Notes and Illustrations

Chapter I.

Page , § 2. After-thought = Nachdenken, i.e. thought which retraces and reproduces an original, but submerged, thought (cf. Hegel's Werke, vi. p. xv): to be distinguished from Reflexion (cf. Werke, i. 174).

P. , § 3. On the blending of universal (thought) and individual (sensation) in what is called perception (Wahrnehmen) see Encycl. §§ 420, 421.

P. , § 3. Cf. Fichte, Werke, ii. 454: 'Hence for the common sort of hearers and readers the uncommon intelligibility of certain sermons and lectures and writings, not one word of which is intelligible to the man who thinks for himself,—because there is really no intelligence in them. The old woman who frequents the church—for whom by the way I cherish all possible respect—finds a sermon very intelligible and very edifying which contains lots of texts and verses of hymns she knows by rote and can repeat. In the same way readers, who fancy themselves far superior to her, find a work very instructive and clear which tells them what they already know, and proofs very stringent which demonstrate what they already believe. The pleasure the reader takes in the writer is a concealed pleasure in himself. What a great man! (he says to himself); it is as if I heard or read myself.

P. , § 6. Cf. Hegel, Werke> viii. 17: 'In this conviction (that what is reasonable is actual, and what is actual is reasonable) stands every plain man, as well as the philosopher; and from it philosophy starts in the study both of the spiritual and of the natural universe——The great thing however is, in the show of the temporal and the transient to recognise the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present. For the work of reason (which is synonymous with the Idea), when in its actuality it simultaneously enters external existence, emerges with an infinite wealth of forms, phenomena and phases, and envelopes its kernel with the motley rind with which consciousness is earliest at home,—a rind which the notion must penetrate before it can find the inward pulse and feel it still beating even in the outward phases. But the infinite variety of circumstance which is formed in this externality by the light of the essence shining in it,—all this infinite material, with its regulations,—is not the object of philosophy.... To comprehend what is, is the task of philosophy: for what is is reason. As regards the individual, each, whatever happens, is a son of his time. So too philosophy is its time apprehended in thoughts. It is just as foolish to fancy that a philosophy can overleap its present world as that an individual can overleap his time. If his theory really goes beyond actualities, if it constructs an ideal, a world as it ought to be, then such existence as it has is only in his intentions—a yielding element in which anything you please may be fancy-formed.' Cf. Schelling, Werke, iv. 390: 'There are very many things, actions, &c. of which we may judge, after vulgar semblance, that they are unreasonable. All the same we presuppose and assume that everything which is or which happens is reasonable, and that reason is, in one word, the prime matter and the real of all being.'

P. , § 6. Actuality (Wirklichkeit) in Werke, iv. 178 seqq.

P. , § 7. Cf. Fichte, Werke, ii. 333: 'Man has nothing at all but experience; and everything he comes to be comes to only through experience, through life itself. All his thinking, be it loose or scientific, common or transcendental, starts from experience and has experience ultimately in view. Nothing has unconditional value and significance but life; all other thinking, conception, knowledge has value only in so far as in some way or other it refers to the fact of life, starts from it, and has in view a subsequent return to it.'

P. , § 7 (note). Thomas Thomson (1773-1852), Professor of Chemistry at Glasgow, distinguished in the early history of chemistry and allied sciences. The Annals of Philosophy appeared from 1813 to 1826.—The art of preserving the hair was published (anonymous) at London in 1825.

P. , § 7 (note). The speech from the throne was read on Feb. 3rd, 1825.

The shipowners' dinner was on Feb. 12. The Times of Feb. 14 gives as Canning's the words 'the just and wise maxims of sound not spurious philosophy.'

P. , § 10. 'Scholasticus' is the guileless 'freshman,' hero of certain Facetiae (attributed to the Pythagorean philosopher Hierocles) which used occasionally to form part of the early Greek reading of schoolboys.

K. L. Reinhold (1754-1823) presents in his intellectual history a picture of the development of ideas in his age. At the beginning his Attempt of a new theory of the human representative faculty (1789) is typical of the tendency to give a subjective psychological interpretation of Kant's theory of knowledge But the period of Reinhold's teaching here referred to is that of Contributions to an easier survey of the condition of philosophy at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Beiträge, 1801): the tendency which Hegel, who reviewed him in the Critical Journal of Philosophy (Werke, i. 267 seqq.), calls 'philosophising before philosophy.'—A similar spirit is operative in Krug's proposal (in his Fundamental Philosophy, 1803) to start with what he called 'philosophical problematics.'

P. , § 11. Plato, Phaedo, p. 89, where Socrates protests against the tendency to confound the defect of a particular piece of reasoning with the incompetence of human reason altogether.

P. , § 13. The dictum that the historical succession of philosophical systems is identical with their logical sequence should not be taken too literally and mechanically. Its essential point is simply the theorem that history is not a casual series of unconnected events—the deeds of particular persons, but is an evolution under laws and uniformities:—it is this theorem applied to philosophies. But difficulties may easily arise in the application of the general principle: e.g. it will be seen (by comparison of § 86 and § 104) that though Pythagoras precedes Parmenides, and number is a stepping-stone to pure thought still pure Being comes at an earlier stage than Quantity.

P. , § 13. There is a silent reference to what Reinhold professed to make the subject of his teaching at Jena—'philosophy without surnames' (ohne Beinamen),—i.e. not a 'critical' philosophy;—or to the 'Philosophy which may not bear any man's name of Beck. As Hegel says, Werke, xvi. 138, 'The solicitude and apprehension against being one-sided is only too often part of the weakness which is capable only of many-sided illogical superficiality.'

P. , § 16. By 'anthropology' is meant not the anthropology of modern writers, who use the name to denote mainly the history of human culture in its more rudimentary stages, and as exhibited chiefly in material products, but the study of those aspects of psychology which are most closely allied with physiological conditions.

With the power of the intuition of genius to give almost all that logical synthesis can produce, cf. Werke, I. 331: 'In this way a grand and pure intuition is able, in the purely architectonic features of its picture, though the inter-connection of necessity and the mastery of form does not come forward into visibility, to give expression to the genuine ethical organism—like a building which silently exhibits the spirit of its author in the several features of its mass, without the image of that spirit being set forth anywhere in one united shape. In such a delineation, made by help of notions, it is only a want of technical skill which prevents reason from raising the principle it embraces and pervades into the "ideal" form and becoming aware of it as the Idea. If the intuition only remains true to itself and does not let analytic intellect disconcert it, it will probably—just because it cannot dispense with notions for its expression—behave awkwardly in dealing with them, assume distorted shapes in its passage through consciousness, and be (to the speculative eye) both incoherent and contradictory: but the arrangement of the parts and of the self-modifying characters betray the inward spirit of reason, however invisible. And so far as this appearance of that spirit is regarded as a product and a result, it will as product completely harmonise with the Idea.' Probably Goethe is before Hegel's mind.

P. , § 17. The triplicity in unity of thought—its forthgoing 'procession,' (cf. p. 362 seqq.) and its return, which is yet an abiding in itself (Bei:sich:sein) was first explicitly schematised by Proclus, the consummator of Neo-Platonism. In his Institutio Theologica he lays it down that the essential character of all spiritual reality (aσώματον) is to be πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρεπτικόν, i.e. to return upon itself, or to be a unity in and with difference,—to be an original and spontaneous principle of movement (c. 15): or, as in C 31: πὰν τὸ πρoῒὸν ἀπό τινος κατ' οὐσίαν ἐπιστρέφεται πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἀφ' οὗ πρόεισιν. Its movement, therefore, is circular κυκλικὴν ἔχει τὴν ἐνέργειαν (c. 33): for everything must at the same time remain altogether in the cause, and proceed from it, and revert to it (c. 35). Such an essence is self-subsistent (αὐθυπόςτατον),—is at once agent (πάραγον) and patient (παραγόμενον). This 'mysticism' (of a trinity which is also unity of motion which is also rest), with its πρόοδoς, ἐπιστroφή, and μονή, is taken up, in his own way, by Scotus Erigena (De Divisione Naturae) as processio (or divisio), reditus, and adunatio. From God 'proceed'—by an eternal creation—the creatures, who however are not outside the divine nature; and to God all things created eternally return.

Chapter II.

P. , § 19. Truth:—as early as Werke, i. 82, i.e. 1801, Hegel had come—perhaps influenced by the example of Jacobi—to the conclusion that 'Truth is a word which, in philosophical discourse, deserves to be used only of the certainty of the Eternal and non-empirical Actual.' (And so Spinoza, ii. 310.)

P. . 'The young have been flattered'—e.g. by Fichte, Werke, i. 435: 'Hence this science too promises itself few proselytes amongst men already formed: if it can hope for any at all, it hopes for them rather from the young world, whose inborn force has not yet been ruined in the laxity of the age.'

P. , § 20. What Kant actually said (Kritik der reinen Vernunft: Elementarlehre, § 16), was 'The I think must be able to accompany all my conceptions' (Vorstellungen). Here, as often elsewhere. Hegel seems to quote from memory,—with some shortcoming from absolute accuracy.

From this point Fichte's idealism takes its spring, e.g. Werke, ii. 505: 'The ground of all certainty,—of all consciousness of fact in life, and of all demonstrative knowledge in science, is this: In and with the single thing we affirm (setzen) (and whatever we affirm is necessarily something single) we also affirm the absolute totality as such.... Only in so far as we have so affirmed anything, is it certain for us,—from the single unit we have comprehended under it away to every single thing in the infinity we shall comprehend under it,—from the one individual who has comprehended it, to all individuals who will comprehend it.... Without this absolute "positing" of the absolute totality in the individual, we cannot (to employ a phrase of Jacobi's) come to bed and board.'

'Obviously therefore you enunciate not the judgment of a single observation, but you embrace and "posit" the sheer infinitude and totality of all possible observations:—an infinity which is not at all compounded out of finites, but out of which, conversely, the finites themselves issue, and of which finite things are the mere always-uncompleted analysis. This—how shall I call it, procedure, positing, or whatever you prefer—this "manifestation" of the absolute totality, I call intellectual vision (Anschauung). I regard it—just because I cannot in any way get beyond intelligence—as immanent in intelligence, and name it so far egoity (Ichheit),—not objectivity and not subjectivity, but the absolute identity of the two:—an egoity, however, which it was to be hoped would not be taken to mean individuality. There lies in it, what you' (he is addressing Reinhold, who here follows Bardili)' call a repetibility ad infinitum. For me, therefore, the essence of the finite is composed of an immediate vision of the absolutely timeless infinite (with an absolute identity of subjectivity and objectivity), and of a separation of the two latter, and an analysis (continued ad infinitum) of the infinite. In that analysis consists the temporal life: and the starting-point of this temporal life is the separation into subject and object, which through the intellectual vision (intuition) are still both held together.'

P. , § 22, the mere fact of conviction. Cf. Rechtsphilosophie, § 140 (Werke, viii. 191): 'Finally the mere conviction which holds something to be right is given out as what decides the morality of an action. The good we will to do not yet having any content, the principle of conviction adds the information that the subsumption of an action under the category of good is purely a personal matter. If this be so, the very pretence of an ethical objectivity is utterly lost. A doctrine like this is closely allied with the self-styled philosophy which denies that the true is cognoscible: because for the Will, truth—i.e. the rationality of the Will—lies in the moral laws. Giving out, as such a system does, that the cognition of the true is an empty vanity, far transcending the range of science (which recognises only appearance), it must, in the matter of conduct, also find its principle in the apparent; whereby moral distinctions are reduced to the peculiar theory of life held by the individual and to his private conviction. At first no doubt the degradation into which philosophy has thus sunk seems an affair of supreme indifference, a mere incident in the futilities of the scholastic world: but the view necessarily makes itself a home in ethics, which is an essential part of philosophy; and it is then in the actual world that the world learns the true meaning of such theories.

'As the view spreads that subjective conviction, and it alone, decides the morality of an action, it follows that the charge of hypocrisy, once so frequent, is now rarely heard. You can only qualify wickedness as hypocrisy on the assumption that certain actions are inherently and actually misdeeds, vices, and crimes, and that the defaulter necessarily is aware of them as such, because he is aware of and recognises the principles and outward acts of piety and honesty, even in the pretence to which he misapplies them. In other words, it was generally assumed as regards immorality that it is a duty to know the good, and to be aware of its distinction from the bad. In any case it was an absolute injunction which forbade the commission of vicious and criminal acts, and which insisted on such actions being imputed to the agent, so far as he was a man, not a beast. But if the good heart, the good intention, the subjective conviction, are set forth as the true sources of moral worth, then there is no longer any hypocrisy, or immorality at all: for whatever one does, he can always justify it by the reflection on it of good aims and motives; and by the influence of that conviction it is good. There is no longer anything inherently vicious or criminal: instead of the frank and free, hardened and unperturbed sinner, comes the person whose mind is completely justified by intention and conviction. My good intention in my act, and my conviction of its goodness, make it good. We speak of judging and estimating an act. But on this principle it is only the aim and conviction of the agent—his faith—by which he ought to be judged. And that not in the sense in which Christ requires faith in objective truth, so that for one who has a bad faith, i.e. a conviction bad in its content, the judgment to be pronounced must be bad, i.e. conformable to this bad content. But faith here means only fidelity to conviction. Has the man (we ask) in acting kept true to his conviction? It is formal subjective conviction on which alone the obligation of duty is made to depend.

'A principle like this, where conviction is expressly made something subjective, cannot but suggest the thought of possible error, with the further implied presupposition of an absolutely-existing law. But the law is no agent: it is only the actual human being who acts; and in the aforesaid principle the only question in estimating human actions is how far he has received the law into his conviction. If, therefore, it is not the actions which are to be estimated and generally measured by that law, it is impossible to see what the law is for, and what end it can serve. Such a law is degraded to a mere outside letter, in fact an empty word; which is only made a law, i.e. invested with obligatory force, by my conviction.

'Such a law may claim its authority from God or the State: it may even have the authority of tens of centuries during which it served as the bond that gave men, with all their deed and destiny, subsistence and coherence. And these are authorities in which are condensed the convictions of countless individuals. And for me to set against that the authority of my single conviction—for as my subjective conviction its sole validity is authority—that self-conceit, monstrous as it at first seems, is, in virtue of the principle that subjective conviction is to be the rule, pronounced to be no self-conceit at all.

'Even if reason and conscience—which shallow science and bad sophistry can never altogether expel—admit, with a noble illogicality, that error is possible, still by describing crime and wickedness as only an error we minimise the fault. For to err is human:—Who has not been mistaken on one point or another, whether he had fresh or pickled cabbage for dinner, and about innumerable things more or less important? But the difference of more or less importance disappears if everything turns on the subjectivity of conviction and on persistency in it. But the said noble illogicality which admits error to be possible, when it comes round to say that a wrong conviction is only an error, really only falls into a further illogicality—the illogicality of dishonesty. One time conviction is made the basis of morality and of man's supreme value, and is thus pronounced the supreme and holy. Another time all we have to do with is an error: my conviction is something trivial and casual, strictly speaking something outside, that may turn out this way or that. And, really, my being convinced is something supremely trivial? if I cannot know truth, it is indifferent how I think; and all that is left to my thinking is that empty good,—a mere abstraction of generalisation.

'It follows further that, on this principle of justification by conviction, logic requires me, in dealing with the way others act against my action, to admit that, so far as they in their belief and conviction hold my actions to be crimes, they are quite in the right. On such logic not merely do I gain nothing, I am even deposed from the post of liberty and honour into a situation of slavery and dishonour. Justice—which in the abstract is mine as well as theirs—I feel only as a foreign subjective conviction, and in the execution of justice I fancy myself to be only treated by an external force.'

P. , § 23. Selbstdenken—to think and not merely to read or listen is the recurrent cry of Fichte (e.g. Werke, ii. 329). According to the editors of Werke, xv. 582, the reference here is to Schleiermacher and to his Monologues. Really it is to the Romantic principle in general, especially F. Schlegel.

P. , § 23. 'Fichte' Werke, ii, 404: 'Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre), besides (for the reason above noted that it has no auxiliary, no vehicle of the intuition at all, except the intuition itself), elevates the human mind higher than any geometry can It gives the mind not only attentiveness, dexterity, stability, but at the same time absolute independence, forcing it to be alone with itself, and to live and manage by itself. Compared with it, every other mental operation is infinitely easy; and to one who has been exercised in it nothing comes hard. Besides as it prosecutes all objects of human lore to the centre it accustoms the eye to hit the proper point at first glance' in everything presented to it, and to prosecute it undeviatingly For such a practical philosopher therefore there can be nothing dark, complicated, and confused, if only he is acquainted with the object of discussion. It comes always easiest to him to construct everything afresh and ab initio, because he carries within him plans for every scientific edifice. He finds his way easily, therefore, in any complicated structure. Add to this the security and confidence of glance which he has acquired in philosophy—the guide which conducts in all raisonnement and the imperturbability with which his eye meets every divergence from the accustomed path and every paradox. It would be quite different with all human concerns, if men could only resolve to believe their eyes. At present they inquire at their neighbours and at antiquity what they really see, and by this distrust in themselves errors are eternalised. Against this distrust the possessor of philosophy is for ever protected. In a word, by philosophy the mind of man comes to itself, and from henceforth rests on itself without foreign aid, and is completely master of itself, as the dancer of his feet, or the boxer of his hands.'

P. , § 23. Aristotle, Metaph. i. 2, 19 (cf. Eth. x. 7). See also Werke, xiv. 280 seqq.

P. , § 24. Schelling's expression, 'petrified intelligence.' The reference is to some verses of Schelling in Werke, iv. 546 (first published in Zeitschrift für speculative Physik, 1800). We have no reason to stand in awe of the world, he says, which is a tame and quiet beast—

Sterft zwar ein Riesengeist darinnen,
Ist aber versteinert mit allen Sinnen;
In todten und lebendigen Dingen
Thut nach Bewustseyn mächtig ringen.

In human shape he at length awakes from the iron sleep, from the long dream: but as man he feels himself a stranger and exile; he would fain return to great Nature; he fears what surrounds him and imagines spectres, not knowing he might say of Nature to himself—

Ich bin der Gott, den sie im Busen hegt,
Der Geist, der sich in allem bewegt:
Vom frühsten Ringen dunkler Kräfte
Bis zum Erguss der ersten Lebenssäfte,
. . . . . . .
herauf zu des Gedankens Jugendkraft
Wodurch Natur verjüngt sich wieder schafft,
Ist eine kraft, ein Wechselspiel und Weben,
Ein Trieb und Drang nach immer höherm Leben.

Cf. Oken, Naturphilosophie,§ 2913: 'A natural body is a thought of the primal act, turned rigid and crystallised,—a word of God.'

Phrases of like import are not infrequent in Schelling's works (about 1800-1), e.g. Werke,1. Abth. iii. 341: 'The dead and unconscious products of nature are only unsuccessful attempts to "reflect" itself; so-called dead nature is in all cases an immature intelligence' (unreife Intelligenz), or iv. 77, 'Nature itself is an intelligence, as it were, turned to rigidity (erstarrte) with all its sensations and perceptions'; and ii. 226 (Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, 1797), 'Hence nature is only intelligence turned into the rigidity of being; its qualities are sensations extinguished to being; bodies are its perceptions, so to speak, killed.'

A close approach to the phrase quoted is found in the words of another of the 'Romantic' philosophers: 'Nature is a petrified magic-city' (versteinerte Zauberstadt). (Novalis, Schriften, ii. 149.)

P. , § 24. Cf. Fichte to Jacobi: (Jacobi's Briefwechsel, ii. 208) 'My absolute Ego is obviously not the individual: that explanation comes from injured snobs and peevish philosophers, seeking to impute to me the disgraceful doctrine of practical egoism. But the individual must be deduced from the absolute ego. To that task my philosophy will proceed in the "Natural Law." A finite being—it may be deductively shown—can only think itself as a sense-being in a sphere of sense-beings,—on one part of which (that which has no power of origination) it has causality, while with the other part (to which it attributes a subjectivity like its own) it stands in reciprocal relations. In such circumstances it is called an individual, and the conditions of individuality are called rights. As surely as it affirms its individuality, so surely does it affirm such a sphere the two conceptions indeed are convertible. So long as we look upon ourselves as individuals—and we always so regard ourselves in life, though not in philosophy and abstract imagination—we stand on what I call the "practical" point of view in our reflections (while to the standpoint of the absolute ego I give the name "speculative"). From the former point of view there exists for us a world independent of us,—a world we can only modify; whilst the pure ego (which even on this altitude does not altogether disappear from us,) is put outside us and called God. How else could we get the properties we ascribe to God and deny to ourselves, did we not after all find them within us, and only refuse them to ourselves in a certain respect, i.e., as individuals? When this "practical" point of view predominates in our reflections, realism is supreme: when speculation itself deduces and recognises that standpoint, there results a complete reconciliation between philosophy and common sense as premised in my system.

'For what good, then, is the speculative standpoint and the whole of philosophy therewith, if it be not for life? Had humanity not tasted of this forbidden fruit, it might dispense with all philosophy. But in humanity there is a wish implanted to behold that region lying beyond the individual; and to behold it not merely in a reflected light but face to face. The first who raised a question about God's existence broke through the barriers, he shook humanity in its main foundation pillars, and threw it out of joint into an intestine strife which is not yet settled, and which can only be settled by advancing boldly to that supreme point from which the speculative and the practical appear to be at one. We began to philosophise from pride of heart, and thus lost our innocence: we beheld our nakedness, and ever since we philosophise from the need of our redemption.'

P. . Physics and Philosophy of Nature: cf. Werke, vii. i, p. 18: 'The Philosophy of Nature takes up the material, prepared for it by physics out of experience, at the point to which physics has brought it, and again transforms it, without basing it ultimately on the authority of experience. Physics therefore must work into the hands of philosophy, so that the latter may translate into a true comprehension (Begriff) the abstract universal transmitted to it, showing how it issues from that comprehension as an intrinsically necessary whole. The philosophic way of putting the facts is no mere whim once in a way, by way of change, to walk on the head, after walking a long while on the legs, or once in a way to see our every-day face besmeared with paint. No; it is because the method of physics does not satisfy the comprehension, that we have to go on further.'

P. , § 24. The distinction of ordinary and speculative Logic is partly like that made by Fichte (i. 68) between Logic and Wissenschaftslehre. 'The former,' says Fichte, 'is conditioned and determined by the latter.' Logic deals only with form; epistomology with import as well.

P. , § 24. The Mosaic legend of the Fall; cf. similar interpretations in Kant: Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1ster Stück; and Schelling, Werke, i. (1. Abth.) 34.

Chapter III.

P. , § 28. Fichte—to emphasise the experiential truth of his system—says (Werke, ii. 331): 'There was a philosophy which professed to be able to expand by mere inference the range thus indicated for philosophy. According to it, thinking was—not, as we have described it, the analysis of what was given and the recombining of it in other forms, but at the same time—a production and creation of something quite new. In this system the philosopher found himself in the exclusive possession of certain pieces of knowledge which the vulgar understanding had to do without. In it the philosopher could reason out for himself a God and an immortality and talk himself into the conclusion that he was wise and good.'

Wolfs definition of philosophy is 'the Science of the possible in so far as it can be'; and the possible = the non-contradictory.

P. , § 29. The oriental sage corresponds (cf. Hegel, Werke, xii. 229) to the writer known as Dionysius the Areopagite (De Mystica Theologia, and De Divitus Nominibus.)—The same problem as to the relation of the Infinite (God) to the Finite (world) is discussed in Jewish speculation (by Saadia, Mamuni, &c.) as the question of the divine names,—a dogma founded on the thirteen names (or attributes) applied to God in Exodus xxxiv. 6. (Cf. D. Kaufmann, Geschichte der Attributenlehre.) The same spirit has led to the list of ninety-nine 'excellent names' of Allah in Islam, a list which tradition derives from Mohammed.

P. , § 31. Cf. Werke, ii. 47 seqq.: 'The nature of the judgment or proposition—involving as it does a distinction of subject and predicate—is destroyed by the "speculative" proposition. This conflict of the propositional form with the unity of comprehension which destroys it is like the antagonism in rhythm between metre and accent. The rhythm results from the floating "mean" and unification of the two. Hence even in the "philosophical" proposition the identity of subject and predicate is not meant to annihilate their difference (expressed by the propositional form): their unity is meant to issue as a harmony. The propositional form lets appear the definite shade or accent pointing to a distinction in its fulfilment: whereas in the predicate giving expression to the substance, and the subject itself falling into the universal, we have the unity in which that accent is heard no more. Thus in the proposition "God is Being" the predicate is Being; it represents the substance in which the subject is dissolved away. Being is here meant not to be predicate but essence: and in that way God seems to cease to be what he is—by his place in the proposition—viz. the permanent subject. The mind—far from getting further forward in the passage from subject to predicate—feels itself rather checked, through the loss of the subject, and thrown back, from a sense of its loss, to the thought of the subject. Or,—since the predicate itself is enunciated as a subject (as Being or as Essence) which exhausts the nature of the subject, it again comes face to face with the subject even in the predicate.—Thought thus loses its solid objective ground which it had on the subject: yet at the same time in the predicate it is thrown back upon it, and instead of getting to rest in itself it returns upon the subject of the content.—To this unusual check and arrest are in the main due the complaints as to the unintelligibility of philosophical works,—supposing the individual to possess any other conditions of education needed for understanding them.'

P. , § 32. On the relation of dogmatism and scepticism see the introduction to Kant's Criticism of Pure Reason, and compare Caird's Critical Philosophy of I. Kant, vol. i. chap. i.

P. , § 33. The subdivision of 'theoretical' philosophy or metaphysics into the four branches, Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology (rational and empirical), and Natural Theology, is more or less common to the whole Wolfian School. Wolf's special addition to the preceding scholastic systems is found in the conception of a general Cosmology. Metaphysics precedes physics, and the departments of practical philosophy. In front of all stands logic or rational philosophy. Empirical psychology belongs properly to physics, but reasons of practical convenience put it elsewhere.

P. , § 34. The question of the 'Seat of the Soul' is well known in the writings of Lotze (e.g. Metaphysic, § 291).

Absolute actuosity. The Notio Dei according to Thomas Aquinas, as well as the dogmatics of post-Reformation times, is actus purus (or actus purissimus). For God nihil potentialitatis habet. Cf. Werke, xii.228: 'Aristotle especially has conceived God under the abstract category of activity. Pure activity is knowledge (Wissen)—in the scholastic age, actus purus—: but in order to be put as activity, it must be put in its "moments." For knowledge we require another thing which is known: and which, when knowledge knows it, is thereby appropriated. It is implied in this that God—the eternal and self-subsistent—eternally begets himself as his Son,—distinguishes himself from himself. But what he thus distinguishes from himself, has not the shape of an otherness: but what is distinguished is ipso facto identical with what it is parted from. God is spirit: no darkness, no colouring or mixture enters this pure light. The relationship of father and son is taken from organic life and used metaphorically—the natural relation is only pictorial and hence does not quite correspond to what is to be expressed. We say, God eternally begets his Son, God distinguishes himself from himself: and thus we begin from God, saying he does this, and in the other he creates is utterly with himself (the form of Love): but we must be well aware that God is this whole action itself God is the beginning; he does this: but equally is he only the end, the totality: and as such totality he is spirit. God as merely the Father is not yet the true (it is the Jewish religion where he is thus without the Son): He is rather beginning and end: He is his presupposition, makes himself a presupposition (this is only another form of distinguishing): He is the eternal process.'

Nicolaus Cusanus speaks of God (De docta Ignorantia, ii. I) as infinita actualitas quae est actu omnis essendi possibilitas. The term 'actuosity' seems doubtful.

P. , § 36. Sensus eminentior. Theology distinguishes three modes in which the human intelligence can attain a knowledge of God. By the via causalitatis it argues that God is; by the via negationis, what he is not; by the via eminentiae, it gets a glimpse of the relation in which he stands to us. It regards God i.e. as the cause of the finite universe; but as God is infinite, all that is predicated of him must be taken as merely approximative (sensu eminentiori) and there is left a vast remainder which can only be filled up with negations [Durandus de S. Porciano on the Sentent, i. 3. I]. The sensus eminentior is the subject of Spinoza's strictures, Ep. 6 (56 in Opp. ii. 202): while Leibniz adopts it in the preface to Théodicée, 'Les perfections de Dieu sont celles de nos âmes, mais il les possède sans bornes: il est un océan, dont nous n'avons reçu que les gouttes; il y a en nous quelque puissance, quelque connaissance, quelque bonté; mais elles sont toutes entières en Dieu.'

The via causalitatis infers e.g., from the existence of morality and intelligence here, a Being whose will finds expression therein: the via eminentiae infers that that will is good, and that intelligence wise in the highest measure, and the via negationis sets aside in the conception of God all the limitations and conditions to which human intelligence and will are subject.

Chapter IV.

P. , § 38. The verses (forming part of the advice which Mephistopheles, personating Faust, gives to the recently-arrived pupil) stand in the original in a different order: beginning "Dann hat er die Theile in seiner Hand," &c. The meaning of these and the two preceding lines is somewhat as follows, in versification even laxer than Goethe's:—

If you want to describe life and gather its meaning,
To drive out its spirit most be your beginning,
Then though fast in your hand lie the parts one by one
The spirit that linked them, alas! is gone.
And 'Nature's Laboratory' is only a name
That the chemist bestows on't to hide his own shame.

One may compare Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre, iii. 3, where it is remarked, in reference to some anatomical exercises: 'You will learn ere long that building-up is more instructive than tearing-down, combining more than separating, animating the dead more than killing again what was killed already.... Combining means more than separating: reconstructing more than onlooking.' The first part of Faust appeared 1808: the Wanderjahre, 1828-9.

P. , § 39. The article on the 'Relation of scepticism to philosophy, an exposition of its various modifications, and comparison of the latest with the ancient'—in form a review of G. E. Schulze's Criticism of Theoretical Philosophy'—was republished in vol. xvi. of Hegel's Werke (vol. i. of the Vermischte Schriften).

P. , § 42. In an earlier review of Kant's work (Werke, i. 83) on Glauben und Wissen (an article in Sendling and Hegel's Journal) Hegel attaches more weight to a factor in the critical theory of knowledge, here neglected. Kant, he says, has—within the limits allowed by his psychological terms of thought—'put (in an excellent way) the à priori of sensibility into the original identity and multiplicity, and that as transcendental imagination in the "higher power" of an immersion of unity in multiplicity: whilst Understanding (Verstand) he makes to consist in the elevation to universality of this à priori synthetic unity of sensibility,—whereby this identity is invested with a comparative antithesis to the sensibility: and Reason (Vernunft) is presented as a still higher power over the preceding comparative antithesis, without however this universality and infinity being allowed to go beyond the stereotyped formal pure infinity. This genuinely rational construction by which, though the bad name "faculties" is left, there is in truth presented a single identity of them all, is transformed by Jacobi into a series of faculties, resting one upon another.'

P. , § 42. Fichte: cf. Werke, i. 420: 'I have said before, and say it here again, that my system is no other than the Kantian. That means: it contains the same view of facts, but in its method is quite independent of the Kantian exposition.' 'Kant, up to now, is a closed book.'—i. 442. There are two ways of critical idealism. 'Either' (as Fichte) 'it actually deduces from the fundamental laws of intelligence, that system of necessary modes of action, and with it, at the same time, the objective conceptions thus arising, and thus lets the whole compass of our conceptions gradually arise under the eyes of the reader or hearer; or' (like Kant and his unprogressive disciples) 'it gets hold of these laws from anywhere and anyhow, as they are immediately applied to objects, therefore on their lowest grade (—on this grade they are called categories), and then asseverates that it is by these that objects are determined and arranged.' And i. 478: 'I know that the categories which Kant laid down are in no way proved by him to be conditions of self-consciousness, but only said to be so: I know that space and time and what in the original consciousness is inseparable from them and fills them both, are still less deduced as such conditions, for of them it is not even said expressly—as of the categories—that they are so, but only inferentially. But I believe quite as surely that I know that Kant had the thought of such a system: that everything he actually propounds are fragments and results of this system; and that his statements have meaning and coherence only on this presupposition.' Cf. viii. 362.

P. , § 42. Transcendental unity of self-consciousness. Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, § 16: 'The I think must be able to accompany all my ideas.... This idea is an act of spontaneity. ... I name it pure apperception ... or original apperception ... because it is that self-consciousness which can be accompanied by none further. The unity of it I also call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to denote the possibility of cognition à priori from it.'

P. , § 44. Caput mortuum: a term of the Alchemists to denote the non-volatile precipitate left in the retort after the spirit had been extracted: the fixed or dead remains, 'quando spiritus animam sursum vexit.'

P. , § 45. Reason and Understanding. In the Wolfian School (e.g. in Baumgarten's Metaphysik, § 468) the term intellect (Verstand) is used of the general faculty of higher cognition, while ratio (Vernunft) specially denotes the power of seeing distinctly the connexions of things. So Wolff (Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, &c. § 277) defines Verstand as 'the faculty of distinctly representing the possible,' and Vernunft (§ 368) as 'the faculty of seeing into the connexion of truths.' It is on this use of Reason as the faculty of inference that Kant's use of the term is founded: though it soon widely departs from its origin. For upon the 'formal' use of reason as the faculty of syllogising, Kant superinduces a transcendental use as a 'faculty of principles,' while the understanding is only 'a faculty of rules.' 'Reason,' in other words, 'itself begets conceptions,' and 'maxims, which it borrows neither from the senses nor from the understanding.' (Kritik d. r. Vern., Dialektik, Einleit. ii. A.) And the essential aim of Reason is to give unity to the various cognitions of understanding. While the unity given by understanding is 'unity of a possible experience,' that sought by reason is the discovery of an unconditioned which will complete the unity of the former (Dial. Einleit. iv), or of 'the totality of the conditions to a given conditioned.' (Dial, vii.)

It is this distinction of the terms which is dominant in Fichte and Hegel, where Verstand is the more practical intellect which seeks definite and restricted results and knowledges, while Vernunft is a deeper and higher power which aims at completeness. In Goethe's more reflective prose we see illustrations of this usage: e.g. Wilh. Meister's Wanderjahre, i. it is said to be the object of the 'reasonable' man 'das entgegengesetzte zu überschauen und in Uebereinstimmung zu bringen': or Bk. ii. Reasonable men when they have devised something verständig to get this or that difficulty out of the way, &c. Goethe, in his Sprüche in Prosa (896), Werke, iii. 281, says 'Reason has for its province the thing in process (das Werdende), understanding the thing completed (das Gewordene): the former does not trouble itself about the purpose, the latter asks not whence. Reason takes delight in developing; understanding wishes to keep everything as it is, so as to use it.' (Similarly in Eckermann's Convers. Feb. 13, 1829.) Cf. Oken, Naturphilosophie, § 2914. Verstand ist Microcosmus, Vernunft Macrocosmus.

Kant's use of the term Reason, coupled with his special view of Practical Reason and his use of the term Faith (Glaube), leads on to the terminology of Jacobi. In earlier writings Jacobi had insisted on the contrast between the superior authority of feeling and faith (which are in touch with truth) and the mechanical method of intelligence and reasoning (Verstand and Vernunft). At a later period however he changed and fixed the nomenclature of his distinction. What he had first called Glaube he latterly called Vernunft,—which is in brief a 'sense for the supersensible'—an intuition giving higher and complete or total knowledge—an immediate apprehension of the real and the true. As contrasted with this reasonable faith or feeling, he regards Verstand as a mere faculty of inference or derivative knowledge, referring one thing to another by the rule of identity.

This distinction which is substantially reproduced by Coleridge (though with certain clauses that show traces of Schellingian influence) has connexions—like so much else in Jacobi—with the usage of Schopenhauer, 'Nobody,' says Jacobi, 'has ever spoken of an animal Vernunft: a mere animal Verstand however we all know and speak of.' (Jacobi's Werke, iii. 8.) Schopenhauer repeats and enforces the remark. All animals possess, says Schopenhauer, the power of apprehending causality, of cognising objects: a power of immediate and intuitive knowledge of real things: this is Verstand. But Vernunft, which is peculiar to man, is the cognition of truth (not of reality): it is an abstract judgment with a sufficient reason (Welt als W. i. § 6).

One is tempted to connect the modern distinction with an older one which goes back in its origin to Plato and Aristotle, but takes form in the Neo-Platonist School, and enters the Latin world through Boëthius. Consol. Phil. iv. 6: Igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus, and in v. 4 there is a full distinction of sensus, imaginatio, ratio and intelligentia in ascending order. Ratio is the discursive knowledge of the idea (universali consideratione perpendit): intelligentia apprehends it at once, and as a simple forma (pura mentis acie contuetur): [cf. Stob. Ed. i. 826-832: Porphyr. Sentent.15]. Reasoning belongs to the human species, just as intelligence to the divine alone. Yet it is assumed—in an attempt to explain divine foreknowledge and defend freedom—that man may in some measure place himself on the divine standpoint (v. 5).

This contrast between a higher mental faculty (mens) and a lower (ratio) which even Aquinas adopts from the interpretation of Aristotle (Summa Theol. i. 79, 9) is the favourite weapon in the hands of mysticism. After the example of Dionysius Areop., Nicolaus of Cusa, Reuchlin, and other thinkers of the Renaissance depreciate mere discursive thought and logical reasoning. It is the inner mens—like a simple ray of light—penetrating by an immediate and indivisible act to the divine—which gives us access to the supreme science. This simplex intelligentia,— superior to imagination or reasoning—as Gerson says, Consid. de Th. 10, is sometimes named mens, sometimes Spiritus, the light of intelligence, the shadow of the angelical intellect, the divine light. From Scotus Erigena to Nicolas of Cusa one tradition is handed down: it is taken up by men like Everard Digby (in his Theoria Analytica) and the group of Cambridge Platonists and by Spinoza in the seventeenth century, and it reappears, profoundly modified, in the German idealism between 1790 and 1820.

P. , § 48. 'Science of Logic'; Hegel's large work on the subject, published between 1812-16. The discussions on the Antinomies belong chiefly to the first part of it.

P. , § 50. 'Natural Theology,' here to be taken in a narrower sense than in p. 73, where it is equivalent to Rational Theology in general. Here it means 'Physico-theology'—the argument from design in nature.

P. , § 50. Spinoza—defining God as 'the union of thought with extension.' This is not verbally accurate; for according to Ethica, i. pr. 11, God, or the substance, consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses the eternal and infinite essence. But Spinoza mentions of 'attributes' only two: Ethica, ii. pr. 1. I Thought is an attribute of God: pr. 2, Extension is an attribute of God. And he adds, Ethica, i. pr. 10, Schol. 'All the attributes substance has were always in it together, nor can one be produced by another.' And in Ethica, ii. 7. Sch. it is said: 'Thinking substance and extended substance is one and the same substance which is comprehended now under this, now under that attribute.'

P. , § 54. 'Practical in the true sense of the word.' Cf. Kant, Werke, Ros. and Sch. i. 581: 'A great misunderstanding, exerting an injurious influence on scientific methods, prevails with regard to what should be considered "practical" in such sense as to justify its place in practical philosophy. Diplomacy and finance, rules of economy no less than rules of social intercourse, precepts of health and dietetic of the soul no less than the body, have been classed as practical philosophy on the mere ground that they all contain a collection of practical propositions. Hut although such practical propositions differ in mode of statement from the theoretical propositions which have for import the possibility of things and the exposition of their nature, they have the same content. "Practical," properly so called, are only those propositions which relate to Liberty under laws. All others whatever are nothing but the theory of what pertains to the nature of things—only that theory is brought to bear on the way in which the things may be produced by us in conformity with a principle; i.e. the possibility of the things is presented as the result of a voluntary action which itself too may be counted among physical causes.' And Kant, Werke, iv. 10. 'Hence a sum of practical precepts given by philosophy does not form a special part of it (co-ordinate with the theoretical) merely because they are practical. Practical they might be, even though their principle were wholly derived from the theoretical knowledge of nature,—as technico-practical rules. They are practical in the true sense, when and because their principle is not borrowed from the nature-conception (which is always sensuously conditioned) and rests therefore on the supersensible, which the conception of liberty alone makes knowable by formal laws. They are therefore ethico-practical, i.e. not merely precepts and rules with this or that intention, but laws without antecedent reference to ends and intentions.'

P. , § 54. Eudaemonism. But there is Eudaemonism and Eudaemonism; as Cf. Hegel, Werke, i. 8. 4 The time had come when the infinite longing away beyond the body and the world had reconciled itself with the reality of existence. Yet the reality which the soul was reconciled to—the objective which the subjectivity recognised—was actually only empirical existence, common world and actuality.... And though the reconciliation was in its heart and ground sure and fast, it still needed an objective form for this ground: the very necessity of nature made the blind certitude of immersion in the reality of empirical existence seek to provide itself with a justification and a good conscience. This reconciliation for consciousness was found in the Happiness-doctrine: the fixed point it started from being the empirical subject, and what it was reconciled to, the vulgar actuality, whereon it might now confide, and to which it might surrender itself without sin. The profound coarseness and utter vulgarity, which is at the basis of this happiness-doctrine, has its only elevation in its striving after justification and a good conscience, which however can get no further than the objectivity of mere intellectualism.

'The dogmatism of eudaemonism and of popular philosophy (Aufklärung) therefore did not consist in the fact that it made happiness and enjoyment the supreme good. For if Happiness be comprehended as an Idea, it ceases to be something empirical and casual—as also to be anything sensuous. In the supreme existence, reasonable act (Thun) and supreme enjoyment are one. So long as supreme blessedness is supreme Idea it matters not whether we try to apprehend the supreme existence on the side of its ideality,—which, as isolated may be first called reasonable act—or on the side of its reality—which as isolated may be first called enjoyment and feeling. For reasonable act and supreme enjoyment, ideality and reality are both alike in it and identical. Every philosophy has only one problem—to construe supreme blessedness as supreme Idea. So long as it is by reason that supreme enjoyment is ascertained, the distinguishability of the two at once disappears: for this comprehension and the infinity which is dominant in act, and the reality and finitude which is dominant in enjoyment, are taken up into one another. The controversy with happiness becomes a meaningless chatter, when happiness is known as the blessed enjoyment of the eternal intuition. But what was called eudaemonism meant—it must be said—an empirical happiness, an enjoyment of sensation, not the eternal intuition and blessedness.'

P. , § 55. Schiller. Ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen(1795), 18th letter. 'Through beauty the sensuous man is led to form and to thought; through beauty the intellectual man is led back to matter and restored to the sense-world. Beauty combines two states which are opposed to one another.' Letter 25. 'We need not then have any difficulty about finding a way from sensuous dependence to moral liberty, after beauty has given a case where liberty can completely co-exist with dependence, and where man in order to show himself an intelligence need not make his escape from matter. If—as the fact of beauty teaches—man is free even in association with the senses, and if—as the conception necessarily involves—liberty is something absolute and supersensible, there can no longer be any question how he comes to elevate himself from limitations to the absolute: for in beauty this has already come to pass.' Cf. Ueber Anmuth und Würde(1793). 'It is in a beautiful soul, then, that sense and reason, duty and inclination harmonize; and grace is their expression in the appearance. Only in the service of a beautiful soul can nature at the same time possess liberty.' (See Bosanquet's History of Aesthetic.)

P. , § 60. The quotation in the note comes from § 87 of the Kritik der Urtheilskraft (Werke, ed. Ros. and Sch. iv. 357).

P. , § 60. Fichte, Werke, i. 279. 'The principle of life and consciousness, the ground of its possibility, is (as has been shown) certainly contained in the Ego: yet by this means there arises no actual life, no empirical life in time—and another life is for us utterly unthinkable. If such an actual life is to be possible, there is still needed for that a special impulse (Aufstoss) striking the Ego from the Non-ego. According to my system, therefore, the ultimate ground of all actuality for the Ego is an original action and re-action between the Ego and something outside it, of which all that can be said is that it must be completely opposed to the Ego. In this reciprocal action nothing is brought into the Ego, nothing foreign imported; everything that is developed from it ad infinitum is developed from it solely according to its own laws. The Ego is merely put in motion by that opposite, so as to act; and without such a first mover it would never have acted; and, as its existence consists merely in action, it would not even have existed. But the source of motion has no further attributes than to set in motion, to be an opposing force which as such is only felt.

'My philosophy therefore is realistic. It shows that the consciousness of finite natures cannot at all be explained, unless we assume a force existing independently of them, and completely opposed to them;—on which as regards their empirical existence they are dependent. But it asserts nothing further than such an opposed force, which is merely felt, but not cognised, by finite beings. All possible specifications of this force or non-ego, which may present themselves ad infinitum in our consciousness, my system engages to deduce from the specifying faculty of the Ego....

'That the finite mind must necessarily assume outside it something absolute (a Ding:an:sich), and yet must on the other hand acknowledge that this something only exists for the mind (is a necessary noümenon): this is the circle which may be infinitely expanded, but from which the finite mind can never issue.' Cf. Fichte's Werke, i. 248, ii. 478.

Chapter V.

P. , § 62. F. H. Jacobi (Werke, v. 82) in his Woldemar (a romance contained in a series of letters, first published as a whole in 1781) writes: 'The philosophical understanding (Verstand) is jealous of everything unique, everything immediately certain which makes itself true, without proofs, solely by its existence. It persecutes this faith of reason even into our inmost consciousness, where it tries to make us distrust the feeling of our identity and personality.' 'What is absolutely and intrinsically true,' he adds (v. 122), 'is not got by way of reasoning and comparison: both our immediate consciousness (Wissen)—I am—and our conscience (Gewissen) are the work of a secret something in which heart, understanding, and sense combine.' 'Notions (Begriffe), far from embalming the living, really turn it into a corpse' (v. 380).

Cf. Fichte's words (Werke, ii. 255), Aus dem Gewissen allein stammt die Wahrheit, &c.

P. , § 62. The Letters on the doctrine of Spinoza, published in 1785, were re-issued in 1789 with eight supplements.

'A science,' says Jacobi in his latest utterance (Werke, iv. pref. xxx.) 'is only a systematic register of cognitions mutually referring to one another—the first and last point in the series is wanting.'

P. , § 62. Lalande's dictum is referred to by Fries (Populäre Vorlesungen über Sternkunde, 1813) quoted by Jacobi in his Werke, ii. 55. What Lalande has actually written in the preface to his work on astronomy is that the science as he understands it has no relation to natural theology—in other words, that he is not writing a Bridgewater treatise.

P. , § 63. Jacobi, Werke, ii. 222. 'For my part, I regard the principle of reason as all one with the principle of life.' And ii. 343: 'Evidently reason is the true and proper life of our nature.' It is in virtue of our inner tendency and instinct towards the eternal (Richtung und Trieb auf das Ewige),—of our sense for the supersensible—that we, human beings, really subsist (iv. 6. 152). And this Organ der Vernehmung des Uebersinnlichen is Reason (iii. 203, &c.).

The language of Jacobi fluctuates, not merely in words, but in the intensity of his intuitionalism. Thus, e.g. iii. 32: 'The reason man has is no faculty giving the science of the true, but only a presage' (Ahndung des Wahren). 'The belief in a God,' he says, at one time (iii. 206) 'is as natural to man as his upright position': but that belief is, he says elsewhere, only 'an inborn devotion (Andacht) before an unknown God.' Thus, if we have an immediate awareness (Wissen) of God, this is not knowledge or science (Wissenschaft). Such intuition of reason is described (ii. 9) as 'the faculty of presupposing the intrinsically (an sich) true, good, and beautiful, with full confidence in the objective validity of the presupposition.' But that object we are let see only in feeling (ii. 61). 'Our philosophy,' he says (iii. 6) 'starts from feeling—of course an objective and pure feeling.'

P. , § 63. Jacobi (Werke, iv. a, p. 211): 'Through faith (Glaube) we know that we have a body.' Such immediate knowledge of our own activity—'the feeling of I am, I act' (iii. 411)—the sense of 'absolute self-activity' or freedom (of which the 'possibility cannot be cognised,' because logically a contradiction) is what Jacobi calls Anschauung (Intuition). He distinguishes a sensuous, and a rational intuition (iii. 59).

P. , § 63. Jacobi expressly disclaims identification of his Glaube with the faith of Christian doctrine (Werke, iv. a, p. 210). In defence he quotes from Hume, Inquiry V, and from Reid, passages to illustrate his usage of the term 'belief—by the distinction between which and faith certain ambiguities are no doubt avoided.

P. , § 66. Kant had said 'Concepts without intuitions are empty' It is an exaggeration of this half-truth (the other half is Intuitions without concepts are blind) that is the basis of these statements of Jacobi (and of Schopenhauer)—a view of which the following passage from Schelling (Werke, ii. 125) is representative. 'Concepts (Begriffe) are only silhouettes of reality. They are projected by a serviceable faculty, the understanding, which only comes into action when reality is already on the scene,—which only comprehends, conceives, retains what it required a creative faculty to produce.... The mere concept is a word without meaning.... All reality that can attach to it is lent to it merely by the intuition (Anschauung) which preceded it. ... Nothing is real for us except what is immediately given us, without any mediation by concepts, without our feeling at liberty. But nothing reaches us immediately except through intuition.' He adds, however, 'Intuition is due to the activity of mind (Sein): it demands a disengaged sense (freier Sinn) and an intellectual organ (geistiges Organ).'

P. . Cicero: De Natura Deorum, i. 16; ii. 4, De quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est; cf. Seneca, Epist. cxvii. 6. The principle is common to Stoics and Epicureans: it is the maxim of Catholic truth Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est—equivalent to Aristotle's ὄ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἷναι φάμεν—But as Aristotle remarks (An. Post. i. 31) τὸ καθόλον καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδίνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι.

Jacobi: Werke, vi. 145. 'The general opinion about what is true and good must have an authority equal to reason.'

P. , § 72. Cf. Encyclop. § 400: 'That the heart and the feeling is not the form by which anything is justified as religious, moral, true, and just, and that an appeal to heart and feeling either means nothing or means something bad, should hardly need enforcing. Can any experience be more trite than that hearts and feelings are also bad, evil, godless, mean, &c.? Ay, that the heart is the source of such feelings only, is directly said in the words: Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, &c. In times when the heart and the sentiment are, by scientific theology and philosophy, made the criterion of goodness, religion, and morality, it is necessary to recall these trivial experiences.'

Chapter VI.

P. , § 80. Goethe; the reference is to Werke, ii. 268 (Natur und Kunst):

Wer Groszes will, muß sich zusammenraffen:
In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister,
Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben.

Such 'limitation' of aim and work is a frequent lesson in Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre, e.g. i. ch. 4. 'Many-sidedness prepares, properly speaking, only the element in which the one-sided can act.... The best thing is to restrict oneself to a handi-work.' And i. ch. 12: 'To be acquainted with and to exercise one thing rightly gives higher training than mere tolerableness (halfness) in a hundred sorts of things.' And ii. ch. 12: 'Your general training and all establishments for the purpose are fool's farces.'

P. , § 81. Cf. Fichte, Werke, ii. 37. 'Yet it is not we who analyse: but knowledge analyses itself, and can do so, because in all its being it is a for-self (Für:sich),' &c.

P. , § 81. Plato, the inventor of Dialectic. Sometimes on the authority of Aristotle, as reported by Diog. Laert. ix. 25, Zeno of Elea gets this title; but Hegel refers to such statements as Diog. Laer,', ii. 34 τρίτον δὲ Πλάτων προσέθηκε τὸν διαλεκτικὸν λόγον, καὶ ἐτελεσιουργῆσε φιλοσοφίαν.

Protagoras. But it is rather in the dialogue Meno, pp. 81-97, that Plato exhibits this view of knowledge. Cf. Phaedo,72 E, and Phaedrus, 245.

Parmenides; especially see Plat. Parmen. pp. 142, 166; cf. Hegel, Werke, xi v. 204.

With Aristotle dialectic is set in contrast to apodictic, and treated as (in the modern sense) a quasi-inductive process (Ar. Top. Lib. viii.): with the Stoics, dialectic is the name of the half-rhetorical logic which they, rather than Aristotle, handed on to the schoolmen of the Middle Ages.

P. , § 81. The physical elements are fire, air, earth, and water. Earthquakes, storms, &c., are examples of the 'meteorological process.' Cf. Encyclop. §§ 281-289.

P. 152, § 82. Dialectic; cf: Werke, v. 326 seqq.

P. 154, § 82. Mysticism; cf. Mill's Logic, bk. v, ch. 3, § 4: 'Mysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence to the subjective creations of the mind's own faculties, to mere ideas of the intellect; and believing that by watching and contemplating these ideas of its own making, it can read in them what takes place in the world without.' Mill thus takes it as equivalent to an ontological mythology—probably a rare use of the term.

Chapter VII.

P. , § 85. The Absolute. The term, in something like its modern usage, is at least as old as Nicolaus Cusanus. God, according to him, is the absoluta omnium quidditas (Apol.406), the esse absolutum, or ipsum esse in existentibus (De ludo Globi, ii. 161 a), the unum absolutum, the vis absoluta, or possibilitas absoluta, or valor absolutus: absoluta vita, absoluta ratio: absoluta essendi forma. On this term and its companion infinities he rings perpetual changes. But its distinct employment to denote the 'metaphysical God' is much more modern. In Kant, e.g. the 'Unconditioned' (Das Unbedingte) is the metaphysical, corresponding to the religious, conception of deity; and the same is the case with Fichte, who however often makes use of the adjective 'absolute.' It is with Schelling that the term is naturalised in philosophy: it already appears in his works of 1793 and 1795: and from him apparently it finds its way into Fichte's Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre of 1801 (Werke, ii. 13) 'The absolute is neither knowing nor being; nor is it identity, nor is it indifference of the two; but it is throughout merely and solely the absolute.'

The term comes into English philosophical language through Coleridge and later borrowers from the German. See Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, Prop. xx, and Mill's Examination of Hamilton, chap. iv.

P. , § 86. Cf. Schelling, iii. 372: I = I expresses the identity between the 'I,' in so far as it is the producing, and the 'I' as the produced; the original synthetical and yet identical proposition: the cogito=sum of Schelling.

P. . Definition of God as Ens realissimum, e.g. Meier's Baumgarten's Metaphysic, § 605.

Jacobi, Werke, iv. 6, thus describes Spinoza's God.

As to the beginning cf. Fichte, Werke, ii. 14 (speaking of 'absolute knowing'): 'It is not a knowing of something, nor is it a knowing of nothing (so that it would be a knowing of somewhat, but this somewhat be nothing): it is not even a knowing of itself, for it is no knowledge at all of;—nor is it a knowing (quantitatively and in relation), but it is (the) knowing (absolutely qualitatively). It is no act, no event, or that somewhat is in knowing; but it is just the knowing, in which alone all acts and all events, which are there set down, can be set down.'

History of Philosophy; cf. Hegel, Werke, i. 165. 'If the Absolute, like its phenomenon Reason, be (as it is) eternally one and the same, then each reason, which has turned itself upon and cognised itself, has produced a true philosophy and solved the problem which, like its solution, is at all times the same. The reason, which cognises itself, has in philosophy to do only with itself: hence in itself too lies its whole work and its activity; and as regards the inward essence of philosophy there are neither predecessors nor successors.

'Just as little, as of constant improvements, can there be talk of "peculiar views" of philosophy.... The true peculiarity of a philosophy is the interesting individuality, in which reason has organised itself a form from the materials of a particular age; in it the particular speculative reason finds spirit of its spirit, flesh of its flesh; it beholds itself in it as one and the same, as another living being. Each philosophy is perfect in itself, and possesses totality, like a work of genuine art. As little as the works of Apelles and Sophocles, if Raphael and Shakespeare had known them, could have seemed to them mere preliminary exercises for themselves—but as cognate spiritual powers;—so little can reason in its own earlier formations perceive only useful preparatory exercises.' Cf. Schelling, iv. 401.

P. , § 86. Parmenides (ap. Simplic. Phys.): of the two ways of investigation the first is that it is, and that not-to-be is not.

ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἓστι τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἓστι μὴ εἶναι

P. , § 87. The Buddhists. Cf. Hegel, Werke, xi. 387. Modern histories of Buddhism insist upon the purely ethico-religious character of the teaching. Writers like von Hartmann (Religionsphilosophie, p. 320) on the contrary hold that Buddhism carried out the esoteric theory of Brahmanism to the consequence that the abstract one is nothing. According to Vassilief, Le Bouddhisme, p. 318 seqq., one of the Buddhist metaphysical schools, the Madhyamikas, founded by Nâgârdjuna 400 years after Buddha, taught that All is Void.—Such metaphysics were probably reactions of the underlying Brahmanist idea.

But generally Buddhism (as was not unnatural 60 years ago) is hardly taken here in its characteristic historical features.

P. , § 88. Aristotle, Phys, i. 8 (191 a. 26): 'Those philosophers who first sought the truth and the real substance of things got on a false track, like inexperienced travellers who fail to discover the way, and declared that nothing can either come into being or disappear, because it is necessary that what comes into being should come into being either from what is or from what is not, and that it is from both of these impossible: for what is does not become (it already is), and nothing would become from what is not.'

(5) is an addition of ed. 3 (1830); cf. Werke, xvii. 181.

P. , § 88. The view of Heraclitus here taken is founded on the interpretation given by Plato (in the Theaetetus,152; Cratylus, 401) and by Aristotle, of a fundamental doctrine of the Ephesian—which however is expressed in the fragments by the name of the everliving fire. The other phrase (Ar. Met. i. 4) is used by Aristotle to describe the position, not of Heraclitus, but of Leucippus and Democritus. Cf. Plutarch, adv. Colotem, 4. 2 Δημόκριτος διορίζεται μὴ μᾱλλον τὸ δὲν ἥ τὸ μηδν εἶναι; cf. Simplic. in Ar. Phys. fol. 7.

P. , § 89. Daseyn: Determinate being. Cf. Schelling, i. 209. 'Being (Seyn) expresses the absolute, Determinate being (Daseyn) a conditional, 'positing': Actuality, one conditioned in a definite sort by a definite condition. The single phenomenon in the whole system of the world has actuality; the world of phenomena in general has Daseyn; but the absolutely-posited, the Ego, is. I am is all the Ego can say of itself.'

P. , § 91. Being-by-self: An:sich:seyn.

Spinoza, Epist. 50, figura non aliud quam determinatio et determinatio negatio est.

P. , § 92. Grenze (limit or boundary), and Schranke (barrier or check) are distinguished in Werke, iii. 128-139 (see Stirling's Secret of Hegel, i. 377 seqq.). Cf. Kant's remark, Krit. d. r. Vernunft, p. 795, that Hume only erschränkt our intellect, ohne ihn zu begrenzen.

P. , § 92. Plato, Timaeus, c. 35 (formation of the world-soul): 'From the individual and ever-identical essence (ὀυσία) and the divisible which is corporeal, he compounded a third intermediate species of essence.... And taking these, being three, he compounded them all into one form (ἰδέα), adjusting perforce the unmixable nature of the other and the same, and mingling them all with the essence, and making of three one again, he again distributed this total into as many portions as were fitting, but each of them mingled out of the same and the other and the essence.'

P. , § 94. Philosophy. Cf. Schelling, Werke, ii. 377. 'A various experience has taught me that for most men the greatest obstacle to the understanding and vital apprehension of philosophy is their invincible opinion that its object is to be sought at an infinite distance. The consequence is, that while they should fix their eye on what is present (das Gegenwärtige), every effort of their mind is called out to get hold of an object which is not in question through the whole inquiry.' ... 'The aim of the sublimest science can only be to show the actuality,—in the strictest sense the actuality, the presence, the vital existence (Daseyn)—of a God in the whole of things and in each one.... Here we deal no longer with an extra-natural or supernatural thing, but with the immediately near, the alone-actual to which we ourselves also belong, and in which we are.'

P. , § 95. Plato's Philebus, ch. xii-xxiii (pp. 23-38): cf. Werke, xiv. 214 seqq.: 'The absolute is therefore what in one unity is finite and infinite.'

P. . Idealism of Philosophy: cf. Schelling, ii. 67. 'Every philosophy therefore is and remains Idealism; and it is only under itself that it embraces realism and idealism; only that the former Idealism should not be confused with the latter, which is of a merely relative kind.'

Hegel, Werke, iii. 163. 'The proposition that the finite is "ideal" constitutes Idealism. In nothing else consists the Idealism of philosophy than in recognising that the finite has no genuine being.... The contrast of idealistic and realistic philosophy is therefore of no importance. A philosophy that attributed to finite existences as such a genuine ultimate absolute being would not deserve the name philosophy.... By "ideal" is meant existing as a representation in consciousness: whatever is in a mental concept, idea or imagination is "ideal": "ideal" is just another word for "in imagination,"—something not merely distinct from the real, but essentially not real. The mind indeed is the great idealist: in the sensation, representation, thought of the mind the fact has not what is called real existence; in the simplicity of the Ego such external being is only suppressed, existing for me, and "ideally" in me. This subjective idealism refers only to the representational form, by which an import is mine.'

P. , § 96. The distinction of nature and mind as real and ideal is especially Schelling's: See e.g. his Einleitung, &c. iii. 272. 'If it is the problem of Transcendental Philosophy to subordinate the real to the ideal, it is on the contrary the problem of the philosophy of nature to explain the ideal from the real.'

P. 183, § 98. Newton: see Scholium at the end of the Principia, and cf. Optics, iii. qu. 28.

Modern Atomism, besides the conception of particles or molecules, has that of mathematical centres of force.

Kant, Werke, v. 379 (ed. Rosenk.). 'The general principle of the dynamic of material nature is that all reality in the objects of the external senses must be regarded as moving force: whereby accordingly so-called solid or absolute impenetrability is banished from natural science as a meaningless concept, and repellent force put in its stead; whereas true and immediate attraction is defended against all the subtleties of a self-misconceiving metaphysic and declared to be a fundamental force necessary for the very possibility of the concept of matter.'

P. , § 98. Abraham Gottheit Kästner (1719-1800), professor forty-four years at Göttingen, enjoyed in the latter half of the eighteenth century a considerable repute, both in literature and in mathematical science. Some of, his epigrams are still quoted.

P. , § 102. The two 'moments' of number Unity, and Sum (Anzahl), may be compared with the Greek distinction between one and ἀριθμός (cf. Arist. Phys. iv. 12 ἐλάχίστος ἀριθμός ἡ δυάς). According to Rosenkranz (Leben Hegels) the classification of arithmetical operations often engaged Hegel's research. Note the relation in Greek between λογικόν and λογιστικόν. Cf. Kant's view of the 'synthesis' in arithmetic.

P. , § 103. Intensive magnitude. Cf. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, p. 207, on Anticipation of Perception (Wahrnehmung), and p. 414, in application to the question of the soul's persistence.

P. , § 104. Not Aristotle, but rather Simplicius on the Physics of Aristotle, fol. 306: giving Zeno's argument against the alleged composition of the line from a series of points. What you can say of one supposed small real unit, you can say of a smaller, and so on ad infinitum. (Cf. Burnet's Early Greek Philosophy, p. 329.)

P. , § 104. The distinction between imagination and intellect made by Spinoza in Ep. xii. (olim xxix.) in Opp. ed. Land vol. ii. 40 seqq. is analogous to that already noted (p. 402) between ratio and intellegentia, and is connected, as by Boëthius, with the distinction which Plato, Timaeus, 37, draws between eternity (αἰών) and time.

The infinite (Eth. i. prop. 8. Schol. I) is the 'absolute affirmation of a certain nature's existence,' as opposed to finitude which is really ex parte negatio. 'The problem has always been held extremely difficult, if not inextricable, because people did not distinguish between what is concluded to be infinite by its own nature and the force of its definition, and what has no ends, not in virtue of its essence, but in virtue of its cause. It was difficult also because they did not distinguish between what is called infinite because it has no ends, and that whose parts (though we may have a maximum and minimum of it) we cannot equate or explicate by any number. Lastly because they lid not distinguish between what we can only understand (intelligere,) but not imagine, and what we can also imagine.'

To illustrate his meaning, Spinoza calls attention to the distinction of substance from mode, of eternity from duration. We can 'explicate' the existence only of modes by duration: that of substance, 'by eternity, i.e. by an infinite fruition of existence or being' (per aeternitatem, hoc est, infinitam existendi, sive, invita latinitate, essendi fruitionem.) The attempt therefore to show that extended substance is composed of parts is an illusion,—which arises because we look at quantity 'abstractly or superficially, as we have it in imagination by means of the senses.' So looking at it, as we are liable to do, a quantity will be found divisible, finite, composed of parts and manifold. But if we look at it as it really is,—as a Substance —as it is in the intellect alone—(which is a work of difficulty), it will be found infinite, indivisible, and unique. 'It is only therefore when we abstract duration and quantity from substance, that we use time to determine duration and measure to determine quantity, so as to be able to imagine them. Eternity and substance, on the other hand, are no objects of imagination but only of intellect; and to try to explicate them by such notions as measure, time, and number—which are only modes of thinking or rather of imagining—is no better than to fall into imaginative raving.' 'Nor will even the modes of Substance ever be rightly understood, should they be confounded with this sort of entia rationis' (i.e. modi cogitandi subserving the easier retention, explication and imagination of things understood)' or aids to imagination. For when we do so, we separate them from substance, and from the mode in which they flow from eternity, without which they cannot be properly understood.' (Cf. Hegel's Werke, i. 63.)

The verses from Albr. von Haller come from his poem on Eternity (1736). Hegel seems to quote from an edition before 1776, when the fourth line was added in the stanza as it thus finally stood:—

Ich häufe ungeheure Zahlen,
Gebürge Millionen auf,
Ich welze Zeit auf Zeit und Welt auf Welten hin,
Und wenn ich auf der March des endlichen nun bin,
Und von der fürchterlichen Höhe
Mit Schwindeln wieder nach dir sehe,
Ist alle Macht der Zahl, vermehrt mit tausend Malen,
Noch nicht ein Theil von dir.
Ich tilge sie, und du liegst ganz vor mir.

Kant, Kritik d. r. Vernunft, p. 641. 'Even Eternity, however eerily sublime may be its description by Haller,' &c.

P. , § 104. Pythagoras in order of time probably comes between Anaximenes (of Ionia) and Xenophanes (of Elea). But the mathematical and metaphysical doctrines attributed to the Pythagorean are known to us only in the form in which they are represented in Plato and Aristotle, i.e. in a later stage of development. The Platonists (cf. Arist. Met. i. 6; xi. 1. 12; xii. 1. 7; cf. Plat. Rep. p. 510) treated mathematical fact as mid-way between 'sensibles' and 'ideas'; and Aristotle himself places mathematics as a science between physical and metaphysical (theological) philosophy.

The tradition (referred to p. 198) about Pythagoras is given by Iamblichus, Vita Pyth. §115 seqq.: it forms part of the later Neo-Pythagorean legend, which entered literature in the first centuries of the Christian era.

P. , § 107. Hebrew hymns: e.g. Psalms lxxiv. and civ.; Proverbs viii. and Job xxxviii. Vetus verbum est, says Leibniz (ed. Erdmann, p. 162), Deum omnia pondere, mensura, numero, fecisse.

P. 202, § 108. The antinomy of measure. These logical puzzles are the so-called fallacy of Sorites (a different thing from the chain-syllogism of the logic-books); cf. Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 29; De Divin. ii. 4—and the φαλακρός cf. Horace, Epist. ii. 1-45.

Chapter VIII.

P. , § 113. Self-relation—(sich) auf sich beziehen.

P. 213, § 115. The 'laws of thought' is the magniloquent title given in the Formal Logic since Kant's day to the principles or maxims (principia, Grundsätze) which Kant himself described as 'general and formal criteria of truth.' They include the so-called principle of contradiction, with its developments, the principle of identity and excluded middle: to which, with a desire for completeness, eclectic logicians have added the Leibnizian principle of the reason. Hegel has probably an eye to Krug and Fries in some of his remarks. The three laws may be compared and contrasted with the three principles, —homogeneity, specification, and continuity of forms, in Kant's Kritik d. r. Vern. p. 686.

P. , § 117. Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, Liv. ii. ch. 27, § 3 (ed. Erdmann, p. 273: cf. fourth Letter to Clarke). Il n'y a point deux individus indiscernables. Un gentilhomme d'esprit de mes amis, en parlant avec moi en présence de Madame l'Electrice dans le jardin de Herrenhausen, crut qu'il trouverait bien deux feuilles entièrement semblables. Madame l'Electrice l'en défia, et il courut longtems en vain pour en chercher.

The principle of individuation or indiscernibility is: 'If two individuals were perfectly alike and equal and, in a word, indistinguishable by themselves, there would be no principle of individuation: (Leibniz, ed. Erdm. p. 277) Poser deux choses indiscernables est poser la même chose sous deux noms (p. 756). Principium individuationis idem est quod absolutae specificationis quâ res ita sit determinata, ut ab aliis omnibus distingui possit.

P. , § 119. Polarity. Schelling, ii. 489. 'The law of Polarity is a universal law of nature'; cf. ii. 459: 'It is a first principle of a philosophic theory of nature to have a view (in the whole of nature), on polarity and dualism.' But he adds (476), 'It is time to define more accurately the concept of polarity.' So Oken, Naturphilosophie: §76: 'A force consisting of two principles is called Polarity.' § 77: 'Polarity is the first force which makes its appearance in the world.' § 81: 'The original movement is a result of the original polarity.'

P. , § 119. Cf. Fichte, ii. 53. 'To everything but this the logically trained thinker can rise. He is on his guard against contradiction. But, in that case, how about the possibility of the maxim of his own logic that we can think no contradiction. In some way he must have got hold of contradiction and thought it, or he could make no communications about it. Had such people only once regularly asked themselves how they came to think the merely possible or contingent (the not-necessary), and how they actually do so! Evidently they here leap through a not-being, not-thinking, &c., into the utterly unmediated, self-initiating, free,—into beënt non-being,—in short, the above contradiction, as it was laid down. With consistent thinkers the result of this incapacity is nothing but the utter abolition of freedom,—the most absolute fatalism and Spinozism.

P. , §121. Leibniz (ed. Erdmann, p. 515). 'The principle of la raison déterminante is that nothing ever occurs without there being a cause for it, or at least a determinant reason, i.e. something which may serve to render a reason à priori why that is existent rather than in any other way. This great principle holds good in all events.' Cf. p. 707. 'The principle of "sufficient reason" is that in virtue of which we consider that no fact could be found true or consistent, no enunciation truthful, without there being a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise.... When a truth is necessary, we can find the reason of it by analysis, resolving it into simpler ideas and truths, until we come to primitive ideas.... But the sufficient reason ought also to be found in contingent truths or truths of fact, i.e. in the series of things spread through the universe of creatures, or the resolution into particular reasons might go into a limitless detail: ... and as all this detail embraces only other antecedent, or more detailed contingencies, ... the sufficient or final (dernière) reason must be outside the succession or series of this detail of contingencies, however infinite it might be. And it is thus that the final reason of things must be in a "necessary substance," in which the detail of the changes exists only eminenter, as in the source,—and it is what we call God.' (Monadology §§ 32-38.)

Hence the supremacy of final causes. Thus Opp. ed. Erdmann, p. 678: Ita fit ut efficientes causae pendeant a finalibus, et spiritualia sint natura priora materialibus. Accordingly he urges, p. 155, that final cause has not merely a moral and religious value in ethics and theology, but is useful even in physics for the detection of deep-laid truths. Cf. p. 106: C'est sanctifier la Philosophie que de faire couler ses ruisseaux de la fontaine des attributs de Dieu. Bien loin d'exclure les causes finales et la considération d'un être agissant avec sagesse, c'est de là qu'il faut tout déduire en Physique. Cf. also Principes de la Nature (Leibn. ed. Erdm. p. 716): 'It is surprising that by the sole consideration of efficient causes or of matter, we could not render a reason for those laws of movement discovered in our time. Il y faut recourir aux causes finales.'

P. , § 121 Socrates. The antitheses between Socrates and the Sophists belongs in the main to the Platonic dialogues,—not co the historical Socrates. It is the literary form in which the philosophy of Plato works out its development through the criticism of contemporary opinions and doctrines. And even in Plato's writings the antagonism is very unlike what later interpretations have made out of it.

P. , § 124. Thing by itself (thing in itself) the Ding:an:sich.

P. , § 126. Cf. Encycl. § 334 (Werke, viii. 1. p. 411). 'In empirical chemistry the chief object is the particularity of the matters and products, which are grouped by superficial abstract features which make impossible any system in the special detail. In these lists, metals, oxygen, hydrogen, &c.—metalloids, sulphur, phosphorus appear side by side as simple chemical bodies on the same level. The great physical variety of these bodies must of itself create a prepossession against such coordination; and their chemical origin, the process from which they issue, is clearly no less various. But in an equally chaotic way, more abstract and more real processes are put on the same level. If all this is to get scientific form, every product ought to be determined according to the grade of the concrete and completely developed process from which it essentially issues, and which gives it its peculiar significance; and for that purpose it is not less essential to distinguish grades in abstractness or reality of the process. Animal and vegetable substances in any case belong to a quite other order: so little can their nature be understood from the chemical process, that they are rather destroyed in it, and only the way of their death is apprehended. These substances, however, ought above all to serve to counter-act the metaphysic predominant in chemistry as in physics,—the ideas or rather wild fancies of the unalterability of matters under all circumstances, as well as the categories of the composition and the consistence of bodies from such matters. We see it generally admitted that chemical matters lose in combination the properties which they show in separation: and yet we find the idea prevailing that they are the same things without the properties as they are with them,—so that as things with these properties they are not results of the process.'—Cf. Werke, vii. a. 372: 'Air does not consist of oxygen and nitrogen: but these are the forms under which air is put,' cf. ib.403.

P. , § 131. Fichte's Sonnenklarer Bericht appeared in 1801.

P. , § 136. Herder's Gott: Gespräche über Spinoza's System, 1787, 2nd ed. 1800. 'God is, in the highest and unique sense of the word, Force, i.e. the primal force of all forces, the soul of all souls' (p. 63), 'All that we call matter, therefore, is more or less animate: it is a realm of efficient forces. One force predominates: otherwise there were no one, no whole' (p. 207). 'The supreme being (Daseyn) could give its creatures nothing higher than being. (Theophron.) But, my friend, being and being, however simple in the concept, are in their estate very different; and what do you suppose, Philolaus, marks its grades and differences? (Phil.) Nothing but forces. In God himself we found no higher conception; but all his forces were only one. The supreme force could not be other than supreme goodness and wisdom, ever-living, ever-active. (Theoph.) Now you yourself see, Philolaus, that the supreme, or rather the All (for God is not a supreme unit in a scale of beings like himself), could not reveal himself otherwise than in the universe as active. In him nothing could slumber, and what he expressed was himself. He is before everything, and everything subsists in him: the whole world an expression, an appearance of his ever-living, ever-acting forces' (p. 200).

'It was the mistake of Spinoza,' says Herder, 'to be unduly influenced by the Cartesian phraseology. Had he chosen the conception of force and effect, everything would have gone easier, and his system become much more distinct and coherent. 'Had he developed the conception of power, and the conception of matter, he must in conformity with his system necessarily have come to the conception of forces, which work as well in matter as in organs of thinking: he would in that case have regarded power and thought as forces, i.e. as one.' (Cf. H. Spencer, 'Force, the Ultimate of Ultimates.' First Princ. p 169)

According to Rosenkranz (Leben Hegels, p. 223) there exists in manuscript a criticism by Hegel on the second edition of Herder's God. Herder's Dialogue belongs to the controversy aroused by Jacobi's letters on Spinoza.

P. , § 136. Newton. Leibniz charges him with the view that God needs from time to time remonter sa montre, otherwise it would cease going: that his machine requires to be cleaned (décrasser) by extraordinary aid' (ed. Erdm. p. 746).

P. , § 140. The verses quoted occur in Goethe's Werke ii. 376, under the heading Allerdings. Originally the first four lines appeared in Haller's poem Die menschlichen Tugenden thus—

Ins Innre der Natur bringt sein erschaffner Geist:
Zu glücklich, wenn sie noch die äußre Schale weist!

(To nature's heart there penetrates no mere created mind:
Too happy if she but display the outside of her rind.)

Hegel—reading weizt for weist—takes the second line as

Too happy, if he can but know the outside of her rind.

Goethe's attack upon a vulgar misuse of the lines belongs to his dispute with the scientists. His verses appeared in 1820 as Heiteres Reimstück at the end of Heft 3 zur Morphologie,—of which the closing section is entitled Freundlicher Zuruf (Werke xxvii. 161), as follows:—

"Ins Innre der Natur,"
O du Philister!—
"Dringt kein erschaffner Geist."
. . . . . . .
"Glückselig! wem sie nur
Die äußre Schale weis't."
Das hör' ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen,
Ich fluche drauf, aber verstohlen:
Sage mir taufend tausendmale:
Alles giebt sie reichlich und gern;
Natur hat weder Stern
Noch Schale,
Alles ist sie mit einem Male.

[The last seven lines may be thus paraphrased in continuation:

I swear—of course but to myself—as rings within my ears
That same old warning o'er and o'er again for sixty years,
And thus a thousand thousand times I answer in my mind:
—With gladsome and ungrudging hand metes nature from her store:
She keeps not back the core,
Nor separates the rind,
But all in each both rind and core has evermore combined.]

P. , § 140. Plato and Aristotle: cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 247 A (φθόνoς γὰρ ξω θείον χόρoυ ἴσταται); Timaeus, 29 E; and Aristotle, Metaph. i. 2. 22.

P. , § 140. Goethe: Sämmtl. Werke, iii. 203 (Maxime und Reflexionen). Gegen große Vorzüge eines Andern giebt es kein Rettungsmittel als die Liebe. Cf. Schiller to Goethe, 2 July, 1796. 'How vividly I have felt on this occasion ... that against surpassing merit nothing but Love gives liberty' (daß es dem Vortrefflichen gegenüber seine Freiheit giebt als die Liebe).

'Pragmatic.' This word, denoting a meddlesome busybody in older English and sometimes made a vague term of abuse, has been in the present century used in English as it is here employed in German.

According to Polybius, ix. I. 2, the πραγματικὸς τρόπος τῆς ἱστορίας is that which has a directly utilitarian aim. So Kant, Foundation of Metaph. of Ethic (Werke, viii. 41, note): 'A history is pragmatically composed when it renders prudent, i.e. instructs the world how it may secure its advantage better or at least as well as the ages preceding.' Schelling (v. 308) quotes in illustration of pragmatic history-writing the words of Faust to Wagner (Goethe, xi. 26):

Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst,
Das ist im Grund der herren eigner Geist,,
In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln.

Cf. also Hegel, Werke, ix. 8. 'A second kind of reflectional history is the pragmatic. When we have to do with the past and are engaged with a distant world, the mind sees rising before it a present, which it has from its own action as a reward for its trouble. The events are different; but their central and universal fact, their structural plan is identical. This abolishes the past and makes the event present. Pragmatic reflections, however abstract they be, are thus in reality the present, and vivify the tales of the past with the life of to-day.—Here too a word should specially be given to the moralising and the moral instructions to be gained through history,—for which it was often studied.... Rulers, statesmen, nations, are especially bidden learn from the experience of history. But what experience and history teach is that nations and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted upon teaching which could have been drawn from it.'

Cf. Froude: Divorce of Catherine, p. 2. 'The student (of history) looks for an explanation (of political conduct) in elements which he thinks he understands—in pride, ambition, fear, avarice, jealousy, or sensuality.'

P. , § 141. Cf. Goethe, xxiii, 298. 'What is the outside of an organic nature but the ever-varied phenomenon of the inside? This outside, this surface is so exactly adapted to a varied, complex, delicate, inward structure that it thus itself becomes an inside: both aspects, the outside and the inside, standing in most direct correlation alike in the quietest existence and in the most violent movement.'

P. , § 143. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2nd ed. p. 266.

P. 269, § 147. Cf. Schelling, Werke, v. 290 (cf. iii. 603). 'There are three periods of history, that of nature, of destiny, and of providence. These three ideas express the same identity, but in a different way. Destiny too is providence, but recognised in the real, as providence, is also destiny, but beheld (angeschaut) in the ideal.'

P. , § 151. On the relation between Spinoza and Leibniz cf. Hegel, Werke, iv. 187-193. It would be a mistake, however, to represent Leibniz as mainly engaged in a work of conscious antagonism to Spinoza.

P. , § 153. Jacobi.—Jacobi (like Schopenhauer) insists specially on the distinction between grounds (Gründe)—which are formal, logical, and verbal, and causes (Ursachen)—which carry us into reality and life and nature. To transform the mere Because into the cause we must (he says) pass from logic and the analytical understanding to experience and the inner life. Instead of the timelessness of simultaneity which characterises the logical relation cf ground and consequent, the nexus of cause and effect introduces the element of time,—thereby acquiring reality (Jacobi, Werke, iii. 452). The conception of Cause—meaningless as a mere category of abstract thought—gets reality as a factor in experience, ein Erfahrungsbegriff, and is immediately given to us in the consciousness of our own causality (Jacobi, Werke, iv. 145-158). Cf. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vern. p. 116.

P. , § 158. The Amor intellectualis Dei (Spinoza, Eth. v. 32) is described as a consequence of the third grade of cognition, viz. the scientia intuitiva which 'proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate cognition of the essence of things (ii. 40, Schol. 2). From it arises (v. 27), the highest possible acquiescentia mentis, in which the mind contemplates all things sub specie aeternitatis (v. 29), knows itself to be in God and sees itself and all things in their divine essence. But this intellectual love of mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself (v. 36) 'From these things we clearly understand in what our salvation or blessedness or liberty consists: to wit, in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in the love of God towards men' (Schol. to v. 36).

Chapter IX.

Page , § 161. Evolution and development in the stricter sense in which these terms were originally used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries imply a theory of preformation, according to which the growth of an organic being is simply a process of enlarging and filling out a miniature organism, actual but invisible, because too inconspicuous. Such was the doctrine adopted by Leibniz (Considérations sur le principe de vie; Système nouveau de la Nature, &c.). According to it development is no real generation of new parts, but only an augmentation into bulk and visibility of parts already outlined. This doctrine of preformation (as opposed to epigenesis) is carried out by Charles Bonnet, who in his Considérations sur les corps organisés (1762) propounds the further hypothesis that the 'germs' from which living beings proceed contain, enclosed one within another, the germs of all creatures yet to be. This is the hypothesis of 'Emboîtement.' 'The system which regards generations as mere educts' says Kant (Kritik der Urteilskraft, § 80; Werke, iv. 318) 'is called that of individual preformation or the evolution theory: the system which regards them as products is called Epigenesis.—which might also be called the theory of generic preformation, considering that the productive powers of the générants follow the inherent tendencies belonging to the family characteristics, and that the specific form is therefore a 'virtual' preformation, in this way the opposing theory of individual preformation might be better called the involution theory, or theory of Einschachtelung (Emboîtement.) Cf. Leibniz (Werke, Erdmann, 715). 'As animals generally are not entirely born at conception or generation, no more do they entirely perish at what we call death; for it is reasonable that what does not commence naturally, does not finish either in the order of nature. Thus quitting their mask or their rags, they only return to a subtler theatre, where however they can be as sensible and well regulated as in the greater.... Thus not only the souls, but even the animals are neither generable nor perishable: they are only developed, enveloped, re-clothed, unclothed,—transformed. The souls never altogether quit their body, and do not pass from one body into another body which is entirely new to them. There is therefore no metempsychosis, but there is metamorphosis. The animals change, take and quit only parts: which takes place little by little and by small imperceptible parcels, but continually, in nutrition: and takes place suddenly notably but rarely, at conception, or at death, which make them gain or lose much all at once.'

The theory of Emboîtement or Envelopment, according to Bonnet (Considérations, &c. ch. I) is that 'the germs of all the organised bodies of one species were inclosed (renfermés) one in another, and have been developed successively.' So according to Haller (Physiology, Tome vii. § 2) 'it is evident that in plants the mother-plant contains the germs of several generations; and there is therefore no inherent improbability in the view that tous les enfans, excepté un, fussent renfermés dans l'ovaire de la première Fille d'Eve.' Cf. Weismann's Continuity of the Germ-plasma. Yet Bonnet (Contemplation de la Nature, part vii. ch. 9, note 2), says, 'The germs are not enclosed like boxes or cases one in another, but a germ forms part of another germ, as a grain forms part of the plant in which it is developed.'

P. , § 163. Rousseau, Contrat Social, liv. ii. ch. 3.

P. , § 165. The 'adequate' idea is a sub-species of the 'distinct.' When an idea does not merely distinguish a thing from others (when it is clear), or in addition represent the characteristic marks belonging to the object so distinguished (when it is distinct), but also brings out the farther characteristics of these characteristics, the idea is adequate. Thus adequate is a sort of second power of distinct. (Cf. Baumeister's Instit. Philos. Ration. 1765, §§ 64-94.) Hegel's description rather agrees with the 'complete idea' 'by which I put before my mind singly marks sufficient to discern the thing represented from all other things in every case, state, and time' (Baumeister, ib. § 88). But cf. Leibniz, ed. Erdm. p. 79: notitia adaequata.

P. , § 166. Cf. Baumeister, Instit. Phil. Rat. § 185: Judicium est idearum conjunctio vel separatio.

P. , § 166. Punctum saliens: the punctum sanguineum saliens of Harvey (de Generat. Animal, exercit. 17), or first appearance of the heart: the στιγμὴ αἱματίνη in the egg, of which Aristotle (Hist. Anim. vi. 3) says τoῡτο τὸ σημεῖον πηδᾷ καὶ κινεῖται ὥσπερ ἓμψυχον.

P. , § 169. Cf. Whately, Logic (Bk. ii. ch. I, § 2), 'Of these terms that which is spoken of is called the subject; that which is said of it, the predicate.'

P. , § 171. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (p. 95, 2nd ed.) § 9.

P. , § 172. Cf. Jevons, Principles of Science, ch. 3, 'on limited identities' and 'negative propositions.'

P. . Ear-lobes. The remark is due to Blumenbach: cf. Hegel's Werke, v. 285.

P. . Colours, i.e. painters' colours; cf. Werke, vii. 1. 314 (lecture-note). 'Painters are not such fools as to be Newtonians: they have red, yellow, and blue, and out of these they make their other colours.'

P. , § 181. For the genetic classification of judgments and syllogisms and the passage from the former to the latter compare especially Lotze's Logic, Book i. And for the comprehensive exhibition of the systematic process of judgment and inference see B. Bosanquet's Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge. The passage from Hegel's Werke, v. 139, quoted at the head of that work is parallel to the sentence in p. 318, 'The interest, therefore,' &c.

P. , § 186. The letters I-P-U, of course, stand for Individual, Particular, and Universal.

P. , § 187. Fourth figure. This so-called Galenian figure was differentiated from the first figure by the separation of the five moods, which (after Arist. An. pr. i. 7 and ii. I) Theophrastus and the later pupils, down at least to Boëthius, had subjoined to the four recognised types of perfect syllogism. But its Galenian origin is more than doubtful.

P. , § 190. Cf. Mill's Logic, Bk. ii. ch. 3. 'In every syllogism considered as an argument to prove the conclusion there is a petitio principii.'

Hegel's Induction is that strictly so called or complete induction, the argument from the sum of actual experiences—that per enumerationem simplicem, and διὰ πάντων. Of course except by accident or by artificial arrangement such completeness is impossible in rerum natura.

P. , § 190. The 'philosophy of Nature' referred to here is probably that of Oken and the Schellingians; but later critics (e.g. Riehl, Philosoph. Criticismus, iii. 120) have accused Hegel himself of even greater enormities in this department.

P. , § 192. Elementarlehre: Theory of the Elements, called by Hamilton (Lectures on Logic, i. 65) Stoicheiology as opposed to methodology. Cf. the Port Royal Logic. Kant's Kritik observes the same division of the subject.

P. , § 193. Anselm, Proslogium, c. 2. In the Monologium Anselm expounds the usual argument from conditioned to unconditioned (Est igitur unum aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est; per quod est quidquid est bonum vel magnum, el omnino quidquid aliquid est. Monol. c. 3). But in the Proslogium he seeks an argument quod nullo ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret—i.e. from the conception of (God as) the highest and greatest that can be (aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari potest) he infers its being (sic ergo vere EST aliquid quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse.) The absolute would not be absolute if the idea of it did not ipso facto imply existence.

Gaunilo of Marmoutier in the Liber pro insipiente made the objection that the fact of such argument being needed showed that idea and reality were prima facie different. And in fact the argument of Anselm deals with an Absolute which is object rather than subject, thought rather than thinker; in human consciousness realised, but not essentially self-affirming—implicit (an:sich) only, as said in pp. 331, 333. And Anselm admits c. 15 Domine, non solum es, quo majus cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam majus quam cogitari potest (transcending our thought).

P. , line 2. This sentence has been transposed in the translation. In the original it occurs after the quotation from the Latin in p. 332.

P. , § 194. Leibniz: for a brief account of the Monads see Caird's Crit. Philosophy of J. Kant, i. 86-95.

A monad is the simple substance or indivisible unity corresponding to a body. It is as simple what the world is as a multiplicity: it 'represents,' i.e. concentrates into unity, the variety of phenomena: is the expression of the material in the immaterial, of the compound in the simple, of the extended outward in the inward. Its unity and its representative capacity go together (cf. Lotze, Mikrokosmus.) It is the 'present which is full of the future and laden with the past' (ed. Erdm. p. 197); the point which is all-embracing, the totality of the universe. And yet there are monads—in the plural.

P. , § 194. Fichte, Werke, i. 430. 'Every thorough-going dogmatic philosopher is necessarily a fatalist.'

P. 338, § 195. Cf. Encyclop. § 463. 'This supreme inwardising of ideation (Vorstellung) is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, reducing itself to the mere being, the general space of mere names and meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same time the power over the different names, the empty link which fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in fixed order.'

Contemporaneously with Hegel, Herbart turned psychology in the line of a 'statics and dynamics of the mind.' See (besides earlier suggestions) his De Attentionis mensura causisque primariis (1822) and his Ueber die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit, Mathematik auf Psychologie anzuwenden (1822).

P. , § 198. Civil society: distinguished as the social and economical organisation of the bourgeoisie, with their particularist-universal aims, from the true universal unity of citoyens in the state or ethico-political organism.

P. , § 204. Inner design: see Kant's Kritik der Urtheilskraft, § 62.

Aristotle, De Anima, ii. 4 (415. b. 7) φανερὸν δ' ὠς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ ψυχὴ ατία: ii. 2 ζωὴν λέγομεν τὴν δι' αὑτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν.

P. , § 206. Neutral first water, cf. Encyclop.§ 284, 'without independent individuality, without rigidity and intrinsic determination, a thorough-going equilibrium.' Cf. Werke, vii. 6. 168. 'Water is absolute neutrality, not like salt, an individualised neutrality; and hence it was at an early date called the mother of everything particular.' 'As the neutral it is the solvent of acids and alkalis.' Cf. Oken's Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie, §§ 294 and 432.

P. , § 206. Conclude = beschliessen: Resolve = entschliessen. Cf. Chr. Sigwart, Kleine Schriften, ii. 115, seqq.

P. , § 216. Aristotle, De Anim. Generat. i. (726. b. 24) ἡ χεὶρ ἄνεν ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἔστι χεὶρ ἀλλὰ μόνον ὁμώνυμον.

Arist. Metaph. viii. 6 (1045. b. 11) ο δὲ (λέγoυσi) σύνθεσιν ἥ σύνδεσμον ψυχῆς σώματι τὸ ζῆν.

P. , § 218. Sensibility, &c. This triplicity (as partly distinguished by Haller after Glisson) of the functions of organic life is largely worked out in Schelling, ii. 491.

P. , § 219. Cf. Schelling, ii. 540. As walking is a constantly prevented falling, so life is a constantly prevented extinction of the vital process.

P. , § 229. Spinoza (Eth. i. def. I) defines causa sui as id cujus essentia involvit existentiam, and (in def. 3) defines substantia as id quod in se est et per se concipitur.

Schelling: e.g. Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie (1801), (Werke, iv. 114): 'I call reason the absolute reason, or reason, in so far as it is thought as total indifference of subjective and objective.'

P. , § 230. 'Mammals distinguish themselves': unter; unter:scheiden, instead of scheiden: cf. Werke, ii. 181. 'The distinctive marks of animals, e.g. are taken from the claws and teeth: for in fact it is not merely cognition which by this means distinguishes one animal from another: but the animal thereby separates itself off: by these weapons it keeps itself to itself and separate from the universal.' Cf. Werke, vii. a. 651 seqq. (Encycl. § 370) where reference is made to Cuvier, Recherches sur les ossements fossiles des quadrupèdes (1812), &c.

P. , § 230. Kant, Kritik der Urtheilskraft: Einleitung, § 9 (note), (Werke, ed. Ros. iv. 39); see Caird's Critical Philosophy of I. Kant, Book i. ch. 5; also Hegel's Werke, ii. 3.

P. , § 231. An example of Wolfs pedantry is given in Hegel, Werke, v. 307, from Wolfs Rudiments of Architecture, Theorem viii. 'A window must be broad enough for two persons to recline comfortably in it, side by side. Proof. It is customary to recline with another person on the window to look about. But as the architect ought to satisfy the main views of the owner (§ I) he must make the window broad enough for two persons to recline comfortably side by side.'

'Construction': cf. Werke, ii. 38. 'Instead of its own internal life and spontaneous movement, such a simple mode (as subject, object, cause, substance, &c.) has expression given to it by perception (here = sense-consciousness) on some superficial analogy: and this external and empty application of the formula is called "Construction." The procedure shares the qualities of all such formalism. How stupid-headed must be the man, who could not in a quarter of an hour master the theory of asthenic, sthenic and indirectly asthenic diseases' (this is pointed at Schelling's Werke, iii. 236) 'and the three corresponding curative methods, and who, when, no long time since, such instruction was sufficient, could not in this short period be transformed from a mere practitioner into a "scientific" physician? The formalism of Naturphilosophie may teach e.g. that understanding is electricity, or that the animal is nitrogen, or even that it is like the South or the North, or that it represents it,—as baldly as is here expressed or with greater elaboration in terminology. At such teachings the inexperienced may fall into a rapture of admiration, may reverence the profound genius it implies,—may take delight in the sprightliness of language which instead of the abstract concept gives the more pleasing perceptual image, and may congratulate itself on feeling its soul akin to such splendid achievement. The trick of such a wisdom is as soon learnt as it is easy to practice; its repetition, when it grows familiar, becomes as intolerable as the repetition of juggling once detected. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is not harder to manipulate than a painter's palette with two colours on it, say red and green, the former to dye the surface if a historic piece, the latter if a landscape is asked for.'

Kant (Werke, iii. 36) in the 'Prolegomena to every future Metaphysic,' § 7, says: 'We find, however, it is the peculiarity of mathematical science that it must first exhibit its concept in a percept, and do so à priori,—hence in a pure percept. This observation with regard to the nature of mathematics gives a hint as to the first and supreme condition of its possibility: it must be based on some pure percept in which it can exhibit all its concepts in concreto and yet à priori, or, as it is called, construe them.'

The phrase, and the emphasis on the doctrine, that perception must be taken as an auxiliary in mathematics,' belong specially to the second edition of the Kritik, e.g. Pref. xii. To learn the properties of the isosceles triangle the mathematical student must 'produce (by 'construction') what he himself thought into it and exhibited à priori according to concepts.'

'Construction, in general,' says Schelling (Werke, v. 252: cf. iv. 407) 'is the exhibition of the universal and particular in unity':—'absolute unity of the ideal and the real.' v. 225. Darstellung in intellektueller Anschauung ist philosophische Konstruktion.

P. . 'Recollection' = Erinnerung: i.e. the return from differentiation and externality to simplicity and inwardness: distinguished from Gedächtniss = memory (specially of words).

P. , § 236. Cf. Schelling, Werke, iv. 405. 'Every particular object is in its absoluteness the Idea; and accordingly the Idea is also the absolute object (Gegenstand) itself,—as the absolutely ideal also the absolutely real.'

P. , § 236. Aristotle, Metaphys. xi. 9 (1074. 6. 34) αὑτὸν ἅρα νοεῖ (ὁ νοῦς = θεος), εἵπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἐστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. Cf. Arist. Metaph. xii. 7.

P. , §239. 'Supposes a correlative' = ist für Eines. On Seyn: für Eines, cf. Werke, iii. 168. Das Ideëlle ist notwendig für:Eines, aber es ist nicht für ein Anderes: das Eine für welches es ist, ist nur es selbst. ... God is therefore for-self (to himself) in so far as he himself is that which is for him.

P. , § 244. The percipient idea (anschauende Idee), of course both object and subject of intuition, is opposed to the Idea (as logical) in the element of Thought: but still as Idea and not—to use Kant's phrase (Kritik der r. Vern. § 26)—as natura materialiter spectata.

A.

Absolute (the), , , ; relation
to God, ; absolute idea, (cf. );
definitions of, , , , , ,
288, , .
Abstract (and concrete), , .
Abstraction, .
Accidents (of substance), seqq.
Activity (bringing condition to fact), .
Actuality, seqq.; its relations
to reason, , , .
Affinity (in chemism), .
Agnosticism, .
All (quasi-universal), .
Alteration, .
Analogy, 324 seqq.
Analysis, ; its dangers, , ;
analytical method, .
Animals and men, , .
Anselm, , seqq.(cf. ).
Anthropomorphism, .
Antinomies (of reason), , , .
Apodictic judgment, .
Appearance, , seqq.
Apperception (pure), , .
Appetite, .
A priori (the), .
Aristotle, his idealism, , , , ;
as a logician, seqq., , ;
on the dignity of philosophy, ;
compared with Plato, ;
on the Idea, ; on life, , .
Arithmetic (logic of), .
Art, .
Assertory judgments, .
Atheism, what it implies, ;
charged against Spinoza, , .
Atomic philosophy, .
Atoms, .
Attraction (as constructive principle), .
Attribution (of predicates), , .
Auflieben, explained, .
Axioms (mathematical), .

B.

Becoming, .
Beginning, what it implies, .
Being (doctrine of), seqq.;
being and nothing, ;
contrasted with thought, , seqq.;
determinate being, seqq.;
being in or by self, ;
being-for-self, seqq.
Body (and soul), .
Boëthius, .
Buddhist metaphysics, , , .

C.

Caput Mortuum, .
Cartesianism, .
Categorical judgment, ; syllogism, .
Categories (the), , , ;
their finitude, , ; criticism of, .
Cause and effect, ; efficient and final, , .
Chance, seqq.
Chaos, .
Chemism, seqq.; chemical principles, , .
Christianity, a religion of reason, ;
its faith, ; religion of consolation, ;
of personality, ; its philosophical precept, .
Cognition, as analysed by Kant, seqq.;
its nature and methods, .
Coleridge, , .
Common sense, .
Comparison, .
Conceivable (the), .
Concept: see Notion.
Conception (= Representation), ; preliminary to thought, .
Condition, .
Conditioned (the), .
Conscience (rights of), , .
Consciousness (appeal to), .
Consensus gentium, , .
Consolation (Christian), .
Construction (method of), (cf. ).
Content (and form), seqq.
Contingency, .
Continuous quantity, .
Contradiction (principle of), seqq; , .
Contrariety, .
Conviction (right of): see Conscience.
Copula (of a judgment), seqq.
Correctness (and truth), seqq., .
Correlation, .
Cosmology, ; cosmological proof, .
Critical philosophy, its thesis, , ;
examined at length, seqq.

D.

Deduction of categories, , seqq.
Definiteness, its value, .
Definition, ; criterion of, .
Degree, .
Deism, , , , .
Demonstration, seqq.
Descartes, seqq., ; compared with Jacobi, .
Design (argument from), (cf. ).
Destiny, .
Determinate being, .
Development, seqq.;
in relation to innate ideas, .
Dialectic, innate in thought, ;
its operation explained,
seqq.; in Plato and Kant,
(cf. ); in Aristotle, ;
distinguished from Scepticism, ;
and from Reflection, .
Difference, .
Discrete quantity, .
Disjunctive judgment, ; syllogism, .
Diversity, .
Division (logical), (cf. ).
Dogmatic philosophy, , .
Dualism in theology, ; in philosophy, .

E.

Eden (Garden of), seqq.
Education, its office, ; mistake in, .
Effect (and Cause), seqq.
Ego (the absolute), .
Eleatic philosophy, seqq., .
'Elements' of logic, .
Emboîtement,289, .
Empiricism, , seqq.; its relative value, .
Encyclopaedia of science, ; of philosophy, .
End (= final cause), ,343 seqq.
Essence (opposed to Being), seqq.
Eudaemonism (before Kant), , .
Evil (Good and), ; origin of, .
Evolution, old technical sense, .
Existence, seqq.
Experience, principle of, , , ; elements in, .
Explanation (limits of), .

F.

Faculties (in psychology), .
Faith, as philosophic principle, seqq.
Fall of man, interpreted, .
Fate, .
Feeling, as cognitive form, , .
Fichte, deduction of categories, , , ;
the Anstoss, , ;
Sonnenklarer Bericht, ;
characteristics of, , ;
on the Object, ; the Ego, .
Figures of syllogism, .
Final cause, seqq., .
Finite (and infinite), , .
Force, seqq.
Form (and content), , seqq.;
form of thought, ; form and matter, .
Fortuitous (the), .
Freedom, , , ;
as character of all thought, , ;
as Nihilism, ; of will, .

G.

Generality, .
Genius (defined by Kant), .
Geometrical method, .
Glaube, , .
God, logical definition of, , , ;
how knowable, , , ;
proofs of his being examined, , , ,
74, seqq., , ;
as activity, , ; as spirit, , ;
as creator, , ; as force, , ;
as trinity, , , ;
as absolute cunning, ;
not jealous, ; his goodness, , ;
his power, , ; his names, , .
Goethe, , (cf. ), (cf. ),
253 (cf. ), (cf. ), , .
Good (the), , .
Greek philosophers, ; gods, .
Grenze and Schranke,412.
Ground (and consequent), seqq.

H.

Haller (A. v.), quoted, , , .
Have (and be), , .
Heraclitus (and the Eleatics), , .
Herder, (cf. ).
History, pragmatic, (cf.422);
psychological, ib.; history of
philosophy, .
Hume (on ideas of necessity), , , .
Hypothetical judgment, ; syllogism, .

I.

I (Ego), its universality, , ;
source of the categories, ;
as self-reference, ; I = I, , .
Idea (the), , seqq.; aesthetic
ideas, ; innate ideas, ;
clear and distinct, , .
Ideal, ; of reason, .
Idealism, subjective, , ; absolute, , .
Ideality (of the finite), , .
Identity, philosophy of, , ;
its meaning, ; law of, .
Imagination (in Spinoza), , ;
in Kant, .
Immediacy (and mediation), ;
immediate knowledge, , seqq.
Indifference (absolute), , .
Individuality, seqq.
Induction, , .
Infinite (and finite), ; wrong infinite, ;
infinite progress, , , .
Innate ideas, .
Intuition (and thought), , , .
Inward (and outward), seqq.

J.

Jacobi (F. H.), , seqq.;
against demonstration, ;
agnostic, seqq.;
on cause, (cf. ).
Judaism, , .
Judgment, defined, ;
classification of, seqq. (cf. );
Kant's criticism of the faculty, .

K.

Kant: his standpoint, , ;
his doctrine of categories, seqq.;
examination of his system, seqq.;
theory of matter, ;
on 'construction' in mathematics, (cf. );

on teleology, on modality, ;
his ethics, , ;
defects of his system, . -387, .
Kästner (A. G.), , .
Kind (genus), .
Knowledge, ; immediate, .

L.

Lalande, , .
Law (of thought), seqq. (cf.417), ;
of a phenomenon, .
Leibniz: maxim of indiscernibles, (cf. );
of sufficient reason, (cf. );
on final cause, (cf. );
his monadology, , (cf. ).
Life (as a logical category), seqq.;
example of becoming, .
Like (and unlike), .
Limit (barrier), .
Locke (as empiricist), .
Logic, defined, ; its utility, , , ;
in Aristotle, ; applied, ; subdivided, ;
formal, , , , .

M.

Magnitude, ; intensive, , .
Man (as an universal), .
Many (and one), .
Marks (in concept), .
Materialism (as logical result of empiricism), , ;
of a mathematical system, .
Mathematics: place in science, seqq.;
mathematical syllogism, .
Matter (and form), , .
Mean (= middle term), seqq.
Means (and end) seqq.
Measure (logical category), seqq.;
its antinomy, .
Mechanism, seqq.;
in ethics and politics, .
Mediation (and immediacy), seqq.
Memory (mechanical), .
Metaphysics, as logic, ;
pre-Kantian, ;
pseudo-metaphysics in science, ;
categories, .
Methods: different, ;
metaphysical, , ;
analytic, ;
synthetic, ;
speculative, ;
methodology, .
Middle (law of excluded), ;
middle term, seqq.
Mind (and nature), seqq., , , .
Modality, .
Mohammedanism, , .
Monads, , .
Moods (of syllogism), .
Mysticism, ,410; mystic numbers, .

N.

Nature (philosophy of), , , ;
and spirit, , , seqq., , , ;
nature and the logical idea, .
Natural (or physico-) theology, seqq., .
Naturalism, .
Necessity (and freedom), , , ;
and universality, , , ;
its nature analysed, seqq.
Necessitarian, .
Negation, , .
Nemesis (measure as), .
Neutralisation, .
Newton, , , , , .
Nicolaus Cusanus, .
Nodal lines, .
Nothing (and being), .
Notion: contrasted with being, , ;
theory of, seqq.;
classifications of, ;
opposed to representative concept, , , .
Novalis, quoted, .
Number, seqq.

O.

Object (and subject), seqq.;
objective (and subjective), seqq.;
objective thought, , , .
Oken, quoted, , , .
One (and many), seqq.
Ontology, ; ontological proof
in theology, , .
Opposition (logical), .
Organism, , , seqq.
Oriental theosophy, .
Ought (the), , , .
Outward (and inward), .

P.

Pantheism, ; in Spinoza, , ;
its principle, .
Paralogism (in rational psychology), , .
Parmenides, , .
Particular, seqq.
Parts (and whole), ;
distinct from organs, .
Personality, , .
Phenomenalism (Kant's), , .
Phenomenology of Spirit: place in Hegel's system, .
Philosophy: general definition, ;
its scope and aim, , , , ,
127, , , , , ;
history of, , , , ;
in England, ;
rise of, ;
its branches, , ;
method of, ;
philosophy and life, , .
Physicists, .
Plato: reminiscence of ideas, , ;
his dialectic, ;
on the Other, ;
Philebus, ;
compared with Aristotle, .
Pneumatology, seqq.
Polarity, (cf. ).
Porosity, .
Positive (and negative), seqq.;
positive element in Science, .
Possibility, .
Practical Reason, , .
Predication, seqq.
Preformation, , .
Problematical judgment, .
Proclus, .
Progress: its meaning, .
Properties (of a thing), .
Proposition, , , .
Protagoras, (cf. ).
Proverbs quoted, .
Providence, .
Psychology, seqq., seqq., , (cf. ).
Punctum Sailens,426.
Pure thought, , .
Pythagoras, , .

Q.

Qualitative judgment, ; syllogism, .
Quality, seqq., .
Quantity, .
Quantum, .

R.

Raisonnement,229.
Ratio (quantitative), .
Reality: opposed to negation, ;
to ideality, .
Reason: faculty of the unconditioned, , seqq.;
as merely critical, ;
practical, ;
negative, seqq.;
as syllogism, .
Reciprocity, .
Reflection, , , , , , ;
distinct from dialectic, ;
judgments of, .
Reinhold: his method, , .
Religion (and philosophy), , , ;
its nature, seqq.
Reminiscence (Platonic), , .
Repulsion, .
Roman religion, .
Rousseau, .
Rule, .

S.

Scepticism: ancient, ;
opposed to dogmatism, ;
modern, ;
its function in philosophy, , .
Schelling, (cf. , ),
(cf. ).
Schiller, (cf. ).
Scholasticism, , , , ;
definition of God, .
Schopenhauer, , , .
Sciences and philosophy, , ;
science and religion, .
Scotch philosophers, .
Scotus Erigena, .
Self-determination, in.
Self-identity, .
Sensation, seqq.
Sensas eminentior, , .
Sex, .
Sin (original), .
Slavery (abolition of), .
Socrates, his dialectic, , .
Solon, .
Somewhat, .
Sophists: theory of education, ;
essence of sophistry, , ;
opposed to Socrates, , .
Sorites,203, .
Soul: as object of psychology, , ;
(rationalist theory of,) criticised by Kant, ;
soul and Spirit, .
Speculation, ;
as opposed to dogmatism, ;
speculative reason, seqq.
Spinoza, his alleged atheism and pantheism, seqq., ;
causa sui, , ;
his God, , ;
on determination, ;
amor intellectualis, (cf. );
on imagination, (cf. );
his method, seqq.(cf. ).
Spirit, see Mind.
State (mechanical theories of the), , .
Subject (and predicate), , , .
Subjective (and objective), , .
Substance, seqq.
Sufficient Reason (principle of), seqq. (cf. ).
Syllogism, seqq.;
as a universal form of things, ;
in mechanism, ; in teleology, .
Synthetic method, .
System (in philosophy), seqq., .

T

Taste, defined by Kant, .
Teleology, seqq.
Terms (of syllogism), .
Theology (natural), seqq., seqq., .
Theorem, .
Theoretical Reason (Kant on), seqq.
Thing, , ; thing in or by itself, , .
Thought, its meaning and activity, seqq.;
subjective, ;
objective, , ;
distinguished from pictorial representation, , .
Transcendent, ; transcendental, , .
Truth, object of philosophy, ;
and of logic, ;
its meaning, , ;
distinguished from correctness, , , .

U.

Unconditioned (the), , .
Understanding, as faculty of the conditioned,

, ;
as a principle of limitation, seqq., .
Unessential, .
Universal (the), , , ;
moment of the notion, seqq.;
universality and necessity, , , .
Untrue, .
Urtheil, .
Utilitarianism in Science, .

V.

Variety, .

Verstand and Vernunft, seqq.
Volition, , seqq.

W.

Wesen, .
Whole (and parts), .
Will ;
as practical reason, ;
its freedom, .
Wolff (Christian), his philosophy, seqq., , ;
method, .
World (the), as object of Cosmology, .

Z.

Zeno (of Elea), , , .