander-in-chief.

1014. Wagon Road. (a) Bridges can be rendered temporarily useless by removing the flooring, or, in the case of steel bridges, by burning the flooring (if obtainable, pour tar or kerosene on flooring), particularly if there is not time to remove it.

Short culverts may sometimes be blown in.

A hastily constructed barricade across a bridge or in a cut of trees, wagons, etc, may be sufficient in some cases where only the temporary check of hostile cavalry or artillery is desired.

(b) The road bed may be blocked by digging trenches not less than thirty feet wide and six feet deep, but as this would take a great deal of time patrols would rarely be charged with such work.

1015. Report on Return of Patrol. On returning the patrol leaders should make a short verbal or written report, almost always the former, briefly recounting the movements of the patrol, the information obtained of the enemy, a description of the country passed over and of friendly troops encountered. Of course, this is not practicable when the situation is changing rapidly and a returning patrol is immediately engaged in some new and pressing duty.

Model Reports of Patrol Leaders

1016. 1. Verbal.

Patrol Leader (Corporal B): Sir, Corporal B reports back with his patrol.

Captain A: I received two messages from you, corporal. What else did you discover?

Corporal B: That was a regiment of infantry, sir, with one battalion thrown out as advance guard. The main body of two battalions went into bivouac at the crossroads and the advance guard formed an outpost line along the big creek two miles south of here.

Captain A: Give me an account of your movements.

Corporal B: We followed this main road south to the creek, where we avoided a mounted patrol moving north on the road at 1–45 P. M., and then reconnoitered the valley from a ridge west of the road. We followed the ridge south for half a mile to a point where we could see a road crossing the valley and the main road at right angles, three miles south of here. There we halted, and at 2:20 what seemed to be the point and advance party (about forty men) of an infantry advance guard appeared, marching north up this road, the head at the crossroad. I then sent you message No. 1 by Private Brown.

In fifteen minutes three companies had appeared 600 yards in rear of the advance party, and I could see a heavy, low column of dust about one-half mile further to the rear. Message No. 2 was then sent in by Privates Baker and Johnson, and to avoid several hostile patrols, I drew off further to the northwest.

The advance guard then halted and established an outpost line along the south of the creek, two miles from here. The cloud of dust proved to be two more battalions and a wagon train. These two battalions went into bivouac on opposite sides of this road at the crossroads and sent out strong patrols east and west on the crossroad. Five wagons went forward to the outpost battalion and the reserve built cook fires.

As Private Rush, here, was the only man I had left, we started back, sketching the valley, ridge and positions of the main body and outpost. Here is the sketch, sir. The fields are all cut crops or meadow.

We sighted two foot patrols from the outpost, moving north about a mile from here, one following the road and one further east.

I did not see any of our patrols.

That is all, sir.

2. Written.

Report of Sergeant Wm. James' Patrol of Five Men

Support No. 1,
Outpost of 6th Inf., Near Dixon,
22 Aug. 12, 2–30 to 5 P. M.

The patrol followed the timber along the creek for one mile S. from our outguards and leaving the creek bottom moved 1/2 mile S. E. to the wooded hill (about 800 ft. high), visible from our lines.

From this hill top the valley to the east (about one mile wide) could be fairly well observed. No signs of the enemy were seen and a message, No. 1, was sent back by Private Russel.

A wagon road runs N. and S. through the valley, bordered by four or five farms with numerous orchards and cleared fields. Both slopes of the valley are heavily wooded.

The patrol then moved S. W., until it struck the macadam pike which runs N. and S., through our lines. Proceeding S. 400 yds. on this pike to a low hill a farmer, on foot, was met. Said he lived one mile further S.; was looking for some loose horses; that four hostile cavalrymen, from the east, stopped at his farm at noon, drank some milk, took oats for their horses, inquired the way to Dixon and rode off in that direction within fifteen minutes. He said they were the first hostiles he had seen; that they told nothing about themselves, and they and their horses looked in good condition. Farmer appeared friendly and honest.

The patrol then returned to our lines following the pike about two miles. Road is in good condition, low hedges and barbed wire fences, stone culverts and no bridges in the two miles. Bordering country is open and gently rolling farming country and all crops are in. A sketch is attached to this report. None of our patrols was seen.

Respectfully submitted,

Wm. James,
Sergeant, Co. A, 6th Infy.

Problem in Patrol Leading and Patrolling

1017. In studying or solving tactical problems on a map you must remember that unless you carefully work out your own solution to the problem before looking at the given solution, you will practically make no progress.

It is best, if your time permits, to write out your solutions, and when you read over the given solutions, compare the solution of each point with what you thought of that same point when you were solving the problem, and consider why you did just what you did. Without this comparison much of the lasting benefit of the work is lost.

In some of these problems both the problem and solutions are presented in dialogue form so as to give company officers examples of the best method of conducting the indoor instruction of their men in minor tactics. It also gives an example of how to conduct a tactical walk out in the country, simply looking at the ground itself, instead of a map hanging on the wall. The enlarged Elementary Map referred to in Par. 954, is supposed to be used in this instruction as well as in the war games.

Problem No. 1. (Infantry)

1018. The Elementary Map (scale 12 inches to the mile) being hung on the wall, about two sergeants and two squads of the company are seated in a semicircle facing it, and the captain is standing beside the map with a pointer (a barrack cleaning rod makes an excellent pointer).

Captain: We will suppose that our company has just reached the village of York. The enemy is reported to be in the vicinity of Boling and Oxford (he points out on the map all places as they are mentioned). We are in the enemy's country.

Corporal James, I call you up at 3 P. M. and give you these orders: "Nothing has been seen of the enemy yet. Our nearest troops are three miles south of here. Take four men from your squad and reconnoiter along this road (County Road) into the valley on the other side of that ridge over there (points to the ridge just beyond the cemetery), and see if you can discover anything about the enemy. Report back here by 5 o'clock. I am sending a patrol out the Valley Pike." Now, Corporal, state just what you would do.

Corporal James: I would go to my squad, fall in Privates Amos, Barlow, Sharp and Brown; see that they had full canteens; that their arms were all right; that they were not lame or sick and I would have them leave their blanket rolls, haversacks and entrenching tools with the company. (Par. 964.)

I would then give these orders (Par. 963); "We are ordered out on patrol duty. Nothing has been seen of the enemy yet. Our nearest troops are three miles south of here. We are ordered to reconnoiter along this road into the valley on the other side of that ridge, and see if we can discover anything about the enemy. Another patrol is going up the Valley Pike. Reports are to be sent here. In case we are scattered we will meet at the woods on the hill over there (indicates the clump of trees just west of Mills' farm).

"I will go ahead. Amos, follow about fifty yards behind me. Barlow, you and Sharp keep about 100 yards behind Amos, and Brown will follow you at half that distance. All keep on the opposite side of the road from the man ahead of you." (Par. 968.)

Captain: All right, Corporal, now describe what route you will follow.

Corporal James: The patrol will keep to the County Road until the crest of the ridge near the stone wall is reached, when what I see in the valley beyond will decide my route for me.

Captain: How about the woods west of the stone walls?

Corporal James: If I did not see anyone from our patrol on the Valley Pike reconnoitering there, I would give Barlow these orders just after we have examined the cemetery, when the patrol would have temporarily closed up somewhat: "Barlow, take Sharp and examine that little woods over there. Join us at the top of this hill." I would then wave to Brown to close up and would proceed to the hill top.

Captain: Barlow what do you do?

Private Barlow: I would say, "Sharp, out straight across for that woods. I will follow you." I would follow about 100 yards behind him. When he reached the edge of the woods I would signal him to halt by holding up my left hand. After I had closed up to about fifty yards I would say to him, "Go into the woods and keep me in sight." I would walk along the edge of the woods where I could see Sharp and the corporal's patrol on the road at the same time.

Captain: That is all right, Barlow. Corporal, you should have instructed Amos or Brown to keep close watch on Barlow for signals.

Corporal James: I intended to watch him myself.

Captain: No, you would have enough to do keeping on the alert for what was ahead of you. Now describe how you lead the patrol to the top of the hill, by the stone wall.

Corporal James: When I reached the crest I would hold up my hand for the patrol to halt and would cautiously advance and look ahead into the valley. If I saw nothing suspicious I would wave to the men to close up and say, "Amos, go to that high ground about 250 yards over there (indicates the end of the nose made by the 60-foot contour just north of the east end of the stone wall), and look around the country." I would keep Brown behind the crest, watching Barlow's movements.

Captain: Now, Corporal, Amos reaches the point you indicated and Barlow and Sharp join you. What do you do?

Corporal James: Can I see the Steel Bridge over Sandy Creek?

Captain: No, it is three-fourths of a mile away and the trees along the road by Smith's hide it. You can see the cut in the road east of the bridge and the Smith house, but the crossroads are hidden by the trees bordering the roads. You see nothing suspicious. It is a clear, sunny afternoon. The roads are dusty and the trees in full foliage. The valley is principally made up of fields of cut hay, corn stubble and meadow land.

Corporal James: Does Private Amos give me any information?

Captain: No, he makes you no signals. You see him sitting behind a bush looking northwest, down the valley.

Corporal James: I would say, "Barlow, head straight across to where that line of trees meets the road (indicates the point where the lane from Mills' farm joins the Chester Pike). Sharp, keep about fifty yards to my right rear." I would follow Barlow at 150 yards and when I had reached the bottom land I would wave to Amos to follow us.

Captain: How about Brown?

Corporal James: I had already given him his orders to follow as rear guard and he should do so without my telling him.

Captain: Amos, what do you do when you see the corporal wave to you?

Private Amos: I would go down the hill and join him.

Captain: No, you could do better than that. You are too far from the corporal for him to signal you to do much of anything except stay there or join him. You should join him, but you should not go straight down to him. You should head so as to strike the Mills' Lane about 100 yards east of the house and then go down the lane, first looking along the stone wall. In this way you save time in reconnoitering the ground near the Mills' farm and protect the patrol against being surprised by an enemy hidden by the line of trees, or the wall along the lane. You are not disobeying your orders but just using common sense in following them out and thinking about what the corporal is trying to do.

Now, Corporal, why didn't you go to the Smith house and find out if the people there had seen anything of the enemy?

Corporal James: You said we were in the enemy's country, sir, so I thought it best to avoid the inhabitants until I found I could not get information in any other way. I intended first to see if I could locate any enemy around here, and if not, to stop at houses on my return. In this way I would be gone before the people could send any information to the enemy about my patrol.

Captain: Barlow reaches the Chester Pike where the Mills' lane leaves it. You are about 150 yards in his rear. Sharp is 50 yards off to your right rear, Amos 100 yards to your left rear and Brown 50 yards behind you. Just as Barlow starts to climb over the barbed wire fence into the Chester Pike you see him drop down on the ground. He signals, "Enemy in sight." Tell me quickly what would you do?

Corporal James: I would wave my hand for all to lie down, and I would hasten forward, stooping over as I ran, until I was about twenty yards from him, when I would crawl forward to the fence, close by him. Just before I reached him I would ask him what he saw.

Captain: He replies, "There are some hostile foot soldiers coming up this road."

Corporal James: I would crawl forward and look.

Captain: You see three or four men, about 500 yards north of you, coming up the Chester Pike. They are scattered out.

Corporal James: I would say, "Crawl into the lane, keep behind the stone wall, watch those fellows, and work your way to that farm" (indicates the Mills' farm). I would start towards the Mills' farm myself, under cover of the trees along the lane and would wave to the other men to move rapidly west, towards the hills.

Captain: Why didn't you try to hide near where you were and allow the hostile men to pass?

Corporal James: There does not seem to be any place to hide near there that a patrol would not probably examine.

Captain: What is your plan now?

Corporal James: I want to get my patrol up to that small woods near the Mills' farm, but I hardly expect to be able to get them up to that point without their being seen. In any event, I want them well back from the road where they can lie down and not be seen by the enemy when he passes.

Captain: You succeed in collecting your patrol in the woods without their being seen, and you see four foot soldiers in the road at the entrance to the land. One man starts up the lane, the others remaining on the road.

Corporal James: I say, "Brown, go through these woods and hurry straight across to York. You should be able to see the village from the other side of the woods. Report to the captain that a hostile patrol of four foot men is working south up the valley, two miles northeast of York. We will go further north. Repeat what I have told you." (Par. 979.)

Captain: Why didn't you send this message before?

Corporal James: Because we were moving in the same direction that the messenger would have had to go, and, by waiting a very few minutes, I was able to tell whether it was a mere patrol or the point of an advance guard.

Captain: Do you think it correct to send a messenger back with news about a small patrol?

Corporal James: Ordinarily it would be wrong, but as nothing has been seen of the enemy until now, this first news is important because it proves to the Captain that the enemy really is in this neighborhood, which it seems to me is a very important thing for him to know and what my mission required me to do. (Par. 981.)

Captain: What are you going to do now, Corporal?

Corporal James: We have traveled about two miles and stopped frequently, so it must be about 4 o'clock. It is one and one-third miles back to York, where I should arrive about 5 o'clock. It would take me twenty-five minutes to go from here to York, so I have about thirty-five minutes left before 5 o'clock. This will permit me to go forward another mile and still be able to reach York on time. It is two-thirds of a mile to the Mason farm, and if the hostile patrol appears to be going on, I will start for that point. Did anyone at the Mills' farm see us?

Captain: No, but tell me first why you do not go along this high ground that overlooks the valley?

Corporal James: Because our patrol that started out the Valley Pike is probably near Twin Hills and I want to cover other country. The orchard at Mason's would obstruct my view from the hills.

Captain: The hostile patrol goes on south. Describe briefly your next movements.

Corporal James: I lead my patrol over to Mason's and, concealing two of the men so that both roads and the house can be watched, I take one man and reconnoiter around the farm yard and go up to the house to question the inhabitants. (Par. 996.)

Captain: You find one woman there who says some other soldiers, on foot, passed there a few minutes ago, marching south. She gives you no other information about the enemy or country.

Corporal James: I would send Amos over to see how deep and wide Sandy Creek is (Par. 1001.) When he returned I would take the patrol over to Twin Hills, follow the ridge south to the stone wall on the County Road, watching the valley for signs of the hostile patrol, and follow the road back to York; then make my report to the Captain, telling him where I had gone, all I had seen, including a description of the country. If I had not been hurried, I would have made a sketch of the valley. I can make a rough one after I get in. (Par. 1015.)

Captain: Suppose on your way back you saw hostile troops appearing on the County Road, marching west over Sandy Ridge. Would you stay out longer or would you consider that you should reach Oxford by 5 o'clock?

Corporal James: I would send a message back at once, and remain out long enough to find out the strength and probable intention of the new enemy.

Captain (to one platoon of his troop of cavalry): We will suppose that this troop has just (9 A. M.) arrived in Boling (Elementary Map) on a clear, dry, summer day. The enemy is supposed to be near Salem and we have seen several of his patrols this morning on our march south to Boling. Sergeant Allen, I call you up and give you these instructions: "Take Corporal Burt's squad (eight men) and reconnoiter south by this road (indicates the Boling-Morey house road) to Salem. I will take the troop straight south to Salem and you will join it there about 10:15. It is four and one-half miles to Salem. Start at once." (You have no map.)

Sergeant Allen: I would like to know just what the Captain wishes my patrol to do. (Par. 965.)

Captain: We will suppose that this is one of the many occasions in actual campaign where things must be done quickly. Where there is no time for detailed orders. You know that the troop has been marching south towards Salem where the enemy is supposed to be. You also know we have seen several of his patrols. I have told you what the troop is going to do, and from all this you should be able to decide what your mission is in this case. We will, therefore, consider that there is no time to give you more detailed orders, and you have to decide for yourself. Of course, if you had failed to hear just what I said, then, in spite of the necessity for haste, I would repeat my instructions to you. (Par. 963.)

Sergeant Allen: I would ride over to Corporal Burt's squad and lead it out of the column to the road leading to the Morey house, and say, "The troop is going on straight south to Salem, four and one-half miles away. This squad will reconnoiter south to Salem by this road, joining the troop there about 10:15. In case we become separated, make for Salem. Corporal, take Brown and form the point. I will follow with the squad about 300 yards in rear. Regulate your gait on me after you get your distance. Move out now at a trot." (Par. 963.)

After Corporal Burt had gotten 150 yards out I would say, "Carter, move out as connecting file." I would then say, "Downs, you will follow about 150 yards behind us as rear guard." When Carter had gone 150 yards down the road I would order, "1. Forward; 2. Trot; 3. March," and ride off at the head of the four remaining men (in column of twos.) (Par. 968.)

Captain: Sergeant, tell me briefly what is your estimate of the situation—that is, what sort of a proposition you have before you and how you have decided to handle it.

Sergeant Allen: As the enemy is supposed to be near Salem and we have already seen his patrols, I expect to encounter more patrols and may meet a strong body of the enemy, on my way to Salem. As I have no map, I cannot tell anything about the road, except that it is about four and one-half miles by the direct road the troop will follow, therefore my route will be somewhat longer. I have been given an hour and fifteen minutes in which to make the trip, so, if I move at a trot along the safer portions of the road. I will have time to proceed very slowly and cautiously along the dangerous portions. My patrol will be stretched out about 500 yards on the road, which should make it difficult for the enemy to surprise us and yet should permit my controlling the movements of the men. (Par. 968.)

I consider that my mission is to start out on this road and find my way around to Salem in about an hour and, particularly, to get word across to the Captain on the other road of anything of importance about the enemy that I may learn.

Captain: Very well. When you reach the cut in the road across the south nose of Hill 38, your point has almost reached the Morey house. Do you make any change in your patrol?

Sergeant Allen: I order, "1. Walk, 2. MARCH," and watch to see if the connecting file observes the change in gait and comes to a walk.

Captain: Suppose he does not come to a walk?

Sergeant Allen: I would say, "Smith, gallop ahead and tell Carter to walk and to keep more on the alert."

Captain: Corporal Burt, you reach the road fork at Morey's. What do you do?

Corporal Burt: I say, "Brown, wait here until Carter is close enough to see which way you go and then trot up to me." I would walk on down the road.

Captain: Wouldn't you make any inspection of the Morey house?

Corporal Burt: Not unless I saw something suspicious from the road. I would expect the main body of the patrol to do that.

Captain: Don't you make any change on account of the woods you are passing?

Corporal Burt: No, sir. It has very heavy underbrush and we would lose valuable time trying to search through it. A large force of the enemy would hardly hide in such a place.

Captain: Sergeant Allen, you reach the road fork. What do you do?

Sergeant Allen: I would have two men go into the Morey house to question anyone they found there. I would order one of the other two men to trot up (north) that road 200 yards and wait until I signaled to him to return. With the other man I would await the result of the inspection of the Morey house. Corporal Burt should have gone ahead without orders to the cut in the road across Long Ridge, leaving Brown half way between us. (Pars. 987 to 996.)

Captain: You find no one at the Morey house.

Sergeant Allen: I would signal the man to the north to come in. I would then order two men to "find a gate in the fence and trot up on that hill (indicating Long Ridge), and look around the country and join me down this road." (Par. 968.) I would then start south at a walk, halting at the cut to await the result of the inspection on the country from the hill.

Captain: Foster, you and Lacey are the two men sent up on Long Ridge. When you reach the hilltop you see four hostile cavalrymen trotting north on the Valley Pike, across the railroad track.

Private Foster: I signal like this (enemy in sight), and wait to see if they go on north. (Par. 978.) Do I see anything else behind or ahead of them?

Captain: You see no other signs of the enemy on any road. Everything looks quiet. The hostile cavalrymen pass the Baker house and continue north.

Private Foster: I would then take Lacey, trot down the ridge to Sergeant Allen, keeping below the crest and report, "Sergeant, We saw four hostile mounted men trotting north on the road about three-quarters of a mile over there (pointing), and they kept on north, across that road (pointing to the Brown-Baker-Oxford road). There was nothing else in sight." I would then tell him what the country to the south looked like, if he wanted to know.

Captain: Sergeant Allen, what do you do now?

Sergeant Allen: I would continue toward the Brown house at a trot. I would send no message to you as you already know there are hostile patrols about and therefore this information would be of little or no importance to you. (Par. 981.)

Captain: You arrive at Brown's house.

Sergeant Allen: I would send two men in to question the people and I would continue on at a walk. I would not send any one up the road towards Oxford as Foster has already seen that road.

Captain: You should have sent a man several hundred yards out the Farm Lane. (Par. 989.) If he moved at a trot it would only have taken a very short time. Continue to describe your movements.

Sergeant Allen: I would halt at the railroad track until I saw my two men coming on from the Brown house. I would then direct the other two men who were with me to go through the first opening in the fence to the west and ride south along that ridge (62—Lone Hill—Twin Hills' ridge) until I signaled them to rejoin. I would tell them to look out for our troop over to the east. If there were a great many fences I would not send them out until we were opposite the southern edge of that woods ahead of us. There I would send them to the high ground to look over the country, and return at once.

Captain: There are a great many fences west of the road and practically none east of the road to Sandy Creek. Just as you arrive opposite the southern edge of those woods and are giving orders for the two men to ride up the hill, you hear firing in the direction of Bald Knob. In the road at the foot of the south slope of Bald Knob, where the trail to the quarry starts off, you can see quite a clump of horses. You see nothing to the west of your position or towards Mason's. What do you do?

Sergeant Allen: I signal "RALLY" to Carter and Downs. If there is a gate nearby I lead my men through it. If not, I have them cut or break an opening in the fence and ride towards the railroad fill at a fast trot, having one man gallop ahead as point.

When we reach the fill, the point having first looked beyond it, I order, "DISMOUNT. Lacey, hold the horses. 1. As skirmishers along that fill, 2. MARCH." When Corporal Burt, Brown, Carter and Downs come up Lacey takes their horses and they join the line of skirmishers. Captain, what do I see from the fill?

Captain: There appear to be about twenty or thirty horses in the group. The firing seems to come from the cut in the road just north of the horses and from the clump of trees by the Quarry. You can also hear firing from a point further north on the road, apparently your troop replying to the fire from Bald Knob. You see nothing in the road south of the horses as far as Hill 42, which obstructs your view. What action do you take?

Sergeant Allen: I order, "AT THE FEET OF THOSE HORSES. RANGE, 850. CLIP FIRE."

Captain: What is your object in doing as you have done?

Sergeant Allen: I know the captain intended to go to Salem with the troop. From the fact that he is replying to the hostile fire I judge he still wishes to push south. I was ordered to reconnoiter along this road, but now a situation has arisen where the troop is being prevented or delayed in doing what was desired and I am in what appears to be a very favorable position from which to give assistance to the troop and enable them to push ahead. I am practically in rear of the enemy and within effective range of their lead horses. I therefore think my mission has at least temporarily changed and I should try and cause the twenty or thirty hostile troopers to draw off (Par. 1011). Besides, I think it is my business to find out what the strength of this enemy is and whether or not he has reinforcements coming up from Salem, and send this information to the captain. From my position I can still watch the Chester Pike.

Captain: After you have emptied your clips you see the enemy running down out of the cut and from among the trees mount their horses and gallop south. What do you do?

Sergeant Allen: I would send Foster across the creek above the trestle (south of trestle), to ride across to that road (pointing towards the cut on Bald Hill) and tell the captain, who is near there, that about thirty men were on the hill and they have galloped south, and that I am continuing towards Salem. I would have Foster repeat the message that I gave him. I would then trot back to the Chester Pike and south to Mason's, taking up our old formation.

Captain: You see nothing unusual at Mason's and continue south until you reach the cross roads by the Smith farm. Corporal Burt and Private Brown are near the stone bridge south of Smith's; Private Carter is half way between you and Corporal Burt; and Private Downs is 100 yards north of Smith's. You have three men with you. What do you do?

Sergeant Allen: What time is it now?

Captain: It is now 9:45 A. M.

Sergeant Allen: I would say, "Lacey, take Jackson and gallop as far as that cut in the road (points east) and see if you can locate the enemy or our troop in the valley beyond. I will wave my hat over my head when I want you to return." I would then say to Private Moore, "Gallop down to Corporal Burt and tell him to fall back in this direction 100 yards, and then you return here bringing the other two men with you." I would then await the result of Private Lacey's reconnaissance, sending Carter to the turn in the road 200 yards west of the cross roads.

Captain: Lacey, what do you do?

Private Lacey: I order Jackson, "Follow 75 yards behind me and watch for signals from Sergeant Allen," and I then gallop across the steel bridge and half way up the hill. I then move cautiously up to the cut and, if the fences permit, I ride up on the side of the cut, dismounting just before reaching the crest of the ridge, and walk forward until I can see into the valley beyond.

Captain: You see no signs of the enemy in the valley, but you see your own troop on the road by the Gibbs farm with a squad in advance in the road on Hill 42.

Private Lacey: I look towards Sergeant Allen to see if he is signaling. I make no signals.

Captain: What do you do, Sergeant?

Sergeant Allen: I wave my hat for Private Lacey to return. I wave to Private Downs to join me and when Private Lacey arrives I signal "ASSEMBLE" to Corporal Burt and then say, "Lacey, join Corporal Burt and tell him to follow me as rear guard. Martin, join Carter and tell him to trot west. We will follow. You stay with him." After he got started I would order, "Follow me. 1. Trot; 2. MARCH."

Captain: When Private Carter reaches the crest of the ridge about one-half mile west of Smith's he signals, "Enemy in sight in large numbers," and he remains in the road with Martin fifty yards in rear. (Par. 978.)

Sergeant Allen: I order, "1. Walk; 2. MARCH. 1. Squad; 2. HALT," and gallop up to Private Carter, dismount just before reaching the crest, give my horse up to Private Martin, and run forward.

Captain: Carter points out what appears to be a troop of cavalry standing in the road leading north out of York, just on the edge of the town. You see about four mounted men 200 yards out of York on your road, halted, and about the same number on the Valley Pike near where it crosses the first stream north of York. What do you do?

Sergeant Allen: I wait about three minutes to see if they are going to move.

Captain: They remain halted, the men at York appear to be dismounted.

Sergeant Allen: I write the following message:

Hill 1/2 mile N. E. of York,
10 A. M.

Captain X:

A hostile troop of cavalry is standing in road at YORK (west of SALEM) with squads halted on N. and N. E. roads from YORK. Nothing else seen. Will remain in observation for the present.

Allen,
Sgt.

I would give the message to Martin, who had previously brought my horse up close in rear of the crest, and would say to him, "Take this message to the captain, straight across to the road the troop is on, and turn south towards Salem if you do not see them at first. Take Lacey with you. Tell him what you have seen. He knows where the troop is." I would have Carter hold my horse, and watch the remainder of the patrol for signals, while I observed the enemy.

Captain: At the end of five minutes the hostile troop trots north on the Valley Pike, the patrol on your road rides across to the Valley Pike and follows the troop.

Sergeant Allen: I would wait until the troops had crossed the creek north of York and would then face my patrol east and trot to the cross roads at Smith's, turn south and continue to Salem, sending one man to ride up on Sandy Ridge, keeping the patrol in sight.

Captain: We have carried out the problem far enough. It furnishes a good example of the varying situations a patrol leader has to meet. Good judgment or common sense must be used in deciding on the proper course to follow. You must always think of what your chief is trying to do and then act in the way you think will best help him to accomplish his object. If you have carefully decided just what mission you have been given to accomplish, you cannot easily go wrong. In handling a mounted patrol you must remember that if the men become widely separated in strange country, or even in country they are fairly familiar with, they are most apt to lose all contact with each other or become lost themselves.

Problem No. 2. (Infantry)

1019. Captain (to one platoon of his company): We will suppose it is about half an hour before dawn. One platoon of the company is deployed as skirmishers, facing north, in the cut where the County Road crosses Sandy Ridge. It is the extreme right of a line of battle extending west along the line of the County Road. The fight was not commenced. This platoon is resting in a wheat field between the railroad and the foot of the slope of Sandy Ridge, 200 yards south of the County Road. Sergeant Allen, I call you up and give you these instructions: "The enemy's line is off in that direction (pointing northwest). Take six men and work north along the railroad until it is light enough to see; then locate the hostile line and keep me informed of their movements. I will be in this vicinity. You have a compass. Start at once." Describe briefly the formation of your patrol while it is moving in the dark.

Sergeant Allen: One man will lead. A second man will follow about fifteen yards in rear of him. I will follow the second man at the same distance with three more men, and the last man will be about twenty yards in rear of me. All will have bayonets fixed, loaded and pieces locked. One short, low whistle will mean, Halt, two short whistles will mean, Forward, and the word "Sandy" will be the countersign by which we can identify each other.

Captain: Very well. We will suppose that you reach the steel trestle over Sandy Creek just at dawn and have met no opposition and heard nothing of the enemy. On either side of Sandy Creek are fields of standing corn about six feet tall. In the present dim light you can only see a few hundred yards off.

Sergeant Allen: The patrol being halted I would walk forward to the leading man (Brown) and say, "Brown, take Carter and form the point for the patrol, continuing along this railroad. We will follow about 150 yards in rear." I would then rejoin the main body of the patrol and order the man in rear to follow about 75 yards in rear of us. When the point had gained its distance I would move forward with the main body, ordering one man to move along the creek bank (west bank), keeping abreast of us until I signaled to him to come in.

Captain: Just as you reach the northern end of the railroad fill your point halts and you detect some movement in the road to the west of you. It is rapidly growing lighter.

Sergeant Allen: I would move the main body by the left flank into the corn, signaling to the man following the creek to rejoin, and for the rear guard to move off the track also. I would expect Brown to do the same, even before he saw what we had done. I would then close up on the point until I could see it and, halting all the patrol, I would order Foster to take Lacey and work over towards the road to see what is there and to report back to me immediately.

Captain: In a few minutes Foster returns and reports, "The enemy is moving south in the road and in the field beyond, in line of squads or sections. A hostile patrol is moving southeast across the field behind us. We were not seen."

(Note: This situation could well have been led up to by requiring Private Foster to explain how he conducted his reconnaissance and having him formulate his report on the situation as given.)

Sergeant Allen: I would then work my patrol closer to the road, keeping Foster out on that flank, and prepare to follow south in rear of the hostile movement.

Captain: The information you have gained is so important that you should have sent a man back to me with a verbal message, particularly as you are in a very dangerous position, and may not be able to send a message later. While you have not definitely located the left of the enemy's line, you have apparently discovered what appears to be a movement of troops forward to form the left of the attacking line. Your action in turning south to follow the troops just reported, is proper, as you now know you are partly in rear of the hostile movement and must go south to locate the hostile flank that your mission requires you to report on.

You men must picture in your minds the appearance of the country the sergeant is operating through. His patrol is now in a field of high standing corn. Unless you are looking down between the regular rows of corn you can only see a few yards ahead of you. The road has a wire fence and is bordered by a fairly heavy growth of high weeds and bushes. The ground is dry and dusty. Sergeant, how do you conduct your movement south?

Sergeant Allen: As my patrol is now in a very dangerous neighborhood and very liable to be caught between two hostile lines, with a deep creek between our present position and our platoon, I think it best to move cautiously southeast until I reach the creek bank (I cannot see it from where I now am), and then follow the creek south. I think I am very apt to find the enemy's left resting on this creek. Besides, if I do not soon locate the enemy, I can hold the main body of my patrol close to the creek and send scouts in towards the road to search for the enemy. It will also be much easier to send information back to the platoon from the creek bank, as a messenger can ford it and head southeast until he strikes the railroad and then follow that straight back to our starting point. It would thus be very difficult for him to get lost.

Captain: You move southeast and strike the creek bank just south of the railroad trestle. You now hear artillery fire off to the west and a rifle fire to the southwest which gradually increases in volume. You see a high cloud of dust hanging over the road on the hill west of Mason's and south of this road on the north slope of the northern-most knoll of the Twin Hills, you can occasionally see the flash of a gun, artillery being discharged. There seems to be no rifle firing directly in your front.

Sergeant Allen: I hurriedly write the following message:

At Ry. trestle 1 mi. N. of Platoon,
5:15 A. M.

Captain X:

Can see arty. firing from position on N. slope of knoll on high ridge to W. of me, and 1/4 mi. S. of E. and W. road. Hostile line is S. of me. Have not located it. Will move S.

Allen,
Sgt. (Par. 974.)

I hand this to Private Smith and say to him. "Carry this quickly to the captain. Follow the railroad back until you cross a wagon road. Our platoon should be to the west of the track just beyond the road." I also read the message to Smith and point out the hostile artillery. I have considered that I sent a message before telling about the hostile advance.

I then continue south, moving slowly and with great caution. I instruct the remaining four men that in case we are surprised to try to cross the creek and follow the railroad back to the platoon.

Captain: Your information about the hostile artillery position was important and should have been sent in, provided you think your description of the hostile position was sufficiently clear to be understood by an observer within your own lines.

There is some question as to the advisability of your remaining on the west bank of the creek. Still you would not be able to tell from where you were what direction the creek took, so you probably would remain on the west bank for the present.

You continue south for about 150 yards and your leading man halts, comes back to you, and reports that the corn ahead is broken and trampled, showing it has been passed over by foot troops. About the same time you hear rifle fire to your immediate front. It sounds very close.

Sergeant Allen: I say, "Cross this creek at once," and when we reach the other bank and the patrol forms again, we move slowly south, all the men keeping away from the creek bank, except myself, and I march opposite the two men constituting the main body.

Captain: About this time you detect a movement in the corn across the creek in rear of the place you have just left. You think it is a body of troops moving south. The firing in front seems to be delivered from a point about two or three hundred yards south of you and you can hear heavy firing from off in the direction of your company, a few bullets passing overhead. There are scattered trees along the creek and some bushes close to the edge.

Sergeant Allen: I would conceal myself close to the bank, the patrol being back, out of sight from the opposite bank, and await developments.

Captain: Sergeant, your patrol is in a dangerous position. The enemy will very likely have a patrol or detachment in rear and beyond his flank. This patrol would probably cross the railroad trestle and take you in rear. You should have given the last men in your patrol particular instructions to watch the railroad to the north. It would have been better if you had sent one man over to the railroad, which is only a short distance away, and had him look up and down the track and also make a hurried survey of the country from an elevated position on the fill.

I also think it would be better not to await developments where you now are, but to push south and make sure of the position of the left of the enemy's firing line, later you can devote more time to the movements in rear of the first line. You are taking too many chances in remaining where you are. I do not mean that you should leave merely because you might have some of your men killed or captured, but because if this did occur you would probably not be able to accomplish your mission. Later you may have to run a big chance of sacrificing several of your men, in order to get the desired information, which would be entirely justifiable. Tell me how your men are arranged and what your next movement would be.

Sergeant Allen: I have four men left, I am close to the stream's bank, under cover; two men are about 25 yards further away from the stream; Private Brown is up stream as far off as he can get and still see the other two men, and Private Foster is down stream the same distance. Both Brown and Foster are well back from the stream. The two men in the middle, the main body of the patrol, make their movements conform to mine, and Brown and Foster regulate their movements on the main body. I will move south until I can locate the enemy's advance line.

Captain: When you are opposite the Mason house, Brown comes back to you, having signaled halt, and reports he can see the enemy's firing line about 100 yards ahead on the other side of the stream, and that a small detachment is crossing the stream just beyond where he was. What do you do?

Sergeant Allen: I creep forward with Brown to verify his report. The remainder of the patrol remains in place.

Captain: You find everything as Brown reported. You see that the firing line extends along the southern edge of the cornfield, facing an uncultivated field covered with grass and frequent patches of weeds two or three feet high. You cannot determine how strong the line is, but a heavy fire is being delivered. You cannot see the detachment that crossed the creek south of you because of the standing corn.

Sergeant Allen: I crawl back to the main body, leaving Brown, and write the following message:

5/6 mi. N. of Platoon,
5:32 A. M.

Captain X:

Enemy's left rests on creek 3/4 mile to your front, along S. edge of cornfield. Creek is 5 ft. deep by 60 ft. wide. Hostile patrols have crossed the creek. Will watch their rear.

Allen,
Sgt.

I give this to Private James and say, "Go over to the railroad (pointing), then turn to your right and follow the track until you cross a wagon road. Our platoon is just beyond that, on this side of the track. Give this message to the captain. Hurry."

Captain: You should have either read the message to James or had him read it. You should also have cautioned him to watch out for that hostile detachment. It might be better to send another man off with a duplicate of the message, as there is quite a chance that James may not get through and the message is all-important. James, you get back to the wagon road here (pointing) and find yourself in the right of your battle line, but cannot locate me or the company right away.

Private James: I would show the note to the first officer I saw in any event, and in this case, I would turn it over to the officer who appeared to be in command of the battalion or regiment on the right of the line, telling him what company the patrol belonged to, when we went out, etc.

Captain: What do you do, sergeant?

Sergeant Allen: I start to move north a short distance in order to find out what reënforcements are in rear of the hostile line.

Captain: After you have moved about 75 yards you are suddenly fired into from across the creek, and at the same time from the direction of the railroad trestle. Your men break and run east through the corn and you follow, but lose sight of them. When you cross the railroad fill you are fired on from the direction of the bridge. You finally stop behind the railroad fill on the quarry switch, where two of your men join you.

Sergeant Allen: I would start south to rejoin the company and report.

Captain: That would be a mistake. It would require a long time for a second patrol to make its way out over unknown ground, filled with hostile patrols, to a point where they could observe anything in rear of the hostile flank. You are now fairly familiar with the ground, you also know about where the hostile patrols are and you have two men remaining. After a brief rest in some concealed place nearby, you should start out again to make an effort to determine the strength of the troops in rear of the hostile flank near you, or at least remain out where you could keep a sharp lookout for any attempted turning movement by the enemy. Should anything important be observed you can send back a message and two of you remain to observe the next developments before returning. The information you might send back and the additional information you might carry back, would possibly enable your own force to avoid a serious reverse or obtain a decided victory.

Your work would be very hazardous, but it is necessary, and while possibly resulting in loss of one or two of your men, it might prevent the loss of hundreds in your main force.

Chapter V

THE SERVICE OF SECURITY

(Based on the Field Service Regulations.)

General Principles

1020. The Service of Security embraces all those measures taken by a military force to protect itself against surprise, annoyance or observation by the enemy. On the march, that portion of a command thrown out to provide this security is called an advance, flank or rear guard, depending on whether it is in front, to the flank or in rear of the main command; in camp or bivouac, it is called the outpost.

The principal duties of these bodies being much the same, their general formations are also very similar. There is (1) the cavalry covering the front; next (2) a group (4 men to a platoon) or line of groups in observation; then (3) the support, or line of supports, whose duty is to furnish the men for the observation groups and check an enemy's attempt to advance until reinforcements can arrive; still farther in rear is (4) the reserve.

In small commands of an infantry regiment or less there usually will not be any cavalry to cover the front, and the reserve is generally omitted. Even the support may be omitted and the observation group or line of groups be charged with checking the enemy, in addition to its regular duties of observation. But whatever the technical designation of these subdivisions, the rearmost one is always in fact a reserve. For example, if the command is so small that the subdivision formally designated as the reserve is omitted, the rear element (squad or platoon or company, etc.) is used as a reserve. As this text deals principally with small commands and only those larger than a regiment usually have the subdivision termed the reserve, this distinction between the element in the Field Service Regulations called the reserve and the actual reserve, must be thoroughly understood.

The arrangements or formations of all detachments thrown out from the main force to provide security against the enemy, are very flexible, varying with every military situation and every different kind of country. The commander of such a detachment must, therefore, avoid blindly arranging his men according to some fixed plan and at certain fixed distances. Acquire a general understanding of the principles of the service of security and then with these principles as a foundation use common sense in disposing troops for this duty.

Advance Guard

1021. Definition and Duties. An advance guard is a detachment of a marching column thrown out in advance to protect the main column from being surprised and to prevent its march from being delayed or interrupted. (The latter duty is generally forgotten and many irritating, short halts result, which wear out or greatly fatigue the main body, the strength of which the advance guard is supposed to conserve.)

In detail the duties of the advance guard are:

1. To guard against surprise and furnish information by reconnoitering to the front and flanks.

2. To push back small parties of the enemy and prevent their observing, firing upon or delaying the main body.

3. To check the enemy's advance in force long enough to permit the main body to prepare for action.

4. When the enemy is met on the defenses, seize a good position and locate his lines, care being taken not to bring on a general engagement unless the advance guard commander is authorized to do so.

5. To remove obstacles, repair the road, and favor in every way possible the steady march of the column.

1022. Strength: The strength of the advance guard varies from one-ninth to one-third of the total command. The larger the force the larger in proportion is the advance guard, for a larger command takes relatively longer to prepare for action than a small one. For example, a company of 100 men would ordinarily have an advance guard of from one to two squads, as the company could deploy as skirmishers in a few seconds. On the other hand, a division of 20,000 men would ordinarily have an advance guard of about 4,500 men, all told, as it would require several hours for a division to deploy and the advance guard must be strong enough to make a stubborn fight.

1023. Composition. The advance guard is principally composed of infantry, preceded if possible, by cavalry well to the front. When there is only infantry, much more patrolling is required of the front troops than when cavalry (called "Advance cavalry") is out in advance. This book does not deal with large advance guards containing artillery and engineers. Machine guns, however, will be frequently used in small advance guards to hold bridges, defiles, etc.

1024. Distance From Main Body. The distance at which the advance guard precedes the main body or the main body follows the advance guard depends on the military situation and the ground. It should always be great enough to allow the main body time to deploy before it can be seriously engaged. For instance the advance guard of a company, say 1 squad, should be 350 to 500 yards in advance of the company. The distance from the leading man back to the principal group of the squad should generally be at least 150 yards. This, added to the distance back to the main body or company, makes a distance of from 500 to 650 yards from the leading man to the head of the main body.

Examples:

Command. Advance Guard. Distance (yds.).

Patrol of 1 squad 2 men 100 to 300

Section of 3 squads 4 men 200 to 400

Inf. platoon of 50 men 1 squad 300 to 450

Cav. platoon of 20 men 4 men 300 to 450

Inf. company of 108 men 1 to 2 squads 350 to 500

Cav. troop of 86 men 1/2 platoon 450 to 600

Inf. battalion 1/2 to 1 company 500 to 700

Cav. squadron 1/2 to 1 troop 600 to 800

These are not furnished as fixed numbers and distances, but are merely to give the student an approximate, concrete idea.

1025. Connecting Files. It should be remembered that between the advance guard and the main body, and between the several groups into which the advance guard is subdivided, connecting files are placed so as to furnish a means of communicating, generally by signals, between the elements (groups) of the column. There should be a connecting file for at least ever, 300 yards. For example, suppose the advance guard of a platoon is 300 yards in front of the main body. In ordinary rolling country, not heavily wooded, a connecting file would be placed half way between the two elements—150 yards from each one.

It is generally wiser to use two men together instead of one, because this leaves one man free to watch for signals from the front while the other watches the main body. However, in very small commands like a company, this is not practicable, as the extra man could not be spared.

Formation of Advance Guards.

1026. Subdivisions. The advance guard of a large force like a brigade or division is subdivided into a number of groups or elements, gradually increasing in size from front to rear. The reason for this is that, as has already been explained, a larger group or force requires longer to deploy or prepare to fight than a smaller one, therefore the small subdivisions are placed in front where they can quickly deploy and hold the enemy temporarily in check while the larger elements in rear are deploying. The number of these subdivisions decreases as the strength of the advance guard decreases, until we find the advance guard of a company consists of one or two squads, which naturally cannot be subdivided into more than two groups; and the advance guard of a squad composed of two men, which admits of no subdivision.

Distance to next element in rear.

Advance Cavalry 1 to 5 miles

Support Advance party Point 150 to 300 yds.

(furnishes patrols) Advance party proper 300 to 600 yds.

Support proper 400 to 800 yds.

Reserve (usually omitted in small commands) 500 yds. to 1 mile

The distances vary principally with the size of the command—slightly with the character of the country.

The advance cavalry is that part of the advance guard going in front of all the foot troops. It is generally one to five miles in advance of the infantry of the advance guard, reconnoitering at least far enough to the front and flanks to guard the column against surprise by artillery fire—4,500 yards.

1027. Support. (a) The support constitutes the principal element or group of all advance guards. It follows the advance cavalry, when there is any, and leads the advance guard when there is no cavalry. The support of a large command is subdivided within itself in much the same manner as the advance guard as a whole is subdivided. It varies in strength from one-fourth to one-half of the advance guard.

1028. (b) Advance Party. As the support moves out it sends forward an advance party several hundred yards, the distance varying with the nature of the country and size of the command. For example, the advance party of a support of one company of 108 men, would ordinarily be composed of one section of three squads, and would march about 300 yards in advance of the company in open country, and about 200 yards in wooded country.

The advance party sends out the patrols to the front and flanks to guard the main body of the support from surprise by effective rifle fire. Patrols are only sent out to the flanks to examine points that cannot be observed from the road. As a rule they will have to rejoin some portion of the column in rear of the advance party. As the advance party becomes depleted in strength in this manner, fresh men are sent forward from the main body of the support to replace those who have fallen behind while patrolling. When there is advance cavalry, much less patrolling is required of the infantry.

(c) The point is a patrol sent forward by the advance party 150 to 300 yards. When the advance party is large enough the point should ordinarily consist of a complete squad, commanded by an officer or experienced noncommissioned officer. It is merely a patrol in front of the column and takes the formation described for patrols.

(d) The commander of the support ordinarily marches with the advance party. He should have a map and control of the guide, if any is present. He sees that the proper road is followed; that guides are left in towns and at crossroads; that bridges, roads, etc., are repaired promptly so as not to delay the march of the column and that information of the enemy is promptly sent back to the advance guard commander; he verifies the correctness of this information, if possible.

1029. (a) A thorough understanding of the arrangement of the support and the duties of the leaders of its subdivisions—point, flank patrols, advance party and main body (of the support)—is of the greatest importance to a noncommissioned officer. For example, the ignorance of one noncommissioned officer leading the advance party of a column of troops six miles long can cause the entire column to be delayed. If he halts because a few shots are fired at his men, and conducts a careful reconnaissance before attacking (instead of pushing right in on the enemy, forcing him to fall back quickly, if a weak detachment; or, to disclose his strength, if strong), the entire column, six miles long, is halted, the march interrupted, valuable time lost, and what is more important, the men irritated and tired out.

(b) The leader of the point must understand that as the principal duty of an advance guard is to secure the safe and uninterrupted march of the main body, he is the first man to discharge this duty. If, for example, his squad receives a volley of shots from some point to the front, he cannot take the time and precautions the commander of a large body would take to reconnoiter the enemy's position, determine something about his strength, etc., before risking an attack. If he did he would not be securing the uninterrupted march of the main body. He has to deploy instantly and press the enemy hard until the hostile opposition disappears or the advance party comes up and its commander takes charge. The point will lose men in this way, but it is necessary, for otherwise one small combat patrol could delay the march time after time.

(c) The same problem must be met in much the same manner by the leader of the advance party. In this case there is more time to think, as the point, being in advance, will have begun the fight before the advance party arrives; but the leader of the advance party must use his men freely and quickly to force the enemy to "show his hand," thus preventing small harassing or combat detachments from delaying the march.

(d) As the subdivisions of the advance guard become larger their leaders act with increasing caution, for as soon as it develops that the enemy in front is really present in some strength, then a halt becomes obligatory and a careful reconnaissance necessary.

(e) The leader of every subdivision must always start a reconnaissance the instant the enemy develops. He may, as in the case of the point, only send one man around to discover the enemy's strength; or, if the leader of the main body of the support, he may send an entire squad. In almost every case the instant he has given his orders for deploying and firing at or rushing the enemy, he sends out his man or men to work around to a position permitting a view of the hostile force. Every noncommissioned officer should impress this on his memory so that he will not forget it in the excitement of a sudden engagement.

(f) No attempt should be made to subdivide the advance guard of a small force into all the elements previously described. For example, the advance guard of a squad is simply a point of one or two men; the advance guard of a company is usually no more than a squad acting as a point, the squad actually having several men from 100 to 150 yards in advance, who really constitute a point for the squad; the advance guard of a battalion would usually consist of a company or less distributed as an advance party proper and a point. The advance guard of a regiment would have no reserve—if, for example, a battalion were used as the advance guard of a regiment, there would be only a support, which would be distributed about as follows: A support proper of about three companies and an advance party (point included) of about one company.

1030. Reserve. An advance guard large enough to have a reserve would be distributed as follows:

The distance Z would be greater than Y and Y would be greater than X. For example, a regiment acting as the advance guard of a brigade would, under ordinary conditions, be distributed about as follows:

As only large commands have a reserve, which would always be commanded by an officer, noncommissioned officers need not give this much consideration, but it must be understood that while this fourth subdivision of the advance guard is the only one officially termed reserve, the last subdivision of any advance guard actually is a reserve, no matter what its official designation.

The advance guard of a cavalry command adopts formations similar to those described above, except that the distances are increased because of the rapidity with which the command can close up or deploy. An advance party with a few patrols is usually enough for a squadron, and precedes it from 600 to 1,000 yards.

1031. Reconnaissance. In reconnaissance the patrols are, as a rule, small (from two to six men).

The flanking patrols, whether of the advance cavalry or of the advance party, are sent out to examine the country wherever the enemy might be concealed. If the nature of the ground permits, these patrols march across country or along roads and trails parallel to the march of the column. For cavalry patrols this is often possible; but with infantry patrols and even with those that are mounted, reconnaissance is best done by sending the patrols to high places along the line of march to overlook the country and examine the danger points. These patrols signal the results of their observations and, unless they have other instructions, join the columns by the nearest routes, other patrols being sent out as the march proceeds and as the nature of the country requires.

Deserters, suspicious characters and bearers of flags of truce (the latter blindfolded), are taken to the advance guard commander.

1032. Advance Guard Order. On receipt of the order for a march designating the troops for the advance guard, the commander of the latter makes his estimate of the situation; that is, he looks at the map or makes inquiries to determine what sort of a country he must march through and the nature of the roads; he considers what the chances are of encountering the enemy, etc., and then how he should best arrange his advance guard to meet these conditions, and what time the different elements of his advance guard must start in order to take their proper place in the column. He then issues his order at the proper time—the evening before if possible and he deems it best, or the morning of the march.

The order for a large advance guard would ordinarily be written; for a small command it would almost invariably be verbal, except that the commander or leader of each element should always make written notes of the principal points, such as the road to be followed, time to start, distances, etc.

Advance Guard Problems

Problem No. 1. (Infantry)

1033. Captain (to one platoon of his company): We will assume that our battalion camped last night at Oxford (Elementary Map) in the enemy's country. It is now sunrise, 5:30 A. M.; camp has been broken and we are ready to march. The officers have returned from reporting to the major for orders and I fall in the company and give the following orders:

"A regiment of the enemy's cavalry is thought to be marching towards Salem from the south. Our battalion will march at once towards Salem to guard the railroad trestle over Sandy Creek, following this road (pointing southeast along the road out of Oxford) and the Chester Pike Which is one and three-quarters miles from here.

"This company will form the advance guard.

"Sergeant Adams, you will take Corporal Baker's squad and form the point, followed by the remainder of the company at about 400 yards. Patrols and connecting files will be furnished by the company.

"The company wagon will join the wagons of the battalion.

"I will be with the company.

"Move out at once."

The weather is fine and the roads are good and free from dust. It is August and nearly all the crops are harvested. Bushes and weeds form a considerable growth along the fences bordering the road.

Sergeant, give your orders.

Sergeant Adams: 1st squad, 1. Right, 2. FACE, 1. Forward, 2. MARCH. Corporal Baker, take Carter (Baker's rear rank man) and go ahead of the squad about 200 yards. Move out rapidly until you get your distance and then keep us in sight.

I would then have the two leading men of the rest of the squad follow on opposite sides of the road, as close to the fence as possible for good walking. This would put the squad in two columns of files of three men each, leaving the main roadway clear and making the squad as inconspicuous as possible, without interfering with ease of marching or separating the men. [Par. 1028 (c).] What sort of crops are in the fields on either side of the road?

Captain: The field on the right (south) is meadow land; that on the left, as far as the railroad, is cut hay; beyond the railroad there is more meadow land.

Sergeant Adams: I would have told Corporal Baker to wait at the cross roads by the Baker house for orders and—

Captain: If you were actually on the ground you probably could not see the cross roads from Oxford. In solving map problems like these do not take advantage of seeing on the map all the country that you are supposed to go over, and then give orders about doing things at places concerning which you would not probably have any knowledge if actually on the ground without the map.

Besides, in this particular case, it was a mistake to have your point wait at the cross roads. If there was any danger of their taking the wrong road it would be a different matter, but here your mission requires you to push ahead. (Par. 1029.) The major is trying to get south of the trestle towards Salem before the cavalry can arrive and destroy it.

Sergeant Adams: I would march steadily along the road, ordering the last man to keep a lookout to the rear for signals from the connecting file (Par. 511a), and I would direct one of the leading men to watch for signals from Corporal Baker.

Captain: You should have given the direction about watching for signals earlier, as this is very important. You also should have ordered two men to follow along the timber by the creek to your south until you signaled for them to come in. The trees along the creek would obstruct your view over the country beyond the creek.

Sergeant Adams: But I thought, Captain, that the patrolling was to be done by the company.

Captain: Yes, the patrolling is to be done by the company, but the creek is only a quarter of a mile, about 400 yards, from the road you are following and the men sent there are merely flankers, not a patrol. You have eight men under your command and you are responsible for the ground within several hundred yards on either side of your route of march. Long Ridge is almost too far for you to send your men, because they would fall far behind in climbing and descending its slopes, but it would not be a great mistake if you sent two men there. As Long Ridge affords an extended view of the valley through which the Chester Pike runs, a patrol should go up on it and remain there until the battalion passes, and this would be more than the leading squad could be expected to attend to. The creek is almost too far from the road in places, but as it is open meadow land you can keep the men within easy touch of you and recall them by signal at any moment you desire. In this work you can see how much depends on good judgment and a proper understanding of one's mission.

Corporal Baker, explain how you would move out with Carter.

Corporal Baker: We would alternate the walk and double time until we had gotten about 200 yards ahead of the squad. I would then say, "Carter, walk along this side of the road (indicates side), keeping on the lookout for signals from the squad. I will go about fifty yards ahead of you." I would keep to the opposite side of the road from Carter, trying to march steadily at the regular marching gait, and keeping a keen watch on everything in front and to the flanks.

Captain: Very good. When you arrive at the cross roads you see a man standing in the yard of the Baker house.

Corporal Baker: I would not stop, but would continue on by the cross roads, as I have no time to question the man and the Sergeant will want to do that. I would call to him and ask him if he had seen any of the enemy about and how far it was to the Chester Pike. If anything looked suspicious around the house or barnyard, I would investigate.

Captain: Sergeant, you arrive at the cross roads, and see the Corporal and Carter going on ahead of you.

Sergeant Adams: I would have already signaled to the two men following the creek to come in and would send a man to meet them with the following order: "Tell Davis to move along the railroad fill with Evans, keeping abreast of us. Then you return to me." I would then say, "Fiske, look in that house and around the barn and orchard and then rejoin me down this road (pointing east)." I would have the civilian join me and walk down the road with me while I questioned him.

Captain: Do you think you have made careful arrangements for searching the house, etc., by leaving only one man to do the work?

Sergeant Adams: I have not sufficient men nor time enough to do much more. I simply want to make sure things are reasonably safe and I thought that a couple of men from the main body of the advance guard would do any careful searching, questioning, etc., that might be deemed necessary. I must not delay the march.

Captain: That is right. You learn nothing from the civilian and he does not arouse any suspicion on your part. You continue along the road. The fields to the north of the road are in wheat stubble; the ground to the south, between your road and the railroad, is rough, rocky grass land with frequent clumps of bushes. Davis and Evans, your right flankers on the railroad fill, are just approaching the cut; Fiske has rejoined; Corporal Baker and his men are about 200 yards from the road forks at Brown's, and you and your four men are 200 yards in their rear, at the turn of the road. At this moment a half dozen shots are fired down the road in your direction from behind the wall along the edge of the orchard on the Brown farm. This firing continues and your two leading men are lying down at the roadside returning the fire. Tell me quickly just what you are going to do?

Sergeant Adams: I order my four men to deploy as skirmishers in that field (pointing to the rough ground south of the road); I go under the fence with the men and lead them forward at a fast run, unless the fire is very heavy.

Captain (interrupting the Sergeant): Davis, you had just reached the cut on the railroad when this happened. What do you do?

Private Davis: I take Evans forward with me at a run through the cut. What do I see along the Chester Pike or Sandy Creek?

Captain: You see no sign of the enemy any place, except the firing over the wall.

Private Davis: I run down the south side of the fill and along towards the road with Evans to open fire on the enemy from their flank, and also to see what is in the orchard. I will probably cross the road so that I can see behind the stone wall.

Captain: That's fine and shows how you should go ahead at such a time without any orders. There is usually no time or opportunity at such a moment for sending instructions and you must use common sense and do something. Generally it would have been better to have tried to signal or send word back that there was nothing in sight along the road or in the valley, but in this particular case you could probably do more good by going quickly around in rear as you did, to discover what was there and assist in quickly dislodging whatever it was. If there had been no nose of the ridge to hide you as you came up and a convenient railroad fill to hurry along behind as you made for the road, your solution might have been quite different.

Sergeant, continue with your movements.

Sergeant Adams: I would attempt to rush the wall. If the fire were too heavy, I would open fire (at will) with all my men, and, if I seemed to get a little heavier fire than the enemy's, I would start half of my men forward on a rush while the others fired. I would try to rush in on the enemy with as little delay as possible, until it developed that he had more than a small detachment there. I assumed it was a delaying patrol in front of me, and as my mission requires me to secure the uninterrupted march of the main body, I must not permit any small detachment to delay me. If, however, it proves to be a larger force, for instance, the head of an advance guard, I will lose some men by plunging in, but as I understand it, that is the duty of the point. Then again, if it be the head of a hostile advance guard, I will want to rush them out of their favorable position under cover of the stone wall, buildings and orchard, before any more of their force can come up. This would give the favorable position to our force; by acting too cautiously we would lose the valuable moments in which the enemy's reënforcements (next elements of the advance guard) were coming up, with this desirable position being weakly held by a small part of the enemy.

Captain: That is all correct. What messages would you have sent?

Sergeant Adams: Up to the present time I would not have sent any. I could not have sent any. I could not afford to take the time to send a man back, nor could I spare the man. Besides, all I could say was that we were fired on, and you should be able to see and hear that from where the company is.

Captain: About the time you reached the position of Corporal Baker the firing ceases, and when you reach the wall you see five mounted men galloping northeast up Farm Lane. The Brown farm appears to be deserted.

Sergeant Adams: I would turn to one of the men and say, "Run back to the Captain and tell him we were fired on from this orchard by a mounted patrol of five men who are galloping off up a lane to the northeast. I am going south." When he had repeated the message I would start south down the Chester Pike, directing Corporal Baker to follow this road south and to tell Davis to follow the high ridge west of the road, going through the clump of woods just ahead. I would send one man as a left flanker to follow the west bank of Sandy Creek. This would leave me with two men, one watching for signals from the front and along Sandy Creek, the other from Davis and from the rear. I would expect to see a patrol from the company moving across towards Boling Woods. Had I not been mixed up in a fight as I approached the Brown farm I would have sent two men as left flankers across country to the cut on the Chester Pike on the western edge of the Boling Woods.

Captain: Very good. That is sufficient for this problem. All of you should have caught the idea of the principal duties of the point and flankers of an advance guard. You must watch the country to prevent being surprised and you must at the same time manage to push ahead with the least possible delay. The point cannot be very cautious so far as concerns its own safety, for this would mean frequent halts which would delay the troops in rear, but it must be cautious about reconnoitering all parts of the ground near the road which might conceal large bodies of the enemy.

The leader of the point must be careful in using his men or he will get them so scattered that they will become entirely separated and he will lose all control of them. As soon as the necessity for flankers on one side of the line of march no longer exists, signal for them to rejoin and do not send them out again so long as you can see from the road all the country you should cover.

Problem No. 2. (Infantry)

1034. Captain (to one platoon of his company): Let us assume that this platoon is the advance party of an advance guard, marching through Salem along the Chester Pike [Par. 1028 (b)]. One squad is 350 yards in front, acting as the point. The enemy is thought to be very near, but only two mounted patrols have been seen during the day. The command is marching for Chester. The day is hot, the roads are good but dusty, and the crops are about to be harvested.

Sergeant Adams, explain how you would conduct the march of the advance party, beginning with your arrival at the cross roads in Salem.

Sergeant Adams: The platoon would be marching in column of squads and I would be at the head. Two pairs of connecting files would keep me in touch with the point. (Par. 1025.) I would now give this order: "Corporal Smith, take two men from your squad and patrol north along this road (pointing up the Tracy-Maxey road) for a mile and then rejoin the column on this road (Chester Pike), to the west of you." I would then say to Private Barker, "Take Carter and cut across to that railroad fill and go along the top of that (Sandy) ridge, rejoining the column beyond the ridge. Corporal Smith with a patrol is going up this road. Keep a lookout for him." When we reached the point where the road crosses the south nose of Sandy Ridge and I saw the valley in front of me with the long high ridge west of Sandy Creek, running parallel to the Chester Pike and about 800 yards west of it, I would give this order: "Corporal Davis, take the three remaining men in Corporal Smith's squad, cross the creek there (pointing in the direction of the Barton farm) go by that orchard, and move north along that high ridge, keeping the column in sight. Make an effort to keep abreast of the advance guard, which will continue along this road."

I gave Corporal Davis the remaining men out of Corporal Smith's squad because I did not want to break up another squad and as this is, in my opinion, a very important patrol, I wanted a noncommissioned officer in charge of it. Unless something else occurs this will be all the patrols I intend sending out until we pass the steel railroad trestle over Sandy Creek.

Captain: Your point about not breaking up a squad when you could avoid it by using the men remaining in an already broken squad, is a very important one. Take this particular case. You first sent out two pairs of connecting files between the advance party and your point—four men. This leaves a corporal and three men in that squad. If we assume that no patrols were out when we passed through Salem, this corporal and two of his men could have been sent up the Tracy-Maxey road, leaving one man to be temporarily attached to some squad. From the last mentioned squad you would pick your two men for the Sandy Ridge patrol and also the corporal and three men for the Barton farm, etc., patrol. This would leave three men in this squad and you would have under your immediate command two complete squads and three men. As the patrols return, organize new squads immediately and constantly endeavor to have every man attached to a squad. This is one of your most important duties, as it prevents disorder when some serious situation suddenly arises. Also it is one of the duties of the detachment commander that is generally overlooked until too late.

The direction you sent your three patrols was good and their orders clear, covering the essential points, but as you have in a very short space of time, detached nine men, almost a third of your advance party, don't you think you should have economized more on men?

Sergeant Adams: The Sandy Ridge patrol is as small as you can make it—two men. I thought the other two patrols were going to be detached so far from the column that they should be large enough to send a message or two and still remain out. I suppose it would be better to send but two men with Corporal Davis, but I think Corporal Smith should have two with him.

Captain: Yes, I agree with you, for you are entering a valley which is, in effect, a defile, and the Tracy-Maxey road is a very dangerous avenue of approach to your main body. But you must always bear in mind that it is a mistake to use one more man than is needed to accomplish the object in view. The more you send away from your advance party, the more scattered and weaker your command becomes, and this is dispersion, which constitutes one of the gravest, and at the same time, most frequent tactical errors.

To continue the problem, we will suppose you have reached the stone bridge over Sandy Creek; the point is at the cross roads by the Smith house; you can see the two men moving along Sandy Ridge; and Corporal Davis' patrol is just entering the orchard by the Barton farm. Firing suddenly commences well to the front and you hear your point reply to it.

Sergeant Adams: I halt to await information from the point.

Captain: That is absolutely wrong. You command the advance party of an advance guard; your mission requires you to secure the uninterrupted march of the main body; and at the first contact you halt, thus interrupting the march (Par. 1021). The sooner you reach the point, the better are your chances for driving off the enemy if he is not too strong, or the quicker you find out his strength and give your commander in the rear the much desired information.

Sergeant Adams: Then I push ahead with the advance party, sending back the following message—

Captain (interrupting): It is not time to send a message. You know too little and in a few minutes you will be up with the point where you can hear what has happened and see the situation for yourself. Then you can send back a valuable message. When but a few moments delay will probably permit you to secure much more detailed information, it is generally best to wait for that short time and thus avoid using two messengers. When you reach the cross roads you find six men of the point deployed behind the fence, under cover of the trees along the County Road, just west of the Chester Pike, firing at the stone wall along the Mills' farm lane. The enemy appears to be deployed behind this stone wall, from the Chester Pike west for a distance of fifty yards, and his fire is much heavier than that of your point. You think he has at least twenty rifles there. You cannot see down the Chester Pike beyond the enemy's position. Your patrol on Sandy Ridge is midway between the 68 and 66 knolls, moving north. The ground in your front, west of the road, is a potato field; that east of the road as far as the swamp, is rough grass land.

Sergeant Adams: I give order, "Corporal Gibbs, deploy your squad to the right of the Pike and push forward between the Pike and the swamp. Corporal Hall (commands the point), continue a heavy fire. Here are six more men for your squad." I give him the four connecting files and two of the three men in the advance party whose squad is on patrol duty. "Corporal Jackson, get your squad under cover here. Lacey, run back to the major and tell him the point has been stopped by what appears to be twenty of the enemy deployed behind a stone wall across the valley 500 yards in our front. I am attacking with advance party."

Captain: Corporal Davis (commands patrol near Barton farm), you can hear the firing and see that the advance is stopped. What do you do?

Corporal Davis: I would head straight across for the clump of woods on the ridge just above the Mills' farm, moving as rapidly as possible.

Captain: That is all right. Sergeant, Corporal Hall's squad keeps up a heavy fire; Corporal Gibb's squad deploys to the right of the pike, rushes forward about 75 yards, but is forced to lie down by the enemy's fire, and opens fire. Corporal Gibbs, what would your command for firing be?

Corporal Gibbs: AT THE BOTTOM OF THAT WALL. BATTLE SIGHT. CLIP FIRE.

Captain: Why at the bottom of the wall?

Corporal Gibbs: The men are winded and excited and will probably fire high, so I gave them the bottom of the wall as an objective.

Captain: The enemy's fire seems as heavy as yours. Sergeant, what do you do?

Sergeant Adams: I give this order. "Corporal Jackson, deploy your squad as skirmishers on the left of Corporal Hall's squad and open fire." What effect does this additional fire have on the enemy?

Captain: His bullets seem to go higher and wider. You appear to be getting fire superiority over him.

Sergeant Adams: If I do not see any signs of the enemy being reënforced, dust in the road behind his position, etc., I take immediate command of the squads of Corporals Hall and Jackson, and lead them forward on a rush across the potato field.

Captain: Corporal Gibbs, what do you do when you see the other two squads rush?

Corporal Gibbs: I order, FIRE AT WILL, and urge the men to shoot rapidly in order to cover the advance.

Captain: Sergeant Adams' squads are forced to halt after advancing about 150 yards.

Corporal Gibbs: I keep up a hot fire until they can resume their firing, when I lead my squad forward in a rush.

Captain: What do you do, Sergeant?

Sergeant Adams: I would have the Corporals keep up a heavy fire. By this time I should think the support would be up to the cross roads.

Captain: It is, but have you given up your attack?

Sergeant Adams: If it looks as if I could drive the enemy out on my next rush, I do so, but otherwise I remain where I am, as I have no reserve under my control and the action has gotten too serious for me to risk anything more when my chief is practically on the ground to make the next decision. He should have heard something about what is on the Pike behind the enemy, from the patrol on Sandy Ridge.

Captain: Your solution seems correct to me. Why did you send Corporal Gibbs' squad up between the pike and the swamp?

Sergeant Adams: It looked as if he would strike the enemy from a better quarter; there appeared to be better cover that way, afforded by the turn in the road, which must have some weeds, etc., along it, and the swamp would prevent him from getting too far separated from the remainder of the advance party.

Captain: The Sergeant's orders for the attack were very good. He gave his squad leaders some authority and attached his extra men to a squad. He did not attempt to assume direct control of individual men, but managed the three squads and made the squad leaders manage the individual men. This is the secret of successful troop leading. His orders were short, plain and given in proper sequence.

Problem No. 3 (Infantry)

(See Fort Leavenworth map in pocket at back of book.)

1035. Situation.

A Blue battalion, in hostile country, is in camp for the night, August 5–6, at Sprong (ja'). At 9:00 P. M., August 5th, Lieutenant A, Adjutant gives a copy of the following order to Sergeant B:

1st Battalion, 1st Infantry,
Sprong, Kansas,
5 Aug., '09.

Field Orders No. 5.

1. The enemy's infantry is six miles east of FORT LEAVENWORTH. His cavalry patrols were seen at F (qg') today.

Our regiment will reach FRENCHMAN'S (oc') at noon tomorrow.

2. The battalion will march tomorrow to seize the ROCK ISLAND BRIDGE (q) at FORT LEAVENWORTH.

3. (a) The advance guard, consisting of 1st platoon Co. A and mounted orderlies B, C, and D, under Sergeant B, will precede the main body at 400 yards.

(b) The head of the main body will march at 6:30 A. M., from 19 via the 17 (jc')—15 (jg') 1—5 (lm')—FORT LEAVENWORTH (om') road.

4. The baggage will follow close behind the main body under escort of Corporal D and one squad, Co. B.

5. Send reports to head of main body.

C,
Major, Comdg.

Copies to the company commanders, to Sergeant B and Corporal D.

A. Required, 1. Give Sergeant B's estimate of the situation. (The estimate of the military situation includes the following points:

1. His orders or mission and how much discretion he is allowed.
2. The ground as it influences his duty.
3. The position, strength and probable intentions of the enemy.
4. Sergeant B's decision.)

Answer. 1. The size of the advance guard, its route and the distance it is to move in front of the main body are prescribed by Major C. Sergeant B is free to divide up the advance as he sees fit, to use the various parts so as to best keep open the way of the main body, maintain the distance of 400 yards in front of it, and protect it from surprise by the enemy.

2. The ground may be such as to make easy or to hinder reconnaissance, such as hills or woods; to impede or hasten the march, such as roads, streams, defiles; to offer good or poor defensive positions; to offer good or poor opportunities for an attack. Sergeant B sees from his map that the ground is rolling and open as far as Kern (ji') with good positions for reconnaissance and for defense or attack. There is a bridge over Salt Creek (ig') which has steep banks and will be a considerable obstacle if the bridge has been destroyed. From this creek to Kern the advance would be under effective fire from Hancock Hill (ki'), so that these heights must be seized before the main body reaches 15 (jg').

Beyond Kern the heavy woods make reconnaissance difficult and must be treated somewhat like a defile by the point. (Par. 991.)

3. There is little to fear from the main body of the enemy which is 11/2 miles farther from the Rock Island bridge than we are, but we know the enemy has cavalry. The size of the cavalry force is not known, and may be sufficient to cause us considerable delay, especially in the woods. The enemy's evident intention is to keep us from seizing the bridge.

4. Having considered all these points, Sergeant B comes to the following decision: ... (Before reading the decision as contained in the following paragraph, make one of your own.)

Answer: To have only an advance party with which to throw forward a point of 5 men 200 yards to the front and send out flankers, as needed (Par. 983); to send the three mounted orderlies well to the front of the point to gain early information of the enemy, especially on Hancock Hill (ji') and the ridge to the north of 11 (jj').

Required, 2. Sergeant B's order. (Par. 963.)

Answer. Given verbally to the platoon and mounted orderlies, at 9:30 P. M.

"The enemy's cavalry patrols were seen at F (qh') today; no hostile infantry is on this side of the Missouri river. The battalion will move tomorrow to Fort Leavenworth, leaving 19 (ja') at 6:30 A. M.

"This platoon and orderlies B, C, and D will form the advance guard, and will start from the hedge 400 yards east of 19 at 6:30 A. M. via the 17 (jc')—15 (jg')—5 (lm') road.

"The point, Corporal Smith and 4 men of his squad, will precede the remainder of the advance guard at 200 yards.

"I will be with the advance party. Privates X and Y will act as connecting files with the main body."

The flankers will be sent out from time to time by Sergeant B as necessary.

Required, 3. The flankers sent out by Sergeant B between 19 (ja') and 15 (jg').

Answer. A patrol of 3 men is sent to Hill 900 southeast of 19 (ja'), thence by Moss (kc') and Taylor (lc') houses to Hill 840 east of Taylor, thence to join at 15 (jg').

Two men are sent from the advance party as it passes Hill 875.5 (ie') to the top of this hill to reconnoiter to the front and northeast. These men return to the road and join after the advance party has reached Salt Creek. Two men are sent ahead of the advance party at a double time take position on "Hill 875 northeast of J. E. Daniels" place (jf') and reconnoiter to the northeast and east.

Reasons. The patrol sent out on the south moves out far enough to get a good view from the hills which an enemy could observe or fire into the column. There is no necessity of sending out flankers north of the road at first, because from the road itself a good view is obtained. Hills 875.5 and 875 give splendid points for observing all the ground to the north and east. (Don't send flankers out unless they are necessary.)

Required, 4. When the advance party reaches J. E. Daniels' house (je') a civilian leaves the house and starts toward 15. What action does Sergeant B take?

Required, 5. When the advance party reaches Salt Creek bridge (jg') the point signals "enemy in sight," and Private H reports that he saw about 6 or 8 mounted men ride up to the edge of the woods at Kern, halt a moment, and disappear. What action does Sergeant B take?

Answer. He at once sends a message back by Private H stating the facts. He then orders the advance party to move forward, hastens up to the point and directs it to continue the march, seeking cover of fences and ravines and hill top.

Required, 6. When the point reaches Schroeder (jh') it receives fire from the orchard at Kern. What action is taken?

Answer. The men in the point are moved rapidly down the hill and gain shelter in the ravines leading toward Kern. Two squads are rapidly placed in line along the ridge west of Schroeder and under cover of their fire the remainder of the advance party run down the hill at 10 yards distance to join the point. A squad of this force is then hurried forward to the Kern house. Here the squad is stopped by fire and Sergeant B deploys two more squads which advance by rushes and drive out the enemy, found to be 10 cavalrymen. The squads left at Schroeder now join at double time and the advance party moves forward, without having delayed the march of the main body.

Problem No. 4 (Infantry)

1036. Situation:

A Blue force of one regiment of infantry has outposts facing south on the line Pope Hill (sm')—National cemetery (pk')—E (qh'). A Red force is reported to have reached Soldiers' Home (3 miles south of Leavenworth) from the south at 7:00 o'clock this morning. Corporal A is directed by Sergeant B, in command of the left support at Rabbit Point (tn'), to take out a patrol toward the waterworks and south along the Esplanade (xo') to the Terminal bridge.

Required, 1. Give Sergeant B's orders to Corporal A.

Answer. "The enemy, strength unknown, was at Soldiers' Home at 7:00 o'clock this morning. Another patrol will advance along Grant avenue (tm').

"Our outposts will remain here for the day.

"Select from the first section a patrol and reconnoiter this road (Farragut avenue) as far as the waterworks (vn'), thence by Esplanade to the Terminal bridge, and report on the ground in our front. When you reach the Terminal bridge return if no enemy is seen.

"Send reports here."

Required, 2. How many men does Corporal A select, and why? (Par. 456.)

Answer. Five men are taken because the patrol is to reconnoiter, not to fight, and on account of the distance to go and lack of information of the enemy, 2 or 3 messages may have to be sent.

Required, 3. What equipment should Corporal A have? (Par. 457.)

Required, 4. State the points to be noted by Corporal A in selecting his patrol and what inspection does he make? (Par. 964.)

Answer. He selects Privates C, D, E, F and G, on account of their bravery, attention to duty and discretion. He directs them to carry one meal in their haversacks, full canteen and fifty rounds of ammunition. He then inspects them as to their physical condition, sees that they have proper equipment and that nothing to rattle or glisten is carried.

Required, 5. What does Corporal A next do? (Par. 965.)

Answer. He gives them their instructions as follows: "The enemy, strength unknown, was at Soldiers' Home (about three miles south of Leavenworth) at 7 o'clock this morning. There will be a friendly patrol along that road (pointing to Grant avenue). We are to reconnoiter along this road and down toward that bridge (pointing). Be very careful not to be seen, take advantage of all cover, and keep in touch with C and myself on this road at the point of the patrol. In case we get separated meet at the waterworks (vn')."

He then explains the signals to be used, and moves the patrol in, close order out along the road until it passes the sentinel at the bridge XV (un'), to whom he gives the direction to be taken by the patrol.

Required, 6. Upon leaving XV, what formation would the patrol take, and reasons for same. (Par. 968.)

Answer. Corporal A and Private C form the point on the road leading southwest of the waterworks; Private D moves on the left overlooking the railroad; Private E moves promptly up Corral creek (um') to the top of Grant Hill (um') to observe the country toward the southwest; Private F moves about 50 yards in rear of the point, followed at 50 yards by Private G.

Corporal A forms his patrol as stated because of the necessity of getting a view from the hill on each side. Only one man is sent out on each side because they can be plainly seen by the patrol on the road, and no connecting file is necessary. The distances taken along the road assure at least one man's escape, and Corporal A is in front to get a good view and to signal the flankers.

Problem No. 5 (Infantry)

1037. Situation:

The head of the patrol is now at the bridge, XVI (un') northwest of the waterworks.

Private E has reached the top of Grant Hill and signals the enemy in sight; the patrol halts and Corporal A moves out to meet Private E who is coming down toward the patrol. He says he saw three mounted men ride up to Grant and Metropolitan avenues (wm') from the south and after looking north a moment move west.

Required, 1. Corporal A's action. (Pars. 979 and .)

Answer. Corporal A at once writes the following message and sends it back by Private E:

"No. 1 Patrol, Company B,
Farragut Avenue,
Northwest of Waterworks,
10 May, '09, 8:30 A. M.

To Commander Blue Left Support,
Rabbit Point.

Three mounted Reds, seen by Private E, just now reconnoitered at Grant and Metropolitan avenues; they are moving west on Metropolitan avenue; the patrol will continue toward the Terminal bridge.

A,
Corporal."

Reasons. The message is sent because this is the first time the enemy has been seen, and they have not been reported north of Soldiers' Home before. The message should state who saw the enemy, and the man seeing them should always carry the message telling of the facts. The patrol would not allow this small hostile patrol to stop its advance, but would proceed on its route cautiously to avoid being seen, and to see if the Red cavalrymen are followed by others of the enemy.

Required, 2. Give the method of reconnoitering the buildings at the waterworks and coal mine. (Par. 996.)

Answer. Private D carefully examines the east side of the enclosures and buildings, while Private C examines the west side. The remainder of the patrol halts concealed in the cut west of the north enclosure, until C and D signal no enemy in sight, whereupon the patrol moves forward along the road (XV—3rd St.), C and D advancing rapidly between the buildings to the town where they join the patrol.

Required, 3. Give the route followed by E from Grant Hill to edge of Leavenworth.

Answer. He moves down the east slope of Grant Hill to the ravine just east of the old R. R. bed (um'), being careful to keep concealed from the direction of Leavenworth. He moves up the ravine, keeping a sharp lookout to the front, and moving rapidly until abreast, if he has fallen behind. He takes the branch ravine lying just west of Circus Hill (vm'), and moves up to its end. Here he halts and makes careful inspection of Metropolitan avenue and the street south into the city. Being sure the coast is clear, he darts across the narrow ridge south of Circus Hill to the ravine to the east and then joins the patrol. He reports to Corporal A any indication of the enemy he may have seen.

Problem No. 6 (Infantry)

1038. Situation:

A Blue force holds Fort Leavenworth (om') in hostile country. Outposts occupy the line Salt Creek Hill (gh')—13 (ij')—Sheridan's Drive, (mi') against the Reds advancing from the northwest.

At 4:30 P. M., June 25th, Sergeant A is given the following orders by Captain B, commanding the support:

"The enemy will probably reach Kickapoo late today. Our outposts extend as far north as Salt Creek Hill. There were six of our men prisoners at 45 (de') this afternoon at 1 o'clock, being held by 15 home guards at Kickapoo. Take —— men from the company and move to Kickapoo, recapture the prisoners and gain all the information you can of the enemy north of there."

Required, 1. How many men does Captain B name, and why? (Par. 960.)

Answer. Thirty men are assigned.

Reason. This is twice as many as the enemy holding the prisoners, and to secure secrecy no larger force than is absolutely necessary should be taken. This force will allow men to surround the enemy while the remainder rush them.

Required, 2. Give the order of Sergeant A to his patrol. (See 6th requirement, Problem 4.)

Required, 3. What route will the patrol take?

Answer, 11 (jj')—13 (ij')—Salt Creek Hill (gh')—and along the edge of the woods east of the M. P. R. R. (fg') as far as the bridge opposite Kickapoo Hill—thence up Kickapoo Hill toward 45 (de').

Reasons. Since the patrol's orders do not require any reconnaissance before reaching Kickapoo the shortest and most practical route is chosen. The route as far as Salt Creek Hill lies behind our outpost line and is thus protected. The main roads are avoided because they will be carefully watched by the enemy. The edge of the woods east of the M. P. Ry. (beginning about ff') gives good cover and by moving to the bridge the patrol can probably sneak close in on the enemy and capture them by surprise.

Problem No. 7 (Infantry)

1039. Situation:

The patrol reaches the top of Kickapoo Hill (cd'). Sergeant A and Private C move cautiously to the top and see the six prisoners in the cemetery (cd') just west of Kickapoo Hill, and a Red sentinel at each corner. Just west of the cemetery are about 10 more Reds. No others are visible.

Required, 1. What decision does Sergeant A make and what does he do?

Answer. He decides to capture the enemy by surprise. He leaves Private C to watch and, moving cautiously back to his patrol, makes the following dispositions: Corporal D with 10 men to move up to Private C and cover the enemy, remaining concealed. He takes the remainder of the patrol with fixed bayonets around the northeast slope of Kickapoo Hill in the woods and moves up the ravine toward 29. When his detachment arrives within about 100 yards of the enemy, they charge bayonet and rush them. Corporal D's party at the same time rush in from the opposite side. (Note: The enemy are demoralized by the surprise and are captured without a shot being fired.)

Required, 2. What action does Sergeant A now take?

Answer. He causes the enemy to be kept apart while he and his noncommissioned officers question them separately. He then questions the Blue prisoners, and furnishing them the guns taken from the Reds, sends them and the captured Reds back to our line under Corporal D, with a written message giving the information secured from his questions. (Par. 984.)

Required, 3. What does he then do?

Answer. Places his main body in concealment at the Cemetery (cd') and sends a patrol under Corporal H via 35–41–43 and one under Corporal F via 29–27–23 west to learn further of the enemy in execution of the second part of his orders.

The patrol under Corporal H sends back the following message:

"No 1. Patrol, Company A, 1st Infantry,
21 June, '09; 5:30 P. M.

Commander Expeditionary Patrol at 45:

A column of infantry is moving east about 1 mile west of Schweizer (aa'); about 800 yards in front of this body is another small body with 8 to 10 men 300 yards still farther east. It took the main body 2 min., 45 sec. to pass a point on the road. I remain in observation.

H,
Corporal."

Required, 3. The size of the command reported by Corporal H and its formation. (Par. 983.)

Answer. One battalion infantry (512 men), preceded by 1 section at advance guard. The advance guard having only advance party and point, 23/4 minutes × 175 = 481 men in the main body, leaving about 32 men for the advance men for the advance guard.

Problem No. 8 (Infantry)

1040. General Situation:

A Blue force of one regiment of infantry has outposts facing south on the line Pope Hill (sm'), National Cemetery (qk')—E (qi'). A Red force moving north reached Soldiers' Home at 7 o'clock this morning.

Special Situation:

Corporal B is chosen by Sergeant A, commander of the right support at the National Cemetery, to take a patrol south as far as 20th street (yf') and Metropolitan avenue (wh'), to report on the ground along the route, and to reconnoiter the enemy. A friendly patrol moves along Sheridan's Drive (i)—Atchison Hill (rg')—Southwest Hill (ue'), and one on Prison Lane (rk').

Required, 1. Sergeant A's orders, verbatim (that is, word for word).

2. Give the various details attended to by Corporal B before he moves out with his patrol.

3. What is the formation of the patrol when its point is at E (qh')?

4. When the patrol reaches 14 (ug'), how are the intersecting roads reconnoitered?

5. Four mounted men are seen riding west at a walk at 64 (wb'). What action does Corporal A take?

6. Describe the ground passed over by the patrol.

Problem No. 9 (Infantry)

1041. Situation:

The enemy is moving east toward Frenchman (oc') and is expected to reach there early tomorrow. A company at 72 (uj') forms the left support of an outpost in hostile country, on the line 70 (vj')—National Cemetery (qj'). At 4 P. M. Sergeant A is ordered to take a patrol of 12 men and go to Frenchman and destroy the bridge there, and remain in observation in that vicinity all night.

Required, 1. His orders to the patrol.

2. The route the patrol will follow, and its formation crossing the Atchison Hill—Government Hill ridge.

3. Give the conduct of the patrol from Atchison Hill (rg')—Government Hill (tf') to its position at the bridge at Frenchman.

General Situation:

A Blue squadron is camped for the night at Waterworks (vn'), Fort Leavenworth, and has outposts on the line XIV (un')—Grant Hill (um')—Prison Hill (wk'). A Red force is reported to be advancing from the north on Kickapoo (cb').

Problem No. 10 (Cavalry)

1042. Special Situation:

Lieutenant A, commanding the left support on Prison Hill, at 5 P. M., directs Sergeant Jones to take a patrol of 5 men from his platoon and move via Atchison Cross (ug') to the vicinity of Kickapoo and secure information of any enemy that may be in that locality. Another patrol is to go via Fort Leavenworth (ol').

Required, 1. The order given by Lieutenant A, verbatim. (Pars. 963 and .)

Answer. "Sergeant Jones, the enemy is north of Kickapoo, moving on that place. This squadron will remain here tonight; Sergeant B will take a patrol through Fort Leavenworth.

"Select a patrol of 5 men from your platoon and move out via Frenchman's (oc') toward Kickapoo.

"Secure any information you can of the enemy in that locality.

"Report on the condition of the bridges between here and 47 (fd').

"You may have to stay out over night.

"Send messages here."

Sergeant Jones selects five good men, directs them to take one cooked ration each and canteen full of water. He inspects the men and horses carefully; sees that no horse of conspicuous color or that neighs is taken. Explains the orders to his men, etc., as was done in the infantry patrol.

Required, 2. What route does the patrol take, and why?

Answer. Metropolitan avenue (w)—70 (vj')—72 (vj')—14 (ug')—Frenchman (oc')—17 (jc')—47 (ec').

Reasons. The enemy is distant and Kickapoo, the objective of the patrol, is seen from the map, which Sergeant Jones has, to be over an hour's ride at a walk and trot. It is not at all probable that the enemy will be met until the patrol reaches the vicinity of Kickapoo and Sergeant Jones decides to take the shortest and best road though it is a main highway, instead of Sheridan's Drive (j) of the F (qg')—15 (jg') lane.

It is always well for a patrol to avoid main highways when the enemy is near, especially in hostile country, but here the time saved more than justifies the use of the direct route.

Problem No. 11 (Cavalry)

1043. Same situation as Problem 1.

Required, 1. The formation and conduct of the patrol as far as Frenchman's.

Answer. Sergeant Jones determines to move at a walk and trot (5 miles per hour) in order to reach the vicinity of Kickapoo and take up a position of observation before night. Sergeant Jones and Private B are in the lead, 2 men about 100 yards to the rear, the remaining 2 men about 75 yards in the rear of these. They move out at a trot along the road until Atchison Cross is reached. The two cross roads are reconnoitered without halting the patrol, inasmuch as from the cross roads a good view is had north and south.

From Atchison Cross to 16 (sf') the patrol moves at a walk, being up a slope from 4 to 6 degrees. Usually such a place would be rushed through, but the distance of the enemy makes this unnecessary. No scouting is done off the road through the woods, because of the distance of the enemy. On reaching the top of the hill the patrol is halted while Sergeant Jones moves up to the high ground south of the road at the crest, and in concealment searches with his glasses the road as far as Frenchman's, especially the village beyond G (qf'). Seeing no signs of the enemy he moves the patrol down the hill at a walk until the cut is passed and there takes a fast trot, so as to avoid being long in a position where they could be seen from the direction of Kickapoo. The same formation and gait are maintained as far as Gauss' (pd'), where a walk is taken to rest the horses and to gain opportunity to see if any enemy are holding the bridge at Frenchman's.

Situation:

Just as the patrol comes to a walk Sergeant Jones sees what appears to be a dismounted patrol moving south over the ridge about 650 yards north of Frenchman's. He can see three men.

Required, 2. Action taken by Sergeant Jones.

Answer. The patrol is moved into the orchard just off the road, while Sergeant Jones moves quickly to the top of the hill and, concealed by the trees, examines the road north to see if the 3 men are followed by others forming a part of a larger patrol or column. He finds the three men are not followed.

Required, 3. What does he do next?

Answer. He determines to capture the patrol by surprise. He has the horses led over south of the orchard hill so as not to be visible to the enemy. He then distributes his men along the north edge of the orchard, himself nearest the bridge, 2 men 75 yards back along the road toward G (qf'), then 2 men 75 yards farther along toward G. As the third man comes opposite him, Sergeant Jones cries "Halt," which is the signal for the other parties to similarly hold up their men.

Reasons. Sergeant Jones might either capture the hostile patrol or let it pass, and then proceed on his road. Since they are the first enemy seen and there is such a good chance to capture them, and as they may furnish definite information of the enemy's main force, he decides as stated. There is an objection in capturing them that he will have to send one or two men to take them to camp. The patrol is placed as described above so as to have the two men opposite each of the enemy, except for Sergeant Jones, who is alone. By thus covering each man of the hostile patrol by two of our men, they will at once see the folly of an effort to escape and no shot need be fired. One man is holding the horses.

Problem No. 12 (Cavalry)

1044. Same situation as Problem 10.

Required:

1. What action does Sergeant Jones take before leaving the vicinity of Frenchman's?

2. Give the formation and conduct of the patrol after leaving here.

3. Give the report submitted by Sergeant Jones under his instructions in regard to bridges. (Par. 1000.)

At 6:30 P. M. (it is dark at 7:30) the patrol reaches 17 (jc').

4. Give the route followed from here and the disposition of the patrol made for the night.

Problem No. 13 (Cavalry)

1045. Situation:

The Missouri river is the boundary between hostile countries.

A Blue separate brigade (3 regiments infantry, 1 squadron cavalry, 1 battery field artillery) is moving from Winchester (19 miles west of Leavenworth) to seize the Rock Island bridge (q) across the Missouri river at Fort Leavenworth. The cavalry squadron is camped at Lowemont, 8 miles west of Leavenworth, for night June 4–5. At 3 P. M. Sergeant Jones is directed to take a patrol of six men and move via the Rock Island bridge into Missouri and gain information of the enemy reported to be now just east of the river.

Required, 1. Give the formation of the patrol when it first comes on the map.

Required, 2. Give the conduct of the patrol from Mottin's (oa') to G (qf').

At Frenchman's, Sergeant Jones met a farmer coming from Fort Leavenworth, who said about 200 hostile cavalry were seen just east of the Missouri about 2 P. M., moving towards the Terminal Bridge (z).

Required, 3. Action of Sergeant Jones. (Does he hold the man? Does he send a message? Does he change his plans or direction of march?)

The patrol reaches the top of the hill, Sheridan's Drive—Government Hill (tf').

Required, 4. What action does Sergeant Jones take before proceeding east?

Flank Guards

1046. The flanks of a column are ordinarily protected by the advance guard, which sends out patrols to carefully examine the country on both sides of the line of march. In some cases, however, the direction of march of the column is such that there is a great danger of the enemy's striking it in flank and some special provision is necessary to furnish additional security on the threatened flank. This is done by having a detachment, called a flank guard, march off the exposed flank. The flank guard usually follows a road, parallel to the one on which the column is marching and at least 1,000 yards (effective rifle range) beyond it. If hostile artillery is feared this distance is much greater.

The flank guard regulates its march so as to continue abreast of the advance guard of the main column. It takes a formation similar to an advance guard, does most of its patrolling to the front and on the exposed flank, and keeps in constant touch with the main column by means of mounted or dismounted messengers.

In case the enemy is encountered the flank guard drives him off if practicable or takes up a defensive position, protecting the march of the main column, and preventing the enemy from disturbing the latter's march.

Rear Guard

1047. Definition and Duties. A rear guard is a detachment of a marching column following in rear to protect the main column from being surprised and to prevent the march from being delayed or interrupted.

When the main column is marching toward the enemy the rear guard is very small and its duties relatively unimportant. It is principally occupied in gathering up stragglers.

When the main column is marching away from the enemy (retreating) the rear guard is all important. It covers the retreat of the main body, preventing the enemy from harassing or delaying its march.

1048. Strength. The strength of a rear guard is slightly greater than that of an advance guard, as it cannot expect, like the latter, to be reinforced in case it is attacked, as the main column is marching away from it and avoiding a fight.

1049. Form of Order. The rear guard commander, on the receipt of the retreat order, issues a rear guard order, according to the form given in the Field Service Regulations.

The distance of a rear guard from the main body and its formation are similar to those of an advance guard. The elements corresponding to the advance cavalry, the point, and the advance party of an advance guard are termed the rear cavalry, rear point and rear party, respectively. The support and reserve retain the same designations.

A rear guard formed during an engagement to cover the withdrawal or retreat of the main body, may first be compelled to take up a defensive position behind which the main body forms up and moves off. It may be forced to withdraw from this position by successive skirmish lines, gradually forming up in column on the road as it clears itself from fighting contact with the enemy.

The rate of march of the rear guard depends upon that of the main body. The main body may be much disorganized and fatigued, necessitating long halts and a slow marching rate.

1050. Action of the Rear Guard. The withdrawal of defeated troops is delayed, if possible, until night. If it becomes necessary to begin a retreat while an engagement is in progress, the rear guard is organized and takes up a defensive position generally behind the fighting line; the latter then falls back and assembles under cover of the rear guard.

The rear cavalry gives away before the enemy's pursuit only when absolutely necessary, maintains communication with and sends information to the rear guard commander, and pays special attention to the weak points in the retreat, namely, the flanks. It makes use of every kind of action of which it is capable, according to the situation, and unless greatly outnumbered by hostile cavalry, it causes considerable delay to the enemy.

When the enemy is conducting an energetic pursuit the rear guard effects its withdrawal by taking up a succession of defensive positions (that is, where the nature of the ground enables the rear guard to defend itself well) and compelling the enemy to attack or turn them. (It should be understood that these successive defensive positions must, in the case of a large force, be from two to four miles apart and in the case of a small force at least one-half mile apart—not a few hundred yards as is frequently attempted in peace maneuvers.)

When the enemy's dispositions for attack are nearly completed, the rear guard begins to fall back, the cavalry on the flanks being usually the last to leave. The commander designates a part of the rear guard to cover the withdrawal of the remainder; the latter then falls back to a new position in rear, and in turn covers the withdrawal of the troops in front. These operations compel the enemy continually to deploy or make turning movements, and constantly retard his advance.

The pursuit may be further delayed by obstacles placed in the enemy's path; bridges are burned or blown up; boats removed or destroyed; fords and roads obstructed; tracks torn up; telegraph lines cut, and houses, villages, woods and fields fired. Demolitions and obstructions are prepared by engineers, assisted, if necessary, by other troops detailed from the reserve, and are completed by the mounted engineers of the rear party at the last moment.

The instructions of the supreme commander govern in the demolition of important structures.

Outposts

(See "Outpost," Par. 887)

1051. Definition and Duties. Outposts are detachments thrown out to the front and flanks of a force that is in camp or bivouac, to protect the main body from being surprised and to insure its undisturbed rest. In fact, an outpost is merely a stationary advance guard. Its duties, in general, are to observe and resist—to observe the enemy, and to resist him in case of attack. Specifically its duties are:

(a) To observe toward the front and flanks by means of stationary sentinels and patrols, in order to locate the enemy's whereabouts and learn promptly of his movements, thus making it impossible for him to surprise us.

(b) To prevent the main body from being observed or disturbed.

(c) In case of attack, to check the enemy long enough to enable the main body to prepare for action and make the necessary dispositions.

1052. Size. The size of the outpost will depend upon many circumstances, such as the size of the whole command, the nearness of the enemy, the nature of the ground, etc. A suitable strength for an outpost may vary from a very small fraction to one-third of the whole force. However, in practice it seldom exceeds one-sixth of the whole force—as a rule, if it be greater, the efficiency of the troops will be impaired. For a single company in bivouac a few sentinels and patrols will suffice; for a large command, a more elaborate outpost system must be provided. The most economical form of outpost is furnished by keeping close contact with the enemy by means of outpost patrols, in conjunction with resisting detachments on the avenues of approach.

Troops at a halt are supposed to be resting, night or day, and the fewer on outpost the more troops will there be resting, and thus husbanding their strength for approaching marches and encounters with the enemy. Outpost duty is about the most exhausting and fatiguing work a soldier performs. It is, therefore, evident that not a man or horse more than is absolutely necessary should be employed, and that the commander should use careful judgment in determining the strength of the outpost, and the chiefs of the various outpost subdivisions should be equally careful in disposing their men so as to permit the greatest possible number to rest and sleep undisturbed, but at the same time always considering the safety of the main body as the chief duty.

1053. Composition. The composition of the outpost will, as a rule, depend upon the size and composition of the command, but a mixed outpost is composed principally of infantry, which is charged with the duty of local observation, especially at night, and with resisting the enemy, in case of attack, long enough for the main body to prepare for action.

The cavalry is charged with the duty of reconnaissance, and is very useful in open country during the day.

Artillery is useful to outposts when its fire can sweep defiles or large open spaces and when it commands positions that might be occupied by hostile artillery.

Machine guns are useful to command approaches and check sudden advances of the enemy.

Engineers are attached to an outpost to assist in constructing entrenchments, clearing the field of fire, opening communication laterally and to the rear. The outpost should be composed of complete organizations. For example, if the outpost is to consist of one company, do not have some of the platoons from one company and the others from another, and if it is to consist of one battalion, do not have some of the companies from one battalion and others from another, etc.

Formation of Outposts

1054. Subdivisions. As in the case of an advance guard, the outpost of a large force is divided into elements or parts, that gradually increase in size from front to rear. These, in order from the main body, are the reserve, the line of supports, the line of outguards, and the advance cavalry, and their formation, as shown by the drawing on the preceding page, may be likened to an open hand, with the fingers apart and extended, the wrist representing the main body, the knuckles the line of supports, the first joints the line of outguards, the second joints the line of sentinels and the finger tips the advance cavalry.

In case of attack each part is charged with holding the enemy in check until the larger element, next in rear, has time to deploy and prepare for action.

1055. Distances Between the Subdivisions. The distances separating the main body, the line of supports, the line of outguards, the line of sentries and the advance cavalry, will depend upon circumstances. There can be no uniformity in the distance between supports and reserves, nor between outguards and supports, even in the same outpost. The avenues of approach and the important features of the ground will largely control the exact positions of the different parts of the outposts. The basic principle upon which the distances are based, is: The distance between any two parts of the outpost must be great enough to give the one in rear time to deploy and prepare for action in case of attack, and the distance of the whole outpost from the main body must, in the case of small commands, be sufficiently great to hold the enemy beyond effective rifle range until the main body can deploy, and, in case of large commands, it must be sufficiently great to hold the enemy beyond effective artillery range until the main body can deploy.

It is, therefore, evident that the distances will be materially affected not only by the size of the main body, but also by the nature of the cover afforded by the ground.

The following is given merely as a very general guide, subject to many changes:

Distance to next element in rear.

Advance cavalry 2 to 6 miles

Supports (Generally two or more) Sentinels (furnished by outguard) 20 to 40 yds.

Outguards (furnished by support) 200 to 500 yds.

Support proper furnishes majority of patrols. 400 to 800 yds.

Reserve (usually omitted in small commands) 1/2 to 2 miles

1056. Advance Cavalry. The advance cavalry is that part of the outpost sent out in front of all foot troops. It generally operates two to six miles beyond the outpost infantry, reconnoitering far to the front and flanks in order to guard the camp against surprise by artillery fire and to give early information of the enemy's movements.

After dusk the bulk of the cavalry usually withdraws to a camp in rear of the outpost reserve, where it can rest securely after the day's hard work and the horses can be fresh for the next day. Several mounted patrols are usually left for the night at junctions or forks on the principal roads to the front, from one to four miles beyond the infantry line of observation.

1057. Supports. The supports constitute a line of supporting and resisting detachments, varying in size from a half a company to a battalion. In outposts consisting of a battalion or more the supports usually comprise about one-half of the infantry. Supports are numbered numerically consecutively from right to left and are placed at the more important points on the outpost line, on or near the line on which resistance is to be made in case of attack.

As a rule, roads exercise the greatest influence on the location of supports, and a support will generally be placed on or near a road.

Each support has assigned to it a definite, clearly-defined section of front that it is to cover, and the support should be located as centrally as possible thereto.

1058. Outguards. The outguards constitute the line of small detachments farthest to the front and nearest to the enemy, and their duty is to maintain uninterrupted observation of the ground in front and on the flanks; to report promptly hostile movements and other information relating to the enemy; to prevent unauthorized persons from crossing the line of observation; to drive off small parties of the enemy, and to make temporary resistance to larger bodies. For convenience outguards are classified as pickets, sentry squads, and cossack posts. They are numbered consecutively from right to left in each support.

1059. A picket is a group consisting of two or more squads, ordinarily not exceeding half a company, posted in the line of outguards to cover a given sector. It furnishes patrols and one or more sentinels, double sentinels, sentry, squads, or cossack posts for observation.

Pickets are placed at the more important points in the line of outguards, such as road forks. The strength of each depends upon the number of small groups required to observe properly its sector.

1060. A sentry squad is a squad posted in observation at an indicated point. It posts a double sentinel in observation, the remaining men resting near by and furnishing the reliefs of sentinels. In some cases it may be required to furnish a patrol.

1061. A cossack post consists of four men. It is an observation group similar to a sentry squad; but employs a single sentinel.

At night, it will sometimes be advisable to place some of the outguards or their sentinels in a position different from that which they occupy in the daytime. In such case the ground should be carefully studied before dark and the change made at dusk. However, a change in the position of the outguard will be exceptional.

1062. Sentinels are generally used singly in daytime, but at night double sentinels will be required in most cases. Sentinels furnished by cossack posts or sentry squads are kept near their group. Those furnished by pickets may be as far as 100 yards away.

Every sentinel should be able to communicate readily with the body to which he belongs.

Sentinel posts are numbered consecutively from right to left in each outguard. Sentry squads and cossack posts furnished by pickets are counted as sentinel posts.

If practicable, troops on outpost duty are concealed and all movements made so as to avoid observation by the enemy; sentinels are posted so as to have a clear view to the front and, if practicable (though it is rarely possible), so as to be able, by day, to see the sentinels of the adjoining outguards. Double sentinels are posted near enough to each other to be able to communicate easily in ordinary voice.

Sentinels are generally on duty two hours out of six. For every sentinel and for every patrol there should be at least three reliefs; therefore, one-third the strength of the outguards gives the greatest number of men that should be on duty as sentinels and patrols at one time.

Skillful selection of the posts of sentinels increases their field of observation. High points, under cover, are advantageous by night as well as by day; they increase the range of vision and afford greater facilities for seeing lights and hearing noises. Observers with good field glasses may be placed on high buildings, on church steeples or in high trees.

Glittering objects on uniform or equipment should be concealed. It is seldom necessary to fix bayonets, except at night, in dense fog, or in very close country.

Reliefs, visiting patrols, and inspecting officers, approach sentinels from the rear, remaining under cover if possible.

1063. Reserve. The reserve forms a general support for the line of resistance. It is, therefore, centrally located near the junction of roads coming from the direction of the enemy, and in concealment if practicable.

Of the troops detailed for outpost duty, about one-half of the infantry, generally all of the artillery, and the cavalry not otherwise employed, are assigned to the reserve. If the outpost consists of less than two companies the reserve may be omitted altogether.

The arms are stacked and the equipments (except cartridge belts) may be removed. Roads communicating with the supports are opened.

When necessary, the outpost order states what is to be done in case of attack, designates places of assembly and provides for interior guards. Interior guards are posted in the camp of the reserve or main body to maintain order, and furnish additional security. Additional instructions may be given for messing, feeding, watering, etc. In the vicinity of the enemy or at night a portion of the infantry may be required to remain under arms, the cavalry to hold their horses (cinches loosened), and the artillery to remain in harness, or take up a combat position.

In case of alarm, the reserve prepares for action without delay, and word is sent to the main body. In combat, the reserve reinforces the line of resistance, and if unable to check the enemy until the arrival of the main body, delays him as much as possible.

The distance of the reserve from the line of resistance varies, but is generally about half a mile; in outposts of four companies or less this distance may be as small as 400 yards.

1064. Patrols. Instead of using outguards along the entire front of observation, part of this front may be covered by patrols only. These should be used to cover such sections of the front as can be crossed by the enemy only with difficulty and over which he is not likely to attempt a crossing after dark.

In daylight much of the local patrolling may be dispensed with if the country can be seen from the posts of the sentinels. However, patrols should frequently be pushed well to the front unless the ground in that direction is exceptionally open.

Patrols must be used to keep up connection between the parts of the outpost except when, during daylight, certain fractions or groups are mutually visible. After dark this connection must be maintained throughout the outpost except where the larger subdivisions are provided with wire communication.

The following patrols are usually sent out from the main bodies of the supports:

(a) Patrols of from three men to a squad are sent along the roads and trails in the direction of the enemy, for a distance of from one to five miles, depending on how close the enemy is supposed to be, whether or not there is any advance cavalry out, and how long the outpost has been in position. The extreme right and left supports send patrols well out on the roads to the flanks. These patrols generally operate continuously as soon as one returns from the front, or possibly even before it returns, another goes out in the same general direction to cover the same country. Frequently a patrol is sent out along a road to the front for two or three miles with orders to remain out until some stated time—for example, 4 P. M., dusk or dawn. It sends in important information, and remains out near the extremity of its route, keeping a close watch on the surrounding country.

An effort should always be made to secure and maintain contact with the enemy, if within a reasonable distance, in order that his movements or lack of movement may be constantly watched and reported on. The usual tendency is towards a failure to send these patrols far enough to the front and for the patrol leader to overestimate the distance he has traveled. A mile through strange country with the ever-present possibility of encountering the enemy seems three miles to the novice.

At night the patrols generally confine their movements to the roads, usually remaining quietly on the alert near the most advanced point of their route to the front.

The majority of such patrols are sent out to secure information of the enemy—reconnoitering patrols—and they avoid fighting and hostile patrols, endeavoring to get in touch with the enemy's main force. Other patrols are sometimes sent out to prevent hostile detachments from approaching the outposts; they endeavor to locate the hostile patrols, drive them back, preventing them from gaining any vantage point from which they can observe the outpost line. These are called combat patrols and have an entirely different mission from reconnoitering patrols.

(b) Patrols of from two men to a squad, usually two men, are sent from the support around the line of its outguards, connecting with the outguards of the adjacent supports, if practicable. These are "visiting patrols," and they serve to keep the outguards of a support in touch with it and with each other; to keep the commander of a support in touch with his outguards and the adjacent supports; and to reconnoiter the ground between the outguards. Since a hostile force of any size is practically forced to keep to the roads, there are rarely ever any supports and very few outguards posted off the roads, the intervals being covered by patrols, as just described.

When going out a patrol will always inform the nearest sentinel of the direction it will take and its probable route and hour of return.

1065. Detail for Patrols. Since for every patrol of four men, twelve are required (3 reliefs of 4 men each), the importance of sending out just enough men and not one more than is actually needed, can readily be understood. As fast as one visiting patrol completes its round, another should usually be sent out, possibly going the rounds by a slightly different route or in the reverse direction. The same generally applies to the reconnoitering and combat patrols, though frequently they are sent out for the entire day, afternoon or night, and no 2d and 3d relief is required. Three reliefs are required for the sentinel or sentinels at the post of the supports, so care should be taken to establish but one post, if it can do all that is required. It should not be considered that every man in the support should be on duty or on a relief for an outguard, a patrol or sentinel post. There should be as many men as possible in the main body of a support (this term is used to distinguish this body from the support proper, which includes the outguards and their sentinels) who only have no duty other than being instantly available in case of attack.

1066. Flags of Truce. Upon the approach of a flag of truce, the sentry will at once notify the commander of the outguard, who will in turn send word to the commander of the outpost and ask for instructions. One or more men will advance to the front and halt the party at such distance as to prevent any of them from overlooking the outposts. As soon as halted, the party will be ordered to face in the opposite direction. If permission is given to pass the party through the outpost line, they will be blindfolded and led under escort to the commander of the outpost. No conversation, except by permission of the outpost commander, is to be allowed on any subject, under any pretext, with the persons bearing the flag of truce.

1067. Entrenchments and Obstacles. The positions held by the subdivisions of an outpost should generally be strengthened by the construction of entrenchments and obstacles, but conditions may render this unnecessary.

1068. Concealment. Troops on outpost must keep concealed as much as is consistent with the proper performance of their duties; especially should they avoid the sky line.

1069. Detached Posts. In addition to ordinary outguards, the outpost commander may detail from the reserve one or more detached posts to cover roads or areas not in general line assigned to the supports.

In like manner the commander of the whole force may order detached posts to be sent from the main body to cover important roads or localities not included in the outpost line.

Detached posts may be sent out to hold points which are of importance to the outpost cavalry, such as a ford or a junction of roads; or to occupy positions especially favorable for observation, but too far to the front to be included in the line of observation; or to protect flanks of the outpost position. Such posts are generally established by the outpost commander, but a support commander might find it necessary to establish a post practically detached from the rest of his command. They usually vary in strength from a squad to a platoon. The number and strength of detached posts are reduced to the absolute needs of the situation.

1070. Examining Posts. An examining post is a small detachment, under the command of an officer or a noncommissioned officer, stationed at some convenient point to examine strangers and to receive bearers Of flags of truce brought in by the outguards or patrols.

Though the employment of examining posts is not general in field operations, there are many occasions when their use is important; for example: When the outguards do not speak the language of the country or of the enemy; when preparations are being made for a movement and strict scrutiny at the outguards is ordered: at sieges, whether in attack or defense. When such posts, are used, strangers approaching the line of observation are passed along the line to an examining post.

No one except the commander is allowed to speak to persons brought to an examining post. Prisoners and deserters are at once sent under guard to the rear.

1071. Cavalry Outpost. Independent cavalry covering a command or on special missions, and occasionally the advance cavalry of a mixed command, bivouac when night overtakes them, and in such cases furnish their own outposts. The outposts are established, in the main, in accordance with the foregoing principles, care being taken to confine outpost work to the lowest limits consistent with safety. No precaution, however, should be omitted, as the cavalry is generally in close proximity to the enemy, and often in territory where the inhabitants are hostile.

The line of resistance is occupied by the supports, the latter sending out the necessary outguards and patrols. Each outguard furnishes its own vedettes (mounted sentinels), or sentinels. Due to the mobility of cavalry, the distances are generally greater than in an outpost for a mixed command. An outguard of four troopers is convenient for the day time, but should be doubled at night, and at important points made even stronger. The sentinels are generally dismounted, their horses being left with those of the outguards.

Mounted cavalry at night can offer little resistance; the supports and outguards are therefore generally dismounted, the horses being under cover in rear, and the positions are strengthened by intrenchments and obstacles. By holding villages, bridges, defiles, etc., with dismounted rifle fire, cavalry can greatly delay a superior force.

There should always be easy communication along the line of resistance to enable the cavalry to concentrate at a threatened point.

A support of one squadron covers with its outposts a section rarely longer than two miles.

As such a line is of necessity weak, the principal reliance is placed on distant patrolling. If threatened by infantry, timely information enables the threatened point to be reinforced, or the cavalry to withdraw to a place of safety. If there is danger from hostile cavalry, the roads in front are blocked at suitable points, such as bridges, fords, defiles, etc., by a succession of obstacles and are defended by a few dismounted men. When compelled to fall back these men mount and ride rapidly to the next obstacle in rear and there take up a new position. As the march of cavalry at night is, as a rule, confined to roads, such tactics seriously delay its advance.

In accordance with the situation and the orders they have received, the support commanders arrange for feeding, watering, cooking, resting and patrolling. During the night the horses of the outguards remain saddled and bridled. During the day time cinches may be loosened, one-third of the horses at a time. Feeding and watering are done by reliefs. Horses being fed are removed a short distance from the others.

Independent cavalry generally remains in outpost position for the night only, its advance being resumed on the following day; if stopped by the enemy, it is drawn off to the flanks upon the approach of its own infantry.

Establishing the Outpost

1072. The outpost is posted as quickly as possible, so that the troops can the sooner obtain rest. Until the leading outpost troops are able to assume their duties, temporary protection, known as the march outpost, is furnished by the nearest available troops.

Upon receipt of the halt order from the commander of the main column, the outpost commander issues the outpost order with the least practicable delay.

The halt order, besides giving the necessary information and assigning camp sites to the parts of the command, details the troops to constitute the outpost, assigns a commander therefor, designates the general line to be occupied, and, when practicable, points out the position to be held in case of attack.

The outpost order gives such available information of the situation as is necessary to the complete and proper guidance of subordinates; designates the troops to constitute the supports; assigns their location and the sector each is to cover; provides for the necessary detached posts; indicates any special reconnaissance that is to be made; orders the location and disposition of the reserve; disposes of the train if the same is ordered to join the outpost; and informs subordinates where information will be sent. In large commands it may often be necessary to give the order from the map, but usually the outpost commander will have to make some preliminary reconnaissance, unless he has an accurate and detailed map.

Generally it is preferable for the outpost commander to give verbal orders to his support commanders from some locality which overlooks the terrain. The time and locality should be so selected that the support commanders may join their commands and conduct them to their positions without causing unnecessary delay to their troops. The reserve commander should, if possible, receive his orders at the same time as the support commanders. Subordinates to whom he gives orders separately should be informed of the location of other parts of the outpost.

1073. After issuing the initial orders, the outpost commander inspects the outpost, orders the necessary changes or additions, and sends his superior a report of his dispositions.

The reserve is marched to its post by its commander, who then sends out such detachments as have been ordered and places the rest in camp or bivouac, over which at least one sentinel should be posted. Connection must be maintained with the main body, the supports, and nearby detached posts.

The supports march to their posts, using the necessary covering detachments when in advance of the march outpost. A support commander's order should fully explain the situation to subordinates, or to the entire command, if it be small. It should detail the troops for the different outguards and, when necessary, define the sector each is to cover. It should provide the necessary sentinels at the post of the support, the patrols to be sent therefrom, and should arrange for the necessary intrenching.

In posting his command the support commander must seek to cover his sector (the front that he is to look after) in such manner that the enemy can not reach, in dangerous numbers and unobserved, the position of the support or pass by it within the sector intrusted to the support. On the other hand, he must economize men on observation and patrol duty, for these duties are unusually fatiguing. He must practice the greatest economy of men consistent with the requirements of practical security.

As soon as the posting of the support is completed, its commander carefully inspects the dispositions and corrects defects, if any, and reports the disposition of his support, including the patrolling ordered, to the outpost commander. This report is preferably made by means of a sketch.

By day the outpost will stack arms and the articles of equipment, except the cartridge belt and canteen, will be placed by the arms. At night the men will invariably sleep with their arms and equipment near them.

In addition to the sentinel posted over the support, a part of the support, say one-third or one-fourth, should always be awake at night.

Each outguard is marched by its commander to its assigned station, and especially in the case of a picket, is covered by the necessary patrolling to prevent surprise.

Having reached the position, the commander explains the situation to his men and establishes reliefs for each sentinel, and, if possible, for each patrol to be furnished. Besides these sentinels and patrols, a picket must have a sentinel at its post.

The commander then posts the sentinels and points out to them the principal features, such as towns, roads, and streams, and gives their names. He gives the direction and location of the enemy, if known, and of adjoining parts of the outpost.

He gives to patrols the same information and the necessary orders as to their routes and the frequency with which the same shall be covered. Each patrol should go over its route once before dark.

Each picket should maintain connection by patrols with the outguards on its right and left.

1074. Intercommunication. It is most important that communication should be maintained at all times between all parts of the outpost, and between the outpost and the main body. This may be done by patrols, messengers, wire or signal.

The commander of the outpost is responsible that proper communication be maintained with the main body, and the support commanders keep up communication with the outguards, with the adjoining supports and with the reserve. The commander of a detached post will maintain communication with the nearest outguard.

1075. Changes for the Night. In civilized warfare, it is seldom necessary to draw the outpost closer to the main body at night in order to diminish the front; nor is it necessary to strengthen the line of observation, as the enemy's advance in force must be confined to the roads. The latter are therefore strongly occupied, the intervening ground being diligently patrolled.

In very open country or in war with savage or semi-civilized people familiar with the terrain, special precautions are necessary.

1076. Relieving the Outpost. Ordinarily outposts are not kept on duty longer than twenty-four hours. In temporary camps or bivouac they are generally relieved every morning. After a day's advance the outpost for the night is usually relieved, the following morning when the support of the new advance guard passes the line of resistance. In retreat the outpost for the night usually forms the rear guard for the following day, and is relieved when it passes the line of observation of the new outpost.

Outguards that have become familiar with the country during the day time should remain on duty that night. Sentinels are relieved once in two hours, or oftener, depending on the weather. The work of patrols is regulated by the support commander.

Commanders of the various fractions of an outpost turn over their instructions and special orders, written and verbal, to their successors, together with the latest information of the enemy, and a description of the important features of the country. When practicable the first patrols sent out by the new outposts are accompanied by members of the old outpost who are familiar with the terrain. When relieved the old outguards return to their supports, the supports to the reserve and the latter to the main body; or, if more convenient, the supports and reserves return to the main body independently, each by the shortest route.

When relieved by an advance guard, the outpost troops ordinarily join their units as the column passes.

Evening and shortly before dawn are hours of special danger. The enemy may attack late in the day in order to establish himself on captured ground by intrenching during the night; or he may send forward troops under cover of darkness in order to make a strong attack at early dawn. Special precaution is therefore taken at those hours by holding the outpost in readiness, and by sending patrols in advance of the line of observation. If a new outpost is to be established in the morning it should arrive at the outpost position at daybreak, thus doubling the outpost strength at that hour.

Outpost Problems

Problem No. 1 (Infantry)

1077. Lieutenant (to two squads of his company): Two battalions of our regiment have camped by Baker's Pond (Elementary Map) for the night. It is now 3 P. M. on a rainy day in August. The enemy is thought to be about five miles to the south of us. Our platoon is the left support of the outpost and is stationed at the road fork on the Chester Pike, by the Mason house. The Twin Hills-Lone Hill ridge is taken care of by other troops. Corporal Baker, where do you think I should place outguards?

Corporal Baker: One at the junction of the Mills farm lane and the Chester Pike, and one at the steel railroad trestle over Sandy Creek.

Lieutenant: Those positions are both too far from the support, almost a half mile, but they cover the two main avenues of approach and there is no good place for a position nearer the support. A position farther north of the Mill's farm lane would have its view obstructed by the wall and trees along the lane and the wall would be a bad thing to leave unoccupied such a short distance to your front. So in this case, in spite of the excessive distances from the support, I think the two positions are well chosen. Each should be an outguard of a squad, for in the day time, in addition to furnishing a sentinel to observe to the front, they should have some power of resistance, particularly at the trestle. At night they should each have one double sentinel post. This requires three reliefs of two men each, which, with the corporal, only leaves one extra man, who can be used as a messenger.

Corporal Baker, I order you to take your squad and post it as Outguard No. 1, at the junction of this (Chester) pike and that farm lane (Mills farm) in front. Corporal Davis' squad will be Outguard No. 2, at the railroad trestle over there (pointing). Friendly troops will be on the ridge to the east of your position. Your meals will be cooked here and sent to you.

Explain how you post your squad.

Corporal Baker: I order Smith to double time 150 yards to the front and act as point for the squad. I then march the squad down to its position, keeping Smith about 200 yards in front until I have arranged everything. I then post Brown under cover of the trees along the lane where he can look down the road as far as possible and I tell him, "Brown, you are to take post here, keeping a sharp lookout to the front and flanks. The enemy is thought to be about five miles south (pointing) of us. This is the Chester Pike. That creek over there is Sandy Creek. Salem is about a mile and three-quarters down this pike in that (S. E.) direction. York is a mile and a half in that (S. W.) direction. Our troops are on that ridge (Twin Hills) and a squad is at the trestle over there. It is Outguard No. 2. You are in Outguard No. 1. You know where we left our platoon. It is our support. Signal Smith to come in." I then have the squad pitch their shelter tents along the northern side of the wall, where they will be hidden to view from the front by the trees along the lane and the wall. I want the men to get shelter from the rain as soon as possible. I then instruct the men of the squad, in the same manner that I did Brown; I notice the time, and detail Davis as second relief and Carter as third relief for Brown's post.

I then direct two men to take all the canteens and go over to that farm (Mills) and fill them, first questioning the people about the enemy and about the country around here. I also direct these two men to get some straw or hay for bedding in the shelter tents, and instruct them to return with as little delay as possible.

I wait until they return and order two other men to go down to the cross roads, question the people there, look the ground over and return here. I caution them not to give any information about our force or the outguard. I would see that the sentinel's position was the best available and that the men had as comfortable quarters as possible, without being unduly exposed to view and without interfering with their movements in case of attack. They would keep their rifles at their sides at all times and not remove their equipments. After dark I put two men on post at the same time. To do this I arrange three reliefs of two men each. They are posted in pairs for two hours at a time.

If no patrol from the support appeared within a half hour after I first took position I would send a messenger back to you to see if everything was all right and tell you what I had done.