The Regard for Truth and Good Faith ( concluded )

Chapter XXXI

Explanation of the moral ideas concerning truthfulness and good faith, pp. –131.—When detected a deception implies a conflict between two irreconcilable ideas, which causes pain, p. .—Men like to know the truth, p. sq.—The importance of knowing the truth, p. .—Deception humiliating, ibid.—A lie or breach of faith held more condemnable in proportion to the magnitude of the harm caused by it, ibid.—The importance of truthfulness and fidelity even in apparently trifling cases, p. sq.—Deceit held permissible or obligatory when promoting the true interest of the person subject to it, p. .—The moral valuation of an act of falsehood influenced by its motive, p. sq.—The opinion that no motive can justify an act of falsehood, p. .—Why falsehood is held permissible, or praiseworthy, or obligatory, when directed against a stranger, ibid.—Deceit condemned as cowardly, p. .—A clever lie admired or approved of, p. .—The duties of sincerity and good faith to some extent founded on prudential considerations, pp. –124.—Lying attended with supernatural danger, ibid.—A mystic efficacy ascribed to the untrue word, pp. –118.—The efficacy of oaths and the methods of charging them with supernatural energy, pp. –122.—Oaths containing appeals to supernatural beings, pp. –122.—By being frequently appealed to in oaths a god may come to be looked upon as a guardian of veracity and good faith, p. .—The influence of oath-taking upon veracity, p. sq.—The influence of education upon the regard for truth, p. .—The influence of habit upon the regard for truth, p. .—Natural to speak the truth, p. sq.—Intercourse with strangers destructive to savage veracity, pp. –129.—Social incoherence apt to lead to deceitful habits, p. .—Social differentiation a cause of deception, p. sq.—Oppression an inducement to falsehood, p. sq.—The duty of informing other persons of the truth, p. .—The regard for knowledge, pp. –136.