The General Nature of the Subjects of Enlightened Moral Judgments

Chapter VIII

Definitions of the term “conduct,” p. sq.—The meaning of the word “act,” p. sq.—The meaning of the word “intention,” p. .—There can be only one intention in one act, p. sq. The moral judgments which we pass on acts do not really relate to the event, but to the intention, p. sq.—A person morally accountable also for his deliberate wishes, p. .—A deliberate wish is a volition, p. sq.—The meaning of the word “motive,” p. .—Motives which are volitions fall within the sphere of moral valuation, ibid.—The motive of an act may be an intention, but an intention belonging to another act, ibid.—Even motives which consist of non-volitional conations may indirectly exercise much influence on moral judgments, p. sq.—Refutation of Mill’s statement that “the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action,” p. sq.—Moral judgments really passed upon men as acting or willing, not upon acts or volitions in the abstract, p. .—Forbearances morally equivalent to acts, p. sq.—Distinction between forbearances and omissions, p. .—Moral judgments refer not only to willing, but to not-willing as well, not only to acts and forbearances, but to omissions, p. sq.—Negligence, heedlessness, and rashness, p. .—Moral judgments of blame concerned with not-willing only in so far as this not-willing is attributed to a defect of the “will,” p. sq.—Distinction between conscious omissions and forbearances, and between not-willing to refrain from doing and willing to do, p. .—The “known concomitants of acts,” p. .—Absence of volitions also gives rise to moral praise, p. sq.—The meaning of the term “conduct,” p. .—The subject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a person’s will, or character, conceived as the cause either of volitions or of the absence of volitions, p. sq.—Moral judgments that are passed on emotions or opinions really refer to the will, p. sq.