Against the Necessity of the Ceremonies

The First Part.

Chapter I.

That Our Opposites Do Urge the Ceremonies as Things Necessary.

Sect. 1. This I prove, 1. From their practice; 2. From their pleading. In their practice, who seeth not that they would tie the people of God to a necessity of submitting their necks to this heavy yoke of human ceremonies? which are with more vehemency, forwardness, and strictness urged, than the weighty matters of the law of God, and the refusing whereof is far more inhibited, menaced, espied, delated, aggravated, censured, and punished, than idolatry, Popery, blasphemy, swearing, profanation of the Sabbath, murder, adultery, &c. Both preachers and people have been, and are, fined, confined, imprisoned, banished, censured, and punished so severely, that he may well say of them that which our divines say of the Papists, Hoec sua inventa Decalago anteponunt, et gravius eos-multarent qui ea violarent, quam qui divina praecepta transgrederentur. Wherefore, seeing they make not only as much, but more ado, about the controverted ceremonies than about the most necessary things in religion, their practice herein makes it too, too apparent what necessity they annex to them.

Sect. 2. And if we will hearken to their pleading it tells no less; for howbeit they plead for their ceremonies, as things indifferent in their own nature, yet, when the [pg 1-002] ceremonies are considered as the ordinances of the church, they plead for them as things necessary. M. G. Powel, in the Consideration of the Arguments directed to the High Court of Parliament in behalf of the Ministers suspended and deprived (ans. 3 to arg. 16), hath these words, yea, these particulars: “Subscription, ceremonies, &c., being imposed by the church, and commanded by the magistrate, are necessary to be observed under the pain of sin.” The Bishop of Edinburgh resolves us concerning the necessity of giving obedience to the laws of the church, enacted anent the ceremonies, thus: “Where a man hath not a law, his judgment is the rule of his conscience, but where there is a law, the law must be the rule. As, for example, before that apostolical canon that forbade to eat blood or strangled things, every man might have done that which in his conscience he thought most expedient, &c., but after the making and the publication of the canon that enjoined abstinence, the same was to rule their consciences. And, therefore, after that time, albeit a man had thought in his own private judgment that to abstain from these things was not expedient, &c. yet, in that case, he ought not to have eaten, because now the will of the law, and not the judgment of his own mind, was the rule of his conscience.” The Archbishop of St Andrews, to the same purpose saith, “In things indifferent we must always esteem that to be best and [pg 1-003] most seemly which seemeth so in the eye of public authority, neither is it for private men to control public judgment, as they cannot make public constitutions, so they may not control nor disobey them, being once made, indeed authority ought to look well to this, that it prescribe nothing but rightly, appoint no rights nor orders in the church but such as may set forward godliness and piety, yet, put the case, that some be otherwise established, they must be obeyed by such as are members of that church, as long as they have the force of a constitution, &c. But thou wilt say, My conscience suffers me not to obey, for I am persuaded that such things are not right, nor appointed. I answer thee, In matters of this nature and quality the sentence of thy superiors ought to direct thee, and that is a sufficient ground to thy conscience for obeying.” Thus we see that they urge the ceremonies, not only with a necessity of practice upon the outward man, but also with a necessity of opinion upon the conscience, and that merely because of the church's determination and appointment; yea, Dr Mortoune maketh kneeling in the act of receiving the communion to be in some sort necessary in itself, for he maintaineth, that though it be not essentially necessary as food, yet it is accidentally necessary as physic. Nay, some of them are yet more absurd, who plainly call the ceremonies necessary in themselves, beside the constitution of the church. Others of them, who confess the ceremonies to be not only unnecessary, but also inconvenient, do, notwithstanding, plead for them as things necessary. Dr Burges tells us, that some of his side think that ceremonies are inconvenient, but withal he discovers to us a strange mystery brought out of the unsearchable deepness of his piercing conception, holding that such things as not only are not at all necessary in themselves, but are inconvenient too, may yet be urged as necessary.

Sect. 3. The urging of these ceremonies as necessary, if there were no more, is a sufficient reason for our refusing them. “To the precepts of God (saith Balduine) nothing is to be added, Deut. xii. Now God [pg 1-004] hath commanded these things which are necessary. The rites of the church are not necessary, wherefore, if the abrogation or usurpation of any rite be urged as necessary, then is an addition made to the commandment of God, which is forbidden in the word, and, by consequence, it cannot oblige me, neither should anything herein be yielded unto.” Who can purge these ceremonies in controversy among us of gross superstition, since they are urged as things necessary? But of this superstition we shall hear afterward in its proper place.

Chapter II.

The Reason Taken Out of Acts XV. To Prove the Necessity of the Ceremonies, Because of the Church's Appointment, Confuted.

The Bishop of Edinburgh, to prove that of necessity our consciences must be ruled by the will of the law, and that it is necessary that we give obedience to the same, albeit our consciences gainsay, allegeth that apostolical canon, Acts xv., for an example, just as Bellarmine maintaineth, Festorum observationem ex se indifferentem esse sed posita lege fieri necessariam. Hospinian, answering him, will acknowledge no necessity of the observation of feasts, except divine law could be showed for it. So say we, that the ceremonies which are acknowledged by formalists to be indifferent in themselves, cannot be made necessary by the law of the church, neither doth that example of the apostolical canon make anything against us, for, according to Mr Sprint's confession, it was not the force or authority of the canon, but the reason and ground whereupon the canon was made, which caused the necessity of abstaining, and to abstain was necessary for eschewing of scandal, whether the apostles and elders had enjoined abstinence or not. The reason, then, why the things prescribed in that canon are called necessary, ver. 28, is not because, being indifferent before the making and publication of the canon, they became necessary by virtue of the canon after it was made, as the Bishop teacheth, but quia tunc [pg 1-005] charitas exigebat, ut illa sua libertate qui ex gentibus conversi erant, propter proximi edificationem inter judeos non uterentur, sed ab ea abstinerent, saith Chemnitius. This law, saith Tilen, was propter charitatem et vitandi offendiculi necessitatem ad tempus sancita. So that these things were necessary before the canon was made. Necessaria fuerunt, saith Ames, antequam Apostoli quidquam de iis statuerant, non absolute, sed quatenus in iis charitas jubebat morem gerere infirmis, ut cajetanus notat. Quamobrem, saith Tilen, cum charitas semper sit colenda, semper vitanda sandala. “Charity is necessary (saith Beza), even in things which are in themselves indifferent.” What they can allege for the necessity of the ceremonies, from the authority and obligatory power of ecclesiastical laws, shall be answered by and by.

Chapter III.

That the Ceremonies Thus Imposed and Urged as Things Necessary, Do Bereave Us of Our Christian Liberty, First, Because Our Practice Is Adstricted.

Sect. 1. Who can blame us for standing to the defence of our Christian liberty, which we ought to defend and pretend in rebus quibusvis? saith Bucer. Shall we bear the name of Christians, and yet make no great account of the liberty which hath been bought to us by the dearest drops of the precious blood of the Son of God? Sumus empti, saith Parcus: non igitur nostri juris ut nos mancipemus hominum servitio: id enim manifesta cum injuria redemptoris Christi fieret: sumus liberti Christi. Magistratui autem, saith Tilen, et ecclesioe proepositis, non nisi usque ad aras obtemperandum, neque ullum certamen aut periculum pro libertatis per Christum nobis partæ defensione defugiendum, siquidem mortem ipsius irritam fieri, Paulus asserit, si spiritualis servitutis jugo, nos implicari patiamur. Gal. v. 1, “Let us stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ [pg 1-006] hath made us free, and not be entangled again with the yoke of bondage.” But that the urging of the ceremonies as necessary doth take away our Christian liberty, I will make it evident in four points.

Sect. 2. First, They are imposed with a necessity of practice. Spotswood tells us, that public constitutions must be obeyed, and that private men may not disobey them, and thus is our practice adstricted in the use of things which are not at all necessary, and acknowledged gratis by the urgers to be indifferent, adstricted (I say) to one part without liberty to the other, and that by the mere authority of a human constitution, whereas Christian liberty gives us freedom both for the omission and for the observation of a thing indifferent, except some other reason do adstrict and restrain it than a bare human constitution. Chrysostome, speaking of such as are subject to bishops, saith, In potestate positum est obedire vel non. Liberty in things indifferent, saith Amandus Polanus, est per quam Christiani sunt liberi in usu vel abstinentia rerum adiaphorarom. Calvin, speaking of our liberty in things indifferent, saith, We may eas nunc usurpare nunc omittere indifferenter, and places this liberty, tam in abstinendo quam in utendo. It is marked of the rites of the ancient church, that liberae fuerunt horum rituum observationes in ecclesia. And what meaneth the Apostle while he saith, “If ye be dead with Christ from the rudiments of the world, why, as though living in the world, are ye subject to ordinances, (touch not, taste not, handle not, which all are to perish with the using,) after the commandments and doctrines of men?” Col. ii. 20-22. Surely he condemneth not only humana decreta de ritibus, but also subjection and obedience to such ordinances of men as take from us liberty of practice in the use of things indifferent, obedience (I say) for conscience of their ordinances merely. What meaneth also that place, 1 Cor. vii. 23, “Be not ye the servants of men?” “It forbids us, (saith Paybody) to be the servants of men, that is, in wicked or superstitious actions, according to their perverse commandments [pg 1-007] or desires.” If he mean of actions that are wicked or superstitious in themselves, then it followeth, that to be subject unto those ordinances, “Touch not, taste not, handle not,” is not to be the servants of men, because these actions are not wicked and superstitious in themselves. Not touching, not tasting, not handling, are in themselves indifferent. But if he mean of actions which are wicked and superstitious, in respect of circumstances, then is his restrictive gloss senseless; for we can never be the servants of men, but in such wicked and superstitious actions, if there were no more but giving obedience to such ordinances as are imposed with a necessity upon us, and that merely for conscience of the ordinance, it is enough to infect the actions with superstition, Sunt hominum servi, saith Bullinqer, qui aliquid in gratiam hominum faciunt. This is nearer the truth; for to tie ourselves to the doing of anything for the will or pleasure of men, when our conscience can find no other reason for the doing of it, were indeed to make ourselves the servants of men. Far be it then from us to submit our necks to such a heavy yoke of human precepts, as would overload and undo us. Nay, we will stedfastly resist such unchristian tyranny as goeth about to spoil us of Christian liberty, taking that for certain which we find in Cyprian, periculosum est in divinis rebus ut quis cedat jure suo.

Sect. 3. Two things are here replied, 1. That there is reason for adstricting of our practice in these things, because we are commanded to obey them that have the rule over us, and to submit ourselves, Heb. xiii. 17, and to submit ourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, 1 Pet. ii. 16, and that except public constitutions must needs be obeyed, there can be no order, but all shall be filled with strife and contention. Ans. 1. As touching obedience to those that are set over us, if they mean not to tyrannise over the Lord's inheritance, 1 Pet. v. 3; and to make the commandments of God of no effect by their traditions, Mark vii. 9, they must give us leave to try their precepts by the sure will of God's word; and when we find that they require of us anything in the worship of God which is [pg 1-008] either against or beside his written word, then modestly to refuse obedience, which is the only way for order, and shunning of strife and contention. It will be said again, that except we prove the things commanded by those who are set over us to be unlawful in themselves, we cannot be allowed to refuse obedience to their ordinances. Ans. This unlawfulness of the ceremonies in themselves hath been proved by us already, and shall yet again be proved in this dispute. But put the case, they were lawful in themselves, yet have we good reason for refusing them: “David thought the feeding of his body was cause sufficient to break the law of the shew-bread; Christ thought the satisfying of the disciples' hunger to be cause sufficient to break the ceremony of the Sabbath. He thought, also, that the healing of the lepers' bodies was a just excuse to break the law that forbade the touching of them; much more, then, may we think now in our estimation, that the feeding of other men's souls, the satisfying of our own consciences, together with the consciences of other men, and the healing of men's superstition and spiritual leprosy, are causes sufficient to break the law of the ceremonies and of the cross, which are not God's but men's,” saith Parker. 2. As touching submission or subjection, we say with Dr Field, that subjection is generally and absolutely required where obedience is not, and even when our consciences suffer us not to obey, yet still we submit and subject ourselves, and neither do nor shall (I trust) show any the least contempt of authority.

Sect. 4. Secondly, It is replied, that our Christian liberty is not taken away when practice is restrained, because conscience is still left free. “The Christian liberty (saith Paybody), is not taken away by the necessity of doing a thing indifferent, or not doing, but only by that necessity which takes away the opinion or persuasion of its indifferency,” So saith Dr Burges, “That the ceremonies in question are ordained to be used necessarily, though the judgment concerning them, and immediate conscience to God, be left free.” Ans. 1. Who doubts of this, that liberty of practice may be restrained in the use of things which are in [pg 1-009] themselves indifferent? But, yet, if the bare authority of an ecclesiastical law, without any other reason than the will and pleasure of men, be made to restrain practice, then is Christian liberty taken away. Junius saith, that externum opus ligatur from the use of things indifferent, when the conscience is not bound; but in that same place he showeth, that the outward action is bound and restrained only quo usque circumstantiae ob quas necessitas imperata est, se extendunt. So that it is not the authority of an ecclesiastical law, but the occasion and ground of it, which adstricts the practice when the conscience is left free. 2. When the authority of the church's constitution is obtruded to bind and restrain the practice of Christians in the use of things indifferent, they are bereaved of their liberty, as well as if an opinion of necessity were borne in upon their consciences. Therefore we see when the Apostle, 1 Cor. vii., gives liberty of marriage, he doth not only leave the conscience free in its judgment of the lawfulness of marriage, but also give liberty of practice to marry or not to marry. And Col. ii. 21, when he giveth instances of such human ordinances as take away Christian liberty, he saith not, you must think that you may not touch, &c., but “touch not,” &c., telling us, that when the practice is restrained from touching, tasting, handling, by the ordinances of men, then is Christian liberty spoiled, though the conscience be left free. Camero, speaking of the servitude which is opposed to Christian liberty, saith, that it is either animi servitus, or corporis servitus. Then if the outward man be brought in bondage, this makes up spiritual thraldom, though there be no more. But, 3. The ceremonies are imposed with an opinion of necessity upon the conscience itself, for proof whereof I proceed to the next point.

Chapter IV.

That the Ceremonies Take Away Our Christian Liberty Proved by a Second Reason, Namely, Because Conscience Itself Is Bound and Adstricted.

Sect. 1. Bishop Lindsey hath told us, that the will of the law must be the rule of our [pg 1-010] conscience, so that conscience may not judge other ways than the law determines. Bishop Spotswood will have the sentence of superiors to direct the conscience, and will have us to esteem that to be best and most seemly which seemeth so to them. Bishop Andrews, speaking of ceremonies, not only will have every person inviolably to observe the rites and customs of his own church, but also will have the ordinances about those rites to be urged under pain of the anathema. I know not what the binding of the conscience is, if this be not it: Apostolus gemendi partes relinquit, non cogendi auctoritatem tribuit ministris quibus plebs non auscultat. And shall they who call themselves the apostles' successors, compel, constrain and enthral, the consciences of the people of God? Charles V., as popish as he was, did promise to the Protestants, Nullam vim ipsorum conscientiis illatum iri. And shall a popish prince speak more reasonable than protestant prelates? But to make it yet more and plentifully to appear how miserably our opposites would enthral our consciences, I will here show, 1. What the binding of the conscience is. 2. How the laws of the church may be said to bind. 3. What is the judgment of formalists touching the binding-power of ecclesiastical laws.

Sect. 2. Concerning the first of these we will hear what Dr Field saith: “To bind the conscience (saith he) is to bind the soul and spirit of man, with the fear of such punishments (to be inflicted by him that so bindeth) as the conscience feareth; that is, as men fear, though none but God and themselves be privy to their doings; now these are only such as God only inflicteth,” &c. This description is too imperfect, and deserves to be corrected. To bind the conscience is illam auctoritatem habere, ut conscientia illi subjicere sese debeat, ita ut peccatum sit, si contra illam quidquam fiat, saith Ames. “The binder (saith Perkins) is that thing whatsoever which hath power and authority over conscience to order it. To bind is to urge, cause, and constrain it in every action, either to accuse for sin, or to excuse for well-doing; or to say, this [pg 1-011] may be done, or it may not be done.” “To bind the conscience (saith Alsted) est illam urgere et adigere, ut vel excuset et accuset, vel indicet quid fieri aut non fieri possit.” Upon these descriptions, which have more truth and reason in them, I infer that whatsoever urges, or forces conscience to assent to a thing as lawful, or a thing that ought to be done, or dissent from a thing as unlawful, or a thing which ought not to be done, that is a binder of conscience, though it did not bind the spirit of a man with the fear of such punishments as God alone inflicteth. For secluding all respect of punishment, and not considering what will follow, the very obliging of the conscience for the time, ad assensum, is a binding of it.

Sect. 3. Touching the second, it is certain that human laws, as they come from men, and in respect of any force or authority which men can give them, have no power to bind the conscience. Neque enim cum hominibus, sed cum uno Deo negotium est conscientis nostris, saith Calvin. Over our souls and consciences, nemini quicquam juris nisi Deo, saith Tilen. From Jerome's distinction, that a king praeest nolentibus but a bishop volentibus, Marcus Antonius de Dominis well concludeth: Volentibus gregi praeesso, excludit omnem jurisdictionem et potestatem imperativam ac coactivam et solam significat directivam, ubi, viz., in libertate subditi est et parere et non parere, ita ut qui praeest nihil habeat quo nolentem parere adigat ad parendum. This point he proveth in that chapter at length, where he disputeth both against temporal and spiritual coactive jurisdiction in the church. If it be demanded to what purpose serveth then the enacting of ecclesiastical laws, since they have not in them any power to bind the conscience, I answer, The use and end for which ecclesiastical laws do serve is, 1. For the plain discovery of such things as the law of God or nature do require of us, so that law which of itself hath power to bind, cometh from the priests and ministers of the Lord neither ἀντοκρατορικῶς nor νομοθετικῶς, but declarativè, Mal. ii. 7. 2. For declaring to us what is fittest in such things as are, in their own nature, indifferent, and neither enforced by [pg 1-012] the law of God nor nature, and which part should be followed in these things as most convenient. The laws of the church, then, are appointed to let us see the necessity of the first kind of things, and what is expedient in the other kind of things, and therefore they are more properly called directions, instructions, admonitions, than laws. For I speak of ecclesiastical laws qua tales, that is, as they are the constitutions of men who are set over us; thus considered, they have only vim dirigendi et monendi. It is said of the apostles, that they were constituted doctrinae Christi testes, non novae doctrinae legist tores. And the same may be said of all the ministers of the gospel, when discipline is taken in with doctrine. He is no nonconformist who holdeth ecclesiam in terris agere partes oratoris, seu legati obsecrantis et suadentis. And we may hitherto apply that which Gerson, the chancellor of Paris, saith: “The wisest and best among the guides of God's church had not so ill a meaning as to have all their constitutions and ordinances taken for laws properly so named, much less strictly binding the conscience, but for threatenings, admonitions, counsels, and directions only, and when there groweth a general neglect, they seem to consent to the abolishing of them again;” for seeing, lex instituitur, cum promulgatur, vigorem habet, cum moribus utentium approbatur.

Sect. 4. But as we have seen in what respect the laws of the church do not bind, let us now see how they may be said to bind. That which bindeth is not the authority of the church, nor any force which the church can give to her laws. It must be then somewhat else which maketh them able to bind, when they bind at all, and that is ratio legis, “the reason of the law,” without which the law itself cannot bind, and which hath the chiefest and most principal power of binding. An ecclesiastical law, saith Junius, διαταξις sive depositio, non vere lex est, sed διατυπωσις aut canon, ac proindedirigit quidem ut canon agentem voluntarie: non autem necessitate cogit, ut lex etiam involuntarium quod si forte ante accedit coactio, ea non est de natura canonis sed altunde pervenit. An ecclesiastical canon, [pg 1-013] saith Tilen, ducit volentem, non trahit nolentem: quod si accedat coactio, ea ecclesiastici canonis natura est prorsus aliena, Calvin's judgment is, that an ecclesiastical canon binds, when manifestam utilitatem prae se fert, and when either tu prepon or charitatis ratio doth require, that we impose a necessity on our liberty. It binds not, then, by its own authority in his mind. And what saith the canon law itself? Sed sciendum est quod ecclesiasticae prohibitiones proprias habent causas quibus cessantibus, cessant et ipsae. Hence Junius saith, that the law binds not per se, but only propter ordinem charitatem, et cautionem scandali. Hence Ames, quamvis ad justas leges humanas, justo modo observandas, obligentur homines in conscientiis suis a Deo; ipsae tamen leges humanae, qua sunt leges hominum, non obligant conscientiam. Hence Alsted: “Laws made by men of things indifferent, whether they be civil or ecclesiastical, do bind the conscience, in so far as they agree with God's word, serve for the public good, maintain order, and finally, take not away liberty of conscience.” Hence the professors of Leyden say, that laws bind not primo et per se, sed secundario, et per accidens; that is, quatenus in illis lex aliqua Dei violator. Hence I may compare the constitutions of the church with responsa juris consultorum among the Romans, which obliged no man, nisi ex aequo et bono, saith Daneus. Hence it may be said, that the laws of the church do not only bind scandali et contemptus ratione, as Hospinian, and in case libertas fiat cum scandalo, as Parcus; for it were scandal not to give obedience to the laws of the church, when they prescribe things necessary or expedient for the eschewing of scandal, and it were contempt to refuse obedience to them, when we are not certainly persuaded of the unlawfulness or inexpediency of the things prescribed.

Sect. 5. But out of the case of scandal or contempt, divines teach that conscience is not bound by the canon of the church made [pg 1-014] about order and policy. Extra casum scandali et destinatae rebellionis, propter commune bonum, non peccat qui contra constitutiones istas fecerit, saith Junius. “If a law (saith Perkins) concerning some external right or thing indifferent, be at some time or upon some occasion omitted, no offence given, nor contempt showed to ecclesiastical authority, there is no breach made in the conscience.” Alsted's rule is, Leges humanae non obligant quando omitti possunt sine impedimento finis ob quem feruntur sine scandalo aliorum, et sine contemptu legislatoris. And Tilen teacheth us, that when the church hath determined the mutable circumstances, in the worship of God, for public edification, privatorum conscientiis liberum est quandoque ista omittere, modo offendicula vitentur, nihil que ex contemptu ecclesiae ac ministerii publici petulanti καινοτομια vel κειοδοξια facere videantur.

Sect. 6. We deny not, then, that the church's canons about rites, which serve for public order and edification, do bind. We say only, that it is not the authority of the church framing the canon that binds, but the matter of the canon chiefly warranted by God's word. Scimus enim quaecunque ad decorum et ordinem pertinent, non habenda esse pro humanis placitas, quia divinitus approbantur. Therefore we think concerning such canons, “that they are necessary to be observed so far forth only, as the keeping of them maintaineth decent order, and preventeth open offence.”

Sect. 7. If any say that I derogate much from the authority of the church when I do nothing which she prescribeth, except I see it lawful and expedient, because I should do this much for the exhortation and admonition of a brother. Ans. 1. I give far more reverence to the direction of the church than to the admonition of a brother, because that is ministerial, this fraternal, that comes from authority, this only from charity, that is public, this private, that is given by many, this by one. And, finally, the church hath a calling to direct me in some things wherein a brother hath not. 2. If it be still instanced that, in the point of obedience, I do [pg 1-015] no more for the church than for any brother, because I am bound to do that which is made evident to be lawful and expedient, though a private Christian do but exhort me to it, or whether I be exhorted to it or not. For answer to this I say, that I will obey the directions of the church in many things rather than the directions of a brother; for in two things which are in themselves indifferent, and none of them inexpedient, I will do that which the church requireth, though my brother should exhort me to the contrary. But always I hold me at this sure ground, that I am never bound in conscience to obey the ordinances of the church, except they be evidently lawful and expedient. This is that, sine quo non obligant, and also that which doth chiefly bind, though it be not the only thing which bindeth. Now, for making the matter more plain, we must consider that the constitutions of the church are either lawful or unlawful. If unlawful, they bind not at all; if lawful, they are either concerning things necessary, as Acts xv. 28, and then the necessity of the things doth bind, whether the church ordain them or not; or else concerning things indifferent, as when the church ordaineth, that in great towns there shall be sermon on such a day of the week, and public prayers every day at such an hour. Here it is not the bare authority of the church that bindeth, without respect to the lawfulness or expediency of the thing itself which is ordained (else we were bound to do every thing which the church ordains, were it never so unlawful, for quod competit alicui qua tali, competit omni tali: we behold the authority of the church making laws, as well in unlawful ordinances as in lawful), nor yet is it the lawfulness or expediency of the thing itself, without respect to the ordinance of the church (for possibly other times and diets were as lawful, and expedient too, for such exercises, as those ordained by the church); but it is the authority of the church prescribing a thing lawful or expedient. In such a case, then neither doth the authority of the church bind, except the thing be lawful and expedient, nor doth the lawfulness and expediency of the thing bind, except the church ordain it; but both these jointly do bind.

Sect. 8. I come now to examine what is the judgment of formalists touching the binding of the conscience by ecclesiastical laws. Dr Field saith, that the question [pg 1-016] should not be proposed, whether human laws do bind the conscience, but “whether binding the outward man to the performance of outward things by force and fear of outward punishment to be inflicted by men, the non-performance of such things, or the non-performance of them with such affections as were fit, be not a sin against God, of which the conscience will accuse us,” &c. Unto this question thus proposed and understood of human laws, and where no more is considered as giving them power to bind, but only the authority of those who make them; some formalists do give (as I will show), and all of them (being well advised) must give an affirmative answer. And, I pray, what did Bellarmine say more, when, expressing how conscience is subject to human authority, he taught that conscience belongeth ad humanum forum, quatenus homo ex praecepto ita obligator ad opus externum faciendum, ut si non faciat, judicat ipse in conscientia sua se male facere, et hoc sufficit ad conscientiam obligandam? But to proceed particularly.

Sect. 9. I begin with Field himself, whose resolution of the question proposed is, that we are bound only to give obedience to such human laws as prescribe things profitable, not for that human laws have power to bind the conscience, but because the things they command are of that nature, that not to perform them is contrary to justice or charity. Whereupon he concludeth out of Stapleton, that we are bound to the performance of things prescribed by human laws, in such sort, that the non-performance of them is sin, not ex sola legislatoris voluntate, sed ex ipsa legum utilitate. Let all such as be of this man's mind not blame us for denying of obedience to the constitutions about the ceremonies, since we find (for certain) no utility, but, by the contrary, much inconveniency in them. If they say that we must think those laws to be profitable or convenient, which they, who are set over us, think to be so, then they know not what they say. For, exempting conscience from being bound by human laws in one thing, they would have it bound by them in another thing. If conscience must needs judge that to be profitable, which seemeth so to those that are set over us, then, sure, is power given to them for binding the conscience so [pg 1-017] straitly, that it may not judge otherwise than they judge, and force is placed in their bare authority for necessitating and constraining the assenting judgment of conscience.

Sect. 10. Some man perhaps will say that we are bound to obey the laws made about the ceremonies, though not for the sole will of the law-makers, nor yet for any utility of the laws themselves, yet for this reason, that scandal and contempt would follow in case we do otherwise. Ans. We know that human laws do bind in the case of scandal or contempt. But that nonconformity is neither scandal nor contempt, Parker hath made it most evident. For, as touching contempt, he showeth out of fathers, councils, canon law, schoolmen, and modern divines, that non obedire is not contempt, but nolle obedire, or superbiendo repugnare. Yea, out of Formalists themselves, he showeth the difference betwixt subjection and obedience. Thereafter he pleadeth thus, and we with him: “What signs see men in us of pride and contempt? What be our cetera opera that bewray such an humour? Let it be named wherein we go not two miles, when we are commanded to go but one, yea, wherein we go not as many miles as any shoe of the preparation of the gospel will bear us. What payment, what pain, what labour, what taxation made us ever to murmur? Survey our charges where we have laboured, if they be not found to be of the faithfulest subjects that be in the Lord, we deserve no favour. Nay, there is wherein we stretch our consciences to the utmost to conform and to obey in divers matters. Are we refractory in other things, as Balaam's ass said to his master? Have I used to serve thee so at other times?” And as touching scandal, he showeth first, that by our not conforming, we do not scandalise superiors, but edify them, although it may be we displease them, of which we are sorry, even as Joab displeased David when he contested against the numbering of the people, yet did he not scandalise David, but edify him. And, secondly, whereas it might be alleged, that nonconformity doth scandalise the people, before whom it soundeth as it were an alarm of disobedience, we reply with him, “Daniel will not omit the ceremony of looking out at the window towards Jerusalem. Mordecai omitteth the ceremony of bowing the knee to Haman; Christ will not [pg 1-018] use the ceremony of washing hands, though a tradition of the elders and governors of the church then being. The authority of the magistrate was violated by these, and an incitement to disobedience was in their ceremonial breach, as much as there is now in ours.”

Sect. 11. But some of our opposites go about to derive the obligatory power of the church's laws, not so much from the utility of the laws themselves, or from any scandal which should follow upon the not obeying of them, as from the church's own authority which maketh them. Camero speaketh of two sorts of ecclesiastical laws: 1. Such as prescribe things frivolous or unjust, meaning such things as (though they neither detract anything from the glory of God, nor cause any damage to our neighbour, yet) bring some detriment to ourselves. 2. Such as prescribe things belonging to order and shunning of scandal. Touching the former, he teacheth rightly, that conscience is never bound to the obedience of such laws, except only in the case of scandal and contempt, and that if at any time such laws may be neglected and not observed, without scandal given, or contempt shown, no man's conscience is holden with them. But touching the other sort of the church's laws, he saith, that they bind the conscience indirectly, not only respectu materiæ præcepti (which doth not at all oblige, except in respect of the end whereunto it is referred, namely, the conserving of order, and the not giving of scandal), but also respectu præcipientis, because God will not have those who are set over us in the church to be contemned. He foresaw (belike), that whereas it is pretended in behalf of those ecclesiastical laws which enjoin the controverted ceremonies, that the things which they prescribe pertain to order and to the shunning of scandal, and so bind the conscience indirectly in respect of the end, one might answer, I am persuaded upon evident grounds that those prescribed ceremonies pertain not to order, and to the shunning of scandal, but to misorder, and to the giving of scandal; therefore he laboured to bind such an one's conscience with another tie, which is the authority of the law-makers. And this authority he would have one to take as ground enough to believe, that that which the church prescribeth doth belong to order and the shunning of scandal, and in that persuasion to do it. But, 1. [pg 1-019] How doth this doctrine differ from that which himself setteth down as the opinion of Papists, Posse los qui præsunt ecclesiæ, cogere fideles ut id credant vel faciant, quod ipsi judicaverint? 2. It is well observed by our writers, that the apostles never made things indifferent to be necessary, except only in respect of scandal, and that out of the case of scandal they still left the consciences of men free, which observation they gather from Acts XV. and 1 Cor. x. Camero himself noteth, that though the church prescribed abstinence from things sacrificed to idols, yet the Apostle would not have the faithful to abstain for conscience' sake: why then holdeth he, that beside the end of shunning scandal and keeping order, conscience is bound even by the church's own authority? 3. As for the reason whereby he would prove that the church's laws do bind, even respectu præcipientis, his form of speaking is very bad. Deus (saith he) non vult contemni præpositos ecclesiæ, nisi justa et necessaria de causa. Where falsely he supposeth, not only that there may occur a just and necessary cause of contemning those whom God hath set over us in the church, but, also, that the not obeying of them inferreth the contemning of them. Now, the not obeying of their laws inferreth not the contemning of themselves (which were not allowable), but only the contemning of their laws. And as Jerome, speaketh of Daniel, Et nunc Daniel regis jussa contemnens, &c.; so we say of all superiors in general, that we may sometimes have just reasons for contemning their commandments, yet are we not to contemn, but to honour themselves. But, 4. Let us take Camero's meaning to be, that God will not have us to refuse obedience unto those who are set over us in the church: none of our opposites dare say, that God will have us to obey those who are set over us in the church in any other things than such as may be done both lawfully and conveniently for the shunning of scandal; and if so, then the church's precept cannot bind, except as it is grounded upon such or such reasons.

Sect. 12. Bishop Spotswood and Bishop Lindsey, in those words which I have heretofore alleged out of them, are likewise of opinion, that the sole will and authority of the church doth bind the conscience to obedience. [pg 1-020] Spotswood will have us, without more ado, to esteem that to be best and most seemly, which seemeth so in the eye of public authority. Is not this to bind the conscience by the church's bare will and authority, when I must needs constrain the judgment of my conscience to be conformed to the church's judgment, having no other reason to move me hereunto but the sole will and authority of the church? Further, he will have us to obey even such things as authority prescribeth not rightly (that is, such rites as do not set forward godliness), and that because they have the force of a constitution. He saith that we should be directed by the sentence of superiors, and take it as a sufficient ground to our consciences for obeying. Bellarmine speaketh more reasonably: Legesæ human non obligant sub pœna mortis æternæ, nisi quatenus violatione legis humanæ offenditur Deus. Lindsey thinketh that the will of the law must be the rule of our consciences; he saith not the reason of the law, but the will of the law. And when we talk with the chief of our opposites, they would bind us by sole authority, because they cannot do it by any reason. But we answer out of Pareus, that the particular laws of the church bind not per se, or propter ipsum speciale mandatum ecclesiæ. Ratio: quia ecclesia res adiaphoras non jubet facere vel omittere propter suum mandatum, sed tantum propter justas mandandi causas, ut sunt conservatio ordinis, vitatio scandali: quæ quamdiu non violantur, conscientias liberas relinquit.

Sect. 13. Thus we have found what power they give to their canons about the ceremonies for binding of our consciences, and that a necessity not of practice only upon the outward man, but of opinion also upon the conscience is imposed by the sole will of the law-makers. Wherefore, we pray God to open their eyes, that they may see their ceremonial laws to be substantial tyrannies over the consciences of God's people. And for ourselves, we stand to the judgment of sounder divines, and we hold with Luther, that unum Dominum habemus qui animas nostras gubernat. With Hemmingius, that we are free ab omnibus humanis ritibus, quantum quidem ad conscientiam attinet. [pg 1-021] With the Professors of Leyden, that this is a part of the liberty of all the faithful, that in things pertaining to God's worship, ab omni traditionum humanarum jugo liberas habeant conscientias, cum solius Dei sit, res ad religionem pertinentes praescribere.

Chapter V.

That the Ceremonies Take Away Christian Liberty, Proved by a Third Reason, Viz., Because They Are Urged Upon Such as, in Their Consciences, Do Condemn Them.

Sect. 1. If Christian liberty be taken away, by adstricting conscience in any, much more by adstricting it in them who are fully persuaded of the unlawfulness of the thing enjoined; yet thus are we dealt with. Bishop Lindsay gives us to understand, that after the making and publication of an ecclesiastical canon, about things of this nature, albeit a man in his own private judgment think another thing more expedient than that which the canon prescribeth, yet in that case his conscience must be ruled by the will of the law, and not by his own judgment. And Bishop Spotswood, to such as object, that their conscience will not suffer them to obey, because they are persuaded that such things are not right, answereth; that the sentence of their superiors ought to direct them, and make their conscience yield to obedience. Their words I have before transcribed. By which it doth manifestly appear, that they would bear dominion over our consciences, not as lords only, by requiring the willing and ready assent of our consciences to those things which are urged upon us by their sole will and authority, but even as tyrants, not caring if they get so much as constrained obedience, and if by their authority they can compel conscience to that which is contrary to the πληροφορια and full persuasion which it hath conceived.

Sect. 2. It will be said, that our consciences are in an error, and therefore ought to be corrected by the sentence of superiors, whose authority and will doth bind us to receive and embrace the ceremonies, though our consciences do condemn them. Ans. [pg 1-022] Giving, and not granting, that our consciences do err in condemning the ceremonies, yet, so long as they cannot be otherwise persuaded, the ceremonies ought not to be urged upon us; for if we be made to do that which our consciences do condemn, we are made to sin, Rom. xiv. 23. It is an audacious contempt, in Calvin's judgment, to do anything repugnante conscientia. The learned Casuists teach us, that an erring conscience, though non obligat, yet ligat; though we be not obliged to do that which it prescribeth, yet are we bound not to do that which it condemneth. Quicquid fit repugnante et reclamante conscientia, peccatum est, etiamsi repugnantia ista gravem errorem includat, saith Alsted. Conscientia erronca obligat, sic intelligendo, quod faciens contra peccet, saith Hemmingius. This holds ever true of an erring conscience about matters of fact, and especially about things indifferent. If any say, that hereby a necessity of sinning is laid on them whose consciences are in an error, I answer, that so long as a man keeps an erroneous conscience, a necessity of sinning lies on him, and that through his own fault. This necessity ariseth from this supposition, that he retain his erring conscience, and so is not absolute, because he should inform his conscience rightly, so that he may both do that which he ought to do, and do it so from the approbation of his conscience. If it be said again, What should be done to them who have not laid down the error of conscience, but do still retain the same? I answer, eligatur id quod tutius et melius est. If therefore the error of conscience be about weighty and necessary matters, then it is better to urge men to the doing of a necessary duty in the service of God, than to permit them to neglect the same, because their erring conscience disapproveth it; for example, it is better to urge a profane man to come and hear God's word than to suffer him to neglect the hearing of the same, because his conscience alloweth him not to hear. But if the error of conscience be about unnecessary things, or such as are in themselves indifferent, then it is pars tutior, the surest and safest part not to urge men to do that which in their consciences they condemn. Wherefore, since the ceremonies [pg 1-023] are not among the number of such necessary things as may not be omitted without the peril of salvation, the invincible disallowance of our consciences should make our opposites not press them upon us, because by practising them we could not but sin, in that our consciences judge them unlawful. If any of our weak brethren think that he must and should abstain from the eating of flesh upon some certain day, though this thing be in itself indifferent, and not necessary, yet, saith Baldwin, “he who is thus persuaded in his conscience, if he should do the contrary, sinneth.”

Sect. 3. Conscience, then, though erring, doth ever bind in such sort, that he who doth against his conscience sinneth against God. Which is also the doctrine of Thomas. But, without any more ado, it is sufficiently confirmed from Scripture. For, was not their conscience in an error who thought they might not lawfully eat all sorts of meat? Yet the Apostle showeth that their conscience, as erring as it was, did so bind, that they were damned if they should eat such meat as they judged to be unclean, Rom. xiv. 14, 23. The reason wherefore an erring conscience bindeth in this kind is, quoniam agens, &c. “Because he who doth any thing against his conscience doth it against the will of God, though not materially and truly, yet formally and by way of interpretation, forsomuch as that which conscience counselleth or prescribeth, it counselleth it under the respect and account of the will of God. He who reproacheth some private man, taking him to be the king, is thought to have hurt not the private man, but the king himself. So he that contemneth his conscience contemneth God himself, because that which conscience counselleth or adviseth is taken to be God's will.” If I go with certain men upon such a course as I judge and esteem to be a treasonable conspiracy against the king (though it be not so indeed), would not his Majesty (if he knew so much), and might he not, justly condemn me as a wicked traitor? But how much more will the King of kings condemn me if I practice the ceremonies which I judge in my conscience to be contrary to the will of God, and to rob him of his royal prerogative?

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Chapter VI.

That the Ceremonies Take Away Christian Liberty Proved by a Fourth Reason, Viz., Because They Are Pressed Upon Us by Naked Will and Authority, Without Giving Any Reason to Satisfy Our Consciences.

Sect. 1. When the Apostle forbiddeth us to be the servants of men, 1 Cor. vii. 23, is it not his meaning that we should do nothing upon the mere will and pleasure of men, or propter hominem et non propter Deum, as Becane the Jesuit expoundeth it, illustrating what he saith by another place, Eph. vi. 6, 7. Christian servants thought it an unworthy thing to serve wicked men, neither yet took they well with the serving of godly men, for that they were all brethren in Christ. The Apostle answereth them, that they did not the will of man, because it was the will of man, but because it was the will of God, and so they served God rather than man, importing that it were indeed a grievous yoke for any Christian to do the will of man, if he were not sure that it is according to the will of God. Should any synod of the church take more upon them than the synod of the apostles did, who enjoined nothing at their own pleasure, but only what they show to be necessary, because of the law of charity? Acts xv. 28. Or should Christians, who ought not to be children, carried about with every wind, Eph. iv. 14; who should be able to discern both good and evil, Heb. v. 14; in whom the word of God ought to dwell plentifully, Col. iii. 16; who are commanded to beware of men, Matt. x. 17; not to believe every spirit, to prove all things, 1 John iv. 1; and to judge of all that is said to them, 1 Thes. v. 21; should they, I say, be used as stocks and stones, not capable of reason, and therefore to be borne down by naked will and authority? 1 Cor. x. 15. Yet thus it fareth with us. Bishop Lindsey will have the will of the law to rule our consciences, which is by interpretation, Sic volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas. He gives us not the reason or equity of the law, but only the will of it, to be our role. Bishop Spotswood will have us to be so directed by the sentence of our superiors, that we take their sentence as [pg 1-025] a sufficient ground to our consciences for obeying. Which is so much as to say, you should not examine the reason and utility of the law, the sentence of it is enough for you: try no more when you hear the sentence of superiors, rest your consciences upon this as a sufficient ground: seek no other, for their sentence must be obeyed. And who among us knoweth not how, in the Assembly of Perth, free reasoning was shut to the door, and all ears were filled with the dreadful pale of authority? There is this much chronicled in two relations of the proceedings of the same, howbeit otherwise very different. They who did sue for a reformation of church discipline in England, complained that they received no other answer but this: “There is a law, it must be obeyed;” and after the same manner are we used. Yet is this too hard dealing, in the judgment of a Formalist, who saith, that the church doth not so deal with them whom Christ hath redeemed: Ac si non possint capere quid sit religiosum, quid minus, itaque quae ab ecclesia proficiscuntur, admonitiones potius et hortationes dici debent, quam leges. And after, he says of ecclesiastical authority, tenetur reddere paerscripti rationem. “I grant (saith Paybody) it is unlawful to do, in God's worship, anything upon the mere pleasure of man.” Chemnitius taketh the Tridentine fathers for not expounding rationes decreti. Junius observeth, that in the council of the apostles, mention was made of the reason of their decree. And a learned historian observeth of the ancient councils, that there were in them, reasonings, colloquies, discussions, disputes, yea, that whatsoever was done or spoken, was called the acts of the council, and all was given unto all. Caeterum (saith Danaeus) quoniam ut ait Tertullianus in Apologetico, iniqua lex est quae se examinari non patitur; non tam vi cogere homines ad obsequium quam ratione persuadere debent cae leges, quae scribuntur à pio nomotheta. Ergo fere sunt duae cujusvis legis partes, quemadmodum etiam Plato, lib. 4, de legibus scribit, nimirum praefacio [pg 1-026] et lex ipsa, i.e. jussio lege comprehensa. Praefatio causam affert, cur hominum negotiis sic prospiciatur. Ecclesiastical authority should prescribe what it thinks fit, Magis docendo, quam jubendo; magis monendo, quam minando, as Augustine speaketh. Non oportet vi vel necessitate constringere, sed ratione et vitae exemplis suadere, saith Gregory Nazianzen, speaking of ecclesiastical regiment. They, therefore, who give their will for a law, and their authority for a reason, and answer all the arguments of opponents, by bearing them down with the force of a public constitution and the judgment of superiors, to which theirs must be conformed, do rule the Lord's flock “with force and with cruelty,” Ezek. xxxiv. 4; “as lords over God's heritage,” 1 Pet. v. 3.

Sect. 2. Always, since men give us no leave to try their decrees and constitutions, that we may hold fast no more than is good, God be thanked that we have a warrant to do it (without their leave) from his own word, 1 Thess. v. 25. Non numeranda suffragia, sed appendenda, saith Augustine in Psal. xxxix. Our divines hold, that all things which are proposed by the ministers of the church, yea, by aecumenical councils, should be proved and examined; and that, when the guides of the church do institute any ceremonies as necessary for edification, yet ecclesia liberum habet judicium approbandi aut reprobandi eas. Nay, the canon law, prohibiting to depart or swerve from the rules and discipline of the Roman church, yet excepteth discretionem justitiae and so permitteth to do otherwise than the church prescribeth, if it be done cum discretione justitiae. The schoolmen also give liberty to a private man, of proving the statutes of the church, and neglecting the same, if he see cause for doing so, Si causa fit evidens, per se ipsum licite potest homo statuti observantiam praeterire. If any be not able to examine and try all such things, debebant omnes posse, Dei jussu: Deficiunt ergo sua culpa, saith Parcus. Si recte probandi facultate destitui nos sentimus, ab eodem spiritu qui per prophetas suos [pg 1-027] loquitur portenda est, saith Calvin. We will not then call any man rabbi, nor jurare in verba magistri, nor yet be Pythagorean disciples to the church herself, but we will believe her and obey her in so far only as she is the pillar and ground of truth.

Chapter VII.

That Festival Days Take Away Our Liberty, Which God Hath Given Us, Proved; And First Out of the Law.

Sect. 1. That which hath been said against all the controverted ceremonies in general, I will now instance of festival days in particular, and prove, both out of the law and gospel, that they take away our liberty which God hath given us, and which no human power can take from us. Out of the law we frame this argument: If the law of God permit us to work all the six days of the week, the law of man cannot inhibit us. But the law of God doth permit us to work all the six days of the week, therefore our opposites deny not the assumption, which is plain from the fourth commandment, “Six days shalt thou labour,” &c. But they would have somewhat to say against the proposition, which we will hear. Hooker tells us, that those things that the law of God leaves arbitrary and at liberty, are subject to the positive ordinances of men. This, I must say, is strange divinity, for if this were true, then might the laws of men prohibit marriage, because it is left arbitrary, 1 Cor. vii. 36. Then might they also have discharged the apostle Paul to take wages, because herein he was at liberty, 1 Cor. ix. 11-13.

Sect. 2. Talen lendeth the cause another lift, and answereth, that no sober man will say, permissionen Dei, principibus suum circa res medias jus imminuere, num enim ob permissum hominibus dominium in volucres cœli, in pisces maris, et bestias agrii, impiæ fuerint leges principum, quibus aucupii, piscationes, et venationis libertatem, sebditis aliis indulgent, aliis adimunt. Ans. That case and this are very different. For every particular man hath not dominion and power over all fowls, fishes, and [pg 1-028] beasts (else, beside that princes should have no privilege of inhibiting the use of those things, there should be no propriety of heritage and possession among subjects); but power over all these is given to mankind. Pareus observeth, hominem collective intelligi in that place, Gen. i. 26; and Junius observeth, nomen Adam de specie esse intelligendum. But each particular man, and not mankind alone, is permitted to labour six days. Wherefore it is plain, that man's liberty is not abridged in the other case as in this, because mankind hath dominion over these creatures, when some men only do exercise the same, as well as if all men did exercise it.

Sect. 3. Bishop Lindsey's answer is no better, viz., that this liberty which God hath given unto men for labour is not absolute, but subject unto order. For, 1. What tyranny is there so great, spoiling men wholly of their liberty, but this pretence agreeth to it? For, by order, he understandeth the constitutions of our governors, as is clear from his preceding words, so that this may be alleged for a just excuse of any tyranny of governors (that men must be subject unto order), no less than for taking away from us the liberty of labouring six days. 2. This answer is nothing else but a begging of that which is in question, for the present question is, whether or not the constitutions of our governors may inhibit us to labour all the six days of the week, and yet he saith no more, but that this liberty of labour must be subject to order, i.e., to the constitutions of governors. 3. Albeit we should most humbly subject ourselves to our governors, yet we may not submit our liberty to them, which God hath graciously given us, because we are forbidden to be the servants of men, 1 Cor. vii. 23; or to be entangled with the yoke of bondage, Gal. v. 1.

Sect. 4. Yet we must hear what the Bishop can say against our proposition: “If under the law (saith he) God did not spoil his people of liberty, when he appointed them to rest two days at Pasche, one at Whitsunday, &c., how can the king's majesty and the church be esteemed to spoil us of our liberty, that command a cessation from labour on three days?” &c. O horrible blasphemy! O double deceitfulness! Blasphemy, [pg 1-029] because so much power is ascribed to the king and the church over us, as God had over his people of old. God did justly command his people, under the law, to rest from labour on other days beside the Sabbath, without wronging them; therefore the king and the church may as justly, and with doing as little wrong, command us to rest likewise, because God, by a ceremonial law, did hinder his people from the use of so much liberty, as the moral law did give them; therefore the king and the church may do so also. Deceitfulness, in that he saith, God did not spoil his people of liberty, &c. We know that, by appointing them to rest on those days, God did not take away liberty from his people, simply and absolutely, because they had no more liberty than he did allow to them by his laws, which he gave by the hand of Moses, yet he did take away that liberty which one part of his laws did permit to them, viz., the fourth commandment of the moral law, which permitted them to labour six days. The Bishop knew that this question in hand hath not to do with liberty, in the general notion of it, but with liberty which the moral law doth permit. We say, then, that God took away from his people Israel, some of the liberty which his moral law permitted to them, because he was the Lawgiver and Lord of the law; and that the king and the church cannot do the like with us, because they are no more lords over God's law than the people who are set under them.

Sect. 5. But he hath yet more to say against us: “If the king (saith he) may command a cessation from economical and private works, for works civil and public, such as the defence of the crown, the liberty of the country, &c., what reason have ye why he may not enjoin a day of cessation from all kind of bodily labour, for the honour of God and exercise of religion?” &c. Ans. This kind of reasoning is most vicious, for three respects: 1. It supposeth that he who may command a cessation from one kind of labour, upon one of the six days, may also command a cessation from all kind of labour, but there is a difference; for the law of God hath allowed us to labour six days of every week, which liberty no human power can take from us. But we cannot say that the law of God alloweth us six days of every week to economical and private works (for then we should never be bound to put our hands to a public work), whence it cometh [pg 1-030] that the magistrate hath power left him to command a cessation from some labour, but not from all. 2. The Bishop reasoneth from a cessation from ordinary labour for extraordinary labour, to a cessation from ordinary labour for no labour, for they who use their weapons for the defence of the crown, or liberty of the country, do not cease from labour, but only change ordinary labour into extraordinary, and private labour into public, whereas our opposites plead for a cessation from all labour upon their holidays. 3. He skippeth de genere in genus, because the king may command a cessation for civil works, therefore he may command a holy rest for the exercise of religion, as if he had so great power in sacred as in civil things.

Sect. 6. The Bishop hath yet a third dart to throw at us: “If the church (saith he) hath power, upon occasional motives, to appoint occasional fasts or festivities, may not she, for constant and eternal blessings, which do infinitely excel all occasional benefits, appoint ordinary times of commemoration or thanksgiving?” Ans. There are two reasons for which the church may and should appoint fasts or festivities upon occasional motives, and neither of them agreeth with ordinary festivities. 1. Extraordinary fasts, either for obtaining some great blessing, or averting some great judgment, are necessary means to be used in such cases, likewise, extraordinary festivities are necessary testifications of our thankfulness for the benefits which we have impetrate by our extraordinary fasts, but ordinary festivities, for constant and eternal blessings, have no necessary use. The celebration of set anniversary days is no necessary mean for conserving the commemoration of the benefits of redemption, because we have occasion, not only every Sabbath day, but every other day, to call to mind these benefits, either in hearing, or reading, or meditating upon God's word. Dies Christo dicatos tollendos existimo judicoque, saith Danaeus quotidie nobis in evangelii proedicatione nascitur, circumciditur, moritur, resurgit Christus. God hath given his church a general precept for extraordinary fasts, Joel i. 14, ii. 15, as likewise for extraordinary festivities to praise God, and to give him thanks in the public assembly of his people, upon the occasional motive of some great [pg 1-031] benefit which, by the means of our fasting and praying, we have obtained, Zech. viii. 19 with vii. 3. If it be said that there is a general command for set festivities, because there is a command for preaching and hearing the word, and for praising God for his benefits; and that there is no precept for particular fasts more than for particular festivities, I answer: Albeit there is a command for preaching and hearing the word, and for praising God for his benefits, yet is there no command (no, not in the most general generality) for annexing these exercises of religion to set anniversary days more than to other days; whereas it is plain, that there is a general command for fasting and humiliation at some times more than at other times. And as for particularities, all the particular causes, occasions, and times of fasting, could not be determined in Scripture, because they are infinite, as Camero saith. But all the particular causes of set festivities, and the number of the same, might have been easily determined in Scripture, since they are not, nor may not be infinite; for the Bishop himself acknowledgeth, that to appoint a festival day for every week, cannot stand with charity, the inseparable companion of piety. And albeit so many were allowable, yet who seeth not how easily the Scripture might have comprehended them, because they are set, constant, and anniversary times, observed for permanent and continuing causes, and not moveable or mutable, as fasts which are appointed for occurring causes, and therefore may be infinite. I conclude that, since God's word hath given us a general command for occasional fasts, and likewise particularly determined sundry things anent the causes, occasions, nature, and manner of fastings, we may well say with Cartwright, that days of fasting are appointed at “such times, and upon such occasions, as the Scripture doth set forth; wherein because the church commandeth nothing, but that which God commandeth, the religious observation of them, falleth unto the obedience of the fourth commandment, as well as of the seventh day itself.”

Sect. 7. The Bishop presseth us with a fourth argument, taken from the calling of people in great towns from their ordinary [pg 1-032] labours to divine service, which argument Tilen also beateth upon. Ans. There is huge difference betwixt the rest which is enjoined upon anniversary festivities, and the rest which is required during the time of the weekly meetings for divine worship. For, 1. Upon festival days, rest from labour is required all the day over, whereas, upon the days of ordinary and weekly meetings, rest is required only during the time of public worship. 2. Cessation from labour, for prayers or preaching on those appointed days of the week, at some occasions may be omitted; but the rest and commemoration appointed by the church, to be precisely observed upon the anniversary festival days, must not be omitted, in the Bishop's judgment. 3. Men are straitly commanded and compelled to rest from labour upon holidays; but to leave work to come to the ordinary weekly meetings, they are only exhorted. And here I mark how the Bishop contradicteth himself; for in one place where his antagonist maintaineth truly, that the craftsman cannot be lawfully commanded nor compelled to leave his work and to go to public divine service, except on the day that the Lord hath sanctified, he replieth, “If he may be lawfully commanded to cease from his labour during the time of divine service, he may be as lawfully compelled to obey the command.” Who can give these words any sense, or see anything in them said against his antagonist's position, except he be taken to say, that the craftsman may be both commanded and compelled to leave his work and go to divine service on the week-days appointed for the same? Nay, he laboureth to prove thus much out of the ninth head of the First Book of Discipline, which saith, “In great towns we think expedient, that every day there be either sermon or common prayers,” &c., where there is nothing of compulsion, or a forcing command, only there is an exhortation. But ere the Bishop have said much, he forgetteth himself, and tells us, that it were against equity and charity to adstrict the husbandman to leave his plough so oft as the days of weekly preaching do return, but that, on the festival days, reason would, that if he did not leave his plough willingly, by authority he should be forced. Which place confirmeth this difference which we give betwixt rest on [pg 1-033] the holidays, and rest at the times of weekly meeting.

Chapter VIII.

That Festival Days Take Away Our Christian Liberty, Proved Out of the Gospel.

Sect. 1. My second argument whereby I prove that the imposing of the observation of holidays doth bereave us of our liberty, I take out of two places of the Apostle, the one, Gal. iv. 10, where he finds fault with the Galatians for observing of days, and giveth them two reasons against them; the one, ver. 3, They were a yoke of bondage which neither they nor their fathers were able to bear; another, ver, 8, They were weak and beggarly rudiments, not beseeming the Christian church, which is liberate from the pedagogical instruction of the ceremonial law. The other place is Col. ii. 16, where the Apostle will have the Colossians not to suffer themselves to be judged by any man in respect of an holiday, i.e. to be condemned for not observing a holiday, for judicare hic significat culpae reum facere, and the meaning is, suffer not yourselves to be condemned by those false apostles, or by any mortal man in the cause of meat, that is, for meat or drink taken, or for any holiday, or any part of an holiday neglected. Two other reasons the Apostle giveth in this place against festival days; one, ver. 17, What should we do with the shadow, when we have the body? another, ver. 20, Why should we be subject to human ordinances, since through Christ we are dead to them, and have nothing ado with them? Now, by the same reasons are all holidays to be condemned, as taking away Christian liberty; and so, that which the Apostle saith doth militate as well against them as against any other holidays; for whereas it might be thought, that the Apostle doth not condemn all holidays, because both he permitteth others to observe days, Rom. xiv. 5, and he himself also did observe one of the Jewish feasts, Acts xviii. 21: it is easily answered, that our holidays have no warrant from these places, except our opposites will say, that they esteem their festival days holier [pg 1-034] than other days, and that they observe the Jewish festivities, neither of which they do acknowledge, and if they did, yet they must consider, that that which the Apostle either said or did hereanent, is to be expounded and understood of bearing with the weak Jews, whom he permitted to esteem one day above another, and for whose cause he did, in his own practice, thus far apply himself to their infirmity at that time when they could not possibly be as yet fully and thoroughly instructed concerning Christian liberty, and the abrogation of the ceremonial law, because the gospel was as yet not fully propagated; and when the Mosaical rites were like a dead man not yet buried, as Augustine's simile runs. So that all this can make nothing for holidays after the full promulgation of the gospel, and after that the Jewish ceremonies are not only dead, but also buried, and so deadly to be used by us. Hence it is, that the Apostle will not bear with the observation of days in Christian churches, who have known God, as he speaks.

Sect. 2. The defenders of holidays answer to these places which we allege against them, that the Apostle condemneth the observation of Judaical days, not of ecclesiastical days, which the church instituteth for order and policy; which evasion Bishop Lindsey followeth so hard, that he sticketh not to hold, that “all the days whereof the Apostle condemneth the observation were Judaical days prescribed in the ceremonial law,” &c. And this he is not contented to maintain himself, but he will needs father it upon his antagonist by such logic, forsooth, as can infer quidlibet ex quodlibet. The Apostle comports with the observation of days in the weak Jews, who understood not the fulness of the Christian liberty, especially since those days, having had the honour to be once appointed by God himself, were to be honourably buried; but the same Apostle reproves the Galatians who had attained to this liberty, and had once left off the observation of days. What ground of consequence can warrant such an illation from these premises as this which the Bishop formeth, namely, that “all the days whereof the Apostle condemned the observation were Judaical days,” &c.

Sect. 3. Now, for confutation of this forged exposition of those places of the [pg 1-035] Apostle, we say, 1. If all the days whereof the Apostle condemned the observation were Judaical days prescribed in the ceremonial law, then do our divines falsely interpret the Apostle's words against popish holidays, and the Papists do truly allege that their holidays are not condemned by the Apostle. The Rhemists affirm, that the Apostle condemneth only Jewish days, but not Christian days, and that we do falsely interpret his words against their holidays. Cartwright answereth them, that if Paul condemned the observing of feasts which God himself instituted, then much more doth he condemn the observation of feasts of man's devising. So Bellarmine allegeth, loqui ibi Apostolum de judaeorum tantum festis. Hospinian, answering him, will have the Apostle's words to condemn the Christian feasts more than the Judaical. Conradus Vorstius rejecteth this position, Apostolus non nisi judaicum discremen dierum in N.T. sublatum esse docet, as a popish error. 2. If the Apostle mean only of Judaical days, either he condemneth the observing of their days materialiter, or formaliter, i.e. either he condemneth the observation of the same feasts which the Jews observed, or the observing of them with such a meaning, after such a manner, and for such an end as the Jews did. The former our opposites dare not hold, for then they should grant that he condemneth their own Easter and Pentecost, because these two feasts were observed by the Jews. Nor yet can they hold them at the latter, for he condemneth that observation of days which had crept into the church of Galatia, which was not Jewish nor typical, seeing the Galatians, believing that Christ was already come, could not keep them as figures of his coming as the Jews did, but rather as memorials that he was already come, saith Cartwright. 1. If the Apostle's reasons wherewith he impugns the observation of days, hold good against our holidays so well as against the Jewish or popish days, then doth he condemn those, no less these. But the Apostle's reasons agree to our holidays for, 1. According to that reason, Gal. iv. [pg 1-036] 3, they bring us under a yoke of bondage. Augustine, complaining of some ceremonies wherewith the church in his time was burdened, thought it altogether best that they should be cut off, Etiamsi fidei non videantur adversari, quia religionem quam Christus liberam esse voluit, servilibus oneribus premunt. Yea, he thought this yoke of servitude greater bondage, and less tolerable than the servility of the Jews, because they were subject to the burdens of the law of God, and not to the presumptions of men. The yoke of bondage of Christians, in respect of feasts, is heavier than the yoke of the Jews, not only for the multitude of them, but because Christianorum festa, ab hominibus tantum, judaeorum vero a Deo fuerint instituta, saith Hospinian. Have not we then reason to exclaim against our holidays, as a yoke of bondage, heavier than that of the Jews, for that our holidays are men's inventions, and so were not theirs? The other reason, Gal. iv. 9, holdeth as good against our holidays. They are rudimental and pedagogical elements, which beseem not the Christian church, for as touching that which Tilen objecteth, that many in the church of the New Testament are still babes to be fed with milk, it maketh as much against the Apostle as against us; for by this reason, he may as well throw back the Apostle's ground of condemning holidays among the Galatians, and say, because many of the Galatians were babes, therefore they had the more need of those elements and rudiments. The Apostle, Gal. iv. 3, compareth the church of the Old Testament to an infant, and insinuateth, that in the days of the New Testament the infancy of the church hath taken an end. And whereas it might be objected, that in the church of the New Testament there are many babes, and that the Apostle himself speaketh of the Corinthians and Hebrews as babes: it is answered by Pareus, Non de paucis personis, sed de statu totius ecclesiae intelligendum est quod hic dicitur. There were also some in the church of the Old Testament, adulti fide heroes; but in respect of the state of the whole church, he who is least in the kingdom of God, is greater than John Baptist, Luke vii. 28. Lex, saith Beza, vocatur elementa, quia illis velut [pg 1-037] rudimentis, Deus ecclesiam suam erudivit, postea pleno cornu effudit Spiritum Sanctum tempore evangelii. 3. That reason also taken from the opposition of the shadow and the body, Col. ii. 17, doth militate against our holidays; for the Apostle there speaketh in the present time, ἐστι σκια: whereas the Judaical rites were abolished, whereupon Zanchius noteth, that the Apostle doth not so much speak of things by-past, as of the very nature of all rites, Definiens ergo ipsos ritus in sese, dixit eos nil aliud esse quam umbram. If all rites, then our holidays among the rest, serve only to adumbrate and shadow forth something, and by consequence are unprofitable and idle, when the substance itself is clearly set before us. 4. That reason, Col. ii. 20, doth no less irresistibly infringe the ordinances about our holidays than about the Jewish; for if men's ordinances, about things once appointed by God himself, ought not to be obeyed, how much less should the precepts of men be received about such things in religion as never had this honour to be God's ordinances, when their mere authority doth limit or adstrict us in things which God hath made lawful or free to us.

Sect. 4. Thus we see how the Apostle's reasons hold good against our holidays; let us see next what respects of difference the Bishop can imagine to evidence wherefore the Judaical days may be thought condemned by the Apostle, and not ours. He deviseth a double respect; and first he tells us, that the Jewish observation of days was to a typical use. And whereas it is objected by us, that the converted Jews did not observe them as shadows of things to come, because then they had denied Christ, he answereth thus: “Howbeit the converted Jews did not observe the Jewish days as shadows of things to come, yet they might have observed them as memorials of by-past temporal and typical benefits, and for present temporal blessings, as the benefit of their delivery out of Egypt, and of the fruits of the earth, which use was also typical.” Ans. 1. This is his own conjecture only, therefore he himself propoundeth it doubtfully, for he dare not say, they did observe them as memorials, &c., but, they might have observed, to which guessing, if I reply, they might also not have observed them as memorials [pg 1-038] of those by-past or present benefits, we say as much against him, and as truly, as he hath said against us. 2. His form of reasoning is very uncouth, for, to prove that the observation of days by the converted Jews was to a typical use, he allegeth, that they might have observed, &c. Thus proving a position by a supposition. O brave! 3. There is no sense in his conjecture, for he yields that they did not observe those days as shadows of things to come, and yet he saith, they might have observed them as memorials of by-past typical benefits; now they could not observe those days as memorials of types, except they observed them also as shadowing forth the antitypes. Pentecost, saith Davenant, et illa legis datae celebratio. Spiritus Sancti missionem, et legis in tabulis cordium per eundem Spiritum inscriptionem, adumbravit. Scenopegiae festum peregrinationem hominis pii per hoc mundi desertum ad caelestem patriam delineabat, &c. So that the feast of Pentecost, if it had been observed as a memorial of the promulgation of the law, could not but shadow forth the sending of the Holy Spirit into our hearts, to write the law in them. And the feast of tabernacles, if it had been observed as a memorial of the benefits which God bestowed on his people in the wilderness, could not but shadow out God's conducting of his children, through the course of their pilgrimage in this world, to the heavenly Canaan. 4. If feasts which were memorials of temporal benefits, were for this reason mystical, then he must grant against himself, that much more are our feasts mystical, which are memorials of spiritual benefits, and consecrated to be holy signs and symbols, for making us call to mind the mysteries of our redemption. 5. Before this dispute take an end, we shall see out of the best learned among our opposites, that they observe the holidays as mystical, and more mystical than the Bishop here describeth the Jewish days to have been, and so we shall see the falsehood of that pretence, that they are observed only for order and policy, and not for mystery. 6. If we would know the true reason which made the converted Jews to observe those days, it was not any mystical use, but that which made them think themselves obliged to other Mosaical rites; even propter auctoritatem legis, [pg 1-039] saith Junius; for albeit they could not be ignorant, that these rites were shadows of things to come, and that the body was of Christ, in whom, and in the virtue of whose death they did stablish their faith, yet they did not at first understand how such things as were once appointed by God himself, and given to his people as ordinances to be kept by him throughout their generations, could be altogether abolished, and for this cause, though they did condescend to a change of the use and signification of those ceremonies, as being no more typical of the kingdom of Christ, which they believed to be already come, yet still they held themselves bound to the use of the things themselves as things commanded by God.

Thus much may be collected from Acts xv. 21, where James gives a reason wherefore it was expedient that the Gentiles should observe some of the Jewish rites for a time, as Calvin, Beza, and Junius, expound the place. His reason is, because the Jews, being so long accustomed with the hearing of the law of Moses, and such as did preach the same, could not be made at first to understand how the ordinances which God gave to his people by the hand of Moses, might be cast off and not regarded, which importeth as much as I say, namely, that the reason wherefore the converted Jews were so apt to be scandalised by such as cared not for the ceremonial law, and held themselves obliged to observe the same, was because they saw not how they could be exempted from the ordinances and statutes of the law of Moses, with which they had been educated and accustomed.

Sect. 5. Rests the second respect of difference given by the Bishop: “Further (saith he), they did observe them with opinion of necessity, as things instituted by God for his worship and their salvation, which sort of observation was legal.” Ans. 1. Be it so; he cannot hereupon infer, that the Apostle doth only condemn the observation of Judaical days, for he seeth nothing of observing days with opinion of necessity, but simply and absolutely he condemneth the observing of days, and his reasons reflex on our holidays, as well as the Jewish. 2. Their opinion of necessity he either refers to [pg 1-040] the institution which these days once had from God, or else to the use which, at that time, they had for God's worship and their salvation. That they observed them with opinion of necessity, as things which had been instituted by God, it is most likely, but that they observed them with opinion of necessity, as things necessary for God's worship and their salvation, is more than can be made good, it is more probable that they observed them merely and simply for that they had the honour to be instituted by God in his law. For to say that they observed them to the same use and end for which God did institute them, is false, because then they had observed them as types and shadows of the coming of Christ, and so had denied Christ. 3. If the Apostle condemn the observing of days instituted by God, with opinion of necessity, much more doth he condemn the observing of days instituted by men with such an opinion. And such is the observation of days urged upon us. Though the Bishop pretend that the observing of our holidays is not imposed with opinion of necessity, shall we therefore think it is so? Nay, Papists do also pretend that the observation of their ceremonies is not necessary, nor the neglecting of them a mortal sin. I have proved heretofore, out of their opposites' own words, that the ceremonies in question (and, by consequence, holidays among the rest) are urged upon us with opinion of necessity, and as their words, so their works bewray them, for they urge the ceremonies with so exorbitant vehemency, and punish refusers with so excessive severity, as if they were the weightiest matters of the law of God. Yet they would have us believe, that they have but sober and mean thoughts of these matters, as of circumstances determined for order and policy only. Just like a man who casts firebrands and arrows, and yet saith, Am not I in sport? Prov. xvi. 18, 19. They will tell us that they urge not the ceremonies as necessary in themselves, but only as necessary in respect of the church's determination, and because of the necessity of obeying those who are set over us. But, I pray, is not this as much as the Rhemists say, who place the necessity of their rites and observances, not in the nature of the things themselves, but in the church's precept?

[pg 1-041]

Chapter IX.

Showing the Weakness of Some Pretences Which Our Opposites Use for Holidays.

Sect. 1. Since it hath been evinced by unanswerable reasons that holidays, as now urged upon us, take away our Christian liberty, I will now pull off them the coat of some fig leaves wherewith they are trimmed up. And first, I hope it will appear to how small purpose Dr Davenant would conciliate his reader's mind to allow of the church's ordinances about holidays (peradventure because he saw all that he had said of that purpose to be too invalid proof), by six cautions, whereby all superstition and abuse which may ensue upon them may be shunned. For whatsoever doth manifestly endanger men's souls, being a thing not necessary in itself, at which they take occasion of superstitious abuse, should rather be removed altogether out of the way, than be set about with a weak and easily-penetrable hedge of some equivocative cautions, which the ruder sort do always, and the learned do too oft, either not understand or not remember. Now, Bishop Lindsey confesseth, and puts it out of all doubt, that when the set times of these solemnities return, superstitious conceits are most pregnant in the heads of people; therefore it must be the safest course to banish those days out of the church, since there is so great hazard, and no necessity, of retaining them.

What they can allege for holidays, from our duty to remember the inestimable benefits of our redemption, and to praise God for the same, hath been already answered. And as touching any expediency which they imagine in holidays, we shall see to that afterward.

Sect. 2. The Act of Perth Assembly allegeth the practice of the ancient church for warrant of holidays, and Tilen allegeth the judgment of antiquity to the same purpose. Ans. The festivities of the ancient church cannot warrant ours; for, 1. In the purest times of the church there was no law to tie men to the observation of holidays. Observandum est, say the divines of Magdeburg, [pg 1-042] apostolos et apostolicos viros, neque de paschate, neque de aliis quibuscunque, festivitatibus legem aliquam constituisse. Socrates reporteth, that men did celebrate the feast of Easter, and other festival days, sicuti voluerunt, ex consuetudine quadam. Nicephorus saith, that men did celebrate festivities, sicuti cuique visum erat, in regionibus passim ex consuitudine quadam per traditionem accepta adducti. In which place, as the reader will plainly perceive, he opposeth tradition to an evangelical or apostolical ordinance. Sozomen tells us, that men were left to their own judgment about the keeping of Easter, Jerome saith of the feasts which the church in his time observed, that they were pro varietate regionum diversa. The first who established a law about any festival day, is thought to have been Pius I, bishop of Rome, yet it is marked that the Asiatican doctors did not care much for this constitution of Pius. I conclude with Cartwright, that those feasts of the primitive church “came by custom, and not by commandment, by the free choice of men, and not by constraint.” So that from these, no commendation ariseth to our feasts, which are not only established by laws, but also imposed with such necessity and constraint, as spoileth us of our liberty.

2. The festival days observed by the ancient church, were not accounted more excellent than other days, for, saith Jerome, non quod celebrior sit dies illa qua conveniumus, &c. But our festival days are made aliis diebus celebriores, yea, are taken to be holier than other days, as I will afterwards prove.

Sect. 3. Moreover, the proctors for holidays among us think to make advantage of the practice of other reformed churches, and the judgment of modern divines. But we are to consider, 1. As they have the example of some churches for them, so we have the example of other churches for us, for the church of Geneva in Savoy, and the church of Strasburg in Germany, did abolish festival days, as Calvin writeth. Yea, in hac tota provincia aboliti fuerunt dies festi, saith he. The church of Zurich in Helvetia did also banish them all away, as Bullinger writeth to Calvin. 2. The practice [pg 1-043] of the greatest part of the reformed churches in observing holidays, cannot commend them in the church of Scotland, 1. Because she did spue them out with so great detestation, that she is more bound to abhor them than other churches which did not the like, and I may well apply to them that which Calvin saith of the ceremonies of the Interim, to Valentinus Pacaeus, Ut concedam faetidas illas sordes quibus purgatae fuerunt vestrae ecclesiae, inrebus medus posse censeri: earum tamen restitutio eritne res media? 2. The church of Scotland is tied yet with another bond to hate holidays, of which other churches are free; for, by a solemn oath sworn to the God of heaven, she hath abjured all antichristian and popish rites, and dedicating of days particularly. When Tilen would make answer to this argument, he saith, that men's consciences should not be snared with rash oaths and superstitious vows, and if that such bonds be laid on, they should be broken and shaken off. What! Calls he this a superstitious vow, which abjured all superstition and superstitious rites? Or calls he this a rash oath, which, upon so sage and due deliberation, so serious advisement, so pious intention, so decent preparation, so great humiliation, was religiously, publicly, solemnly sworn throughout this land, and that at the straight command of authority? Who is ignorant of these things, except he be a stranger in our Israel? But say the oath had been rash and temeratious, shall it not therefore oblige? His judgment is, it doth not; and so thinks the Bishop of Winchester, who teacheth us, that if the oath be made rashly, paenitenda promissio non perficienda praesumptio, he had said better thus, paenitenda praesumptio, perficienda promissio; for was not that a very rash oath which the princes of Israel did swear to the Gibeonites, not asking counsel at the mouth of the Lord? Josh. ix. 14-16, yet it bound both them, Josh ix. 19, and their posterity, some hundred years after, 2 Sam. xxi. 1. If the matter then be lawful, the oath binds, were it sworn ever so rashly.

Sect. 4. As touching the judgment of divines, we say, 1. Many divines disallow of festival days, and with the church, were free of them. For the Belgic churches, in their synod, anno 1578, wished that the six days [pg 1-044] might be wrought upon, and that the Lord's day alone might be celebrated. And Luther in his book, de Bonis Operibus, wished that there were no feast-days among Christians but the Lord's day. This wish of theirs declareth plainly, that they allowed of no holiday except the Lord's day; yet Bishop Lindsey must make a fashion of saying something for an answer. “This wish (saith he) Luther and the Belgic churches conceived, out of their miscontent at the number, corruptions, and superstitions of the festival days, beside the Lord's day, as ye do.” Ans. 1. Their wish importeth a simple and absolute mistaking of all festival days besides the Lord's day, and not of their number and corruptions only. 2. It is well that he acknowledgeth both them and us to have reason of miscontentment at holidays, from their corruptions and superstitions. The old Waldenses also, whose doctrine was restored and propagated by John Huss, and Jerome of Prague, after Wiclif, and that with the congratulation of the church of Constantinople, held, that they were to rest from labour upon no day but upon the Lord's day, whereby it appeareth, that holidays have had adversaries before us. I find that they pervert some places which they allege against us out of Calvin. Tilen allegeth, Calvin. Inst., lib. 2, cap. 8, sec. 32, acknowledging alios quoque dies festos praeter dominicum, &c. I marvel how a judicious reader could imagine such a thing to be in that place, for both in that and the subsequent section, he is speaking of the Lord's day against the Anabaptists, and if any man will think that in sec. 32 he is speaking of holy assemblies of Christians in the general, yet he can see nothing there of any festival days, beside the Lord's day, dedicated to holy meetings. There is another place of Calvin abused by Bishop Spotswood and Bishop Lindsey, taken out of one of his Epistles to Hallerus, which I find in the volume before quoted, p. 136, 137, that which they grip to in this epistle is, that Calvin, speaking of the abrogation of festival days in Geneva, saith, hoc tamen testatum esse volo, si mihi delata optio fuisset, quod nunc constitutum est, non fuisse pro [pg 1-045] sententia dicturum. Ans. That which made Calvin say so, was not any liking which he had to festival days, for he calls the abolishing of them ordo bene compositus; but as himself showeth in the following epistle, which beareth this title, Cal. Ministro Burensi, S.D., the reason why he durst scarcely have so determined, if his judgment had been required, was, because, he saw neither end nor remedy for the prevailing tumult of contention raised about festival days, and likely to impede the course of reformation; therefore fovendae pacis studio, he professeth that he durst not make mention of the abrogation of those holidays. Because he would have tolerated holidays, because he durst not at that time, and as the case then stood, have spoken of the abolishing them, can it be hereupon concluded that he allowed of them? No, sure. But it is observable how both those prelates pervert Calvin's words. Bishop Spotswood allegeth his words anent the abolishing of these festival days, thus: Ego neque suasor neque impulsor fui, atque hoc testatum volo, si mihi delata optio, &c. Whereas the words in that epistle lie thus: Ego tametsi neque suasor, neque impulsor fui, sic tamen accidisse non moleste fero. Quod si statum nostrae ecclesiae aeque compertum haberes, non dubitares meo judicio subscribere. Hoc tamen testatum esse volo, si mihi delata optio, &c. The Bishop would have made his hearers believe that Calvin was not content with the abolishing of the festival days, whereas his words testify the very contrary. Bishop Lindsey is as gross in perverting the end of that epistle. Nec tamen est cur homines adeo exasperentur, si libertate nostra ut ecclesiae edificatio postulat utimur, &c., from which words he concludes, that in Calvin's judgment, the observation and abrogation of those days is in the power and liberty of the church. But the reader will perceive, that Calvin there speaketh only of the church's liberty to abrogate holidays, and nothing of her power to observe them, for he is showing, that howbeit he durst not have given advice to abolish them, if the decision had been referred to him, yet they had no reason for them who were offended at the abolishing of them in Geneva, because that church had done no more than she had power and liberty to do for edification. 3. Other testimonies [pg 1-046] they produce, which cannot help them much. That which Bishop Lindsey allegeth out of Zanchius's confession, maketh him but small advantage; for though Zanchius there alloweth of the sanctification of some festival days, yet, writing on the fourth commandment, he acknowledgeth that it is more agreeable to the first institution, and to the writings of the apostles, that one day of the week only be sanctified. What meant the Bishop to say? that this place is falsified and mutilated by his antagonist, who quotes it not to prove that Zanchius disalloweth of festival days, but to prove that, in Zanchius's judgment, the sanctification of the Sabbath only, and no other day in the week, agreeth best with divine and apostolical institution? Was there any need to allege more of Zanchius's words than concerned the point which he had to prove? The Bishop allegeth also a testimony out of Perkins on Gal. iv. 10, which makes him but very little help; for albeit Perkins thought good, in some sort, to excuse the observing of days in his own mother church of England, yet I find in that place, 1. He complaineth that the greatest part respects those holidays more than they should. 2. He alloweth only the observing of days for order's sake, that men may come to the church to hear God's word, which respect will not be enough to the Bishop, if there be not a solemnising and celebrating of the memory of some of God's inestimable benefits, and a dedicating of the day to this end and purpose. 3. He saith, that it is the privilege of God to appoint an extraordinary day of rest, so that he permitteth not power to the church for appointing a set, constant, and anniversary day of rest, for such a day becometh an ordinary day of rest. 4. He preferreth the practice of those churches of the Protestants who do not observe holidays, because, saith he, the church, in the apostles' days, had no holiday besides the Lord's day, and the fourth commandment enjoins the labour of six days.

Sect. 5. The Bishop meeteth with another answer in his antagonist which crosseth his testimonies, namely, that howsoever foreign divines, in their epistles and councils, spake sometimes sparingly against holidays, when their advice was sought of churches newly risen out of Popery and greatly distressed, yet they never advised a church to resume [pg 1-047] them where they were removed. The Bishop objecteth against this answer, that Calvin, epist. 51, “adviseth the Monbelgardens not to contend against the prince for not resuming (he should have said, for not receiving, if he had translated Calvin's words faithfully) of all festival days, but only such as served not to edification, and were seen to be superstitious.” Ans. 1. Albeit he spake sparingly against holidays, when he gave advice to that distressed and lately reformed church, lest the work of reformation should have been letted, yet he did not allow holidays among them. For in another epistle written to them he saith, De pulsu campanarum et diebus festis ita sentimus, ferendas potius esse vobis has ineptias, quam stationem in qua estis a domino collocati deferendum, modo ne approbetis; modo etiam liberum vobis sit reprehendere, quae inde sequentur superstitiones. And this he setteth down for one of these superstitions, quod dies a die discernitur, where also he condemneth both the observing of days to the honour of man as superstitious, and the observing of them for the honour of God as [pg 1-048] Judaical. If holidays, in Calvin's judgment, be fooleries—if he gave advice not to approve them—if he thought them occasions of superstition—if he held it superstition to distinguish one day from another, or to esteem one above another—if he call them Judaical, though kept to the honour of God, judge then what allowance they had from him. 2. If the Bishop stand to Calvin's judgment in that place which he quoteth, he must allow as to refuse some festival days, though enjoined by the prince. In festis non recipiendis cuperem vos esse constantiores, sic tamen ut non litigetis de quibuslibet. Then he allowed them to contend against some holidays, though the prince imposed them. 3. The church of Scotland did remove festival days in another manner, and bound herself never to receive them by another bond than ever the Monbelgardens did; so that having other bonds lying upon us than other churches have, we are so much the more straightly obliged neither to receive holidays, nor any other antichristian and popish ceremony.

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