Why Moral Judgments Are Passed on Conduct and Character—Moral Valuation and Free-Will

Chapter XIII

Explanation of the fact that moral judgments are passed on conduct and character, p. .—The correctness of this explanation proved by the circumstance that not only moral emotions, but non-moral retributive emotions as well, are felt with reference to phenomena exactly similar in nature to those on which moral judgments are passed, pp. –319.—Whether moral or non-moral, a retributive emotion is essentially directed towards a sensitive and volitional entity, or self, conceived of as the cause of pleasure or the cause of pain, p. .—The futility of other attempts to solve the problem, p. sq.—The nature of the moral emotions also gives us the key to the problem of the co-existence of moral responsibility with the general law of cause and effect, p. .—The theory according to which responsibility, in the ordinary sense of the term, and moral judgments generally, are inconsistent with the notion that the human will is determined by causes, p. sq.—Yet, as a matter of fact, moral indignation and moral approval are felt by determinists and libertarians alike, p. sq.—Explanation of the fallacy which lies at the bottom of the conception that moral valuation is inconsistent with determinism, p. .—Causation confounded with compulsion, pp. –324.—The difference between fatalism and determinism, pp. –326.—The moral emotions not concerned with the origin of the innate character, p. .