Chapter 4

The History of Rome, Books 09 to 26 (part 4)

Marcellus marched with his entire forces against Leontini, having sent for Appius also, in order that he might attack it in another quarter; when, such was the ardour of the troops in consequence of the indignation they felt at the Roman guards being put to the sword during the negotiations for a peace, that they took the town by storm on the first assault. Hippocrates and Epicydes, perceiving that the enemy were getting possession of the walls and breaking open the gates, retired with a few others into the citadel, from which they fled unobserved during the night to Herbessus. The Syracusans, who had marched from home with eight thousand troops, were met at the river Myla by a messenger, who informed them that the city was taken. The rest which he stated was a mixture of truth and falsehood; he said that there had been an indiscriminate massacre of the soldiers and the townsmen, and that he did not think that one person who had arrived at puberty had survived; that the town had been pillaged, and the property of the rich men given to the troops. On receiving such direful news the army halted; and while all were under violent excitement, the generals, Sosis and Dinomenes, consulted together as to the course to be taken. The scourging and beheading of two thousand deserters had given to this false statement a plausibility which excited alarm; but no violence was offered to any of the Leontine or other soldiers after the city was taken; and every man's property was restored to him, with the exception only of such as was destroyed in the first confusion which attended the capture of the city. The troops, who complained of their fellow-soldiers having been betrayed and butchered, could neither be induced to proceed to Leontini, nor wait where they were for more certain intelligence. The praetors, perceiving their minds disposed to mutiny, but concluding that their violence would not be of long continuance, if those who had led them on to such folly were removed, led the troops to Megara, whence they themselves with a few horsemen proceeded to Herbessus, under the expectation of having the city betrayed to them in the general consternation; but being disappointed in this attempt, they resolved to resort to force, and moved their camp from Megara on the following day, in order to attack Herbessus with all their forces. Hippocrates and Epicydes having formed the design of putting themselves into the hands of the soldiers, who were for the most part accustomed to them, and were now incensed at the report of the massacre of their comrades, not so much as a safe measure on the first view of it as that it was their only course, now that all hope was cut off, went out to meet the army. It happened that the troops which marched in the van were six hundred Cretans, who had been engaged in the service of Hieronymus under their command, and were under obligation to Hannibal, having been captured at the Trasimenus among the Roman auxiliaries, and dismissed by him. Hippocrates and Epicydes, recognising them by their standards and the fashion of their armour, held out olive branches, and the fillets usually worn by suppliants, and implored them to receive them into their ranks, protect them when received, and not betray them to the Syracusans, by whom they themselves would soon be delivered up to the Romans to be butchered.

But the Cretans with one accord called out to them to be of good courage; that they would share every fortune with them. During this conversation, the vanguard had halted, and the march was delayed; nor had the cause of the delay as yet reached the generals. After the report had spread that Hippocrates and Epicydes were there, and a voice was heard through the whole army, which showed evidently that the troops were pleased at their arrival, the praetors immediately gallopped to the front, and earnestly asked "what was the meaning of that violation of discipline, which the Cretans had committed in holding conference with the enemy, and allowing them to mingle with their ranks without the authority of the praetors." They ordered Hippocrates to be seized and thrown into chains. On hearing which such a clamour was raised, first by the Cretans and then by the rest, that it was quite evident if they proceeded farther that they would have cause to fear. In this state of anxiety and perplexity, they gave orders to march back to Megara, whence they had set out, and sent messengers to Syracuse, to give information of their present condition. Hippocrates added a deception, seeing that the minds of the troops were disposed to entertain every suspicion. Having sent some Cretans to lie in wait in the roads, he read a letter he pretended had been intercepted, but which he had written himself. The address was: "The praetors of Syracuse to the consul Marcellus." After the customary wishing of health, it stated "that he had acted duly and properly in sparing none of the Leontines, but that the cause of all the mercenary troops was the same, and that Syracuse would never be tranquil while there were any foreign auxiliaries in the city or in the army. That it was therefore necessary that he should endeavour to get into his power those who were encamped at Megara, with their praetors, and by punishing them, at length restore Syracuse to liberty." After this letter had been read, they ran to seize their arms in every direction, with so great a clamour, that the praetors, in the utmost consternation, rode away to Syracuse during the confusion. The mutiny, however, was not quelled even by their flight, but an attack was made upon the Syracusan soldiers; nor would any one have escaped their violence, had not Hippocrates and Epicydes opposed the resentment of the multitude, not from pity or any humane motive, but lest they should cut off all hope of effecting their return; and that they might have the soldiers, both as faithful supporters of their cause, and as hostages, and conciliate to themselves their relatives and friends, in the first place by so great an obligation, and in the next by reason of the pledge. Having also experienced that the populace could be excited by any cause, however groundless or trifling, they procured a soldier of the number of those who were besieged at Leontini, whom they suborned to carry a report to Syracuse, corresponding with that which had been falsely told at the Myla; and by vouching for what he stated, and relating as matters which he had seen, those things of which doubts were entertained, to kindle the resentment of the people.

This man not only obtained credit with the commons, but being introduced into the senate-house, produced an impression upon the senate also. Some men of no small authority openly declared, that it was very fortunate that the rapacity and cruelty of the Romans had been made apparent in the case of the Leontines; that if they had entered Syracuse, they would have committed the same or even more horrible acts, as there the temptations to rapacity would have been greater. All, therefore, advised that the gates should be closed and the city guarded, but not the same persons were objects of fear or hatred to all alike. Among the soldiers of every kind, and a great part of the people, the Roman name was hated. The praetors, and a few of the nobles, though enraged by the fictitious intelligence, rather directed their cautions against a nearer and more immediate evil. Hippocrates and Epicycles were now at the Hexapylum; and conversations were taking place, fomented by the relatives of the native soldiers who were in the army, touching the opening of the gates, and the allowing their common country to be defended from the violence of the Romans. One of the doors of the Hexapylum was now thrown open, and the troops began to be taken in at it, when the praetors interposed; and first by commands and menaces, then by advice, they endeavoured to deter them from their purpose, and last of all, every other means proving ineffectual, forgetful of their dignity, they tried to move them by prayers, imploring them not to betray their country to men heretofore the satellites of the tyrant, and now the corrupters of the army. But the ears of the excited multitude were deaf to all these arguments, and the exertions made from within to break open the gates, were not less than those without; the gates were all broken open, and the whole army received into the Hexapylum. The praetors, with the youth of the city, fled into the Achradina; the mercenary soldiers and deserters, with all the soldiers of the late king who were at Syracuse, joined the forces of the enemy. The Achradina also was therefore taken on the first assault, and all the praetors, except such as escaped in the confusion, were put to the sword. Night put an end to the carnage. On the following day the slaves were invited to liberty, and those bound in prison were released; after which this mixed rabble created Hippocrates and Epicydes their praetors, and thus Syracuse, when for a brief period the light of liberty had shone on it, relapsed into her former state of servitude.

The Romans, on receiving information of these events, immediately moved their camp from Leontini to Syracuse. It happened at this time that ambassadors were sent by Appius in a quinquereme, to make their way through the harbour. A quadrireme was sent in advance, which was captured as soon as it entered the mouth of the harbour, and the ambassadors with difficulty made their escape. And now not only the laws of peace but of war also were not regarded, when the Roman army pitched their camp at Olympium, a temple of Jupiter, a mile and a half from the city. From which place also it was thought proper that ambassadors should be sent forward; these were met by Hippocrates and Epicydes with their friends without the gate, to prevent their entering the city. The Roman, who was appointed to speak, said that "he did not bring war, but aid and assistance to the Syracusans, not only to such as, escaping from the midst of the carnage, fled to the Romans for protection, but to those also, who, overpowered by fear, were submitting to a servitude more shocking, not only than exile, but than death. Nor would the Romans suffer the horrid murder of their friends to go unavenged. If, therefore, those who had taken refuge with them were allowed to return to their country with safety, the authors of the massacre delivered up, and the Syracusans reinstated in the enjoyment of their liberty and laws, there would be no necessity for arms; but if these things were not done, they would direct their arms unceasingly against those who delayed them, whoever they might be." Epicydes replied, that "if they had been commissioned with any message for them, they would have given them an answer; and when the government of Syracuse was in the hands of those persons to whom they were come, they might visit Syracuse again. If they should commence hostilities, they would learn by actual experience that it was by no means the same thing to besiege Syracuse and Leontini." With this he left the ambassadors and closed the gate. The siege of Syracuse then commenced by sea and land at the same time; by land on the side of the Hexapylum; by sea on the side of the Achradina, the wall of which is washed by its waves; and as the Romans felt a confidence that as they had taken Leontini by the terror they occasioned on the first assault, they should be able in some quarter to effect an entrance into a city so desert, and diffused over so large an extent of ground, they brought up to the walls every kind of engine for besieging cities.

And an attempt made with so much energy would have succeeded, had it not been for one person then at Syracuse. That person was Archimedes, a man of unrivalled skill in observing the heavens and the stars, but more deserving of admiration as the inventor and constructor of warlike engines and works, by means of which, with a very slight effort, he turned to ridicule what the enemy effected with great difficulty. The wall which ran along unequal eminences, most of which were high and difficult of access, some low and open to approach along level vales, he furnished with every kind of warlike engine, as seemed suitable to each particular place. Marcellus attacked from the quinqueremes the wall of the Achradina, which, as before stated, was washed by the sea. From the other ships the archers and slingers and light infantry, whose weapon is difficult to be thrown back by the unskilful, allowed scarce any person to remain upon the wall unwounded. These, as they required room for the discharge of their missiles, kept their ships at a distance from the wall. Eight more quinqueremes joined together in pairs, the oars on their inner sides being removed, so that side might be placed to side, and which forming as it were ships, were worked by means of the oars on the outer sides, carried turrets built up in stories, and other engines employed in battering walls. Against this naval armament, Archimedes placed on different parts of the walls engines of various dimensions. Against the ships which were at a distance he discharged stones of immense weight. Those which were nearer he assailed with lighter, and therefore more numerous missiles. Lastly, in order that his own men might heap their weapons upon the enemy, without receiving any wounds themselves, he perforated the wall from the top to the bottom with a great number of loop-holes, about a cubit in diameter, through which some with arrows, others with scorpions of moderate size, assailed the enemy without being seen. Certain ships which came nearer to the walls in order to get within the range of the engines, he placed upon their sterns, raising up their prows by throwing upon them an iron grapple, attached to a strong chain, by means of a tolleno which projected from the wall, and overhung them, having a heavy counterpoise of lead which forced back the lever to the ground; then the grapple being suddenly disengaged, the ship falling as it were from the wall, was, by these means, to the utter consternation of the mariners, dashed in such a manner against the water, that even if it fell back in an erect position it took in a great quantity of water. Thus the attack by sea was foiled, and their whole efforts were directed to an attack by land with all their forces. But on this side also the place was furnished with a similar array of engines of every kind, procured at the expense of Hiero, who had given his attention to this object through a course of many years, and constructed by the unrivalled abilities of Archimedes. The nature of the place also assisted them; for the rock which formed the foundation of the wall was for the most part so steep, that not only materials discharged from engines, but such as were rolled down by their own gravity, fell upon the enemy with great force; the same cause rendered the approach to the city difficult, and the footing unsteady. Wherefore, a council being held, it was resolved, since every attempt was frustrated, to abstain from assaulting the place, and keeping up a blockade, only to cut off the provisions of the enemy by sea and land.

Meanwhile, Marcellus, who had set out with about a third part of the army, to recover the towns which, during the commotion, had gone over to the Carthaginians, regained Helorus and Herbessus by voluntary surrender. Megara, which he took by storm, he demolished and plundered, in order to terrify the rest, but particularly the Syracusans. Much about the same time, Himilco, who had kept his fleet for a long time at the promontory of Pachynus, landed twenty-five thousand infantry, three thousand horse, and twelve elephants, at Heraclea, which they call Minoa. This force was much greater than that which he had before on board his fleet at Pachynus. But after Syracuse was seized by Hippocrates, he proceeded to Carthage, where, being aided by ambassadors from Hippocrates, and a letter from Hannibal, who said that now was the time to recover Sicily with the highest honour, while his own advice given in person had no small influence, he had prevailed upon the Carthaginians to transport into Sicily as large a force as possible, both of foot and horse. Immediately on his arrival he retook Heraclea, and within a few days after Agrigentum; and in the other states which sided with the Carthaginians, such confident hopes were kindled of driving the Romans out of Sicily, that at last even those who were besieged at Syracuse took courage; and thinking that half their forces would be sufficient for the defence of the city, they divided the business of the war between them in such a manner, that Epicydes superintended the defence of the city, while Hippocrates, in conjunction with Himilco, prosecuted the war against the Roman consul. The latter, having passed by night through the intervals between the posts, with ten thousand foot and five hundred horse, was pitching a camp near the city Acrillae, when Marcellus came upon them, while engaged in raising the fortifications, on his return from Agrigentum, which was already occupied by the enemy, having failed in his attempt to get there before the enemy by expeditious marching, Marcellus calculated upon any thing rather than meeting with a Syracusan army at that time and place; but still through fear of Himilco and the Carthaginians, for whom he was by no means a match with the forces he had with him, he was marching with all possible circumspection, and with his troops so arranged, as to be prepared for any thing which might occur.

It happened that the caution he had observed with intent to guard him against the Carthaginians, proved useful against the Sicilians. Having caught them in disorder and dispersed, employed in forming their camp, and for the most part unarmed, he cut off all their infantry. Their cavalry, having commenced a slight engagement, fled to Acrae with Hippocrates. This battle having checked the Sicilians in their purpose of revolting from the Romans, Marcellus returned to Syracuse, and a few days after Himilco, being joined by Hippocrates, encamped on the river Anapus, about eight miles distant from that place. Nearly about the same time, fifty-five ships of war of the Carthaginians, with Bomilcar as commander of the fleet, put into the great harbour of Syracuse from the sea, and a Roman fleet of thirty quinqueremes landed the first legion at Panormus; and so intent were both the contending powers upon Sicily, that the seat of war might seem to have been removed from Italy. Himilco, who thought that the Roman legion which had been landed at Panormus, would doubtless fall a prey to him on its way to Syracuse, was mistaken in his road; for the Carthaginian marched through the inland parts of the country, while the legion, keeping along the coast, and attended by the fleet, came up with Appius Claudius, who had advanced to Pachynum with a part of his forces to meet it. Nor did the Carthaginians delay longer at Syracuse. Bomilcar, who at the same time that he did not feel sufficient confidence in his naval strength, as the Romans had a fleet more than double his number, was aware that delay which could be attended with no good effect, would only increase the scarcity of provisions among the allies by the presence of his troops, sailed out into the deep, and crossed over into Africa. Himilco, who had in vain followed Marcellus to Syracuse, to see if he could get any opportunity of engaging him before he was joined by larger forces, failing in this object, and seeing that the enemy were secured at Syracuse, both by their fortifications and the strength of their forces, to avoid wasting time in sitting by as an idle spectator of the siege of his allies, without being able to do any good, marched his troops away, in order to bring them up wherever the prospect of revolt from the Romans might invite him, and wherever by his presence he might inspire additional courage in those who espoused his interest. He first got possession of Murgantia, the Roman garrison having been betrayed by the inhabitants themselves. Here a great quantity of corn and provisions of every kind had been laid up by the Romans.

To this revolt the minds of other states also were stimulated; and the Roman garrisons were now either driven out of the citadels, or treacherously given up and overpowered. Enna, which stood on an eminence lofty and of difficult ascent on all sides, was impregnable on account of its situation, and had besides in its citadel a strong garrison commanded by one who was very unlikely to be overreached by treachery, Lucius Pinarius, a man of vigorous mind, who relied more on the measures he took to prevent treachery, than on the fidelity of the Sicilians; and at that time particularly the intelligence he had received of so many cities being betrayed, and revolting, and of the massacre of the garrisons, had made him solicitous to use every precaution. Accordingly, by day and night equally, every thing was kept in readiness, and every place furnished with guards and watches, the soldiery being continually under arms and at their posts. But when the principal men in Enna, who had already entered into a covenant with Himilco to betray the garrison, found that they could get no opportunity of circumventing the Roman, they resolved to act openly. They urged, that "the city and the citadel ought to be under their control, as they had formed an alliance with the Romans on the understanding that they were to be free, and had not been delivered into their custody as slaves. That they therefore thought it just that the keys of the gates should be restored to them. That their honour formed the strongest tie upon good allies, and that the people and senate of Rome would entertain feelings of gratitude towards them if they continued in friendship with them of their own free will, and not by compulsion." The Roman replied, that "he was placed there by his general to protect the place; that from him he had received the keys of the gates and the custody of the citadel, trusts which he held not subject to his own will, nor that of the inhabitants of Enna, but to his who committed them to him. That among the Romans, for a man to quit his post was a capital offence, and that parents had sanctioned that law by the death even of their own children. That the consul Marcellus was not far off; that they might send ambassadors to him, who possessed the right and liberty of deciding." But they said, they would certainly not send to him, and solemnly declared, that as they could not obtain their object by argument, they would seek some means of asserting their liberty. Pinarius upon this observed, "that if they thought it too much to send to the consul, still they would, at least, grant him an assembly of the people, that it might be ascertained whether these denunciations came from a few, or from the whole state." An assembly of the people was proclaimed for the next day, with the general consent.

After this conference, he returned into the citadel, and assembling his soldiers, thus addressed them: "Soldiers, I suppose you have heard in what manner the Roman garrisons have been betrayed and cut off by the Sicilians of late. You have escaped the same treachery, first by the kindness of the gods, and secondly by your own good conduct, in unremittingly standing and watching under arms. I wish the rest of our time may be passed without suffering or committing dreadful things. This caution, which we have hitherto employed, has been directed against covert treachery, but not succeeding in this as they wished, they now publicly and openly demand back the keys of the gates; but as soon as we shall have delivered them up, Enna will be instantly in the hands of the Carthaginians, and we shall be butchered under circumstances more horrid than those with which the garrison of Murgantia were massacred. I have with difficulty procured a delay of one night for deliberation, that I might employ it in acquainting you with the danger which threatens you. At daybreak they intend holding a general assembly for the purpose of criminating me, and stirring up the people against you; to-morrow, therefore, Enna will be inundated either with your blood, or that of its own inhabitants. If they are beforehand with you, you will have no hope left, but if you anticipate their proceedings, you will have no danger. Victory will belong to that side which shall have drawn the sword first. You shall all, therefore, full armed, attentively wait the signal. I shall be in the assembly, and by talking and disputing will spin out the time till every thing shall be ready. When I shall have given the signal with my gown, then, mind me raising a shout on all sides rush upon the multitude, and fell all before you with the sword, taking care that no one survive from whom either force or fraud can be apprehended. You, mother Ceres and Proserpine, I entreat, and all ye other gods, celestial and infernal, who frequent this city and these consecrated lakes and groves, that you would lend us your friendly and propitious aid, as we adopt this measure not for the purpose of inflicting, but averting injury. I should exhort you at greater length my soldiers, if you were about to fight with armed men, men unarmed and off their guard, you will slay to satiety. The consul's camp too is near, so that nothing can be apprehended from Himilco and the Carthaginians'."

Being allowed to retire immediately after this exhortation, they employed themselves in taking refreshment. The next day they stationed themselves some in one place and others in another, to block up the streets, and shut up the ways by which the townsmen might escape, the greater part of them stationing themselves upon and round the theatre, as they had been accustomed before also to be spectators of the assemblies. When the Roman praefect, having been brought into the presence of the people by the magistrates, said, that the power and authority of deciding the question appertained to the consul, and not to him, repeating for the most part what he had urged the day before, first of all a small number, and then more, desired him to give up the keys, but afterwards all with one consent demanded it, and when he hesitated and delayed, threatened him furiously, and seemed as though they would not further delay violent extremities then the praefect gave the signal agreed upon with his gown and the soldiers, who had been long anxiously waiting the signal, and in readiness, raising a shout, ran down, some of them from the higher ground, upon the rear of the assembly while others blocked up the passages leading out of the crowded theatre. The people of Enna thus shut up in the pit were put to the sword, being heaped one upon another not only in consequence of the slaughter, but also from their own efforts to escape, for some scrambling over the heads of others, and those that were unhurt falling upon the wounded, and the living upon the dead, they were accumulated together. Thence they ran in every direction throughout the city, when nothing was any where to be seen but flight and bloodshed, as though the city had been captured, for the rage of the soldiery was not less excited in putting to the sword an unarmed rabble, than it would have been had the heat of battle and an equality of danger stimulated it. Thus possession of Enna was retained, by an act which was either atrocious or unavoidable. Marcellus did not disapprove of the deed, and gave up the plunder of the place to the soldiery, concluding that the Sicilians, deterred by this example, would refrain from betraying their garrisons. As this city was situated in the heart of Sicily, and was distinguished both on account of the remarkable strength of its natural situation, and because every part of it was rendered sacred by the traces it contained of the rape of Proserpine of old, the news of its disaster spread though the whole of Sicily in nearly one day, and as people considered that by this horrid massacre violence had been done not only to the habitations of men, but even of the gods, then indeed those who even before this event were in doubt which side they should take, revolted to the Carthaginians Hippocrates and Himilco, who had in vain brought up their troops to Enna at the invitation of the traitors, retired thence, the former to Murgantia, the latter to Agrigentum. Marcellus retrograded into the territory of Leontium, and after collecting a quantity of corn and other provisions in his camp there, left a small body of troops to protect it, and then went to carry on the siege of Syracuse. Appius Claudius having been allowed to go from thence to Rome to put up for the consulship, he appointed Titus Quintus Crispinus to command the fleet and the old camp in his room. He himself fortified his camp, and built huts for his troops at a distance of five miles from Hexapylum, at a place called Leon. These were the transactions in Sicily up to the beginning of the winter.

The same summer the war with king Philip, as had been before suspected, broke out. Ambassadors from Oricum came to Marcus Valerius, the praetor, who was directing his fleet around Brundusium and the neighbouring coasts of Calabria, with intelligence, that Philip had first made an attempt upon Apollonia, having approached it by sailing up the river with a hundred and twenty barks with two banks of oars; after that, not succeeding so speedily as he had hoped, that he had brought up his army secretly to Oricum by night; which city, as it was situated on a plain, and was not secured either by fortifications or by men and arms, was overpowered at the first assault. At the same time that they delivered this intelligence, they entreated him to bring them succour, and repel that decided enemy of the Romans by land or by a naval force, since they were attacked for no other cause than that they lay over against Italy. Marcus Valerius, leaving Publius Valerius lieutenant-general charged with the protection of that quarter, set sail with his fleet equipped and prepared, having put on board of ships of burthen such soldiers as there was not room for in the men of war, and reached Oricum on the second day; and as that city was occupied by a slight garrison, which Philip had left on his departure thence, he retook it without much opposition. Here ambassadors came to him from Apollonia, stating that they were subjected to a siege because they were unwilling to revolt from the Romans, and that they would not be able any longer to resist the power of the Macedonians, unless a Roman force were sent for their protection. Having undertaken to perform what they wished, he sent two thousand chosen armed men in ships of war to the mouth of the river, under the command of Quintus Naevius Crista, praefect of the allies, a man of enterprise, and experienced in military affairs. Having landed his troops, and sent back the ships to join the rest of the fleet at Oricum, whence he had come, he marched his troops at a distance from the river, by a way not guarded at all by the king's party, and entered the city by night, so that none of the enemy perceived him. During the following day they remained quiet, to afford time for the praefect to inspect the youth of Apollonia, together with the arms and resources of the city. Having derived considerable confidence from a review and inspection of these, and at the same time discovering from scouts the supineness and negligence which prevailed among the enemy, he marched out of the city during the dead of night without any noise, and entered the camp of the enemy, which was in such a neglected and exposed state, that it was quite clear that a thousand men had passed the rampart before any one perceived them, and that had they abstained from putting them to the sword, they might have penetrated to the royal pavilion. The killing of those who were nearest the gate aroused the enemy; and in consequence, they were all seized with such alarm and dismay, that not only none of the rest attempted to take arms or endeavour to expel the enemy from the camp, but even the king himself, betaking himself to flight, in a manner half naked and just as he was when roused from his sleep, hurried away to the river and his ships in a garb scarcely decent for a private soldier, much less for a king. Thither also the rest of the multitude fled with the utmost precipitation. Little less than three thousand men were slain or made prisoners in the camp; considerably more, however, were captured than slain. The camp having been plundered, the Apollonians removed into their city the catapults, ballistas, and other engines which had been got together for the purpose of assaulting their city, for the protection of their walls, in case at any time a similar conjuncture should arise; all the rest of the plunder which the camp afforded was given up to the Romans. Intelligence of these events having been carried to Oricum, Marcus Valerius immediately brought his fleet to the mouth of the river, that the king might not attempt to make his escape by ship. Thus Philip, having lost all hope of being able to cope with his enemies by land or sea, and having either hauled on shore or burnt his ships, made for Macedonia by land, his troops being for the most part unarmed and despoiled of their baggage. The Roman fleet, with Marcus Valerius, wintered at Oricum.

The same year the war was prosecuted in Spain with various success; for before the Romans crossed the Iberus, Mago and Hasdrubal had routed an immense army of Spaniards; and the farther Spain would have revolted from the Romans, had not Publius Cornelius, hastily crossing the Iberus with his army, given a seasonable stimulus to the wavering resolutions of his allies by his arrival among them. The Romans first encamped at a place called the High Camp, which is remarkable for the death of the great Hamilcar. It was a fortress strongly defended by works, and thither they had previously conveyed corn; but as the whole circumjacent country was full of enemy's troops, and the Roman army on its march had been charged by the cavalry of the enemy without being able to take revenge upon them, two thousand men, who either loitered behind or had strayed through the fields, having been slain, the Romans quitted this place to get nearer to a friendly country, and fortified a camp at the mount of Victory. To this place came Cneius Scipio with all his forces, and Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, and a third Carthaginian general, with a complete army, all of whom took up a position opposite the Roman camp and on the other side the river. Publius Scipio, going out with some light troops to take a view of the surrounding country, was observed by the enemy; and he would have been overpowered in the open plain, had he not seized an eminence near him. Here too he was closely invested, but was rescued from the troops which environed him by the arrival of his brother. Castulo, a city of Spain, so strong and celebrated, and so closely connected with the Carthaginians, that Hannibal had taken a wife from it, revolted to the Romans. The Carthaginians commenced the siege of Illiturgi, because there was a Roman garrison in it; and it seemed that they would carry the place, chiefly in consequence of a lack of provisions. Cneius Scipio, setting out with a legion lightly equipped, in order to bring succour to his allies and the garrison, entered the city, passing between the two camps of the enemy, and slaying a great number of them. The next day also he sallied out and fought with equal success. Above twelve thousand were slain in the two battles, more than a thousand made prisoners, and thirty-six military standards captured. In consequence of this they retired from Illiturgi. After this the siege of Bigerra, a city which was also in alliance with the Romans, was commenced by the Carthaginians; but Scipio coming up, raised the siege without experiencing any opposition.

The Carthaginians then removed their camp to Munda, whither the Romans speedily followed them. Here a pitched battle was fought, which lasted almost four hours; and while the Romans were carrying all before them in the most glorious manner, the signal for retreat was sounded, because the thigh of Cneius Scipio had been transfixed with a javelin. The soldiers round about him were thrown into a state of great alarm, lest the wound should be mortal. However, there was no doubt but that if they had not been prevented by the intervention of this accident, they might have taken the Carthaginian camp that day. By this time, not only the men, but the elephants, were driven quite up to the rampart; and even upon the top of it nine and thirty elephants were pierced with spears. In this battle, too, as many as twelve thousand are said to have been slain, nearly three thousand captured, with fifty-seven military standards. The Carthaginians retired thence to the city Auringis, whither the Romans followed them, in order to take advantage of their terror. Here Scipio again fought them, having been carried into the field in a small litter; the victory was decisive; but not half so many of the enemy were slain as before, because fewer survived to fight. But this family, which possessed a natural talent at renewing war and restoring its effects, in a short time recruited their army, Mago having been sent by his brother to press soldiers, and assumed courage to try the issue of a fresh struggle. Though the soldiers were for the most part different, yet as they fought in a cause which had so often been unsuccessful within the space of a few days, they carried into the field the same state of mind as those which had been engaged before, and the issue of the battle was similar. More than eight thousand were slain, not much less than a thousand captured, with fifty-eight military standards. The greater part of the spoils had belonged to the Gauls, consisting of golden chains and bracelets in great numbers. Also two distinguished Gallic petty princes, whose names were Moenicaptus and Civismarus, fell in this battle. Eight elephants were captured and three slain. When affairs went on so prosperously in Spain, the Romans began to feel ashamed that Saguntum, on account of which the war had originated, should continue for now the eighth year in the power of the enemy. Accordingly, having expelled by force the Carthaginian garrison, they retook that town, and restored it to such of the ancient inhabitants as had survived the fury of the war. The Turditanians also, who had been the cause of the war between that people and the Carthaginians, they reduced under their power, sold them as slaves, and razed their city.

Such were the achievements in Spain during the consulate of Quintus Fabius and Marcus Claudius. At Rome, as soon as the new plebeian tribunes entered upon their office, Lucius Metellus, a plebeian tribune, immediately appointed a day for impleading the censors, Publius Furius and Marcus Atilius, before the people. In the preceding year, when he was quaestor, they had deprived him of his horse, removed him from his tribe, and disfranchised him, on account of the conspiracy entered into at Cannae to abandon Italy. But being aided by the other nine tribunes, they were forbidden to answer while in office, and were discharged. The death of Publius Furius prevented their completing the lustrum. Marcus Atilius abdicated his office. An assembly for the election of consuls was held by Quintus Fabius Maximus. The consuls elected were Quintus Fabius Maximus, son of the consul, and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus a second time, both being absent. The praetors appointed were Marcus Atilius, and the two curule aediles, Publius Sempronius Tuditanus and Cneius Fulvius Centumalus, together with Marcus Aemilius Lepidus. It is recorded, that the scenic games were this year, for the first time, celebrated for four days by the curule aediles. The aedile Tuditanus was the man who made his way through the midst of the enemy at Cannae when all the rest were paralysed with fear, in consequence of that dreadful calamity. As soon as the elections were completed, the consuls elect having been summoned to Rome, at the instance of Quintus Fabius, the consul, entered upon their office, and took the sense of the senate respecting the war, their own provinces as well as those of the praetors, and also respecting the armies to be employed, and which each of them was to command.

The provinces and armies were thus distributed: the prosecution of the war with Hannibal was given to the consuls, and of the armies, one which Sempronius himself had commanded, and another which the consul Fabius had commanded, each consisting of two legions. Marcus Aemilius, the praetor, who had the foreign jurisdiction, was to have Luceria as his province, with the two legions which Quintus Fabius, then consul, had commanded as praetor, his colleague, Marcus Atilius, the city praetor, undertaking the duties of his office. The province of Ariminum fell to the lot of Publius Sempronius, that of Suessula to Cneius Fulvius, with two legions each likewise; Fulvius taking with him the city legions; Tuditanus receiving his from Manius Pomponius. The following generals were continued in command, and their provinces assigned to them thus: to Marcus Claudius, so much of Sicily as lay within the limits of the kingdom of Hiero; to Lentulus, the propraetor, the old province in that island; to Titus Otacilius, the fleet; no additional troops were assigned to them. Marcus Valerius had Greece and Macedonia, with the legion and the fleet which he had there; Quintus Mucius had Sardinia, with his old army, consisting of two legions; Caius Terentius, Picenum, with one legion which he then commanded. Besides, orders were given to enlist two legions for the city, and twenty thousand men from the allies. With these leaders and these forces did they fortify the Roman empire against the many wars which had either actually broken out, or were suspected at one and the same time. After enlisting the city legions and raising troops to make up the numbers of the others, the consuls, before they quitted the city, expiated the prodigies which were reported. A wall and a gate had been struck by lightning; and at Aricia even the temple of Jupiter had been struck by lightning. Other illusions of the eyes and ears were credited as realities. An appearance as of ships had been seen in the river at Tarracina, when there were none there. A clashing of arms was heard in the temple of Jupiter Vicilinus, in the territory of Compsa; and a river at Amiternum had flowed bloody. These prodigies having been expiated according to a decree of the pontiffs, the consuls set out, Sempronius for Lucania, Fabius for Apulia. The father of the latter came into the camp at Suessula, as his lieutenant-general; and when the son advanced to meet him, the lictors, out of respect for his dignity, went on in silence. The old man rode past eleven of the fasces, when the consul ordered the lictor nearest to him to take care and he called to him to dismount; then at length dismounting, he exclaimed, "I wished to try, my son, whether you were duly sensible that you are a consul."

To this camp came Dasias Altinius of Arpi privately and by night, attended by three slaves, with a promise that if he should receive a reward for it, he would engage to betray Arpi to them. Fabius having laid the matter before a council, some were of opinion that "he ought to be scourged and put to death as a deserter, as a man of unstable mind, and a common enemy to both sides; who, after the defeat at Cannae, had gone over to Hannibal and drawn Arpi into revolt, as if it were right that a man's fidelity should vary according to the fluctuations of fortune; and who now, when the Roman cause, contrary to his hopes and wishes, was as it were rising up again, would seem to aggravate his baseness by recompensing those whom he had formerly betrayed, by fresh betrayal. That a man whose custom it was to espouse one side, while his heart was on another, was unworthy of confidence as an ally, and contemptible as an enemy; that he ought to be made a third example to deserters, in addition to the betrayers of Falerii and Pyrrhus." On the other hand, Fabius, the father of the consul, observed, that, "forgetful of circumstances, men were apt to exercise a free judgment on every question in the heat of war, as in time of peace; for though in the present instance that which ought rather to form the object of their endeavours and to occupy their thoughts, is by what means it may be brought about that none of the allies may revolt from the Roman people, yet that they never think of; but, on the contrary, they urge that an example ought to be made of any who might repent and look back upon their former alliance. But if it is allowable to forsake the Romans, and not allowable to return to them, who can doubt but that in a short time the Romans, deserted by their allies, will see every state in Italy united in leagues with the Carthaginians. Not, however, that he was of opinion that any confidence was to be reposed in Altinius, but he would invent some middle course of proceeding. Treating him neither as an enemy nor as a friend for the present, his wish was, that he should be kept during the war in some city whose fidelity could be relied on, at a short distance from the camp, in a state of easy restraint; and that when the war was concluded, they should then deliberate whether he more deserved to be punished for his former defection, or pardoned for his present return." The opinion of Fabius was approved of. Altinius was bound in chains and given into custody, together with his companions, and a large quantity of gold which he brought with him was ordered to be kept for him. He was kept at Cales, where, during the day, he was unconfined, but attended by guards who locked him up at night. He was first missed and inquired for at his house at Arpi. but afterwards, when the report of his absence had spread through the city, a violent sensation was excited, as if they had lost their leader, and, from the apprehension of some attempt to alter the present state of things, messengers were immediately despatched to Hannibal. With this the Carthaginian was far from being displeased, both because he had long regarded the man himself with suspicion, as one of doubtful fidelity, and because he had now been lucky enough to get a pretext for possessing himself of the property of so wealthy a person. But that the world might suppose that he had yielded to resentment more than to avarice, he added cruelty to rapacity; for he summoned his wife and children to the camp, and after having made inquiry, first, respecting the flight of Altinius, and then, touching the quantity of gold and silver which was left at his house, and informed himself on all these points, he burned them alive.

Fabius, setting out from Suessula, first set about the siege of Arpi; and having pitched his camp about half a mile from it, he took a near view of the site and walls of the city, and resolved to attack it, in preference, in that quarter where it was most secured by works, and where the least care was taken in guarding it. After getting all things together which could be of use in besieging a city, he selected the most efficient of the centurions out of the whole army, placing them under the command of tribunes of approved valour, and giving them six hundred soldiers, a number which was thought sufficient for the purpose. These he ordered to bring the scaling ladders to the place which he had marked out, as soon as the signal of the fourth watch had sounded. In this part there was a low and narrow gate, opening into a street which was little frequented, and which led through a deserted part of the city. He ordered them, after scaling the wall, to proceed to this gate, and break down the bars on the inside by force, and when they were in possession of that part of the city, to give a signal with a cornet, that the rest of the troops might be brought up, observing that he would have every thing prepared and ready. These orders were executed promptly, and that which seemed likely to impede their operations, served more than any thing to conceal them. A shower of rain, which came on suddenly at midnight, compelled the guards and watches to slip away from their posts and take shelter in the houses; and the noise of the shower, which was somewhat copious, at first prevented their hearing that which was made by the men in breaking open the gate. Afterwards, when it fell upon the ear more gently and uniformly, it lulled a great number of the men to sleep. After they had secured possession of the gate, they placed cornet-players in the street at equal distances, and desired them to sound, in order to call the consul. This being done according to the plan previously agreed upon, the consul ordered the troops to march, and a little before daylight entered the city through the broken gate.

Then at length the enemy were roused, the shower was now subsiding, and daylight coming on. Hannibal had a garrison of about five thousand armed men in the city, and the inhabitants themselves had three thousand men in arms; these the Carthaginians placed in front against the enemy, to guard against any treachery on their rear. The fight was carried on at first in the dark, and in the narrow streets, the Romans having seized not only the streets, but the houses also nearest the gate, that they might not be struck or wounded by any thing discharged at them from above. Some of the Arpinians and Romans recognised each other, which led to conversations, in which the Romans asked them, what it was they meant? for what offence on the part of the Romans, or what service on that of the Carthaginians, they, who were Italians, made war in favour of foreigners and barbarians, against their ancient allies the Romans, and endeavoured to render Italy tributary and stipendiary to Africa? The Arpinians urged in excuse of themselves, that in ignorance of all the circumstances, they had been sold to the Carthaginians by their nobility, and that they were kept in a state of thraldom and oppression by the few. A beginning having been made, greater numbers on both sides entered into conversation; and at length the praetor of Arpi was brought by his countrymen before the consul, and after exchanging assurances in the midst of the standards and the troops, the Arpinians suddenly turned their arms against the Carthaginians, in favour of the Romans. Some Spaniards also, little less than a thousand in number, after only stipulating with the consul that the Carthaginian garrison might be allowed to march out unhurt, passed over to the consul. The gates were therefore thrown open for the Carthaginians; and being allowed to go out unmolested, in conformity with the stipulation, they joined Hannibal in Salapia. Thus was Arpi restored to the Romans, without the loss of a life, except that of one man, who was formerly a traitor, and recently a deserter. The Spaniards were ordered to receive a double allowance of provisions, and on very many occasions the republic availed itself of their brave and faithful services. While one of the consuls was in Apulia, and the other in Lucania, a hundred and twelve Campanian noblemen, having gone out of Capua, with the permission of the magistrates, under pretence of collecting booty from the enemy's lands, came into the Roman camp, which lay above Suessula. They told the soldiers, forming the vanguard, that they wished to speak with the praetor. Cneius Fulvius commanded the camp; who, on being informed of the circumstance, ordered ten of them to be brought into his presence unarmed; and after hearing their request, (and all they asked was, that when the Romans should recover Capua, their property might be restored to them,) they were all received under his protection. The other praetor, Sempronius Tuditanus, took by force the town of Aternum; more than seven thousand were captured, with a considerable quantity of coined brass and silver. A dreadful fire happened at Rome, which continued for two nights and a day; every thing was burnt to the ground between the Salinae and the Carmental gate, with the Aequimaelium and the Jugarian street. In the temples of Fortune, Mater Matuta, and Hope, which latter stood without the gate, the fire, spreading to a wide extent, consumed much both sacred and profane.

The same year, the two Cornelii, Publius and Cneius, as affairs were now in a prosperous state in Spain, and they had recovered many ancient allies, and attached fresh ones to them, extended their views even to Africa. Syphax was a king of the Numidians, who had suddenly become hostile to the Carthaginians; to him they sent three centurions as ambassadors, to form a treaty of friendship and alliance with him; and to promise, that, if he persevered in pressing the war against the Carthaginians, he would render an acceptable service to the senate and people of Rome, and they would endeavour to requite the favour with large additions, and at a seasonable time. This embassy was gratifying to the barbarian; and when conversing with the ambassadors on the art of war he heard the observations of those experienced soldiers, by comparing his own practice with so regular a system of discipline, he became sensible of how many things he himself was ignorant. Then he entreated them to give the first proof of their being good and faithful allies, "by letting two of them carry back the result of their embassy to their generals, while one remained with him as his instructor in military science, observing that the Numidian nation were unacquainted with the method of carrying on war with foot forces, being useful only as mounted soldiers. That it was in this manner that their ancestors had carried on war even from the first origin of their nation, and to this they were habituated from their childhood. But that they had to contend with an enemy who relied upon the prowess of their infantry; with whom, if they wished to be placed upon an equality in respect of efficient strength, they must also furnish themselves with infantry. That his dominions abounded with a large quantity of men fit for the purpose, but that he was unacquainted with the art of arming, equipping, and marshalling them; that all his infantry were unwieldy and unmanageable, like a rabble collected together by chance." The ambassadors answered, that they would comply with his request for the present, on his engaging to send him back immediately, if their generals did not approve of what they had done. The name of the person who staid behind with the king was Quintus Statorius. With the two other Romans, the Numidian sent ambassadors into Spain, to receive the ratification of the alliance from the Roman generals. He gave it in charge to the same persons, forthwith to induce the Numidians, who were serving as auxiliaries among the Carthaginian troops, to go over to the other side. Statorius raised a body of infantry for the king out of the large number of young men which he found; and having formed them into companies, in close imitation of the Roman method, taught them to follow their standards and keep their ranks when being marshalled, and when performing their evolutions; and he so habituated them to military works and other military duties, that in a short time the king relied not more on his cavalry than on his infantry; and in a regular and pitched battle, fought on a level plain, he overcame his enemies, the Carthaginians. In Spain also the arrival of the king's ambassadors was of the greatest advantage to the Romans, for at the news thereof the Numidians began rapidly to pass over. Thus the Romans and Syphax were united in friendship, which the Carthaginians hearing of, immediately sent ambassadors to Gala, who reigned in another part of Numidia, over a nation called Massylians.

Gala had a son named Masinissa, seventeen years of age, but a youth of such talents, that even at that time it was evident that he would render the kingdom more extensive and powerful than when he received it. The ambassadors represented that, "since Syphax had united himself with the Romans, that by their alliance he might strengthen his hands against the kings and nations of Africa, it would be better for Gala also to unite with the Carthaginians as soon as possible, before Syphax crossed over into Spain, or the Romans into Africa; that Syphax might be overpowered, while as yet he derived nothing from his league with the Romans but the name of it." Gala, his son claiming to be intrusted with the conduct of the war, was easily prevailed upon to send an army, which, joined by the legions of the Carthaginians, totally defeated Syphax in a great battle. In this thirty thousand men are said to have been slain. Syphax, with a few horsemen, fled from the field, and took refuge among the Maurusian Numidians, a nation dwelling at the extremity of Africa, near the ocean, and over against Gades. But the barbarians flocking to his standard from all sides, in consequence of his great renown, he speedily armed a very large force. Before he passed over with these forces into Spain, which was separated only by a narrow strait, Masinissa came up with his victorious army; and here he acquired great glory in the prosecution of the war with Syphax, in which he acted alone and unsupported by any aid from the Carthaginians. In Spain nothing worth mentioning was performed, except that the Romans drew over to their side the Celtiberian youth, by giving them the same pay which they had stipulated with the Carthaginians to pay them. They also sent above three hundred Spaniards of the greatest distinction into Italy, to bring over their countrymen, who served among the auxiliary troops of Hannibal. The only memorable circumstance of this year in Spain was, that the Romans then, for the first time, employed mercenary troops in their camp, namely, the Celtiberians.

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BOOK XXV.

B.C. 213-212

Publius Cornelius Scipio, afterwards called Africanus, elected aedile before he had attained the age required by the law. The citadel of Tarentum, in which the Roman garrison had taken refuge, betrayed to Hannibal. Games instituted in honour of Apollo, called Apollinarian. Quintus Fulvius and Appius Claudius, consuls, defeat Hanno the Carthaginian general. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus betrayed by a Lucanian to Mago, and slain. Centenius Penula, who had been a centurion, asks the senate for the command of an army, promising to engage and vanquish Hannibal, is cut off with eight thousand men. Cneius Fulvius engages Hannibal, and is beaten, with the loss of sixteen thousand men slain, he himself escapes with only two hundred horsemen. Quintus Fulvius and Appius Claudius, consuls, lay siege to Capua. Syracuse taken by Claudius Marcellus after a siege of three years. In the tumult occasioned by taking the city, Archimedes is killed while intently occupied on some figures which he had drawn in the sand. Publius and Cornelius Scipio, after having performed many eminent services in Spain, are slain, together with nearly the whole of their armies, eight years after their arrival in that country; and the possession of that province would have been entirely lost, but for the valour and activity of Lucius Marcius, a Roman knight, who, collecting the scattered remains of the vanquished armies, utterly defeats the enemy, storming their two camps, killing thirty-seven thousand of them, and taking eighteen hundred together with an immense booty.

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Hannibal passed the summer during which these events occurred in Africa and Italy, in the Tarentine territory, with the hope of having the city of the Tarentines betrayed to him. Meanwhile some inconsiderable towns belonging to them, and to the Sallentines, revolted to him. At the same time, of the twelve states of the Bruttians, which had in a former year gone over to the Carthaginians, the Consentians and Thurians returned to the protection of the Roman people. And more would have done the same, had not Titus Pomponius Veientanus, praefect of the allies, having acquired the appearance of a regular general, in consequence of several successful predatory expeditions in the Bruttian territory, got together a tumultuary band, and fought a battle with Hanno. In that battle, a great number of men, consisting, however, of a disorderly rabble of slaves and rustics, were slain or captured. The least part of the loss was, that the praefect himself was taken prisoner; for he was not only in the present instance guilty of having rashly engaged the enemy, but previously, in the capacity of farmer of the revenue, by iniquitous practices of every description, had shown himself faithless and injurious to the state, as well as the companies. Among the Lucanians, the consul, Sempronius, fought several small battles, but none worthy of being recorded, he also took several inconsiderable towns. In proportion as the war was protracted, and the sentiments no less than the circumstances of men fluctuated accordingly as events flowed prosperously or otherwise, the citizens were seized with such a passion for superstitious observances, and those for the most part introduced from foreign countries, that either the people or the gods appeared to have undergone a sudden change. And now the Roman rites were growing into disuse, not only in private, and within doors, but in public also; in the forum and Capitol there were crowds of women sacrificing, and offering up prayers to the gods, in modes unusual in that country. A low order of sacrificers and soothsayers had enslaved men's understandings, and the numbers of these were increased by the country people, whom want and terror had driven into the city, from the fields which were lain uncultivated during a protracted war, and had suffered from the incursions of the enemy, and by the profitable cheating in the ignorance of others which they carried on like an allowed and customary trade. At first, good men gave protest in private to the indignation they felt at these proceedings, but afterwards the thing came before the fathers, and formed a matter of public complaint. The aediles and triumviri, appointed for the execution of criminals, were severely reprimanded by the senate for not preventing these irregularities, but when they attempted to remove the crowd of persons thus employed from the forum, and to overthrow the preparations for their sacred rites, they narrowly escaped personal injury. It being now evident, that the evil was too powerful to be checked by inferior magistrates, the senate commissioned Marcus Atilius, the city praetor, to rid the people of these superstitions. He called an assembly, in which he read the decree of the senate, and gave notice, that all persons who had any books of divination, or forms of prayer, or any written system of sacrificing, should lay all the aforesaid books and writings before him before the calends of April; and that no person should sacrifice in any public or consecrated place according to new or foreign rites.

Several of the public priests too died this year: Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, chief pontiff, Caius Papirius Maso, son of Caius, a pontiff, Publius Furius Philo, an augur, and Caius Papirius Maso, son of Lucius, a decemvir for the superintendence of sacred rites. In lieu of Lentulus, Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, in lieu of Papirius Cnaeius, Servilius Caepio, were created pontiffs. Lucius Quinctius Flaminius was created augur, and Lucius Cornelius Lentulus decemvir for the superintendence of sacred rites. The time for the election of consuls was now approaching; but as it was not thought proper to call the consuls away from the war with which they were intently occupied, Tiberius Sempronius, the consul, nominated Caius Claudius Centho as dictator to hold the election. He appointed Quintus Fulvius Flaccus as his master of the horse. On the first day on which the election could be held, the dictator appointed as consuls, Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, his master of the horse, and Appius Claudius Pulcher, who had held the government of Sicily as praetor. The praetors created were Cneius Fulvius Flaccus, Caius Claudius Nero, Marcus Junius Silanus, Publius Cornelius Sulla. The election completed, the dictator retired from his office. This year, Publius Cornelius Scipio, afterwards surnamed Africanus, held the office of curule aedile, with Marcus Cornelius Cethegus; and when the tribunes of the people opposed his pretensions to the aedileship, alleging, that no notice ought to be taken of him, because he had not attained the legal age for candidateship, he observed, "if the citizens in general are desirous of appointing me aedile, I am old enough." Upon this the people ran to their respective tribes to give their votes, with feelings so strongly disposed in his favour, that the tribunes on a sudden abandoned their attempt. The largesses bestowed by the aediles were the following: the Roman games were sumptuously exhibited, considering the present state of their resources; they were repeated during one day, and a gallon of oil was given to each street. Lucius Villius Tapulus, and Marcus Fundanius Fundulus, the plebeian aediles, accused some matrons of misconduct before the people, and some of them they convicted and sent into exile. The plebeian games were repeated during two days, and a feast in honour of Jupiter was celebrated on occasion of the games.

Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, for the third time, and Appius Claudius entered upon the office of consuls. The praetors determined their provinces by lot. Publius Cornelius Sulla received both the city and the foreign jurisdiction, formerly allotted to two persons, Cneius Fulvius Flaccus, Apulia, Caius Claudius Nero, Suessula, and Marcus Junius Silanus, Tuscany. To the consuls the conduct of the war with Hannibal was decreed with two legions each, one taking the troops of Quintus Fabius, the consul of the former year, the other those of Fulvius Centumalus. Of the praetors, Fulvius Flaccus was to have the legions which were in Luceria under Aemilius the praetor, Nero Claudius those in Picenum under Caius Terentius, each raising recruits for himself to fill up the number of his troops. To Marcus Junius the city legions of the former year were assigned, to be employed against the Tuscans. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and Publius Sempronius Tuditanus were continued in command in their provinces of Lucania and Gaul with the armies they had, as was also Publius Lentulus in that part of Sicily which formed the ancient Roman province. Marcus Marcellus had Syracuse, and that which was the kingdom of Hiero. Titus Otacilius was continued in the command of the fleet, Marcus Valerius in that of Greece, Quintus Mucius Scaevola in that of Sardinia. The Cornelii, Publius and Cneius, were continued in the command of Spain. In addition to the armies already existing, two legions for the service of the city were levied by the consuls, and a total of twenty-three legions was made up this year. The levy of the consuls was impeded by the conduct of Marcus Posthumius Pyrgensis, almost accompanied with a serious disturbance. Posthumius was a farmer of the revenue, who, for knavery and rapacity, practised through a course of many years, had no equal except Titus Pomponius Veientanus, who had been taken prisoner the former year by the Carthaginians under the conduct of Hanno, while carelessly ravaging the lands in Lucania. As the state had taken upon itself the risk of any loss which might arise from storms to the commodities conveyed to the armies, not only had these two men fabricated false accounts of shipwrecks, but even those which had really occurred were occasioned by their own knavery, and not by accident. Their plan was to put a few goods of little value into old and shattered vessels, which they sank in the deep, taking up the sailors in boats prepared for the purpose, and then returning falsely the cargo as many times more valuable than it was. This fraudulent practice had been pointed out to Marcus Atilius, the praetor in a former year, who had communicated it to the senate; no decree, however, had been passed censuring it, because the fathers were unwilling that any offence should be given to the order of revenue farmers while affairs were in such a state. The people were severer avengers of the fraud; and at length two tribunes of the people, Spurius and Lucius Carvilius, being moved to take some active measure, as they saw that this conduct excited universal disgust, and had become notorious, proposed that a fine of two hundred thousand asses should be imposed on Marcus Posthumius. When the day arrived for arguing the question, the people assembled in such numbers, that the area of the Capitol could scarcely contain them; and the cause having been gone through, the only hope of safety which presented itself was, that Caius Servilius Casca, a tribune of the people, a connexion and relation of Posthumius, should interpose his protest before the tribes were called to give their votes. The witnesses having been produced, the tribunes caused the people to withdraw, and the urn was brought, in order that the tribes should draw lots which should give the vote first. Meanwhile, the farmers of the revenue urged Casca to stop the proceedings for that day. The people, however, loudly opposed it; and Casca happened to be sitting on the most prominent part of the rostrum, whose mind fear and shame were jointly agitating. Seeing that no dependence was to be placed in him for protection, the farmers of the revenue, forming themselves into a wedge, rushed into the void space occasioned by the removal of the people for the purpose of causing disturbance, wrangling at the same time with the people and the tribunes. The affair had now almost proceeded to violence, when Fulvius Flaccus, the consul, addressing the tribunes, said, "Do you not see that you are degraded to the common rank, and that an insurrection will be the result, unless you speedily dismiss the assembly of the commons."

The commons being dismissed, the senate was assembled, when the consuls proposed the consideration of the interruption experienced by the assembly of the commons, in consequence of the violence and audacity of the farmers of the revenue. They said, that "Marcus Furius Camillus, whose banishment was followed by the downfall of the city, had suffered himself to be condemned by his exasperated countrymen. That before him, the decemviri, according to whose laws they lived up to the present day, and afterwards many men of the first rank in the state, had submitted to have sentence passed upon them by the people. But Posthumius Pyrgensis had wrested from the Roman people their right of suffrage, had dissolved the assembly of the commons, had set at nought the authority of the tribunes, had drawn up a body of men in battle-array against the Roman people; and seized upon a post, in order to cut off the tribunes from the commons, and prevent the tribes being called to give their votes. That the only thing which had restrained the people from bloodshed and violence, was the forbearance of the magistrates in giving way for the moment to the fury and audacity of a few individuals, and suffering themselves and the Roman people to be overcome; and that no opportunity might be afforded those who were seeking an occasion of violence, in dissolving, agreeably to the wish of the defendant himself, that assembly which he was about to interrupt by force of arms." Observations of this kind having been urged with a warmth proportioned to the atrocity of the conduct which called them forth, by all the most respectable persons, and the senate having passed a decree to the effect that the violence offered was prejudicial to the state, and a precedent of pernicious tendency, immediately the Carvilii, tribunes of the people, giving up the action for a fine, appointed a day on which Posthumius should be tried capitally, and ordered, that unless he gave bail, he should be apprehended by the beadle, and carried to prison. Posthumius gave bail, but did not appear. The tribunes then proposed to the commons, and the commons resolved, that if Marcus Posthumius did not appear before the calends of May, and if on being cited on that day he did not answer, and sufficient cause were not shown why he did not, he would be adjudged an exile, his goods would be sold, and himself interdicted from water and fire. They then proceeded to indict capitally, and demand bail of each of the persons who had been the promoters of the disorder and riot. At first they threw into prison those who did not give bail, and afterwards even such as could; upon which the greater part of them went into exile, to avoid the danger to which this proceeding exposed them.

The knavery of the revenue farmers, and their subsequent audacious conduct to screen themselves from its effects, thus terminated. An assembly was then held for the creation of a chief pontiff. The new pontiff, Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, presided. The election was contested with the greatest obstinacy by three candidates, Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, the consul, who had been twice consul before and censor, Titus Manhus Torquatus, who had himself also been distinguished by two consulships and the censorship, and Publius Licinius Ciassus, who was about to stand for the office of curule aedile. In this contest, the last-mentioned candidate, though a young man, beat the others, who were his superiors in years, and had filled offices of honour. Before him there had not been a man for a hundred and twenty years, except Publius Cornelius Calussa, who had been created chief pontiff without having sat in the curule chair. Though the consuls found great difficulty in completing the levy, for in consequence of the scarcity of young men, it was not easy to procure enough for the two purposes of forming the new city legions, and recruiting the old ones, the senate forbade them to desist from the attempt, and ordered two triumvirates to be appointed, one of which within, the other without the fiftieth mile from the city, might ascertain the utmost number of free-born men which were to be found in the villages, and market towns, and hamlets, and enlist whom they thought strong enough to bear arms, though they had not attained the military age. That the tribunes of the people, if they thought proper, should propose to the people, that such as should take the military oath being under seventeen years, should be allowed to reckon their period of service in the same manner as if they had enlisted at seventeen or older. The two triumvirates, created agreeably to this decree of the senate, enlisted free-born men throughout the country. At the same time a letter from Marcellus from Sicily, respecting the petition of the troops who served with Publius Lentulus, was read in the senate. These troops were the relics of the disaster at Cannae, and had been sent out of the way into Sicily, as has been mentioned before, on an understanding that they should not be brought home before the conclusion of the Carthaginian war.

With the permission of Lentulus, these men sent the most distinguished of the cavalry and centurions, and a select body of the legionary infantry, as ambassadors to Marcellus, to his winter quarters. Having obtained leave to speak, one of them thus addressed him: "We should have approached you, Marcus Marcellus, when consul in Italy, as soon as that decree of the senate was passed respecting us, which, though not unjust, was certainly severe, had we not hoped, that being sent into a province which was in a state of disorder in consequence of the death of its kings, to carry on an arduous war against the Sicilians and Carthaginians together, we should make atonement to the state by our blood and wounds, in the same manner as, within the memory of our fathers, those who were taken prisoners by Pyrrhus at Heraclea, made atonement by fighting against the same Pyrrhus. And yet, for what fault of ours, conscript fathers, did you then, or do you now, feel displeasure towards us; for when I look upon you, Marcus Marcellus, I seem to behold both the consuls and the whole body of the senate; and had you been our consul at Cannae, a better fate would have attended the state as well as ourselves. Permit me, I entreat you, before I complain of the hardship of our situation, to clear ourselves of the guilt with which we are charged. If it was neither by the anger of the gods, nor by fate, according to whose laws the course of human affairs is unalterably fixed, but by misconduct that we were undone at Cannae; but whose was that misconduct; the soldiers', or that of their generals? For my own part, I, as a soldier, will never say a word of my commander, particularly when I know that he received the thanks of the senate for not having despaired of the state; and who has been continued in command through every year since his flight from Cannae. We have heard that others also who survived that disaster, who were military tribunes, solicit and fill offices of honour, and have the command of provinces. Do you then, conscript fathers, pardon yourselves and your children, while you exercise severity towards such insignificant persons as we are? It was no disgrace to a consul and other leading persons in the state, to fly when no other hope remained; and did you send your soldiers into the field as persons who must of necessity die there? At the Allia nearly the whole army fled; at the Caudine Forks the troops delivered up their arms to the enemy, without even making an effort; not to mention other disgraceful defeats of our armies. Yet, so far from any mark of infamy being sought for, which might be fixed upon these troops, the city of Rome was recovered by means of those very troops who had fled to Veii from the Allia; and the Caudine legions, which had returned to Rome without their arms, being sent back armed to Samnium, brought under the yoke that very enemy who had exulted in the disgrace which, in this instance, attached to them. But is there a man who can bring a charge of cowardice or running away against the army which fought at Cannae, where more than fifty thousand men fell; from whence the consul fled with only seventy horsemen; where not a man survived, except perchance those whom the enemy left, being wearied with killing? When the proposal to ransom the prisoners was negatived, we were the objects of general commendation, because we reserved ourselves for the service of the state; because we returned to the consul to Venusia, and exhibited an appearance of a regular army. Now we are in a worse condition than those who were taken prisoners in the time of our fathers; for they only had their arms, the nature of their service, and the place where they might pitch their tents in the camp altered; all which, however, they got restored by one service rendered to the state, and by one successful battle. Not one of them was sent away into banishment; not one was deprived of the hope of completing the period of his service; in short, an enemy was assigned to them, fighting with whom they might at once terminate their life or their disgrace. We, to whom nothing can be objected, except that it is owing to us that any Roman soldier has survived the battle of Cannae, are removed far away, not only from our country and Italy, but even from an enemy; where we may grow old in exile, where we can have no hope or opportunity of obliterating our disgrace, of appeasing the indignation of our countrymen, or, in short, of obtaining an honourable death. We seek neither to have our ignominy terminated, nor our virtue rewarded, we only ask to be allowed to make trial of our courage, and to exercise our virtue. We seek for labour and danger that we may discharge the duty of men and soldiers. A war is carrying on in Sicily, now for the second year, with the utmost vigour on both sides. The Carthaginians are storming some cities, the Romans others, armies of infantry and horse are engaging in battle, at Syracuse the war is prosecuted by sea and by land. We hear distinctly the shout of the combatants, and the din of arms, while we ourselves lie inactive and unemployed, as if we had neither hands nor arms. The consul, Sempronius has now fought many pitched battles with the enemy with legions of slaves. They receive as the fruits of their exertion their liberty, and the rights of citizens. Let us at least be employed by you as slaves purchased for the service of this war, let us be allowed to combat with the enemy and acquire our freedom by fighting. Do you wish to make trial of our valour by sea, by land, in a pitched battle, or in the assault of towns? We ask as our portion all those enterprises which present the greatest difficulty and danger, that what ought to have been done at Cannae may be done as soon as possible, for the whole of our subsequent lives has been doomed to ignominy."

At the conclusion of this speech they prostrated themselves at the knees of Marcellus. Marcellus replied, that the question was neither within his authority nor his power, that he would, however, write to the senate, and be guided in every thing he did by the judgment of the fathers. This letter was brought to the new consuls, and by them read in the senate, and, on the question being put relative to this letter, they decreed, "that the senate saw no reason why the interests of the republic should be intrusted to the hands of soldiers who had deserted then comrades, in battle, at Cannae. If Marcus Marcellus, the proconsul, thought otherwise, that he should act as he deemed consistent with the good of the republic and his own honour, with this proviso, however, that none of these men should be exempt from service, nor be presented with any military reward in consideration of valour, or be conveyed back to Italy, while the enemy was in that country." After this, agreeably to the decree of the senate, and the order of the people, an election was held by the city praetor, at which five commissioners were created for the purpose of repairing the walls and turrets, and two sets of triumviri, one to search for the property belonging to the temples, and to register the offerings, the other for repairing the temples of Fortune and Mother Matuta within the Carmental gate, and also that of Hope without the gate, which had been destroyed by fire the year before. Dreadful storms occurred at this time. It rained stones for two days without intermission in the Alban mount. Many places were struck by lightning; two buildings in the Capitol, the rampart in the camp above Suessula in many places, and two of the men on guard were killed. A wall and certain towers at Cannae were not only struck with lightning, but demolished. At Reate, a vast rock was seen to fly about; the sun appeared unusually red and blood-like. On account of these prodigies there was a supplication for one day, and the consuls employed themselves for several days in sacred rites; at the same time there was a sacred rite performed through nine days. An accidental circumstance which occurred at a distance, hastened the revolt of Tarentum, which had now for a long time been the object of the hopes of Hannibal and of the suspicion of the Romans. Phileas, a native of Tarentum, who had been a long time at Rome under the pretence of an embassy, being a man of a restless mind, and ill brooking that inactive state in which he considered that his powers had been for too long a time sinking into imbecility, discovered for himself a means of access to the Tarentine hostages. They were kept in the court of the temple of Liberty, and guarded with less care, because it was neither the interest of themselves nor of their state to escape from the Romans. By corrupting two of the keepers of the temple, he was enabled to hold frequent conferences with them, at which he solicited them to come into this design; and having brought them out of their place of confinement as soon as it was dark, he became the companion of their clandestine flight, and got clear away. As soon as day dawned, the news of their escape spread through the city, and a party sent in pursuit, having seized them all at Tarracina, brought them back. They were led into the Comitium, and after being scourged with rods, with the approbation of the people, were thrown down from the rock.

The severity of this punishment exasperated the inhabitants of two of the most distinguished Greek states in Italy, not only publicly as communities, but privately as individuals, according as each was connected, either by relationship or friendship, with those who had been so disgracefully put to death. Of these about thirteen noble Tarentine youths formed a conspiracy, the chief of whom were Nico and Philemenus. Concluding that it would be right to confer with Hannibal before they took any step, they went to him, having been allowed to go out of the city by night on pretence of hunting. When they were now not far from the camp, all the rest hid themselves in a wood by the road side; but Nico and Philemenus, proceeding to the advanced guard, were seized, and at their own request brought before Hannibal. Having laid before him the motives of their plan, and the object they had in view, they received the highest commendation, and were loaded with promises; and that their countrymen might believe that they had gone out of the city to obtain plunder, they were desired to drive to the city some cattle of the Carthaginians which had been sent out to graze. A promise was given them that they might do this without danger or interruption. The booty of the young men attracted notice, and less astonishment was therefore felt that they should frequently repeat the attempt. At a second meeting with Hannibal they entered into a solemn engagement, that the Tarentines should be free, enjoying their own laws, and all their rights uninterfered with; that they should neither pay any tribute to the Carthaginians, nor receive a garrison against their will; that their present garrison should be delivered up to the Carthaginians. These points being agreed upon, Philemenus then began to repeat more frequently his customary practice of going out and returning to the city followed by his dogs, and furnished with the other requisites for hunting; for he was remarkable for his fondness of hunting; and generally bringing home something which he had captured or taken away from the enemy, who had purposely placed it in his way he presented it to the commander or the guards of the gates. They supposed that he preferred going and returning by night through fear of the enemy. After this practice had become so familiar, that at whatever time of the night he gave a signal, by whistling, the gate was opened, Hannibal thought that it was now time to put the plan in execution. He was at the distance of three days' journey, and to diminish the wonder which would be felt at his keeping his camp fixed in one and the same place so long, he feigned himself ill. Even to the Romans who formed the garrison of Tarentum, his protracted inactivity had ceased to be an object of suspicion.

But after he determined to proceed to Tarentum, selecting from his infantry and cavalry ten thousand men, whom, from activity of body, and lightness of arms, he judged best adapted for the expedition, he began his march in the fourth watch of the night; and sending in advance about eighty Numidian horsemen, ordered them to scour the country on each side of the road, and narrowly examine every place, lest any of the rustics who might have observed his army at a distance should escape; to bring back those who were got before, and kill those whom they met, that they might appear to the neighbouring inhabitants to be a plundering party, rather than a regular army. Hannibal himself, marching at a rapid pace, pitched his camp about fifteen miles from Tarentum; and without telling his soldiers even there, what was their destination, he only called them together and admonished them to march all of them in the road, and not to suffer any one to turn aside or deviate from the line; and above all, that they would be on the watch, so as to catch the word of command, and not do any thing without the order of their leaders; that in due time he would issue his commands as to what he wished to be done. About the same hour a rumour reached Tarentum, that a few Numidian horsemen were devastating the fields, and had terrified the rustics through a wide extent of country; at which intelligence the Roman praefect took no further step than to order a division of his cavalry to go out the following day at sunrise to check the depredations of the enemy; and so far was he from directing his attention to any thing else on this account, that on the contrary, this excursion of the Numidians was a proof to him that Hannibal and his army had not moved from his camp. Early in the night Hannibal put his troops in motion, and Philemenus, with his customary burden of prey taken in hunting, was his guide. The rest of the conspirators waited the accomplishment of what had been concerted; and the agreement was, that Philemenus, while bringing in his prey through the small gate by which he was accustomed to pass, should introduce some armed men, while Hannibal in another quarter approached the gate called Temenis, which faced the east, in that quarter which was towards the continent, near the tombs which were within the walls. When he drew near to the gate, Hannibal raised a fire according to agreement, which made a blaze; the same signal was returned by Nico, and the fires were extinguished on both sides. Hannibal led his troops on in silence to the gate. Nico suddenly fell upon the guards while asleep, slew them in their beds, and opened the gate. Hannibal then entered with his infantry, ordering his cavalry to stay behind, that they might be able to bring their assistance wherever it was required without obstruction. Philemenus also in another quarter approached the small gate by which he was accustomed to pass and re-pass. His voice, which was well known, for he said he could scarcely bear the weight of the huge beast he had gotten, and his signal, which had now become familiar, having roused the guard, the small gate was opened. Two youths carrying in a boar, Philemenus himself followed, with a huntsman, unencumbered, and while the attention of the guard was incautiously turned upon those who carried the boar, in consequence of its astonishing size, he transfixed him with a hunting spear. About thirty armed men then entering, slew the rest of the guards, and broke open the adjoining gate, when a body of troops, in regular array, instantly rushed in. Being conducted hence in silence to the forum, they joined Hannibal. The Carthaginian then sent the Tarentines, with two thousand Gauls formed into three divisions, in different directions through the city, with orders to occupy the most frequented streets. A confusion arising, the Romans were put to the sword on all hands. The townsmen were spared; but in order to insure this, he instructed the Tarentine youths, when they saw any of their friends at a distance, to bid them be quiet and silent, and be of good courage.

The tumult and clamour was now such as usually takes place in a captured city, but no man knew for certain what was the occasion. The Tarentines supposed that the Romans had suddenly risen to plunder the city. To the Romans it appeared, that some commotion had been set on foot by the townsmen with a treacherous design. The praefect, who was awakened at the first alarm, escaped to the port, whence getting into a boat he was conveyed round to the citadel. The sound of a trumpet also from the theatre excited alarm; for it was a Roman trumpet, prepared by the conspirators for this very purpose; and as it was blown unskilfully by a Grecian, it could not be ascertained who gave the signal, or to whom it was given. At dawn of the day, the Romans recognised the Carthaginian and Gallic arms, which removed all doubt; and the Greeks, seeing the bodies of slain Romans spread about in all directions, perceived that the city had been taken by Hannibal. When the light had increased, so that they could discriminate with greater certainty, and the Romans who survived the carnage had taken refuge in the citadel, the tumult now beginning to subside a little, Hannibal gave orders to assemble the Tarentines without their arms. All of them attended the assembly, except those who had accompanied the Romans in their retreat to the citadel, to share every fortune with them. Here Hannibal having addressed the Tarentines in terms of kindness, and appealed to the services he had rendered to those of their countrymen whom he had captured at the Trasimenus and at Cannae, and having at the same time inveighed against the haughty domination of the Romans, desired that they would every one of them retire to their respective houses, and inscribe their names upon their doors; declaring, that he should give orders that those houses which had not the names written upon them should be plundered. That if any man should write his name upon the house of a Roman, (and the Romans occupied houses by themselves,) he should treat him as an enemy. Having dismissed the assembly, and the names inscribed upon the doors having made it easy to distinguish the house of an enemy from that of a friend, on a signal given, the troops ran in every direction to plunder the lodgings of the Romans, and a considerable booty was found.

The next day he led his troops to assault the citadel; but seeing that it was protected by very high rocks towards the sea, which washed the greater part of it, and formed it into a sort of peninsula, and towards the city by a wall and ditch, and consequently that it could not be taken by assault or by works; lest the design to protect the Tarentines should detain him from the prosecution of more important objects, and lest the Romans should have the power of sallying from the citadel whenever they pleased against the Tarentines, if left without a strong protecting force, he resolved to cut off the communication between the citadel and city by a rampart; not without a hope that he might have an opportunity of fighting with the Romans, when attempting to obstruct the work; and if they should sally forth too eagerly, that by killing many of them the strength of the garrison would be so far reduced, that the Tarentines alone would be easily able to defend themselves from them. After they had begun, the Romans, suddenly throwing open the gate, rushed in upon the workmen. The guard stationed before the works allowed itself to be driven back, in order that their boldness might be increased by success, and that they might pursue them when driven back, in greater numbers, and to a greater distance. Then on a signal given, the Carthaginians, whom Hannibal kept in readiness for this purpose, sprang up on all sides; nor could the Romans sustain the attack, but were prevented from precipitate flight by the narrowness of the ground, by impediments occasioned in some places by the works already commenced, in others by the preparations for the work. Most of them were driven headlong into the ditch, and more were killed in the flight than in the battle. After this the work was commenced without any attempt to obstruct it. A large ditch was formed, within which a rampart was thrown up. He prepared also to add a wall at a small distance, and on the same side, that they might defend themselves from the Romans even without a garrison. He, however, left them a small force, at once for their protection and to assist in building the wall. The general himself, setting out with the rest of his forces, pitched his camp at the river Galaesus, five miles from the city. Returning from this position to inspect the work, which had gone on somewhat faster than he had anticipated, he conceived a hope that the citadel might even be taken by storm; for it was not protected by an elevated situation as the other parts were, but placed upon a plain, and separated from the city only by a wall and ditch. While subjected to an attack from every kind of military engine and work, a reinforcement sent from Metapontum inspired the Romans with courage to assault the works of the enemy, by a sudden attack, under cover of the night. Some of them they threw down, others they destroyed by fire, and thus there was an end to Hannibal's attempts against the citadel in that quarter. His only remaining hope was in a siege; nor did that afford a good prospect of success, because, occupying a citadel which was placed on a peninsula and commanded the entrance of the harbour, they had the sea open to them, while the city, on the contrary, was deprived of any supplies by sea: and thus the besiegers were in greater danger of want than the besieged. Hannibal assembled the chief men of the Tarentines, and laid before them all the present difficulties. He said, "That he could neither discover any method by which a citadel so well fortified could be taken, nor could he hope for any favourable result from a siege, while the enemy was master of the sea; but that if ships could be obtained, by which the introduction of supplies might be prevented, the enemy would either immediately evacuate it, or surrender themselves." The Tarentines agreed with him; but were of opinion, that "he who gave the advice ought also to assist in carrying it into execution; for if the Carthaginian ships were brought there from Sicily, they would be able to effect it; but by what means could their own ships, shut up as they were in a confined harbour, the mouth of which was in the command of the enemy, be brought out into the open sea." "They shall be brought out," said Hannibal. "Many things which are difficult in themselves, are easily effected by contrivance. You have a city situated upon a plain; you have level and sufficiently wide roads extending in every direction. By the road which runs through the midst of the city from the harbour to the sea I will convey your ships in waggons without any great difficulty, and the sea will be ours which the enemy now commands. We will invest the citadel on one side by sea, on the other by land; nay, rather, in a short time, we will take it either abandoned by the enemy, or with the enemy in it." This speech not only inspired hopes of accomplishing the object, but excited the greatest admiration of the general. Waggons were immediately collected from every quarter and joined together; machines were employed to haul the ships on shore, and the road was prepared, in order that the waggons might run more easily, and thus the difficulty of passing be diminished. Beasts of burden and men were next collected, and the work was actively commenced. After the lapse of a few days, the fleet, equipped and ready for action, sailed round the citadel, and cast anchor just before the mouth of the harbour. Such was the state of things at Tarentum, when Hannibal left it and returned to his winter quarters. Authors, however, are divided as to whether the defection of the Tarentines took place in the present or former year. The greater number, and those who, from their age, were more able to recollect these events, represent it to have occurred in the present year.

The Latin holidays detained the consuls and praetors at Rome till the fifth of the calends of May; on which day, having completed the solemnities on the mount, they proceeded to their respective provinces. Afterwards a new difficulty respecting religious matters arose out of the prophetic verses of Marcius, who had been a distinguished soothsayer; and on a search being made the year before, for books of this description, agreeably to a decree of the senate, these verses had fallen into the hands of Marcus Atilius, the city praetor, who had the management of that business, and he had immediately handed them over to the new praetor, Sulla. The importance attached to one of the two predictions of Marcius, which was brought to light after the event to which it related had occurred, and the truth of which was confirmed by the event, attached credence to the other, the time of whose fulfilment had not yet arrived. In the former prophecy, the disaster at Cannae was predicted in nearly these words: "Roman of Trojan descent, fly the river Canna, lest foreigners should compel thee to fight in the plain of Diomede. But thou wilt not believe me until thou shalt have filled the plain with blood, and the river carries into the great sea, from the fruitful land, many thousands of your slain countrymen, and thy flesh becomes a prey for fishes, birds, and beasts inhabiting the earth. For thus hath Jupiter declared to me." Those who had served in that quarter recognised the correspondence with respect to the plains of the Argive Diomede and the river Canna, as well as the defeat itself. The other prophecy was then read, which was more obscure, not only because future events are more uncertain than past, but also from being more perplexed in its style of composition. "Romans, if you wish to expel the enemy and the ulcer which has come from afar, I advise, that games should be vowed, which may be performed in a cheerful manner annually to Apollo; when the people shall have given a portion of money from the public coffers, that private individuals then contribute, each according to his ability. That the praetor shall preside in the celebration of these games, who holds the supreme administration of justice to the people and commons. Let the decemviri perform sacrifice with victims after the Grecian fashion. If you do these things properly you will ever rejoice, and your affairs will be more prosperous, for that deity will destroy your enemies who now, composedly, feed upon your plains." They took one day to explain this prophecy. The next day a decree of the senate was passed, that the decemviri should inspect the books relating to the celebration of games and sacred rites in honour of Apollo. After they had been consulted, and a report made to the senate, the fathers voted, that "games should be vowed to Apollo and celebrated; and that when the games were concluded, twelve thousand asses should be given to the praetor to defray the expense of sacred ceremonies, and also two victims of the larger sort." A second decree was passed, that "the decemviri should perform sacrifice in the Grecian mode, and with the following victims: to Apollo, with a gilded ox, and two white goats gilded; to Latona, with a gilded heifer." When the praetor was about to celebrate the games in the Circus Maximus, he issued an order, that during the celebration of the games, the people should pay a contribution, as large as was convenient, for the service of Apollo. This is the origin of the Apollinarian games, which were vowed and celebrated in order to victory, and not restoration to health, as is commonly supposed. The people viewed the spectacle in garlands; the matrons made supplications; the people in general feasted in the courts of their houses, throwing the doors open; and the day was distinguished by every description of ceremony.

While Hannibal was in the neighbourhood of Tarentum, and both the consuls in Samnium, though they seemed as if they were about to besiege Capua, the Campanians were experiencing famine, that calamity which is the usual attendant of a protracted siege. It was occasioned by the Roman armies' having prevented the sowing of the lands. They therefore sent ambassadors to Hannibal, imploring him to give orders that corn should be conveyed to Capua from the neighbouring places, before both the consuls led their legions into their fields, and all the roads were blocked up by the troops of the enemy. Hannibal ordered Hanno to pass with his army from Bruttium into Campania, and to take care that the Campanians were supplied with corn. Hanno, setting out from Bruttium with his army, and carefully avoiding the camp of the enemy and the consuls who were in Samnium, when he drew near to Beneventum, pitched his camp on an eminence three miles from the city. He next ordered that the corn which had been collected during the summer, should be brought from the neighbouring people in alliance with him, into his camp, assigning a guard to escort those supplies. He then sent a messenger to the Capuans, fixing a day when they should attend at his camp to receive the corn, bringing with them vehicles and beasts of every description, collected from every part of their country. The Campanians executed this business with their usual indolence and carelessness. Somewhat more than four hundred vehicles, with a few beasts of burden besides, were sent. After receiving a reproof from Hanno for this conduct, who told them, that not even hunger, which excited dumb animals to exertion, could stimulate them to diligence, another day was named when they were to fetch the corn after better preparation. All these transactions being reported to the Beneventans, just as they occurred, they lost no time in sending ten ambassadors to the Roman consuls, who were encamped in the neighbourhood of Bovianum. The consuls, hearing what was going on at Capua, arranged it so that one of them should lead an army into Campania; and Fulvius, to whose lot that province had fallen, setting out by night, entered the walls of Beneventum. Being now near the enemy, he obtained information that Hanno had gone out to forage with a portion of his troops; that the Campanians were supplied with corn by a quaestor; that two thousand waggons had arrived together with an undisciplined and unarmed rabble; that every thing was done in a disorderly and hurried manner; and that the form of a camp, and all military subordination, were destroyed by the intermixture of rustics out of the neighbourhood. This intelligence being sufficiently authenticated, the consul ordered his soldiers to get ready only their standards and arms against the next night, as he must attack the Carthaginian camp. They set out at the fourth watch of the night, leaving all their packages and baggage of every description at Beneventum; and arriving a little before daylight at the camp, they occasioned such a panic, that, had the camp been situated on level ground, it might doubtlessly have been taken on the first assault. The height of its situation and the works defended it; for they could not be approached on any side except by a steep and difficult ascent. At break of day a hot engagement commenced, when the Carthaginians not only defended their rampart, but having more even ground, threw down the enemy as they attempted to ascend the steep.

Persevering courage, however, at length prevailed over every impediment, and they made their way up to the ditch and rampart in several parts at the same time, but with many wounds and much loss of soldiers. The consul, therefore assembling the military tribunes, said they must desist from this inconsiderate enterprise; and that it appeared to him to be the safer course, that the troops should be led back to Beneventum for that day, and then on the following day to pitch his camp close to that of the enemy, so that the Campanians could not quit it, nor Hanno return to it; and in order that that object might be attained with the greater ease, that he should send for his colleague and his army; and that they would direct their whole force on that point. This plan of the general was disconcerted, after the signal began to sound for a retreat, by the clamours of the soldiery, who despised so pusillanimous an order. Nearest to the gate of the enemy's camp was a Pelignian cohort, whose commander, Vibius Accuaeus, seizing the standard, threw it over the rampart. Then pronouncing a curse upon himself and his cohort, if the enemy got possession of that standard, he rushed forward before the rest, and crossing the ditch and rampart, burst into the camp of the enemy. The Pelignians were now fighting within the rampart, when in another quarter Valerius Flaccus, a military tribune of the third legion, taunting the Romans with cowardice for conceding to allies the honour of taking the camp. Titus Pedanius, first centurion of the first century, snatched the standard out of the hands of the standard-bearer, and cried out, "Soon shall this standard, and this centurion, be within the rampart of the enemy; let those follow who would prevent the standard's being captured by the enemy." Crossing the ditch, he was followed first by the men of his own maniple, and then by the whole legion. By this time the consul also, changing his plan on seeing them crossing the rampart, began to incite and encourage his soldiers, instead of calling them off; representing to them, how critical and perilous was the situation of the bravest cohort of their allies and a legion of their countrymen. All, therefore, severally exerting themselves to the utmost, regardless whether the ground were even or uneven, while showers of weapons were thrown against them from all sides, the enemy opposing their arms and their persons to obstruct them, made their way and burst in. Many who were wounded, even those whose blood and strength failed them, pressed forward, that they might fall within the rampart of the enemy. The camp, therefore, was taken in an instant, as if it had been situated upon level ground, and not completely fortified. What followed was a carnage rather than a battle. The troops of both sides being huddled together within the rampart, above six thousand of the enemy were slain; above seven thousand, together with the Campanians who fetched the corn, and the whole collection of waggons and beasts of burden, were captured. There was also a great booty, which Hanno in his predatory excursions, which he had been careful to make in every quarter, had drawn together from the lands of the allies of the Romans. After throwing down the camp of the enemy, they returned thence to Beneventum; and there both the consuls (for Appius Claudius came thither a few days after) sold the booty and distributed it, making presents to those by whose exertions the camp of the enemy had been captured; above all, to Accuaeus the Pelignian, and Titus Pedanius, first centurion of the third legion. Hanno, setting off from Cominium in the territory of Cere, whither intelligence of the loss of the camp had reached him, with a small party of foragers, whom he happened to have with him, returned to Bruttium, more after the manner of a flight than a march.

The Campanians, when informed of the disaster which had befallen themselves and their allies, sent ambassadors to Hannibal to inform him, that "the two consuls were at Beneventum, which was a day's march from Capua; that the war was all but at their gates and their walls; and that if he did not hasten to their assistance, Capua would fall into the power of the enemy sooner than Arpi had; that not even Tarentum itself, much less its citadel, ought to be considered of so much consequence as to induce him to deliver up to the Roman people, abandoned and undefended, Capua, which he used to place on an equal footing with Carthage." Hannibal, promising that he would not neglect the interest of the Campanians, sent, for the present, two thousand horse, with the ambassadors, aided by which, they might secure their lands from devastation. The Romans, meanwhile, among the other things which engaged their attention, had an eye to the citadel of Tarentum, and the garrison besieged therein. Caius Servilius, lieutenant-general, having been sent, according to the advice of the fathers, by Publius Cornelius, the praetor, to purchase corn in Etruria, made his way into the harbour of Tarentum, through the guard-ships of the enemy, with some ships of burden. At his arrival, those who before, having very slight hopes of holding out, were frequently invited by the enemy, in conferences, to pass over to them, now, on the contrary, were the persons to invite and solicit the enemy to come over to them; and now, as the soldiers who were at Metapontum had been brought to assist in guarding the citadel of Tarentum, the garrison was sufficiently powerful. In consequence of this measure, the Metapontines, being freed from the fears which had influenced them, immediately revolted to Hannibal. The people of Thurium, situated on the same coast, did the same. They were influenced not more by the defection of the Metapontines and Tarentines, with whom they were connected, being sprung from the same country, Achaia, than by resentment towards the Romans, in consequence of the recent execution of the hostages. The friends and relations of these hostages sent a letter and a message to Hanno and Mago, who were not far off among the Bruttii, to the effect, that if they brought their troops up to the walls, they would deliver the city into their hands. Marcus Atinius was in command at Thurium, with a small garrison, who they thought might easily be induced to engage rashly in a battle, not from any confidence which he reposed in his troops, of which he had very few, but in the youth of Thurium, whom he had purposely formed into centuries, and armed against emergencies of this kind. The generals, after dividing their forces between them, entered the territory of Thurium; and Hanno, with a body of infantry, proceeded towards the city in hostile array. Hanno staid behind with the cavalry, under the cover of some hills, conveniently placed for the concealment of an ambush. Atinius, having by his scouts discovered only the body of infantry, led his troops into the field, ignorant both of the domestic treachery and of the stratagem of the enemy. The engagement with the infantry was particularly dull, a few Romans in the first rank engaging while the Thurians rather waited than helped on the issue. The Carthaginian line retreated, on purpose that they might draw the incautious enemy to the back of the hill, where their cavalry were lying in ambush; and when they had come there, the cavalry rising up on a sudden with a shout, immediately put to flight the almost undisciplined rabble of the Thurians, not firmly attached to the side on which they fought. The Romans, notwithstanding they were surrounded and hard pressed on one side by the infantry, on the other by the cavalry, yet prolonged the battle for a considerable time; but at length even they were compelled to turn their backs, and fled towards the city. There the conspirators, forming themselves into a dense body, received the multitude of their countrymen with open gates; but when they perceived that the routed Romans were hurrying towards the city, they exclaimed that the Carthaginian was close at hand, and that the enemy would enter the city mingled with them, unless they speedily closed the gates. Thus they shut out the Romans, and left them to be cut up by the enemy. Atinius, however, and a few others were taken in. After this for a short time there was a division between them, some being of opinion that they ought to defend the city, others that they ought, after all that had happened, to yield to fortune, and deliver up the city to the conquerors; but, as it generally happens, fortune and evil counsels prevailed. Having conveyed Atinius and his party to the sea and the ships, more because they wished that care should be taken of him, in consequence of the mildness and justice of his command, than from regard to the Romans, they received the Carthaginians into the city. The consuls led their legions from Beneventum into the Campanian territory, with the intention not only of destroying the corn, which was in the blade, but of laying siege to Capua; considering that they would render their consulate illustrious by the destruction of so opulent a city, and that they would wipe away the foul disgrace of the empire, from the defection of a city so near remaining unpunished for three years. Lest, however, Beneventum should be left without protection, and that in case of any sudden emergency, if Hannibal should come to Capua, in order to bring assistance to his friends, which they doubted not he would do, the cavalry might be able to sustain his attack, they ordered Tiberius Gracchus to come from Lucania to Beneventum with his cavalry and light-armed troops and to appoint some person to take the command of the legions and stationary camp, for the defence of Lucania.

An unlucky prodigy occurred to Gracchus, while sacrificing, previous to his departure from Lucania. Two snakes gliding from a secret place to the entrails, after the sacrifice was completed, ate the liver; and after having been observed, suddenly vanished out of sight. The sacrifice having been repeated according to the admonition of the aruspices, and the vessel containing the entrails being watched with increased attention, it is reported that the snakes came a second, and a third time, and, after tasting the liver, went away untouched. Though the aruspices forewarned him that the portent had reference to the general, and that he ought to be on his guard against secret enemies and machinations, yet no foresight could avert the destiny which awaited him. There was a Lucanian, named Flavius, the leader of that party which adhered to the Romans when the others went over to Hannibal; he was this year in the magistracy, having been created praetor by the same party. Suddenly changing his mind, and seeking to ingratiate himself with the Carthaginians, he did not think it enough that he himself should pass over to them, or that he should induce the Lucanians to revolt with him, unless he ratified his league with the enemy with the head and blood of the general, betrayed to them, though his guest. He entered into a secret conference with Mago, who had the command in Bruttium, and receiving a solemn promise from him, that he would take the Lucanians into his friendship, without interfering with their laws, if he should betray the Roman general to the Carthaginians, he conducted Mago to a place to which he was about to bring Gracchus with a few attendants. He then directed Mago to arm his infantry and cavalry, and to occupy the retired places there, in which he might conceal a very large number of troops. After thoroughly inspecting and exploring the place on all sides, a day was agreed upon for the execution of the affair. Flavius came to the Roman general, and said, that "he had begun a business of great importance, for the completion of which, it was necessary to have the assistance of Gracchus himself. That he had persuaded the praetors of all the states which had revolted to the Carthaginians in the general defection of Italy, to return into the friendship of the Romans, since now the Roman power too, which had almost come to ruin by the disaster at Cannae. was daily improving and increasing, while the strength of Hannibal was sinking into decay, and was almost reduced to nothing. He had told them that the Romans would be disposed to accept an atonement for their former offence; that there never was any state more easy to be entreated, or more ready to grant pardon; how often, he had observed to them, had they forgiven rebellion even in their own ancestors! These considerations," he said, "he had himself urged, but that they would rather hear the same from Gracchus himself in person, and touching his right hand, carry with them that pledge of faith. That he had agreed upon a place with those who were privy to the transaction, out of the way of observation, and at no great distance from the Roman camp; that there the business might be settled in few words, so that all the Lucanian states might be in the alliance and friendship of the Romans." Gracchus, not suspecting any treachery either from his words or the nature of the proposal, and being caught by the probability of the thing, set out from the camp with his lictors and a troop of horse, under the guidance of his host, and fell headlong into the snare. The enemy suddenly arose from their lurking-place, and Flavius joined them; which made the treachery obvious. A shower of weapons was poured from all sides on Gracchus and his troop. He immediately leaped from his horse, and ordering the rest to do the same, exhorted them, that "as fortune had left them only one course, they would render it glorious by their valour. And what is there left," said he, "to a handful of men, surrounded by a multitude, in a valley hemmed in by a wood and mountains, except death? The only question was, whether, tamely exposing themselves to be butchered like cattle, they should die unavenged; or whether, drawing the mind off from the idea of suffering and anticipation of the event, and giving full scope to fury and resentment, they should fall while doing and daring, covered with hostile blood, amid heaps of arms and bodies of their expiring foes." He desired that "all would aim at the Lucanian traitor and deserter;" adding, that "the man who should send that victim to the shades before him, would acquire the most distinguished glory, and furnish the highest consolation for his own death." While thus speaking, he wound his cloak round his left arm, for they had not even brought their shields out with them, and then rushed upon the enemy. The exertion made in the fight was greater than could be expected from the smallness of the number. The bodies of the Romans were most exposed to the javelins, with which, as they were thrown on all sides from higher ground into a deep valley, they were transfixed. The Carthaginians seeing Gracchus now bereft of support, endeavoured to take him alive; but he having descried his Lucanian host among the enemy, rushed with such fury into their dense body that it became impossible to save his life without a great loss. Mago immediately sent his corpse to Hannibal, ordering it to be placed, with the fasces which were taken at the same time, before the tribunal of the general. This is the true account; Gracchus fell in Lucania, near the place called the Old Plains.

There are some who have put forth an account, stating, that when in the territory of Beneventum, near the river Calor, having gone out from his camp with his lictors and three servants, for the purpose of bathing, he was slain while naked and unarmed, and endeavouring to defend himself with the stones which the river brought down, by a party of the enemy which happened to be concealed among the osiers which grew upon the banks. Others state, that having gone out five hundred paces from the camp, at the instance of the aruspices, in order to expiate the prodigies before mentioned on unpolluted ground, he was cut off by two troops of Numidians who happened to be lying in ambush there. So different are the accounts respecting the place and manner of the death of so illustrious and distinguished a man. Various also are the accounts of the funeral of Gracchus. Some say that he was buried by his own friends in the Roman camp; others relate, and this is the more generally received account, that a funeral pile was erected by Hannibal, in the entrance of the Carthaginian camp; that the troops under arms performed evolutions, with the dances of the Spaniards, and motions of the arms and body, which were customary with the several nations; while Hannibal himself celebrated his obsequies with every mark of respect, both in word and deed. Such is the account of those who assert that the affair occurred in Lucania. If you are disposed to credit the statement of those who relate that he was slain at the river Calor, the enemy got possession only of the head of Gracchus; which being brought to Hannibal, he immediately despatched Carthalo to convey it into the Roman camp to Cneius Cornelius, the quaestor, who buried the general in the camp, the Beneventans joining the army in the celebration.

The consuls having entered the Campanian territory, while devastating the country on all sides, were alarmed, and thrown into confusion, by an eruption of the townsmen and Mago with his cavalry. They called in their troops to their standards from the several quarters to which they were dispersed, but having been routed when they had scarcely formed their line, they lost above fifteen hundred men. The confidence of the Campanians, who were naturally presumptuous, became excessive in consequence of this event, and in many battles they challenged the Romans; but this one battle, which they had been incautiously and imprudently drawn into, had increased the vigilance of the consuls. Their spirits were restored, while the presumption of the other party was diminished, by one trifling occurrence; but in war nothing is so inconsiderable as not to be capable, sometimes, of producing important consequences. Titus Quinctius Crispinus was a guest of Badius, a Campanian, united with him by the greatest intimacy. Their acquaintance had increased from the circumstance of Badius having received the most liberal and kind attentions at the house of Crispinus, in a fit of illness, at Rome, before the Campanian revolt. On the present occasion, Badius, advancing in front of the guards, which were stationed before the gate, desired Crispinus to be called; and Crispinus, on being informed of this, thinking that a friendly and familiar interview was requested, and the memory of their private connexion remaining even amidst the disruption of public ties, advanced a little from the rest. When they had come within view of each other, Badius exclaimed, "I challenge you to combat, Crispinus; let us mount our horses, and making the rest withdraw, let us try which is the better soldier." In reply, Crispinus said, that "neither of them were in want of enemies to display their valour upon; for his own part, even if he should meet him in the field he would turn aside, lest he should pollute his right-hand with the blood of a guest;" and then turning round, was going away. But the Campanian, with increased presumption, began to charge him with cowardice and effeminacy, and cast upon him reproaches which he deserved himself, calling him "an enemy who sheltered himself under the title of host, and one who pretended to spare him for whom he knew himself not to be a match. If he considered; that when public treaties were broken, the ties of private connexion were not severed with them, then Badius the Campanian openly, and in the hearing of both armies, renounced his connexion of hospitality with Titus Quinctius Crispinus the Roman. He said, that there could exist no fellowship or alliance with him and an enemy whose country and tutelary gods, both public and private, he had come to fight against. If he was a man, he would meet him." Crispinus hesitated for a long time; but the men of his troop at length prevailed upon him not to allow the Campanian to insult him with impunity. Waiting, therefore, only to ask his generals whether they would allow him to fight, contrary to rule, with an enemy who had challenged him; having obtained their permission, he mounted his horse, and addressing Badius by name, called him out to the combat. The Campanian made no delay. They engaged with their horses excited to hostility. Crispinus transfixed Badius with his spear in the left shoulder, over his shield. He fell from his horse in consequence of the wound; and Crispinus leaped down to despatch him as he lay, on foot. But Badius, before his enemy was upon him, ran off to his friends, leaving his horse and buckler. Crispinus, decorated with the spoils, and displaying the horse and arms which he had seized together with the bloody spear, was conducted amid the loud plaudits and congratulations of the soldiery into the presence of the consuls, where he was highly commended, and was presented with gifts.

Hannibal, having moved his camp from the territory of Beneventum to Capua, drew out his troops in order of battle the third day after his arrival; not entertaining the least doubt but that, as the Campanians had fought successfully a few days ago when he was absent, the Romans would be still less able to withstand him and his army, which had been so often victorious. After the battle had commenced, the Roman line was distressed chiefly from the attack of the cavalry, being overwhelmed with their darts, till the signal was given to the Roman cavalry to direct their horses against the enemy; thus it was a battle of the cavalry. But at this time the Sempronian army, commanded by Cneius Cornelius the quaestor, being descried at a distance, excited alarm in both parties equally, lest those who were approaching should be fresh enemies. As if by concert, therefore, both sounded a retreat; and the troops were withdrawn from the field to their camps, in an equal condition; a greater number, however, of the Romans fell in the first charge of the cavalry. The consuls, to divert the attention of Hannibal from Capua, departed thence on the following night in different directions, Fulvius into the territory of Cuma, Claudius into Lucania. The next day Hannibal, having received intelligence that the camp of the Romans was deserted, and that they had gone off in different directions in two divisions, doubtful at first which he should follow, commenced the pursuit of Appius; who, after leading him about whichever way he pleased, returned by another route to Capua. Hannibal, while in this quarter, had another opportunity of gaining an advantage. Marcus Centenius, surnamed Penula, was distinguished among the centurions of the first rank by the size of his person, and his courage. Having gone through his period of service, he was introduced to the senate by Publius Cornelius Sulla, when he requested of the fathers that five thousand men might be placed at his disposal. He said, that "as he was acquainted with the character of the enemy, and the nature of the country, he should speedily perform some service; and that he would employ those arts by which our generals and armies had been hitherto ensnared against the inventor of them." This was not promised more foolishly than it was believed; as if the qualifications of a soldier and a general were the same. Instead of five, eight thousand men were given him, half Romans, half allies. He himself also got together a considerable number of volunteers, in the country, on his march; and having almost doubled his force, arrived in Lucania, where Hannibal had halted after having in vain pursued Claudius. No doubt could be entertained of the issue of a contest which was to take place between Hannibal, as general on one side, and a centurion on the other; between armies, one of which had grown old in victory, the other entirely inexperienced, and for the most part even tumultuary and half-armed. As soon as the troops came within sight of each other, and neither of them declined an engagement, the lines were formed. The battle, notwithstanding the utter disparity of the contending parties, lasted more than two hours, the Roman troops acting with the greatest spirit as long as their general survived. But after that he had fallen, for he continually exposed himself to the weapons of the enemy, not only from regard to his former character, but through fear of the disgrace which would attach to him if he survived a disaster occasioned by his own temerity, the Roman line was immediately routed. But so completely were they prevented from flying, every way being beset by the cavalry, that scarcely a thousand men escaped out of so large an army; the rest were destroyed on all hands, in one way or other.

The siege of Capua was now resumed by the consuls with the utmost energy. Every thing requisite for the business was conveyed thither and got in readiness. A store of corn was collected at Casilinum; at the mouth of the Vulturnus, where a town now stands, a strong post was fortified; and a garrison was stationed in Puteoli, which Fabius had formerly fortified, in order to have the command of the neighbouring sea and the river. Into these two maritime forts, the corn recently sent from Sicily, with that which Marcus Junius, the praetor, had bought up in Etruria, was conveyed from Ostia, to supply the army during the winter. But, in addition to the disaster sustained in Lucania, the army also of volunteer slaves, who had served during the life of Gracchus with the greatest fidelity, as if discharged from service by the death of their general, left their standards. Hannibal was not willing that Capua should be neglected, or his allies deserted, at so critical a juncture; but, having obtained such success from the temerity of one Roman general, his attention was fixed on the opportunity which presented itself of crushing the other general and his army. Ambassadors from Apulia reported that Cneius Fulvius, the praetor, had at first conducted his measures with caution, while engaged in besieging certain towns of Apulia, which had revolted to Hannibal; but that afterwards, in consequence of extraordinary success, both himself and his soldiers, being glutted with booty, had so given themselves up to licentiousness and indolence, that all military discipline was disregarded. Having frequently on other occasions, as well as but a few days ago, experienced what an army was good for, when conducted by an unskilful commander, he moved his camp into Apulia.

The Roman legions, and the praetor, Fulvius, were in the neighbourhood of Herdonia, where, receiving intelligence of the approach of the enemy, they had nearly torn up the standards and gone out to battle without the praetor's orders; nor did any thing tend more to prevent it than the assured hope they entertained that they could do so whenever they pleased, consulting only their own will. The following night, Hannibal having obtained information that the camp was in a state of tumult, and that most of the troops were in a disorderly manner urging the general to give the signal, and calling out to arms, and therefore feeling convinced that an opportunity presented itself for a successful battle, distributed three thousand light troops in the houses in the neighbourhood, and among the thorns and woods. These, on a signal being given, were to rise up from their lurking-place with one accord; and Mago, with about two thousand horse, was ordered to occupy all the roads in the direction in which he supposed their flight would be directed. Having made these preparations during the night, he led his troops into the field at break of day. Nor did Fulvius decline the challenge; not so much from any hope of success entertained by himself, as drawn by the blind impetuosity of his soldiers. Accordingly, the line itself was formed with the same want of caution with which they entered the field, agreeably to the whim of the soldiers, who came up as chance directed, and took their stations just where they pleased; which they afterwards abandoned, as fear or caprice suggested. The first legion and the left wing of the allied troops were drawn up in front. The line was extended to a great length, the tribunes remonstrating, that there was no strength in it, and that wherever the enemy made the charge they would break through it: but no salutary advice reached their minds, nor even their ears. Hannibal was now come up, a general of a totally different character, with an army neither similar in its nature, nor similarly marshalled. The consequence was, that the Romans did not so much as sustain their shout and first attack. Their general, equal to Centenius in folly and temerity, but by no means to be compared with him in courage, when he saw things going against him, and his troops in confusion, hastily mounting his horse, fled from the field with about two hundred horsemen. The rest of the troops, beaten in front, and surrounded on the flank and rear, were slaughtered to such a degree, that out of eighteen thousand men, not more than two thousand escaped. The enemy got possession of the camp.

When these disastrous defeats, happening one upon another, were reported at Rome, great grief and consternation seized the city. But still, as the consuls had been hitherto successful when it was most important, they were the less affected by these disasters. Caius Lastorius and Marcus Metilius were sent as ambassadors to the consuls, with directions carefully to collect the remains of the two armies, and use every endeavour to prevent their surrendering themselves to the enemy, through fear or despair, (which was the case after the battle of Cannae,) and to search for the deserters from the army of volunteer slaves. Publius Cornelius was charged with the same business; to him also the levy was intrusted. He caused an order to be issued throughout the market and smaller towns, that search should be made for the volunteer slaves, and that they should be brought back to their standards. All these things were executed with the most vigilant care. The consul, Appius Claudius, having placed Decius Junius in command at the mouth of the Vulturnus, and Marcus Aurelius Cotta at Puteoli, with directions to send off the corn immediately to the camp, as each of the ships from Etruria and Sardinia arrived with it, returned himself to Capua, and found his colleague Quintus Fulvius at Casilinum, conveying every requisite thence, and making every preparation for the siege of Capua. Both of them then joined in besieging the city, summoning Claudius Nero, the praetor, from the Claudian camp at Suessula; who, leaving a small garrison there, marched down to Capua with all the rest of his forces. Thus there were three generals' tents erected round Capua; and three armies, applying themselves to the work in different parts, proceeded to surround the city with a ditch and rampart, erecting forts at moderate intervals. The Campanians attempting to obstruct the work, a battle was fought in several places at once; the consequence of which was, that at length the Campanians confined themselves within their gates and walls. Before, however, these works were carried quite round, ambassadors were sent to Hannibal to complain that Capua was abandoned, and almost given up to the Romans, and to implore him, that he would now, at least, bring them assistance, when they were not only besieged, but surrounded by a rampart. A letter was sent to the consuls from Publius Cornelius, the praetor, directing that before they completely enclosed Capua with their works, they should grant permission to such of the Campanians as chose to quit Capua, and take their property with them. That those should retain their liberty, and all their possessions, who quitted it before the ides of March, but that those who quitted it after that day, as well as those who continued there, would be considered as enemies. Proclamation was made to the Campanians to this effect, but it was received with such scorn, that they spontaneously used insulting language and menaces. Hannibal had marched his legions from Herdonea to Tarentum, with the hope of getting possession of the citadel of that place, by force or stratagem. But not succeeding there, he turned his course to Brundusium, thinking that town would be betrayed to him, but, while fruitlessly spending time there also, the Campanian ambassadors came to him with complaints and entreaties. Hannibal answered them in a proud manner, that he had before raised the siege of Capua, and that now the consuls would not sustain his approach. The ambassadors, dismissed with these hopes, with difficulty effected their return to Capua, which was by this time surrounded by a double trench and rampart.

At the time when the circumvallation of Capua was carrying on with the greatest activity, the siege of Syracuse, which had been forwarded by intestine treachery, in addition to the efforts and bravery of the general and his army, was brought to a conclusion. For in the beginning of spring, Marcellus being in doubt whether he should direct the operations of the war against Himilco and Hippocrates at Agrigentum, or press the siege of Syracuse, though he saw that it was impossible to take the city by force, which, from its situation, both with respect to sea and land, was impregnable, nor by famine, as it was supported by an uninterrupted supply of provisions from Carthage, yet that he might leave no course untried, directed the Syracusan deserters (and there were in the Roman camp some men in this situation of the highest rank, who had been driven out of the city during the defection from the Romans, because they were averse to a change of measures) to sound the feelings of those who were of the same party in conferences, and to promise them, that if Syracuse was delivered up, they should have their liberty, and be governed by their own laws. There was no opportunity however, of having a conference; for as many were suspected of disaffection, the attention and observation of all were exerted, lest any thing of the kind should occur unknown to them. One of the exiles, who was a servant, having been allowed to enter the city in the character of a deserter, assembled a few persons, and opened a conversation upon the subject. After this, certain persons, covering themselves with nets in a fishing smack, were in this way conveyed round to the Roman camp, and conferred with the fugitives. The same was frequently repeated by different parties, one after another; and at last they amounted to eighty. But after every thing had been concerted for betraying the city, the plot was reported to Epicydes, by one Attalus, who felt hurt that he had not been intrusted with the secret; and they were all put to death with torture. This attempt having miscarried, another hope was immediately raised. One Damippus, a Lacedaemonian, who had been sent from Syracuse to king Philip, had been taken prisoner by the Roman fleet. Epicydes was particularly anxious to ransom this man above any other; nor was Marcellus disinclined to grant it; the Romans, even at this time, being desirous of gaining the friendship of the Aetolians, with whom the Lacedaemonians were in alliance. Some persons having been sent to treat respecting his ransom, the most central and convenient place to both parties for this purpose appeared to be at the Trogilian port, near the tower called Galeagra. As they went there several times, one of the Romans, having a near view of the wall, and having determined its height, as nearly as it could be done by conjecture, from counting the stones, and by forming an estimate, in his own mind, what was the height of each stone in the face of the work; and having come to the conclusion that it was considerably lower than he himself and all the rest had supposed it, and that it was capable of being scaled with ladders of moderate size, laid the matter before Marcellus. It appeared a thing not to be neglected; but as the spot could not be approached, being on this very account guarded with extraordinary care, a favourable opportunity of doing it was sought for. This a deserter suggested, who brought intelligence that the Syracusans were celebrating the festival of Diana; that it was to last three days, and that as there was a deficiency of other things during the siege, the feasts would be more profusely celebrated with wine, which was furnished by Epicydes to the people in general, and distributed through the tribes by persons of distinction. When Marcellus had received this intelligence, he communicated it to a few of the military tribunes; then having selected, through their means, such centurions and soldiers as had courage and energy enough for so important an enterprise, and having privately gotten together a number of scaling-ladders, he directed that a signal should be given to the rest of the troops to take their refreshment, and go to rest early, for they were to go upon an expedition that night. Then the time, as it was supposed, having arrived, when, after having feasted from the middle of the day, they would have had their fill of wine, and have begun to sleep, he ordered the soldiers of one company to proceed with the ladders, while about a thousand armed men were in silence marched to the spot in a slender column. The foremost having mounted the wall, without noise or confusion, the others followed in order; the boldness of the former inspiring even the irresolute with courage.

The thousand armed men had now taken a part of the city, when the rest, applying a greater number of ladders, mounted the wall on a signal given from the Hexapylos. To this place the former party had arrived in entire solitude; as the greater part of them, having feasted in the towers, were either asleep from the effects of wine, or else, half asleep, were still drinking. A few of them, however, they surprised in their beds, and put to the sword. They began then to break open a postern gate near the Hexapylos, which required great force; and a signal was given from the wall by sounding a trumpet, as had been agreed upon. After this, the attack was carried on in every quarter, not secretly, but by open force; for they had now reached Epipolae, a place protected by numerous guards, where the business was to terrify the enemy, and not to escape their notice. In effect they were terrified; for as soon as the sound of the trumpets was heard, and the shouts of the men who had got possession of the walls and a part of the city, the guards concluded that every part was taken, and some of them fled along the wall, others leaped down from it, or were thrown down headlong by a crowd of the terrified townsmen. A great part of the inhabitants, however, were ignorant of this disastrous event, all of them being overpowered with wine and sleep; and because, in a city of so wide extent, what was perceived in one quarter was not readily made known through the whole city. A little before day, Marcellus having entered the city with all his forces, through the Hexapylos, which was forced open roused all the townsmen; who ran to arms, in order, if possible, by their efforts, to afford succour to the city, which was now almost taken. Epicydes advanced with a body of troops at a rapid pace from the Insula, which the Syracusans themselves call Nasos, not doubting but that he should be able to drive out what he supposed a small party, which had got over the wall through the negligence of the guards. He earnestly represented to the terrified inhabitants who met him, that they were increasing the confusion, and that in their accounts they made things greater and more important than they really were. But when he perceived that every place around Epipolae was filled with armed men, after just teasing the enemy with the discharge of a few missiles, he marched back to the Achradina, not so much through fear of the number and strength of the enemy, as that some intestine treachery might show itself, taking advantage of the opportunity, and he might find the gates of the Achradina and island closed upon him in the confusion. When Marcellus, having entered the walls, beheld this city as it lay subjected to his view from the high ground on which he stood, a city the most beautiful, perhaps, of any at that time, he is said to have shed tears over it; partly from the inward satisfaction he felt at having accomplished so important an enterprise, and partly in consideration of its ancient renown. The fleets of the Athenians sunk there, and two vast armies destroyed, with two generals of the highest reputation, as well as the many wars waged with the Carthaginians with so much peril arose before his mind; the many and powerful tyrants and kings; but above all Hiero, a king who was not only fresh in his memory, but who was distinguished for the signal services he had rendered the Roman people, and more than all by the endowments which his own virtues and good fortune had conferred. All these considerations presenting themselves at once to his recollection, and reflecting, that in an instant every thing before him would be in flames, and reduced to ashes; before he marched his troops to the Achradina, he sent before him some Syracusans, who, as was before observed, were among the Roman troops, to induce the enemy, by a persuasive address, to surrender the city.

The gates and walls of the Achradina were occupied principally by deserters, who had no hopes of pardon in case of capitulation. These men would neither suffer those who were sent to approach the walls, nor to address them. Marcellus, therefore, on the failure of this attempt, gave orders to retire to the Euryalus, which is an eminence at the extremity of the city, at the farthest point from the sea, and commanding the road leading into the fields and the interior of the island, and is conveniently situated for the introduction of supplies. This fort was commanded by Philodemus, an Argive, who was placed in this situation by Epicydes. Marcellus sent Sosis, one of the regicides, to him. After a long conversation, being put off for the purpose of frustrating him, he brought back word to Marcellus, that Philodemus had taken time to deliberate. This man postponing his answer day after day, till Hippocrates and Himilco should quit their present position, and come up with their legions; not doubting but that if he should receive them into the fort, the Roman army, shut up as it was within the walls, might be annihilated, Marcellus, who saw that the Euryalus would neither be delivered up to him, nor could be taken by force, pitched his camp between Neapolis and Tycha, which are names of divisions of the city, and are in themselves like cities; fearful lest if he entered populous parts of the city, he should not be able to restrain his soldiers, greedy of plunder, from running up and down after it. When three ambassadors came to him from Tycha and Neapolis with fillets and other badges of supplicants, imploring him to abstain from fire and slaughter, Marcellus, having held a council respecting these entreaties, for so they were, rather than demands, ordered his soldiers, according to the unanimous opinion of the council, not to offer violence to any free person, but told them that every thing else might be their booty. The walls of the houses forming a protection for his camp, he posted guards and parties of troops at the gates, which were exposed, as they faced the streets, lest any attack should be made upon his camp while the soldiers were dispersed in pursuit of plunder. After these arrangements, on a signal given, the soldiers dispersed for that purpose; and though they broke open doors and every place resounded in consequence of the alarm and confusion created, they nevertheless refrained from blood. They did not desist from plunder till they had gutted the houses of all the property which had been accumulated during a long period of prosperity. Meanwhile, Philodemus also, who despaired of obtaining assistance, having received a pledge that he might return to Epicydes in safety, withdrew the garrison, and delivered up the fortress to the Romans. While the attention of all was engaged by the tumult occasioned in that part of the city which was captured, Bomilcar, taking advantage of the night, when, from the violence of the weather the Roman fleet was unable to ride at anchor in the deep, set out from the bay of Syracuse, with thirty-five ships, and sailed away into the main without interruption; leaving fifty-five ships for Epicydes and the Syracusans; and having informed the Carthaginians in what a critical situation Syracuse was placed, returned, after a few days, with a hundred ships; having, as report says, received many presents from Epicydes out of the treasure of Hiero.

Marcellus, by gaining possession of the Euryalus, and placing a garrison in it, was freed from one cause of anxiety; which was, lest any hostile force received into that fortress on his rear might annoy his troops, shut up and confined as they were within the walls. He next invested the Achradina, erecting three camps in convenient situations, with the hope of reducing those enclosed within it to the want of every necessary. The outposts of both sides had remained inactive for several days, when the arrival of Hippocrates and Himilco suddenly caused the Romans to be attacked aggressively on all sides; for Hippocrates, having fortified a camp at the great harbour, and given a signal to those who occupied the Achradina, attacked the old camp of the Romans, in which Crispinus had the command; and Epicydes sallied out against the outposts of Marcellus, the Carthaginian fleet coming up to that part of the shore which lay between the city and the Roman camp, so that no succour could be sent by Marcellus to Crispinus. The enemy, however, produced more tumult than conflict; for Crispinus not only drove back Hippocrates from his works, but pursued him as he fled with precipitation, while Marcellus drove Epicydes into the city; and it was considered that enough was now done even to prevent any danger arising in future from their sudden sallies. They were visited too by a plague; a calamity extending to both sides, and one which might well divert their attention from schemes of war. For as the season of the year was autumn, and the situation naturally unwholesome, though this was much more the case without than within the city, the intolerable intensity of the heat had an effect upon the constitution of almost every man in both the camps. At first they sickened and died from the unhealthiness of the season and climate; but afterwards the disease was spread merely by attending upon, and coming in contact with, those affected; so that those who were seized with it either perished neglected and deserted, or else drew with them those who sat by them and attended them, by infecting them with the same violence of disease. Daily funerals and death were before the eye; and lamentations were heard from all sides, day and night. At last, their feelings had become so completely brutalized by being habituated to these miseries, that they not only did not follow their dead with tears and decent lamentations, but they did not even carry them out and bury them; so that the bodies of the dead lay strewed about, exposed to the view of those who were awaiting a similar fate; and thus the dead were the means of destroying the sick, and the sick those who were in health, both by fear and by the filthy state and the noisome stench of their bodies. Some preferring to die by the sword, even rushed alone upon the outposts of the enemy. The violence of the plague, however, was much greater in the Carthaginian than the Roman army; for the latter, from having been a long time before Syracuse, had become more habituated to the climate and the water. Of the army of the enemy, the Sicilians, as soon as they perceived that diseases had become very common from the unwholesomeness of the situation, dispersed to their respective cities in the neighbourhood; but the Carthaginians, who had no place to retire to, perished, together with their generals, Hippocrates and Himilco, to a man. Marcellus, on seeing the violence with which the disease was raging, had removed his troops into the city, where their debilitated frames were recruited in houses and shade. Many however, of the Roman army were cut off by this pestilence.

The land forces of the Carthaginians being thus destroyed, the Sicilians, who had served under Hippocrates retired to two towns of no great size, but well secured by natural situation and fortifications; one was three miles, the other fifteen, from Syracuse. Here they collected a store of provisions from their own states, and sent for reinforcements. Meanwhile, Bomilcar, who had gone a second time to Carthage, by so stating the condition of their allies as to inspire a hope that they might not only render them effectual aid, but also that the Romans might in a manner be made prisoners in the city which they had captured, induced the Carthaginians to send with him as many ships of burden as possible, laden with every kind of provisions, and to augment the number of his ships. Setting sail, therefore, from Carthage with a hundred and thirty men of war and seven hundred transports, he had tolerably fair winds for crossing over to Sicily, but was prevented by the same wind from doubling Cape Pachynum. The news of the approach of Bomilcar, and afterwards his unexpected delay, excited alternate fear and joy in the Romans and Syracusans. Epicydes, apprehensive lest if the same wind which now detained him should continue to blow from the east for several days, the Carthaginian fleet would return to Africa, put the Achradina in the hands of the generals of the mercenary troops, and sailed to Bomilcar; whom he at length prevailed upon to try the issue of a naval battle, though he found him with his fleet stationed in the direction of Africa, and afraid of fighting, not so much because he was unequal in the strength or the number of his ships, for he had more than the Romans, as because the wind was more favourable to the Roman fleet than to his own. Marcellus also seeing that an army of Sicilians was assembling from every part of the island, and that the Carthaginian fleet was approaching with a great want of supplies, though inferior in the number of his ships, resolved to prevent Bomilcar from coming to Syracuse, lest, blocked up in the city of his enemies, he should be pressed both by sea and land. The two hostile fleets were stationed near the promontory of Pachynum, ready to engage as soon as the sea should become calm enough to admit of their sailing out into the deep. Accordingly, the east wind, which had blown violently for several days, now subsiding, Bomilcar got under sail first, his van seeming to make for the main sea, in order to double the promontory with greater ease; but seeing the Roman ships bearing down upon him, terrified by some unexpected occurrence, it is not known what, he sailed away into the main sea; and sending messengers to Heraclea, to order the transports to return to Africa, he passed along the coast of Sicily and made for Tarentum. Epicydes, thus suddenly disappointed in such great expectations, to avoid returning to endeavour to raise the siege of a city, a great part of which was already in the hands of the enemy, sailed to Agrigentum, intending to wait the issue of the contest, rather than take any new measures when there.

Intelligence of these events having been carried into the camp of the Sicilians, that Epicydes had departed from Syracuse, that the island was deserted by the Carthaginians, and almost again delivered up to the Romans; after sounding the inclinations of the besieged in conferences, they sent ambassadors to Marcellus, to treat about terms of capitulation. They had not much difficulty in coming to an agreement, that all the parts of the island which had been under the dominion of their kings should be ceded to the Romans; that the rest, with their liberty and their own laws, should be preserved to the Sicilians. They then invited to a conference the persons who had been intrusted with the management of affairs by Epicydes; to whom they said, that they were sent from the army of the Sicilians, at once to Marcellus and to them, that both those who were besieged and those who were not might share the same fortune; and that neither of them might stipulate any thing for themselves separately. They were then allowed to enter, in order to converse with their relations and friends; when, laying before them the terms which they had made with Marcellus, and holding out to them a hope of safety, they induced them to join with them in an attack upon the prefects of Epicydes, Polyclitus, Philistion, and Epicydes, surnamed Sindon. Having put them to death, they summoned the multitude to an assembly; and after complaining of the famine, at which they had been accustomed to express their dissatisfaction to each other in secret, they said, that "although they were pressed by so many calamities, they had no right to accuse Fortune, because it was at their own option how long they should continue to suffer them. That the motive which the Romans had in besieging Syracuse was affection for the Syracusans, and not hatred; for when they heard that the government was usurped by Hippocrates and Epicydes, the creatures first of Hannibal and then of Hieronymus, they took arms and began to besiege the city, in order to reduce not the city itself, but its cruel tyrants. But now that Hippocrates is slain, Epicydes shut out of Syracuse, his praefects put to death, and the Carthaginians driven from the entire possession of Sicily by sea and land, what reason can the Romans have left why they should not desire the preservation of Syracuse, in the same manner as they would if Hiero were still lining, who cultivated the friendship of Rome with unequalled fidelity? That, therefore, neither the city nor its inhabitants were in any danger, except from themselves, if they neglected an opportunity of restoring themselves to the favour of the Romans; and that no so favourable a one would ever occur as that which presented itself at the present instant, immediately upon its appearing that they were delivered from their insolent tyrants."

This speech was received with the most unqualified approbation of all present. It was resolved, however, that praetors should be elected before the nomination of deputies; which being done, some of the praetors themselves were sent as deputies to Marcellus, the chief of whom thus addressed him: "Neither in the first instance did we Syracusans revolt from you, but Hieronymus, whose impiety towards you was by no means so great as towards us; nor afterwards was it any Syracusan who disturbed the peace established by the death of the tyrant, but Hippocrates and Epicydes, creatures of the tyrant; while we were overpowered, on the one hand by fear, and on the other by treachery. Nor can any one say that there ever was a time when we were in possession of our liberty, when we were not also at peace with you. In the present instance, manifestly, as soon as ever we became our own masters, by the death of those persons who held Syracuse in subjection, we lost no time in coming to deliver up our arms, to surrender ourselves, our city, and our walls, and to refuse no conditions which you shall impose upon us. To you, Marcellus, the gods have given the glory of having captured the most renowned and beautiful of the Grecian cities. Every memorable exploit which we have at any time achieved by land or sea accrues to the splendour of your triumph. Would you wish that it should be known only by fame, how great a city has been captured by you, rather than that she should stand as a monument even to posterity; so that to every one who visits her by sea or land, she may point out at one time our trophies gained from the Athenians and Carthaginians, at another time those which you have gained from us; and that you should transmit Syracuse unimpaired to your family, to be kept under the protection and patronage of the race of the Marcelli? Let not the memory of Hieronymus have greater weight with you than that of Hiero. The latter was your friend for a much longer period than the former was your enemy. From the latter you have realized even benefits, while the frenzy of Hieronymus only brought ruin upon himself." At the hands of the Romans all things were obtainable and secure. There was a greater disposition to war, and more danger to be apprehended among themselves; for the deserters, thinking that they were delivered up to the Romans, induced the mercenary auxiliaries to entertain the same apprehension; and hastily seizing their arms, they first put the praetors to death, and then ran through the city to massacre the Syracusans. In their rage they slew all whom chance threw in their way, and plundered every thing which presented itself; and then, lest they should have no leaders, they elected six praetors, so that three might have the command in the Achradina, and three in the island. At length, the tumult having subsided, and the mercenary troops having ascertained, by inquiry, what had been negotiated with the Romans, it began to appear, as was really the case, that their cause and that of the deserters were different.

The ambassadors returned from Marcellus very opportunely. They informed them that they had been influenced by groundless suspicions, and that the Romans saw no reason why they should inflict punishment upon them. Of the three praefects of the Achradina one was a Spaniard, named Mericus. To him one of the Spanish auxiliaries was designedly sent, among those who accompanied the ambassadors. Having obtained an interview with Mericus in the absence of witnesses, he first explained to him the state in which he had left Spain, from which he had lately returned: "That there every thing was in subjection to the Roman arms; that it was in his power, by doing the Romans a service, to become the first man among his countrymen, whether he might be inclined to serve with the Romans, or to return to his country. On the other hand, if he persisted in preferring to hold out against the siege, what hope could he have, shut up as he was by sea and land?" Mericus was moved by these suggestions, and when it was resolved upon to send ambassadors to Marcellus, he sent his brother among them; who, being brought into the presence of Marcellus, apart from the rest, by means of the same Spaniard, after receiving an assurance of protection, arranged the method of carrying their object into effect, and then returned to the Achradina. Mericus then, in order to prevent any one from conceiving a suspicion of treachery, declared, that he did not like that deputies should be passing to and fro; he thought that they should neither admit nor send any; and in order that the guards might be kept more strictly, that such parts as were most exposed should be distributed among the prefects, each being made responsible for the safety of his own quarter. All approved of the distribution of the posts. The district which fell to the lot of Mericus himself extended from the fountain Arethusa to the mouth of the large harbour, of which he caused the Romans to be informed. Accordingly, Marcellus ordered a transport with armed men to be towed by a quadrireme to the Achradina during the night, and the soldiers to be landed in the vicinity of that gate which is near the fountain of Arethusa. This order having been executed at the fourth watch, and Mericus having received the soldiers when landed at the gate, according to the agreement, Marcellus assaulted the walls of the Achradina with all his forces at break of day, so that he not only engaged the attention of those who occupied the Achradina, but also bands of armed men, quitting their own posts ran to the spot from the island, in order to repel the furious attack of the Romans. During this confusion, some light ships which had been prepared beforehand, and had sailed round, landed a body of armed men at the island; these suddenly attacking the half-manned stations and the opened door of the gate at which the troops had a little before run out, got possession of the island without much opposition, abandoned as it was, in consequence of the flight and trepidation of its guards. Nor were there any who rendered less service, or showed less firmness in maintaining their posts, than the deserters; for as they did not repose much confidence even in those of their own party, they fled in the middle of the contest. When Marcellus learnt that the island was taken, one quarter of the Achradina in the hands of his troops, and that Mericus, with the men under his command, had joined them, he sounded a retreat, lest the royal treasure, the fame of which was greater than the reality, should be plundered.

The impetuosity of the soldiers having been checked, time and opportunity to escape were given to the deserters in the Achradina; and the Syracusans, at length delivered from their fears, threw open the gates of the Achradina, and sent deputies to Marcellus, requesting only safety for themselves and children. Having summoned a council, to which the Syracusans were invited who were among the Roman troops, having been driven from home during the disturbances, Marcellus replied, "that the services rendered by Hiero through a period of fifty years, were not more in number than the injuries committed against the Roman people in these few years by those who had had possession of Syracuse; but that most of these injuries had justly recoiled upon their authors, and that they had inflicted much more severe punishment upon themselves for the violation of treaties, than the Roman people desired. That he was indeed now besieging Syracuse for the third year, but not that the Romans might hold that state in a condition of slavery, but that the ringleaders of the deserters might not keep it in a state of thraldom and oppression. What the Syracusans could do was exemplified, either by the conduct of those Syracusans who were among the Roman troops, or that of the Spanish general, Mericus, who had delivered up the post which he was appointed to command, or, lastly, by the late but bold measure adopted by the Syracusans themselves. That the greatest possible recompence for all the evils and dangers which he had for so long a time undergone, both by sea and land, around the walls of Syracuse, was the reflection, that he had been able to take that city." The quaestor was then sent with a guard to the island, to receive and protect the royal treasure. The city was given up to be plundered by the soldiery, after guards had been placed at each of the houses of those who had been with the Roman troops. While many acts exhibited horrid examples of rage and rapacity, it is recorded that Archimedes, while intent on some figures which he had described in the dust, although the confusion was as great as could possibly exist in a captured city, in which soldiers were running up and down in search of plunder, was put to death by a soldier, who did not know who he was; that Marcellus was grieved at this event, and that pains were taken about his funeral, while his relations also for whom diligent inquiry was made, derived honour and protection from his name and memory. Such, for the most part, was the manner in which Syracuse was captured. The quantity of booty was so great, that had Carthage itself, which was carrying on a contest on equal terms, been captured, it would scarcely have afforded so much. A few days before the taking of Syracuse, Titus Otacilius passed over from Lilybaeum to Utica with eighty quinqueremes, and entering the harbour before it was light, took some transports laden with corn; then landing, he laid waste a considerable portion of the country around Utica, and brought back to his ships booty of every description. He returned to Lilybaeum, the third day after he set out, with a hundred and thirty transports laden with corn and booty. The corn he sent immediately to Syracuse; and had it not been for the very seasonable arrival of this supply, a destructive famine threatened alike the victors and the vanquished.

Nothing very memorable had been done in Spain for about two years, the operations of the war consisting more in laying plans than in fighting; but during the same summer in which the events above recorded took place, the Roman generals, quitting their winter quarters, united their forces; then a council was summoned; and the opinions of all accorded, that since their only object hitherto had been to prevent Hasdrubal from pursuing his march into Italy, it was now time that an effort should be made to bring the war in Spain to a termination; and they thought that the twenty thousand Celtiberians, who had been induced to take arms that winter, formed a sufficient accession to their strength. There were three armies of the enemy. Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, and Mago, who had united their forces, were about a five days' journey from the Romans. Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar, who was the old commander in Spain, was nearer to them: he was with his army near the city Anitorgis. The Roman generals were desirous that he should be overpowered first; and they hoped that they had enough and more than enough strength for the purpose. Their only source of anxiety was, lest the other Hasdrubal and Mago, terrified at his discomfiture, should protract the war by withdrawing into trackless forests and mountains. Thinking it, therefore, the wisest course to divide their forces and embrace the whole Spanish war, they arranged it so that Publius Cornelius should lead two-thirds of the Roman and allied troops against Mago and Hasdrubal, and that Cneius Cornelius, with the remaining third of the original army, and with the Celtiberians added to them, should carry on the war with the Barcine Hasdrubal. The two generals and their armies, setting out together, preceded by the Celtiberians, pitched their camp near the city Anitorgis, within sight of the enemy, the river only separating them. Here Cneius Scipio, with the forces above mentioned, halted, but Publius Scipio proceeded to the portion of the war assigned to him.

Hasdrubal perceiving that there were but few Roman troops in the camp, and that their whole dependence was on the Celtiberian auxiliaries; and having had experience of the perfidy of the barbarian nations in general, and particularly of all those nations among which he had served for so many years; as there was every facility of intercourse, for both camps were full of Spaniards, by secret conferences with the chiefs of the Celtiberians, he agreed with them, for a large consideration, to take their forces away. Nor did they conceive it to be any great crime; for the object was not that they should turn their arms against the Romans, while the reward which they were to receive to abstain from the war was large enough to remunerate them for their service in it. At the same time the mere rest from labour, the return to their homes, with the pleasure of seeing their friends and property, were pleasing to the generality. Accordingly, the multitude were prevailed upon as easily as their leaders. They had, moreover, nothing to fear from the Romans, in consequence of the smallness of their numbers, should they endeavour to detain them by force. It will indeed be the duty of all Roman generals to take care, and the instances here recorded should be considered as strong arguments, never to place so much confidence in foreign auxiliaries, as not to retain in their camps a preponderance of their own strength and of that force which is properly their own. The Celtiberians, suddenly taking up their standards, marched away, replying only to the Romans, who asked the cause of their departure and entreated them to stay, that they were called away by a war at home. Scipio seeing that his allies could be detained neither by prayers nor force, and that he was neither a match for his enemy without them, nor could again effect a junction with his brother, no other course which promised safety offering itself, resolved to retire as far as possible, carefully using every caution not to encounter the enemy any where on level ground. On his departing, the enemy, crossing the river, pursued him almost in his footsteps.

During the same period an equal terror and a greater danger pressed upon Publius Scipio. Masinissa was a young man at that time an ally of the Carthaginians, whom afterwards the friendship of the Romans rendered illustrious and powerful. He not only opposed himself with his Numidian cavalry to Scipio on his approach, but afterwards harassed him incessantly day and night, so as both to cut off his stragglers, who had gone out to a distance from the camp in search of wood and forage, and riding up to the very gates of his camp, and charging into the midst of his advanced guards, to fill every quarter with the utmost confusion. By night also alarm was frequently occasioned in the gates and rampart by his sudden attacks. Nor was there any time or place at which the Romans were exempt from fear and anxiety; and driven within their rampart, and deprived of every necessary, they suffered in a manner a regular siege; and it appeared that it would have been still straiter, if Indibilis, who it was reported was approaching with seven thousand five hundred Suessetani, should form a junction with the Carthaginians. Scipio, though a wary and provident general, overpowered by difficulties, adopted the rash measure of going to meet Indibilis by night, with the intention of fighting him wherever he should meet him. Leaving, therefore, a small force in his camp, under the command of Titus Fonteius, lieutenant-general, he set out at midnight, and meeting with the enemy, came to battle with him. The troops fought in the order of march rather than of battle. The Romans, however, had the advantage, though in an irregular fight; but the Numidian cavalry, whose observation the general supposed that he had escaped, suddenly spreading themselves round his flanks, occasioned great terror. After a new contest had been entered into with the Numidians, a third enemy came up in addition to the rest, the Carthaginian generals having come up with their rear when they were now engaged in fighting. Thus the Romans were surrounded on every side by enemies; nor could they make up their minds which they should attack first, or in what part, forming themselves into a close body, they should force their way through. The general, while fighting and encouraging his men, exposing himself wherever the strife was the hottest, was run through the right side with a lance; and when the party of the enemy, which, formed into a wedge, had charged the troops collected round the general, perceived Scipio falling lifeless from his horse, elated with joy, they ran shouting through the whole line with the news that the Roman general had fallen. These words spreading in every direction, caused the enemy to be considered as victors, and the Romans as vanquished. On the loss of the general the troops immediately began to fly from the field; but though it was not difficult to force their way through the Numidians and the other light-armed auxiliaries, yet it was scarcely possible for them to escape so large a body of cavalry, and infantry equal to horses in speed. Almost more were slain in the flight than in the battle; nor would a man have survived, had not night put a stop to the carnage, the day by this time rapidly drawing to a close.

After this, the Carthaginian generals, who were not slow in following up their victory, immediately after the battle, scarcely giving their soldiers necessary rest, hurry their army to Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar; confidently hoping, that after uniting their forces with his, the war might be brought to a conclusion. On their arrival, the warmest congratulations passed between the troops and their generals, who were delighted with their recent victory; for they had not only destroyed one distinguished general and all his men, but looked forward to another victory of equal magnitude as a matter of certainty. The intelligence of this great disaster had not yet reached the Romans; but there prevailed a kind of melancholy silence and mute foreboding, such as is usually found in minds which have a presentiment of impending calamity. The general himself, besides feeling that he was deserted by his allies, and that the forces of the enemy were so much augmented, was disposed from conjecture and reasoning rather to a suspicion that some defeat had been sustained, than to any favourable hopes. "For how could Hasdrubal and Mago bring up their troops without opposition, unless they had terminated their part of the war? How was it that his brother had not opposed his progress or followed on his rear? in order that if he could not prevent the armies and generals of the enemy from forming a junction, he might himself join his forces with his brother's." Disturbed with these cares, he believed that the only safe policy for the present was to retire as far as possible; and, accordingly, he marched a considerable distance thence in one night, the enemy not being aware of it, and on that account continuing quiet. At dawn, perceiving that their enemy had decamped, they sent the Numidians in advance, and began to pursue them as rapidly as possible. The Numidians overtook them before night, and charged; sometimes their rear, at other times their flanks. They then began to halt and defend themselves as well as they could; but Scipio exhorted them at once to fight so as not to expose themselves, and march at the same time, lest the infantry should overtake them.

But having made but little progress for a long time, in consequence of his making his troops sometimes advance and at others halt, and night now drawing on, Scipio recalled his troops from the battle, and collecting them, withdrew to a certain eminence, not very safe, indeed, particularly for dispirited troops, but higher than any of the surrounding places. There, at first, his infantry, drawn up around his baggage and cavalry, which were placed in their centre, had no difficulty in repelling the attacks of the charging Numidians; but afterwards, when three generals with three regular armies marched up in one entire body, and it was evident that his men would not be able to do much by arms in defending the position without fortifications, the general began to look about, and consider whether he could by any means throw a rampart around; but the hill was so bare, and the soil so rough, that neither could a bush be found for cutting a palisade, nor earth for making a mound, nor the requisites for making a trench or any other work; nor was the place naturally steep or abrupt enough to render the approach and ascent difficult to the enemy, as it rose on every side with a gentle acclivity. However, that they might raise up against them some semblance of a rampart, they placed around them the panniers tied to the burdens, building them up as it were to the usual height, and when there was a deficiency of panniers for raising it, they presented against the enemy a heap of baggage of every kind. The Carthaginian armies coming up, very easily marched up the eminence, but were stopped by the novel appearance of the fortification, as by something miraculous, when their leaders called out from all sides, asking "what they stopped at? and why they did not tear down and demolish that mockery, which was scarcely strong enough to impede the progress of women and children; that the enemy, who were skulking behind their baggage, were, in fact, captured and in their hands." Such were the contemptuous reproofs of their leaders. But it was not an easy task either to leap over or remove the burdens raised up against them, or to cut through the panniers, closely packed together and covered completely with baggage. When the removal of the burdens had opened a way to the troops, who were detained by them for a long time, and the same had been done in several quarters, the camp was now captured on all sides; the Romans were cut to pieces on all hands, the few by the many, the dispirited by the victorious. A great number of the men, however, having fled for refuge into the neighbouring woods, effected their escape to the camp of Publius Scipio, which Titus Fonteius commanded. Some authors relate that Cneius Scipio was slain on the eminence on the first assault of the enemy; others that he escaped with a few attendants to a castle near the camp; this, they say, was surrounded with fire, by which means the doors which they could not force were consumed; that it was thus taken, and all within, together with the general himself, put to death. Cneius Scipio was slain in the eighth year after his arrival in Spain, and on the twenty-ninth day after the death of his brother. At Rome the grief occasioned by their death was not more intense than that which was felt throughout Spain. The sorrow of the citizens, however, was partly distracted by the loss of the armies, the alienation of the province, and the public disaster, while in Spain they mourned and regretted the generals themselves, Cneius, however, the more, because he had been longer in command of them, had first engaged their affections, and first exhibited a specimen of Roman justice and forbearance.

When it seemed that the Roman armies were annihilated, and Spain lost, one man recovered this desperate state of affairs. There was in the army one Lucius Marcius, the son of Septimus, a Roman knight, an enterprising youth, and possessing a mind and genius far superior to the condition in which he had been born. To his high talents had been added the discipline of Cneius Scipio, under which he had been thoroughly instructed during a course of so many years in all the qualifications of a soldier. This man, having collected the troops which had been dispersed in the flight, and drafted some from the garrisons, had formed an army not to be despised, and united it with Titus Tonteius, the lieutenant-general of Publius Scipio. But so transcendent was the Roman knight in authority and honour among the troops, that when, after fortifying a camp on this side of the Iberus, it had been resolved that a general of the two armies should be elected in an assembly of the soldiers, relieving each other in the guard of the rampart, and in keeping the outposts until every one had given his vote, they unanimously conferred the supreme command upon Lucius Marcius. All the intervening time, which was but short, was occupied in fortifying their camp and collecting provisions, and the soldiers executed every order not only with vigour, but with feelings by no means depressed. But when intelligence was brought them that Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, who was coming to put the finishing stroke to the war, had crossed the Iberus and was drawing near, and when they saw the signal for battle displayed by a new commander, then calling to mind whom they had had for their leaders a little while ago, relying on what leaders and what forces they used to go out to fight, they all suddenly burst into tears and beat their heads, some raising their hands to heaven and arraigning the gods, others prostrating themselves upon the ground and invoking by name each his own former commander. Nor could their lamentations be restrained, though the centurions endeavoured to animate their companies, and though Marcius himself soothed and remonstrated with them, asking them "why they had given themselves up to womanish and unavailing lamentations rather than summon up all their courage to protect themselves and the commonwealth together, and not suffer their generals to lie unavenged?" But suddenly a shout and the sound of trumpets were heard; for by this time the enemy were near the rampart. Upon this, their grief being suddenly converted into rage, they hastily ran to arms, and, as it were, burning with fury, rushed to the gates and charged the enemy, while advancing in a careless and disorderly manner. This unexpected event instantly struck terror into the Carthaginians, who wondering whence so many enemies could have sprung up so suddenly, as the army had been almost annihilated; what could have inspired men who had been vanquished and routed with such boldness and confidence in themselves; what general could have arisen now that the two Scipios were slain; who could command the camp, and who had given the signal for battle; in consequence of these so many and so unexpected circumstances, at first, being in a state of complete uncertainty and amazement, they gave ground; but afterwards, discomfited by the violence of the charge, they turned their backs; and either there would have been a dreadful slaughter of the flying enemy, or a rash and dangerous effort on the part of the pursuers, had not Marcius promptly given the signal for retreat, and by throwing himself in the way of the front rank, and even holding some back with his own hands, repressed the infuriated troops. He then led them back to the camp, still eager for blood and slaughter. When the Carthaginians, who were at first compelled to fly with precipitation from the rampart of their enemy, saw that no one pursued them, concluding that they had stopped from fear, now on the other hand went away to their camp at an easy pace, with feelings of contempt for the enemy. There was a corresponding want of care in guarding their camp; for though the enemy were near, yet it seemed that they were but the remains of the two armies which had been cut to pieces a few days before. As in consequence of this all things were neglected in the enemy's camp, Marcius having ascertained this, addressed his mind to a measure which on the first view of it might appear rather rash than bold: it was, aggressively to assault the enemy's camp, concluding that the camp of Hasdrubal, while alone, might be carried with less difficulty than his own could be defended, if the three armies and as many generals should again unite; taking into consideration also that either if he succeeded he would retrieve their prostrate fortune, or if repulsed, still, by making the attack himself, he would rescue himself from contempt.

Lest, however, the suddenness of the affair, and the fear of night, should frustrate a measure which was in itself ill adapted to his condition, he thought it right that his soldiers should be addressed and exhorted; and having called an assembly, he discoursed as follows: "Soldiers, either my veneration for our late commanders, both living and dead, or our present situation, may impress on every one the belief that this command, as it is highly honourable to me, conferred by your suffrages, so is it in its nature a heavy and anxious charge. For at a time when I should be scarcely so far master of myself as to be able to find any solace for my afflicted mind, did not fear deaden the sense of sorrow, I am compelled to take upon myself alone the task of consulting for the good of you all; a task of the greatest difficulty when under the influence of grief. And not even at that critical moment, when I ought to be considering in what manner I may be enabled to keep together for my country these remains of two armies, can I divert my mind from the affliction which incessantly preys upon me. For bitter recollection is ever present, and the Scipios ever disturb me with anxious cares by day and dreams by night, frequently rousing me from my sleep, and imploring me not to suffer themselves nor their soldiers, your companions in war, who had been victorious in this country for eight years, nor the commonwealth to remain unrevenged; enjoining me also to follow their discipline and their plans; and desiring that as there was no one more obedient to their commands while they were alive than I, so after their death I would consider that conduct as best, which I might have the strongest reason for believing they would have adopted in each case. I could wish also that you, my soldiers, should not show your respect for them by lamentations and tears, as if they were dead; (for they still live and flourish in the fame of their achievements;) but that whenever the memory of those men shall occur to you, you would go into battle as though you saw them encouraging you and giving you the signal. Nor certainly could anything else than their image presenting itself yesterday to your eyes and minds, have enabled you to fight that memorable battle, in which you proved to the enemy that the Roman name had not become extinct with the Scipios; and that the energy and valour of that people, which had not been overwhelmed by the disaster at Cannae, would, doubtlessly, emerge from the severest storms of fortune. Now since you have dared so much of your own accord, I have a mind to try how much you will dare when authorized by your general: for yesterday, when I gave the signal for retreat while you were pursuing the routed enemy with precipitation, I did not wish to break your spirit, but to reserve it for greater glory and more advantageous opportunities; that you might afterwards, when prepared and armed, seize an occasion of attacking your enemy while off their guard, unarmed, and even buried in sleep. Nor do I entertain the hope of gaining an opportunity of this kind rashly, but from the actual state of things. Doubtless, if any one should ask even himself, by what means, though few in number and disheartened by defeat, you defended your camp against troops superior in number and victorious, you would give no other answer than that, as this was the very thing you were afraid of, you had kept every place secured by works and yourselves ready and equipped. And so it generally happens: men are least secure against that which fortune causes not to be feared; because you leave unguarded and exposed what you think is not necessary to be cared about. There is nothing whatever which the enemy fear less at the present time, than lest we, who were a little while ago besieged and assaulted, should aggressively assault their camp ourselves. Let us dare, then, to do that which it is incredible we should have the courage to attempt; it will be most easy from the very fact of its appearing most difficult. At the third watch of the night I will lead you thither in silence. I have ascertained by means of scouts that they have no regular succession of watches, no proper outposts. Our shout at their gates, when heard, and the first assault, will carry their camp. Then let that carnage be made among men, torpid with sleep, terrified at the unexpected tumult, and overpowered while lying defenceless in their beds, from which you were so grieved to be recalled yesterday. I know that the measure appears to you a daring one; but in difficult and almost desperate circumstances the boldest counsels are always the safest. For if when the critical moment has arrived, the opportunity of seizing which is of a fleeting nature, you delay ever so little, in vain do you seek for it afterwards when it has been neglected. One army is near us; two more are not far off. We have some hopes if we make an attack now; and you have already made trial of your own and their strength. If we postpone the time and cease to be despised in consequence of the fame of yesterday's irruption, there is danger lest all the generals and all the forces should unite. Shall we be able then to withstand three generals and three armies, whom Cneius Scipio with his army unimpaired could not withstand? As our generals have perished by dividing their forces, so the enemy may be overpowered while separated and divided. There is no other mode of maintaining the war; let us, therefore, wait for nothing but the opportunity of the ensuing night. Now depart, with the favour of the gods, and refresh yourselves, that, unfatigued and vigorous, you may burst into the enemy's camp with the same spirit with which you have defended your own." This new enterprise, proposed by their new general, they received with joy; and the more daring it was the more it pleased them. The remainder of the day was spent in getting their arms in readiness and recruiting their strength, the greater part of the night was given to rest, and at the fourth watch they were in motion.

At a distance of six miles beyond their nearest camp lay other forces of the Carthaginians. A deep valley, thickly planted with trees, intervened. Near about the middle of this wood a Roman cohort and some cavalry were placed in concealment with Punic craft. The communication between the two armies being thus cut off, the rest of the forces were marched in silence to the nearest body of the enemy; and as there were no outposts before the gates, and no guards on the rampart, they entered quite into the camp, as though it had been their own, no one any where opposing them. The signals were then sounded and a shout raised. Some put the enemy to the sword when half asleep; others threw fire upon the huts, which were covered in with dry straw; others blocked up the gates to intercept their escape. The enemy, who were assailed at once with fire, shouting, and the sword, were in a manner bereaved of their senses, and could neither hear each other, nor take any measures for their security. Unarmed, they fell into the midst of troops of armed men: some hastened to the gates; others, as the passes were flocked up, leaped over the rampart, and as each escaped they fled directly towards the other camp, where they were cut off by the cohort and cavalry rushing forward from their concealment, and were all slain to a man. And even had any escaped from that carnage, the Romans, after taking the nearer camp, ran over to the other with such rapidity, that no one could have arrived before them with news of the disaster. In this camp, as they were far distant from the enemy, and as some had gone off just before daylight for forage, wood, and plunder, they found every thing in a still more neglected and careless state. Their arms only were placed at the outposts, the men being unarmed, and either sitting and reclining upon the ground, or else walking up and down before the rampart and the gates. On these men, thus at their ease and unguarded, the Romans, still hot from the recent battle, and flushed with victory, commenced an attack; no effectual opposition therefore could be made to them in the gates. Within the gates, the troops having rushed together from every part of the camp at the first shout and alarm, a furious conflict arose; which would have continued for a long time, had not the bloody appearance of the Roman shields discovered to the Carthaginians the defeat of the other forces, and consequently struck them with dismay. This alarm produced a general flight; and all except those who were overtaken with the sword, rushing out precipitately wherever they could find a passage, abandoned their camp. Thus, in a night and a day, two camps of the enemy were carried, under the conduct of Lucius Marcius. Claudius, who translated the annals of Acilius out of Greek into Latin, states that as many as thirty-seven thousand men were slain, one thousand eight hundred and thirty made prisoners, and a great booty obtained; among which was a silver shield of a hundred and thirty-eight pounds' weight, with an image upon it of the Barcine Hasdrubal. Valerius Antias states, that the camp Of Mago only was captured, and seven thousand of the enemy slain; and that in the other battle, when the Romans sallied out and fought with Hasdrubal, ten thousand were slain, and four thousand three hundred captured. Piso writes, that five thousand were slain in an ambuscade when Mago incautiously pursued our troops who retired. With all, the name of the general, Marcius, is mentioned with great honour, and to his real glory they add even miracles. They say, that while he was haranguing his men a stream of fire poured from his head without his perceiving it, to the great terror of the surrounding soldiers; and that a shield, called the Marcian, with an image of Hasdrubal upon it, remained in the temple up to the time of the burning of the Capitol, a monument of his victory over the Carthaginians. After this, affairs continued for a considerable time in a tranquil state in Spain, as both parties, after giving and receiving such important defeats, hesitated to run the hazard of a general battle.

During these transactions in Spain, Marcellus, after the capture of Syracuse, having settled the other affairs in Sicily with so much honour and integrity as not only to add to his own renown, but also to the majesty of the Roman people, conveyed to Rome the ornaments of the city, together with the statues and pictures with which Syracuse abounded. These were certainly spoils taken from enemies, and acquired according to the laws of war; but hence was the origin of the admiration of the products of Grecian art, and to that freedom with which at present all places, both sacred and profane, are despoiled; which at last recoiled upon the Roman gods, and first upon that very temple which was so choicely adorned by Marcellus. For foreigners were in the habit of visiting the temples dedicated by Marcellus near the Capuan gate, on account of their splendid ornaments of this description, of which a very small portion can be found. Embassies from almost all the states of Sicily came to him. As their cases were different, so were also the terms granted to them. Those who had either not revolted or had returned to the alliance before the capture of Syracuse, were received and honoured as faithful allies. Those who had been induced to submit through fear after the capture of Syracuse, as vanquished, received laws from the conqueror. The Romans, however, had still remaining a war of no small magnitude at Agrigentum, headed by Epicydes and Hanno, generals in the late war, and a third new one sent by Hannibal in the room of Hippocrates, a Libyphoenician by nation, and a native of Hippo, called by his countrymen Mutines; an energetic man, and thoroughly instructed in all the arts of war under the tuition of Hannibal. To this man the Numidian auxiliaries were assigned by Epicydes and Hanno. With these he so thoroughly overran the lands of his enemies, and visited his allies with such activity, in order to retain them in their allegiance, and for the purpose of bringing them seasonable aid as each required it, that in a short time he filled all Sicily with his fame, nor was greater confidence placed in any one else by those who favoured the Carthaginian interest. Accordingly the Carthaginian and Syracusan generals, who had been hitherto compelled to keep within the walls of Agrigentum, not more at the advice of Mutines than from the confidence they reposed in him, had the courage to go out from the walls, and pitched a camp near the river Himera. When this was announced to Marcellus, he immediately advanced and sat down at a distance of about four miles from the enemy, with the intention of waiting to see what steps they took, and what they meditated. But Mutines allowed no room or time for delay or deliberation, but crossed the river, and, charging the outposts of his enemy, created the greatest terror and confusion. The next day, in an engagement which might almost be called regular, he compelled his enemy to retire within their works. Being called away by a mutiny of the Numidians, which had broken out in the camp, and in which about three hundred of them had retired to Heraclea Minoa, he set out to appease them and bring them back; and is said to have earnestly warned the generals not to engage with the enemy during his absence. Both the generals were indignant at this conduct, but particularly Hanno, who was before disturbed at his reputation. "Is it to be borne," said he, "that a mongrel African should impose restraints upon me, a Carthaginian general, commissioned by the senate and people?" Epicydes, who wished to wait, was prevailed upon by him to agree to their crossing the river and offering battle; for, said he, if they should wait for Mutines, and the battle should terminate successfully, Mutines would certainly have the credit of it.

But Marcellus, highly indignant that he who had repulsed Hannibal from Nola, when rendered confident by his victory at Cannae, should succumb to enemies whom he had vanquished by sea and land, ordered his soldiers immediately to take arms and raise the standards. While marshalling his army, ten Numidians rode up rapidly from the enemy's line with information that their countrymen, first induced by the same causes which brought on the mutiny, in which three hundred of their number retired to Heraclea, and secondly, because they saw their commander, just on the approach of a battle, sent out of the way by generals who wished to detract from his glory, would not take any part in the battle. This deceitful nation made good their promise in this instance. Accordingly the spirits of the Romans were increased by the intelligence, which was speedily conveyed through the lines, that the enemy were abandoned by the cavalry, which the Romans principally feared; while at the same time the enemy were dispirited, not only because they were deprived of the principal part of their strength, but further, because they were afraid lest they should themselves be attacked by their own cavalry. Accordingly, there was no great resistance made: the first shout and onset determined the business. The Numidians who stood quiet in the wings during the action, when they saw their party turning their backs, accompanied them in their flight only for a short time; but when they perceived that they were all making for Agrigentum with the most violent haste, they turned off to the neighbouring towns round about, through fear of a siege. Many thousand men were slain and captured, together with eight elephants. This was the last battle which Marcellus fought in Sicily, after which he returned victorious to Syracuse. The year was now about closing; the senate therefore decreed that Publius Cornelius, the praetor, should send a letter to Capua to the consuls, with directions that while Hannibal was at a distance, and nothing of any great importance was going on at Capua, one of them, if they thought fit, should come to Rome to elect new magistrates. On the receipt of the letter, the consuls arranged it between themselves, that Claudius should hold the election, and Fulvius remain at Capua. The consuls created by Claudius were Cneius Fulvius Centumalus, and Publius Sulpicius Galba, the son of Servius, who had never exercised any curule magistracy. After this Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, Caius Sulpicius, and Caius Calpurnius Piso, were created praetors. Piso had the city jurisdiction; Sulpicius, Sicily; Cethegus, Apulia; Lentulus, Sardinia. The consuls were continued in command for a year longer.

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BOOK XXVI.

B.C 212-211

Hannibal encamps on the banks of the Amo, within three miles of Rome. Attended by two thousand horsemen, he advances close to the Colline gate to take a view of the walls and situation of the city. On two successive days the hostile armies are hindered from engaging by the severity of the weather. Capua taken by Quintus Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the chief nobles die, voluntarily, by poison. Quintus Fulvius having condemned the principal senators to death, at the moment they are actually tied to the stakes, receives despatches from Rome, commanding him to spare their lives, which he postpones reading until the sentence is executed. Publius Scipio, offering himself for the service, is sent to command in Spain, takes New Carthage in one day. Successes in Sicily. Treaty of friendship with the Aetolians. War with Philip, king of Macedonia, and the Acarnanians.

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The consuls, Cneius Fulvius Centumalus and Publius Sulpicius Galba, having entered on their office on the ides of March, assembled the senate in the Capitol, and took the opinion of the fathers on the state of the republic, the manner of conducting the war, and on what related to the provinces and the armies. Quintus Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the consuls of the former year, were continued in command; and the armies which they before had were assigned to them, it being added that they should not withdraw from Capua, which they were besieging, till they had taken it. The Romans were now solicitously intent upon this object, not from resentment so much, which was never juster against any city, as from the consideration that as this city, so celebrated and powerful, had by its defection drawn away several states, so when reduced it would bring back their minds to respect for the former supreme government. Two praetors also of the former year, Marcus Junius and Publius Sempronius, were each continued in command of the two legions which they had under them, the former in Etruria, the latter in Gaul. Marcus Marcellus also was continued in command, that he might, as proconsul, finish the war in Sicily with the army he had there. If he wanted recruits he was to take them from the legions which Publius Cornelius, the propraetor, commanded in Sicily, provided he did not choose any soldier who was of the number of those whom the senate had refused to allow to be discharged, or to return home till the war was put an end to. To Caius Sulpicius, to whose lot Sicily had fallen, the two legions which Publius Cornelius had commanded were assigned, to be recruited from the army of Cneius Fulvius, which had been shamefully beaten, and had experienced a dreadful loss the year before in Apulia. To soldiers of this description the senate had assigned the same period of service as to those who fought at Cannae; and as an additional mark of ignominy upon both, they were not allowed to winter in towns, or to build huts for wintering within the distance of ten miles from any town. To Lucius Cornelius, in Sardinia, the two legions which Quintus Mucius had commanded were assigned; if recruits were wanted, the consuls were ordered to enlist them. To Titus Otacilius and Marcus Valerius was allotted the protection of the coasts of Sicily and Greece, with the legions and fleets which they had commanded. The Greek coast had fifty ships with one legion; the Sicilian, a hundred ships with two legions. Twenty-three legions were employed by the Romans in carrying on the war this year by land and sea.

In the beginning of the year, on a letter from Lucius Marcius being laid before the senate, they considered his achievements as most glorious; but the title of honour which he assumed (for though he was neither invested with the command by the order of the people, nor by the direction of the fathers, his letter ran in this form, "The propraetor to the senate") gave offence to a great many. It was considered as an injurious precedent for generals to be chosen by the armies, and for the solemn ceremony of elections, held under auspices, to be transferred to camps and provinces, and (far from the control of the laws and magistrates) to military thoughtlessness. And though some gave it as their opinion, that the sense of the senate should be taken on the matter, yet it was thought more advisable that the discussion should be postponed till after the departure of the horsemen who brought the letter from Marcius. It was resolved, that an answer should be returned respecting the corn and clothing of the army, stating, that the senate would direct its attention to both those matters; but that the letter should not be addressed to Lucius Marcius, propraetor, lest he should consider that as already determined which was the very point they reserved for discussion. After the horsemen were dismissed, it was the first thing the consuls brought before the senate; and the opinions of all to a man coincided, that the plebeian tribunes should be instructed to consult the commons with all possible speed, as to whom they might resolve to send into Spain to take the command of that army which had been under the conduct of Cneius Scipio. The plebeian tribunes were instructed accordingly, and the question was published. But another contest had pre-engaged the minds of the people: Caius Sempronius Blaesus, having brought Cneius Fulvius to trial for the loss of the army in Apulia, harassed him with invectives in the public assemblies: "Many generals," he reiterated, "had by indiscretion and ignorance brought their armies into most perilous situations, but none, save Cneius Fulvius, had corrupted his legions by every species of excess before he betrayed them to the enemy; it might therefore with truth be said, that they were lost before they saw the enemy, and that they were defeated, not by Hannibal, but by their own general. No man, when he gave his vote, took sufficient pains in ascertaining who it was to whom he was intrusting an army. What a difference was there between this man and Tiberius Sempronius! The latter having been intrusted with an army of slaves, had in a short time brought it to pass, by discipline and authority, that not one of them in the field of battle remembered his condition and birth, but they became a protection to our allies and a terror to our enemies. They had snatched, as it were, from the very jaws of Hannibal, and restored to the Roman people, Cumae, Beneventum, and other towns. But Cneius Fulvius had infected with the vices peculiar to slaves, an army of Roman citizens, of honourable parentage and liberal education; and had thus made them insolent and turbulent among their allies, inefficient and dastardly among their enemies, unable to sustain, not only the charge, but the shout of the Carthaginians. But, by Hercules, it was no wonder that the troops did not stand their ground in the battle, when their general was the first to fly; with him, the greater wonder was that any had fallen at their posts, and that they were not all the companions of Cneius Fulvius in his consternation and his flight. Caius Flaminius, Lucius Paullus, Lucius Posthumius, Cneius and Publius Scipio, had preferred falling in the battle to abandoning their armies when in the power of the enemy. But Cneius Fulvius was almost the only man who returned to Rome to report the annihilation of his army. It was a shameful crime that the army of Cannae should be transported into Sicily, because they fled from the field of battle, and not be allowed to return till the enemy has quitted Italy; that the same decree should have been lately passed with respect to the legions of Cneius Fulvius; while Cneius Fulvius himself has no punishment inflicted upon him for running away, in a battle brought about by his own indiscretion; that he himself should be permitted to pass his old age in stews and brothels, where he passed his youth, while his troops, whose only crime was that they resembled their general, should be sent away in a manner into banishment, and suffer an ignominious service. So unequally," he said, "was liberty shared at Rome by the rich and the poor, by the ennobled and the common people."

The accused shifted the blame from himself to his soldiers; he said, "that in consequence of their having in the most turbulent manner demanded battle, they were led into the field, not on the day they desired, for it was then evening, but on the following; that they were drawn up at a suitable time and on favourable ground; but either the reputation or the strength of the enemy was such, that they were unable to stand their ground. When they all fled precipitately, he himself also was carried away with the crowd, as had happened to Varro at the battle of Cannae, and to many other generals. How could he, by his sole resistance, benefit the republic, unless his death would remedy the public disasters? that he was not defeated in consequence of a failure in his provisions; that he had not, from want of caution, been drawn into a disadvantageous position; that he had not been cut off by an ambuscade in consequence of not having explored his route, but had been vanquished by open force, and by arms, in a regular engagement. He had not in his power the minds of his own troops, or those of the enemy. Courage and cowardice were the result of each man's natural constitution." He was twice accused, and the penalty was laid at a fine. On the third accusation, at which witnesses were produced, he was not only overwhelmed with an infinity of disgraceful charges, but a great many asserted on oath, that the flight and panic commenced with the praetor, that the troops being deserted by him, and concluding that the fears of their general were not unfounded, turned their backs; when so strong a feeling of indignation was excited, that the assembly clamorously rejoined that he ought to be tried capitally. This gave rise to a new controversy; for when the tribune, who had twice prosecuted him as for a finable offence, now, on the third occasion, declared that he prosecuted him capitally; the tribunes of the commons being appealed to, said, "they would not prevent their colleague from proceeding, as he was permitted according to the custom of their ancestors, in the manner he himself preferred, whether according to the laws or to custom, until he had obtained judgment against a private individual, convicting him either of a capital or finable offence." Upon this, Sempronius said, that he charged Cneius Fulvius with the crime of treason; and requested Caius Calpurnius, the city praetor, to appoint a day for the comitia. Another ground of hope was then tried by the accused, viz. if his brother, Quintus Fulvius, could be present at his trial, who was at that time flourishing in the fame of his past achievements and in the near expectation of taking Capua. Fulvius wrote to the senate, requesting the favour in terms calculated to excite compassion, in order to save the life of his brother; but the fathers replied, that the interest of the state would not admit of his leaving Capua. Cneius Fulvius, therefore, before the day appointed for the comitia arrived, went into exile to Tarquinii, and the commons resolved that it was a legal exile.

Meanwhile all the strength of the war was directed against Capua. It was, however, more strictly blockaded than besieged. The slaves and populace could neither endure the famine, nor send messengers to Hannibal through guards so closely stationed. A Numidian was at length found, who, on undertaking to make his way with it, was charged with a letter; and going out by night, through the midst of the Roman camp, in order to fulfil his promise, he inspired the Campanians with confidence to try the effect of a sally from every quarter, while they had any strength remaining. In the many encounters which followed, their cavalry were generally successful, but their infantry were beaten: however, it was by no means so joyful to conquer, as it was miserable to be worsted in any respect by a besieged and almost subdued enemy. A plan was at length adopted, by which their deficiency in strength might be compensated by stratagem. Young men were selected from all the legions, who, from the vigour and activity of their bodies, excelled in swiftness; these were supplied with bucklers shorter than those worn by horsemen, and seven javelins each, four feet in length, and pointed with steel in the same manner as the spears used by light-armed troops. The cavalry taking one of these each upon their horses, accustomed them to ride behind them, and to leap down nimbly when the signal was given. When, by daily practice, they appeared to be able to do this in an orderly manner, they advanced into the plain between the camp and the walls, against the cavalry of the Campanians, who stood there prepared for action. As soon as they came within a dart's cast, on a signal given, the light troops leaped down, when a line of infantry formed out of the body of horse suddenly rushed upon the cavalry of the enemy, and discharged their javelins one after another with great rapidity; which being thrown in great numbers upon men and horses indiscriminately, wounded a great many. The sudden and unsuspected nature of the attack, however, occasioned still greater terror; and the cavalry charging them, thus panic-struck, chased them with great slaughter as far as their gates. From that time the Roman cavalry had the superiority; and it was established that there should be velites in the legions. It is said that Quintus Navius was the person who advised the mixing of infantry with cavalry, and that he received honour from the general on that account.

While affairs were in this state at Capua, Hannibal was perplexed between two objects, the gaining possession of the citadel of Tarentum, and the retaining of Capua. His concern for Capua, however, prevailed, on which he saw that the attention of every body, allies and enemies, was fixed; and whose fate would be regarded as a proof of the consequences resulting from defection from the Romans. Leaving therefore, a great part of his baggage among the Bruttians, and all his heavier armed troops, he took with him a body of infantry and cavalry, the best he could select for marching expeditiously, and bent his course into Campania. Rapidly as he marched he was followed by thirty-three elephants. He took up his position in a retired valley behind Mount Tifata, which overhung Capua. Having at his coming taken possession of fort Galatia, the garrison of which he dislodged by force, he then directed his efforts against those who were besieging Capua. Having sent forward messengers to Capua stating the time at which he would attack the Roman camp, in order that they also, having gotten themselves in readiness for a sally, might at the same time pour forth from all their gates, he occasioned the greatest possible terror; for on one side he himself attacked them suddenly, and on the other side all the Campanians sallied forth, both foot and horse, joined by the Carthaginian garrison under the command of Bostar and Hanno. The Romans, lest in so perilous an affair they should leave any part unprotected, by running together to any one place, thus divided their forces: Appius Claudius was opposed to the Campanians; Fulvius to Hannibal; Caius Nero, the propraetor, with the cavalry of the sixth legion, placed himself in the road leading to Suessula; and Caius Fulvius Flaccus, the lieutenant-general, with the allied cavalry, on the side opposite the river Vulturnus. The battle commenced not only with the usual clamour and tumult, but in addition to the din of men, horses, and arms, a multitude of Campanians, unable to bear arms, being distributed along the walls, raised such a shout together with the clangour of brazen vessels, similar to that which is usually made in the dead of night when the moon is eclipsed, that it diverted the attention even of the combatants. Appius easily repulsed the Campanians from the rampart. On the other side Hannibal and the Carthaginians, forming a larger force, pressed hard on Fulvius. There the sixth legion gave way; being repulsed, a cohort of Spaniards with three elephants made their way up to the rampart. They had broken through the centre of the Roman line, and were in a state of anxious and perilous suspense, whether to force their way into the camp, or be cut off from their own army. When Fulvius saw the disorder of the legion, and the danger the camp was in, he exhorted Quintus Navius, and the other principal centurions, to charge the cohort of the enemy which was fighting under the rampart; he said, "that the state of things was most critical; that either they must retire before them, in which case they would burst into the camp with less difficulty than they had experienced in breaking through a dense line of troops, or they must cut them to pieces under the rampart: nor would it require a great effort; for they were few, and cut off from their own troops, and if the line which appeared broken, now while the Romans were dispirited, should turn upon the enemy on both sides, they would become enclosed in the midst, and exposed to a twofold attack." Navius, on hearing these words of the general, snatched the standard of the second company of spearmen from the standard-bearer, and advanced with it against the enemy, threatening that he would throw it into the midst of them unless the soldiers promptly followed him and took part in the fight. He was of gigantic stature, and his arms set him off; the standard also, raised aloft, attracted the gaze both of his countrymen and the enemy. When, however, he had reached the standards of the Spaniards, javelins were poured upon him from all sides, and almost the whole line was turned against him; but neither the number of his enemies nor the force of the weapons could repel the onset of this hero.

Marcus Atilius, the lieutenant-general, also caused the standard of the first company of principes of the same legion to be borne against a cohort of the Spaniards. Lucius Portius Licinus and Titus Popilius, the lieutenant-generals, who had the command of the camp, fought valiantly in defence of the rampart, and slew the elephants while in the very act of crossing it. The carcasses of these filling up the ditch, afforded a passage for the enemy as effectually as if earth had been thrown in, or a bridge erected over it; and a horrid carnage took place amid the carcasses of the elephants which lay prostrate. On the other side of the camp, the Campanians, with the Carthaginian garrison, had by this time been repulsed, and the battle was carried on immediately under the gate of Capua leading to Vulturnus. Nor did the armed men contribute so much in resisting the Romans, who endeavoured to force their way in, as the gate itself, which, being furnished with ballistas and scorpions, kept the enemy at bay by the missiles discharged from it. The ardour of the Romans was also clamped by the general, Appius Claudius, receiving a wound; he was struck by a javelin in the upper part of his breast, beneath the left shoulder, while encouraging his men before the front line. A great number, however, of the enemy were slain before the gate, and the rest were driven in disorder into the city. When Hannibal saw the destruction of the cohort of Spaniards, and that the camp of the enemy was defended with the utmost vigour, giving up the assault, he began to withdraw his standards, making his infantry face about, but throwing out his cavalry in the rear lest the enemy should pursue them closely. The ardour of the legions to pursue the enemy was excessive, but Flaccus ordered a retreat to be sounded, considering that enough had been achieved to convince the Campanians, and Hannibal himself, how unable he was to afford them protection. Some who have undertaken to give accounts of this battle, record that eight thousand of the army of Hannibal, and three thousand Campanians, were slain; that fifteen military standards were taken from the Carthaginians, and eighteen from the Campanians. In other authors I find the battle to have been by no means so important, and that there was more of panic than fighting; that a party of Numidians and Spaniards suddenly bursting into the Roman camp with some elephants, the elephants, as they made their way through the midst of the camp, threw down their tents with a great noise, and caused the beasts of burden to break their halters and run away. That in addition to the confusion occasioned, a stratagem was employed; Hannibal having sent in some persons acquainted with the Latin language, for he had some such with him, who might command the soldiers, in the name of the consuls, to escape every one as fast as he could to the neighbouring mountains, since the camp was lost; but that the imposture was soon discovered, and frustrated with a great slaughter of the enemy; that the elephants were driven out of the camp by fire. However commenced, and however terminated, this was the last battle which was fought before the surrender of Capua. Seppius Lesius was Medixtuticus, or chief magistrate of Capua, that year, a man of obscure origin and slender fortune. It is reported that his mother, when formerly expiating a prodigy which had occurred in the family in behalf of this boy, who was an orphan, received an answer from the aruspex, stating, that "the highest office would come to him;" and that not recognising, at Capua, any ground for such a hope, exclaimed, "the state of the Campanians must be desperate indeed, when the highest office shall come to my son." But even this expression, in which the response was turned into ridicule, turned to be true, for those persons whose birth allowed them to aspire to high offices, refusing to accept them when the city was oppressed by sword and famine, and when all hope was lost, Lesius, who complained that Capua was deserted and betrayed by its nobles, accepted the office of chief magistrate, being the last Campanian who held it.

But Hannibal, when he saw that the enemy could not be drawn into another engagement, nor a passage be forced through their camp into Capua, resolved to remove his camp from that place and leave the attempt unaccomplished, fearful lest the new consuls might cut off his supplies of provision. While anxiously deliberating on the point to which he should next direct his course, an impulse suddenly entered his mind to make an attack on Rome, the very source of the war. That the opportunity of accomplishing this ever coveted object, which occurred after the battle of Cannae, had been neglected, and was generally censured by others, he himself did not deny. He thought that there was some hope that he might be able to get possession of some part of the city, in consequence of the panic and confusion which his unexpected approach would occasion, and that if Rome were in danger, either both the Roman generals, or at least one of them, would immediately leave Capua; and if they divided their forces, both generals being thus rendered weaker, would afford a favourable opportunity either to himself or the Campanians of gaining some advantage. One consideration only disquieted him, and that was, lest on his departure the Campanians should immediately surrender. By means of presents he induced a Numidian, who was ready to attempt any thing, however daring, to take charge of a letter; and, entering the Roman camp under the disguise of a deserter, to pass out privately on the other side and go to Capua. As to the letter, it was full of encouragement. It stated, that "his departure, which would be beneficial to them, would have the effect of drawing off the Roman generals and armies from the siege of Capua to the defence of Rome. That they must not allow their spirits to sink; that by a few days' patience they would rid themselves entirely of the siege." He then ordered the ships on the Vulturnus to be seized, and rowed up to the fort which he had before erected for his protection. And when he was informed that there were as many as were necessary to convey his army across in one night, after providing a stock of provisions for ten days, he led his legions down to the river by night, and passed them over before daylight.

Fulvius Flaccus, who had discovered from deserters that this would happen, before it took place, having written to Rome to the senate to apprize them of it, men's minds were variously affected by it according to the disposition of each. As might be expected in so alarming an emergency, the senate was immediately assembled, when Publius Cornelius, surnamed Asina, was for recalling all the generals and armies from every part of Italy to protect the city, disregarding Capua and every other concern. Fabius Maximus thought that it would be highly disgraceful to retire from Capua, and allow themselves to be terrified and driven about at the nod and menaces of Hannibal. "Was it probable that he, who, though victorious at Cannae, nevertheless dared not approach the city, now, after having been repulsed from Capua, had conceived hopes of making himself master of Rome? It was not to besiege Rome, but to raise the siege of Capua that he was coming. Jupiter, the witness of treaties violated by Hannibal, and the other deities, would defend the city of Rome with that army which is now at the city." To these opposite opinions, that of Publius Valerius Flaccus, which recommended a middle course, was preferred. Regardful of both objects, he thought that a letter should be written to the generals at Capua, informing them of the force they had at the city for its protection, and stating, that as to the number of forces which Hannibal was bringing with him, or how large an army was necessary to carry on the siege of Capua, they themselves knew. If one of the generals and a part of the army could be sent to Rome, and at the same time Capua could be efficiently besieged by the remaining general and army, that then Claudius and Fulvius should settle between themselves which should continue the siege of Capua, and which should come to Rome to protect their capital from being besieged. This decree of the senate having been conveyed to Capua, Quintus Fulvius, the proconsul, who was to go to Rome, as his colleague was ill from his wound, crossed the Vulturnus with a body of troops, to the number of fifteen thousand infantry and a thousand horse, selected from the three armies. Then having ascertained that Hannibal intended to proceed along the Latin road, he sent persons before him to the towns on and near the Appian way, Setia, Cora, and Lanuvium, with directions that they should not only have provisions ready in their towns, but should bring them down to the road from the fields which lay out of the way, and that they should draw together into their towns troops for their defence, in order that each state might be under its own protection.

On the day he crossed the Vulturnus, Hannibal pitched his camp at a small distance from the river. The next day, passing by Cales, he reached the Sidicinian territory, and having spent a day there in devastating the country, he led his troops along the Latin way through the territory of Suessa, Allifae, and Casinum. Under the walls of Casinum he remained encamped for two days, ravaging the country all around; thence passing by Interamna and Aquinum, he came into the Fregellan territory, to the river Liris, where he found the bridge broken down by the Fregellans in order to impede his progress. Fulvius also was detained at the Vulturnus, in consequence of Hannibal's having burnt the ships, and the difficulty he had in procuring rafts to convey his troops across that river from the great scarcity of materials. The army having been conveyed across by rafts, the remainder of the march of Fulvius was uninterrupted, a liberal supply of provisions having been prepared for him, not only in all the towns, but also on the sides of the road; while his men, who were all activity, exhorted each other to quicken their pace, remembering that they were going to defend their country. A messenger from Fregella, who had travelled a day and a night without intermission, arriving at Rome, caused the greatest consternation; and the whole city was thrown into a state of alarm by the running up and down of persons who made vague additions to what they heard, and thus increased the confusion which the original intelligence created. The lamentations of women were not only heard from private houses, but the matrons from every quarter, rushing into the public streets, ran up and down around the shrines of the gods, sweeping the altars with their dishevelled hair, throwing themselves upon their knees and stretching their uplifted hands to heaven and the gods, imploring them to rescue the city of Rome out of the hands of their enemies, and preserve the Roman mothers and their children from harm. The senate sat in the forum near the magistrates, in case they should wish to consult them. Some were receiving orders and departing to their own department of duty; others were offering themselves wherever there might be occasion for their aid. Troops were posted in the citadel, in the Capitol, upon the walls around the city, and also on the Alban mount, and the fort of Aesula. During this confusion, intelligence was brought that Quintus Fulvius, the proconsul, had set out from Capua with an army; when the senate decreed that Quintus Fulvius should have equal authority with the consuls, lest on entering the city his power should cease. Hannibal, having most destructively ravaged the Fregellan territory, on account of the bridge having been broken down, came into the territory of the Lavici, passing through those of Frusino, Ferentinum, and Anagnia; thence passing through Algidum he directed his course to Tusculum; but not being received within the walls, he went down to the right below Tusculum to Gabii; and marching his army down thence into the territory of the Pupinian tribe, he pitched his camp eight miles from the city. The nearer the enemy came, the greater was the number of fugitives slain by the Numidians who preceded him, and the greater the number of prisoners made of every rank and age.

During this confusion, Fulvius Flaccus entered the city with his troops through the Capuan gate, passed through the midst of the city, and through Carinae, to Esquiliae; and going out thence, pitched his camp between the Esquiline and Colline gates. The plebeian aediles brought a supply of provisions there. The consuls and the senate came to the camp, and a consultation was held on the state of the republic. It was resolved that the consuls should encamp in the neighbourhood of the Colline and Esquiline gates; that Caius Calpurnius, the city praetor, should have the command of the Capitol and the citadel; and that a full senate should be continually assembled in the forum, in case it should be necessary to consult them amidst such sudden emergencies. Meanwhile, Hannibal advanced his camp to the Anio, three miles from the city, and fixing his position there, he advanced with two thousand horse from the Colline gate as far as the temple of Hercules, and riding up, took as near a view as he could of the walls and site of the city. Flaccus, indignant that he should do this so freely, and so much at his ease, sent out a party of cavalry, with orders to displace and drive back to their camp the cavalry of the enemy. After the fight had begun, the consuls ordered the Numidian deserters who were on the Aventine, to the number of twelve hundred, to march through the midst of the city to the Esquiliae, judging that no troops were better calculated to fight among the hollows, the garden walls, and tombs, or in the enclosed roads which were on all sides. But some persons, seeing them from the citadel and Capitol as they filed off on horseback down the Publician hill, cried out that the Aventine was taken. This circumstance occasioned such confusion and terror, that if the Carthaginian camp had not been without the city, the whole multitude, such was their alarm, would have rushed out. They then fled for refuge into their houses and upon the roofs, where they threw stones and weapons on their own soldiers as they passed along the streets, taking them for enemies. Nor could the tumult be repressed, or the mistake explained, as the streets were thronged with crowds of rustics and cattle, which the sudden alarm had driven into the city. The battle between the cavalry was successful, and the enemy were driven away; and as it was necessary to repress the tumults which were arising in several quarters without any cause, it was resolved that all who had been dictators, consuls, or censors, should be invested with authority till such time as the enemy had retired from the walls. During the remainder of the day and the following night, several tumults arose without any foundation, and were repressed.

The next day Hannibal, crossing the Anio, drew out all his forces in order of battle; nor did Flaccus and the consuls decline to fight. When the troops on both sides were drawn up to try the issue of a battle, in which Rome was to be the prize of the victors, a violent shower of rain mingled with hail created such disorder in both the lines, that the troops, scarcely able to hold their arms, retired to their camps, less through fear of the enemy than of any thing else. On the following day, likewise, a similar tempest separated the armies marshalled on the same ground; but after they had retired to their camps the weather became wonderfully serene and tranquil. The Carthaginians considered this circumstance as a Divine interposition, and it is reported that Hannibal was heard to say, "That sometimes he wanted the will to make himself master of Rome, at other times the opportunity." Two other circumstances also, one inconsiderable, the other important, diminished his hopes. The important one was, that while he lay with his armed troops near the walls of the city, he was informed that troops had marched out of it with colours flying, as a reinforcement for Spain; that of less importance was, that he was informed by one of his prisoners, that the very ground on which his camp stood was sold at this very time, without any diminution in its price. Indeed, so great an insult and indignity did it appear to him that a purchaser should be found at Rome for the very soil which he held and possessed by right of conquest, that he immediately called a crier, and ordered that the silversmiths' shops, which at that time stood around the Roman forum, should be put up for sale. Induced by these circumstances he retired to the river Tutia, six miles from the city, whence he proceeded to the grove of Feronia, where was a temple at that time celebrated for its riches. The Capenatians and other states in the neighbourhood, by bringing here their first-fruits and other offerings according to their abilities, kept it decorated with abundance of gold and silver. Of all these offerings the temple was now despoiled. After the departure of Hannibal, vast heaps of brass were found there, as the soldiers, from a religious feeling, had thrown in pieces of uncoined brass. The spoliation of this temple is undoubted by historians; but Caelius asserts, that Hannibal, in his progress to Rome, turned out of his way to it from Eretum. According to him his route commenced with Amiternum, Caetilii, and Reate. He came from Campania into Samnium, and thence into Pelignia; then passing the town Sulmio, he entered the territory of the Marrucini; thence through the Alban territory he came to that of the Marsi, from which he came to Amiternum and the village of Foruli. Nor is this diversity of opinion a proof that the traces of so great an army could be confounded in the lapse of so brief a period. That he went that way is evident. The only question is, whether he took this route to the city, or returned by it from the city into Campania?

With regard to Capua, Hannibal did not evince such obstinate perseverance in raising the siege of it as the Romans did in pressing it; for quitting Lucania, he came into the Bruttian territory, and marched to the strait and Rhegium with such rapidity, that he was very near taking the place by surprise, in consequence of the suddenness of his arrival. Though the siege had been urged with undiminished vigour during his absence, yet Capua felt the return of Flaccus; and astonishment was excited that Hannibal had not returned with him. Afterwards they learnt, by conversations, that they were abandoned and deserted, and that the Carthaginians had given up all hopes of retaining Capua. In addition to this a proclamation was made by the proconsul, agreeably to a decree of the senate, and published among the enemy, that any Campanian citizen who came over before a stated day should be indemnified. No one, however, came over, as they were held together by fear more than fidelity; for the crimes they had committed during their revolt were too great to admit of pardon. As none of them passed over to the enemy, consulting their own individual interest, so no measure of safety was taken with regard to the general body. The nobility had deserted the state, nor could they be induced to meet in the senate, while the office of chief magistrate was filled by a man who had not derived honour to himself from his office, but stripped the office of its influence and authority by his own unworthiness. Now none of the nobles made their appearance even in the forum, or any public place, but shut themselves up in their houses, in daily expectation of the downfall of their city, and their own destruction together. The chief responsibility in every thing devolved upon Bostar and Hanno, the praefects of the Punic garrison, who were anxious on account of their own danger, and not that of their allies. They addressed a letter to Hannibal, in terms, not only of freedom, but severity, charging him with "delivering, not only Capua into the hands of the enemy, but with treacherously abandoning themselves also, and their troops, to every species of torture;" they told him "he had gone off to the Bruttians, in order to get out of the way, as it were, lest Capua should be taken before his eyes; while, by Hercules, the Romans, on the contrary, could not be drawn off from the siege of Capua, even by an attack upon their city. So much more constant were the Romans in their enmity than the Carthaginians in their friendship. If he would return to Capua and direct the whole operations of the war to that point, that both themselves and the Campanians would be prepared for a sally. That they had crossed the Alps not to carry on a war with the people of Rhegium nor Tarentum. That where the Roman legions were, there the armies of the Carthaginians ought to be. Thus it was that victories had been gained at Cannae and Trasimenus; by uniting, by pitching their camp close to that of the enemy, by trying their fortune." A letter to this effect was given to some Numidians who had already engaged to render their services for a stated reward. These men came into the camp to Flaccus under pretence of being deserters, with the intention of quitting it by seizing an opportunity, and the famine, which had so long existed at Capua, afforded a pretext for desertion which no one could suspect. But a Campanian woman, the paramour of one of the deserters, unexpectedly entered the camp, and informed the Roman general that the Numidians had come over according to a preconcerted plan of treachery, and were the bearers of letters to Hannibal; that she was prepared to convict one of the party of that fact, as he had discovered it to her. On being brought forward, he at first pretended, with considerable pertinacity, that he did not know the woman; but afterwards, gradually succumbing to the force of truth, when he saw the instruments of torture called for and preparing, he confessed that it was so. The letters were produced, and a discovery was made of an additional fact, before concealed, that other Numidians were strolling about in the Roman camp, under pretence of being deserters. Above seventy of these were arrested, and, with the late deserters, scourged with rods; and after their hands had been cut off, were driven back to Capua. The sight of so severe a punishment broke the spirit of the Campanians.

The people, rushing in crowds to the senate-house, compelled Lesius to assemble a senate, and openly threatened the nobles, who had now for a long time absented themselves from the public deliberations, that unless they attended the meeting of the senate, they would go round to their houses and drag them all before the public by force. The fear of this procured the magistrate a full senate. Here, while the rest contended for sending ambassadors to the Roman generals, Vibius Virrius, who had been the instigator of the revolt from the Romans, on being asked his opinion, observed, that "those persons who spoke of sending ambassadors, and of peace, and a surrender, did not bear in mind either what they would do if they had the Romans in their power, or what they themselves must expect to suffer. What! do you think," says he, "that your surrender will be like that in which formerly we placed ourselves and every thing belonging to us at the disposal of the Romans, in order that we might obtain assistance from them against the Samnites? Have you already forgotten at what a juncture we revolted from the Romans, and what were their circumstances? Have you forgotten how at the time of the revolt we put to death, with torture and indignity, their garrison, which might have been sent out? How often, and with determined hostility, we have sallied out against them when besieging us, and assaulted their camp? How we invited Hannibal to come and cut them off? And how most recently we sent him hence to lay siege to Rome? But come, retrace on the other hand what they have done in hostility towards us, that you may learn therefrom what you have to hope for. When a foreign enemy was in Italy, and that enemy Hannibal; when the flame of war was kindled in every quarter; disregarding every other object, disregarding even Hannibal himself, they sent two consuls with two consular armies to lay siege to Capua. This is the second year, that, surrounded with lines and shut up within our walls, they consume us by famine, having suffered in like manner with ourselves the extremest dangers and the severest hardships, having frequently had their troops slain near their rampart and trenches, and at last having been almost deprived of their camp. But I pass over these matters. It has been usual, even from of old, to suffer dangers and hardships in besieging an enemy's city. The following is a proof of their animosity and bitter hatred. Hannibal assaulted their camp with an immense force of horse and foot, and took a part of it. By so great a danger they were not in the least diverted from the siege. Crossing the Vulturnus, he laid waste the territory of Cales with fire. Such calamities inflicted upon their allies had no effect in calling them off. He ordered his troops to march in hostile array to the very city of Rome. They despised the tempest which threatened them in this case also. Crossing the Anio, he pitched his camp three miles from the city, and lastly, came up to the very walls and gates. He gave them to understand that he would take their city from them, unless they gave up Capua. But they did not give it up. Wild beasts, impelled by headlong fury and rage, you may divert from their object to bring assistance to those belonging to them, if you attempt to approach their dens and their young. The Romans could not be diverted from Capua by the blockade of Rome, by their wives and children, whose lamentations could almost be heard from this place, by their altars, their hearths, the temples of their gods, and the sepulchres of their ancestors profaned and violated. So great was their avidity to bring us to punishment, so insatiable their thirst for drinking our blood. Nor, perhaps, without reason. We too would have done the same had the opportunity been afforded us. Since, however, the gods have thought proper to determine it otherwise, though I ought not to shrink from death, while I am free, while I am master of myself, I have it in my power, by a death not only honourable but mild, to escape the tortures and indignities which the enemy hope to inflict upon me. I will not see Appius Claudius and Quintus Fulvius in the pride and insolence of victory, nor will I be dragged in chains through Rome as a spectacle in a triumph, that afterwards in a dungeon, or tied to a stake, after my back has been lacerated with stripes, I may place my neck under a Roman axe. I will neither see my native city demolished and burnt, nor the matrons, virgins, and free-born youths of Campania dragged to constupration. Alba, from which they themselves derived their origin, they demolished from her foundations, that there might remain no trace of their rise and extraction, much less can I believe they will spare Capua, towards which they bear a more rancorous hatred than towards Carthage. For such of you, therefore, as have a mind to yield to fate, before they behold such horrors, a banquet is furnished and prepared at my house. When satiated with wine and food, the same cup which shall have been given to me shall be handed round to them. That potion will rescue our bodies from torture, our minds from insult, our eyes and ears from seeing and hearing all those cruelties and indignities which await the vanquished. There will be persons in readiness who will throw our lifeless bodies upon a large pile kindled in the court-yard of the house. This is the only free and honourable way to death. Our very enemies will admire our courage, and Hannibal will learn that those whom he deserted and betrayed were brave allies."

More of those who heard this speech of Virrius approved of the proposal contained in it, than had strength of mind to execute what they approved. The greater part of the senate being not without hopes that the Romans, whose clemency they had frequently had proof of in many wars, would be exorable by them also, decreed and sent ambassadors to surrender Capua to the Romans. About twenty-seven senators, following Vibius Virrius to his home, partook of the banquet with him; and after having, as far as they could, withdrawn their minds, by means of wine, from the perception of the impending evil, all took the poison. They then rose from the banquet, after giving each other their right hands, and taking a last embrace, mingling their tears for their own and their country's fate; some of them remained, that they might be burned upon the same pile, and the rest retired to their homes. Their veins being filled in consequence of what they had eaten, and the wine they drank, rendered the poison less efficacious in expediting death; and accordingly, though the greater part of them languished the whole of that night and part of the following day, all of them, however, breathed their last before the gates were opened to the enemy. The following day the gate of Jupiter, which faced the Roman camp, was opened by order of the proconsul, when one legion and two squadrons of allies marched in at it, under the command of Caius Fulvius, lieutenant-general. When he had taken care that all the arms and weapons to be found in Capua should be brought to him; having placed guards at all the gates to prevent any one's going or being sent out, he seized the Carthaginian garrison, and ordered the Campanian senators to go into the camp to the Roman generals. On their arrival they were all immediately thrown into chains, and ordered to lay before the quaestor an account of all the gold and silver they had. There were seventy pounds of gold, and three thousand two hundred of silver. Twenty-five of the senators were sent to Cales, to be kept in custody, and twenty-eight to Teanum; these being the persons by whose advice principally it appeared that the revolt from the Romans had taken place.

Fulvius and Claudius were far from being agreed as to the punishment of the Campanian senators. Claudius was disposed to grant their prayer for pardon, but Fulvius was more inclined to severity. Appius, therefore, was for referring the entire disposal of the question to the Roman senate. He thought it right also, that the fathers should have the opportunity of asking them whether any of the Latin confederates, or of the municipal towns, had taken part in these designs, and whether they had derived any assistance from them in the war. Fulvius, on the contrary, urged that they ought by no means to run the hazard of having the minds of faithful allies harassed by doubtful accusations, and subjected to informers who never cared at all what they did or what they said. For this reason he said that he should prevent and put a stop to any such inquiry. After this conversation they separated; Appius not doubting but that his colleague, though he expressed himself so warmly, would, nevertheless, wait for a letter from Rome, in an affair of such magnitude. But Fulvius, fearing that his designs would be frustrated by that very means, dismissed his council, and commanded the military tribunes and the praefects of the allies to give notice to two thousand chosen horsemen to be in readiness at the third trumpet. Setting out for Teanum with this body of cavalry, he entered the gate at break of day, and proceeded direct to the forum; and a number of people having flocked together at the first entrance of the horsemen, he ordered the Sidicinian magistrate to be summoned; when he desired him to bring forth the Campanians whom he had in custody. These were all accordingly brought forth, scourged, and beheaded. He then proceeded at full speed to Cales; where, when he had taken his seat on the tribunal, and while the Campanians, who had been brought forth, were being bound to the stake, an express arrived from Rome, and delivered to him a letter from Caius Calpurnius, the praetor, and a decree of the senate. A murmur immediately pervaded the whole assembly, beginning at the tribunal, that the entire question respecting the Campanians was referred to the decision of the fathers, and Fulvius, suspecting this to be the case, took the letter, and without opening it put it into his bosom, and then commanded the crier to order the lictor to do his duty. Thus punishment was inflicted on those also who were at Cales. The letter was then read, together with the decree of the senate, when it was too late to prevent the business which was already executed, and which had been accelerated by every means to prevent its being obstructed. When Fulvius was now rising from his seat, Jubellius Taurea, a Campanian making his way through the middle of the city and the crowd, called upon him by name, and when Flaccus, who wondered greatly what he could want, had resumed his seat, he said, "Order me also to be put to death, that you may be able to boast, that a much braver man than yourself has been put to death by you." Fulvius at first said, that the man could not certainly be in his senses, then, that he was restrained by a decree of the senate, even though he might wish it, when Jubellius exclaimed "Since, after the capture of my country, and the loss of my relations and friends, after having killed, with my own hand, my wife and children to prevent their suffering any indignity, I am not allowed even to die in the same manner as these my countrymen, let a rescue be sought in courage from this hated existence." So saying, he thrust a sword, which he had concealed under his garment, right through his breast, and fell lifeless at the general's feet.

Because not only what related to the punishment of the Campanians, but most of the other particulars of this affair, were transacted according to the judgment of Flaccus alone, some authors affirm that Appius Claudius died about the time of the surrender of Capua, and that this same Taurea neither came to Cales voluntarily nor died by his own hand, but that while he was being tied to the stake among the rest, Flaccus, who could not distinctly hear what he vociferated from the noise which was made, ordered silence, when Taurea said the things which have been before related "that he, a man of the greatest courage, was being put to death by one who was by no means his equal in respect to valour." That immediately on his saying this, the herald, by command of the proconsul, pronounced this order. "Lictor, apply the rods to this man of courage, and execute the law upon him first." Some authors also relate, that he read the decree of the senate before he beheaded them, but that as there was a clause in it, to the effect, that if he thought proper he should refer the entire question to the senate, he construed it that the decision as to what was most for the interest of the state was left to himself. He returned from Cales to Capua. Atella and Calatia surrendered themselves, and were received. Here also the principal promoters of the revolt were punished. Thus eighty principal members of the senate were put to death, and about three hundred of the Campanian nobles thrown into prison. The rest were distributed through the several cities of the Latin confederacy, to be kept in custody, where they perished in various ways. The rest of the Campanian citizens were sold. The remaining subject of deliberation related to the city and its territory. Some were of opinion that a city so eminently powerful, so near, and so hostile, ought to be demolished. But immediate utility prevailed, for on account of the land, which was evidently superior to any in Italy from the variety and exuberance of its produce, the city was preserved that it might become a settlement of husbandmen. For the purpose of peopling the city, a number of sojourners, freed-men, dealers, and artificers, were retained, but all the land and buildings were made the property of the Roman state. It was resolved, however, that Capua should only be inhabited and peopled as a city, that there should be no body-politic, nor assembly of the senate or people, nor magistrates. For it was thought that a multitude not possessing any public council, without a ruling power, and unconnected by the participation of any common rights, would be incapable of combination. They resolved to send a praefect annually from Rome to administer justice. Thus were matters adjusted at Capua, upon a plan in every respect worthy of commendation. Punishment was inflicted upon the most guilty with rigour and despatch, the populace dispersed beyond all hope of return, no rage vented in fire and ruins upon the unoffending houses and walls. Together also with advantage, a reputation for clemency was obtained among the allies, by the preservation of a city of the greatest celebrity and opulence, the demolition of which, all Campania, and all the people dwelling in the neighbourhood of Campania, would have bewailed, while their enemies were compelled to admit the ability of the Romans to punish their faithless allies, and how little assistance could be derived from Hannibal towards the defence of those whom he had taken under his protection.

The Roman senate having gone through every thing which required their attention relative to Capua, decreed to Caius Nero six thousand foot and three hundred horse, whichever he should himself choose out of those two legions which he had commanded at Capua, with an equal number of infantry, and eight hundred horse of the Latin confederacy. This army Nero embarked at Puteoli, and conveyed over into Spain. Having arrived at Tarraco with his ships, landed his troops, hauled his ships ashore, and armed his mariners to augment his numbers, he proceeded to the river Iberus, and received the army from Titus Fonteius and Lucius Marcius. He then marched towards the enemy. Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar, was encamped at the black stones in Ausetania, a place situated between the towns Illiturgi and Mentissa. The entrance of this defile Nero seized, and Hasdrubal, to prevent his being shut up in it, sent a herald to engage that, if he were allowed to depart thence, he would convey the whole of his army out of Spain. The Roman general having received this proposition gladly, Hasdrubal requested the next day for a conference, when the Romans might draw up conditions relative to the surrender of the citadels of the towns, and the appointment of a day on which the garrisons might be withdrawn, and the Carthaginians might remove every thing belonging to them without imposition. Having obtained his point in this respect, Hasdrubal gave orders that as soon as it was dark, and during the whole of the night afterwards, the heaviest part of his force should get out of the defile by whatever way they could. The strictest care was taken that many should not go out that night, that the very fewness of their numbers might both be more adapted to elude the notice of the enemy from their silence, and to an escape through confined and rugged paths. Next day they met for the conference; but that day having been spent, on purpose, in speaking and writing about a variety of subjects, which were not to this point, the conference was put off to the next day. The addition of the following night gave him time to send still more out; nor was the business concluded the next day. Thus several days were spent in openly discussing conditions, and as many nights in privately sending the Carthaginian troops out of their camp; and after the greater part of the army had been sent out, he did not even keep to those terms which he had himself proposed; and his sincerity decreasing with his fears, they became less and less agreed. By this time nearly all the infantry had cleared the defile, when at daybreak a dense mist enveloped the whole defile and the neighbouring plains; which Hasdrubal perceiving, sent to Nero to put off the conference to the following day, as the Carthaginians held that day sacred from the transaction of any serious business. Not even then was the cheat suspected. Hasdrubal having gained the indulgence he sought for that day also, immediately quitted his camp with his cavalry and elephants, and without creating any alarm escaped to a place of safety. About the fourth hour the mist, being dispelled by the sun, left the atmosphere clear, when the Romans saw that the camp of the enemy was deserted. Then at length Claudius, recognising the Carthaginian perfidy, and perceiving that he had been caught by trickery, immediately began to pursue the enemy as they moved off, prepared to give battle; but they declined fighting. Some skirmishes, however, took place between the rear of the Carthaginians and the advanced guard of the Romans.

During the time in which these events occurred, neither did those states of Spain which had revolted after the defeat that was sustained, return to the Romans, nor did any others desert them. At Rome, the attention of the senate and people, after the recovery of Capua, was not fixed in a greater degree upon Italy than upon Spain. They resolved that the army there should be augmented and a general sent. They were not, however, so clear as to the person whom they should send, as that, where two generals had fallen within the space of thirty days, he who was to supply the place of them should be selected with unusual care. Some naming one person, and others another, they at length came to the resolution that the people should assemble for the purpose of electing a proconsul for Spain, and the consuls fixed a day for the election. At first they waited in expectation that those persons who might think themselves qualified for so momentous a command would give in their names, but this expectation being disappointed, their grief was renewed for the calamity they had suffered, and then regret for the generals they had lost. The people thus afflicted, and almost at their wits' end, came down, however, to the Campus Martius on the day of the election, where, turning towards the magistrates, they looked round at the countenances of their most eminent men, who were earnestly gazing at each other, and murmured bitterly, that their affairs were in so ruinous a state, and the condition of the commonwealth so desperate, that no one dared undertake the command in Spain. When suddenly Publius Cornelius, son of Publius who had fallen in Spain, who was about twenty-four years of age, declaring himself a candidate, took his station on an eminence from which he could be seen by all. The eyes of the whole assembly were directed towards him, and by acclamations and expressions of approbation, a prosperous and happy command were at once augured to him. Orders were then given that they should proceed to vote, when not only every century, but every individual to a man, decided that Publius Scipio should be invested with the command in Spain. But after the business had been concluded, and the ardour and impetuosity of their zeal had subsided, a sudden silence ensued, and a secret reflection on what they had done, whether their partiality had not got the better of their judgment? They chiefly regretted his youth, but some were terrified at the fortune which attended his house and his name, for while the two families to which he belonged were in mourning, he was going into a province where he must carry on his operations between the tombs of his father and his uncle.

Perceiving the solicitude and anxiety which people felt, after performing the business with so much ardour, he summoned an assembly, in which he discoursed in so noble and high minded a manner, on his years, the command intrusted to him, and the war which he had to carry on, as to rekindle and renew the ardour which had subsided, and inspire the people with more confident hopes than the reliance placed on human professions, or reasoning on the promising appearance of affairs, usually engenders. For Scipio was not only deserving of admiration for his real virtues, but also for his peculiar address in displaying them, to which he had been formed from his earliest years;--effecting many things with the multitude, either by feigning nocturnal visions or as with a mind divinely inspired; whether it was that he was himself, too, endued with a superstitious turn of mind, or that they might execute his commands and adopt his plans without hesitation, as if they proceeded from the responses of an oracle. With the intention of preparing men's minds for this from the beginning, he never at any time from his first assumption of the manly gown transacted any business, public or private, without first going to the Capitol, entering the temple, and taking his seat there; where he generally passed a considerable time in secret and alone. This practice, which was adhered to through the whole of his life, occasioned in some persons a belief in a notion which generally prevailed, whether designedly or undesignedly propagated, that he was a man of divine extraction; and revived a report equally absurd and fabulous with that formerly spread respecting Alexander the Great, that he was begotten by a huge serpent, whose monstrous form was frequently observed in the bedchamber of his mother, but which, on any one's coming in, suddenly unfolding his coils, glided out of sight. The belief in these miraculous accounts was never ridiculed by him, but rather increased by his address; neither positively denying any such thing nor openly affirming it. There were also many other things, some real and others counterfeit, which exceeded in the case of this young man the usual measure of human admiration, in reliance on which the state intrusted him with an affair of so much difficulty, and with so important a command, at an age by no means ripe for it. To the forces in Spain, consisting of the remains of the old army, and those which had been conveyed over from Puteoli by Claudius Nero, ten thousand infantry and a thousand horse were added; and Marcus Junius Silanus, the propraetor, was sent to assist in the management of affairs. Thus with a fleet of thirty ships, all of which were quinqueremes, he set sail from the mouth of the Tiber, and coasting along the shore of the Tuscan Sea, the Alps, and the Gallic Gulf, and then doubling the promontory of the Pyrenees, landed his troops at Emporiae, a Greek city, which also derived its origin from Phocaea. Ordering his ships to attend him, he marched by land to Tarraco; where he held a congress of deputies from all the allies; for embassies had poured forth from every province on the news of his arrival. Here he ordered his ships to be hauled on shore, having sent back the four triremes of the Massilians which had, in compliment to him, attended him from their home. After that, he began to give answers to the embassies of the several states, which had been in suspense on account of the many vicissitudes of the war; and this with so great dignity, arising from the great confidence he had in his own talents, that no presumptuous expression ever escaped him; and in every thing he said there appeared at once the greatest majesty and sincerity.

Setting out from Tarraco, he visited the states of his allies and the winter quarters of his army; and bestowed the highest commendations upon the soldiers, because, though they had received two such disastrous blows in succession, they had retained possession of the province, and not allowing the enemy to reap any advantage from their successes, had excluded them entirely from the territory on this side of the Iberus, and honourably protected their allies. Marcius he kept with him, and treated him with such respect, that it was perfectly evident there was nothing he feared less than lest any one should stand in the way of his own glory. Silanus then took the place of Nero, and the fresh troops were led into winter quarters. Scipio having in good time visited every place where his presence was necessary, and completed every thing which was to be done, returned to Tarraco. The reputation of Scipio among his enemies was not inferior to that which he enjoyed among his allies and countrymen. They felt also a kind of presentiment of what was to come, which occasioned the greater apprehension, the less they could account for their fears, which had arisen without any cause. They had retired to their winter quarters in different directions. Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, had gone quite to the ocean and Gades; Mago into the midland parts chiefly above the forest of Castulo; Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar, wintered in the neighbourhood of Saguntum, close upon the Iberus. At the close of the summer in which Capua was recovered and Scipio entered Spain, a Carthaginian fleet, which had been fetched from Sicily to Tarentum, to cut off the supplies of the Roman garrison in the citadel of that place, had blocked up all the approaches to the citadel from the sea; but by lying there too long, they caused a greater scarcity of provisions to their friends than to their enemies. For so much corn could not be brought in for the townsmen, along the coasts which were friendly to them, and through the ports which were kept open through the protection afforded by the Carthaginian fleet, as the fleet itself consumed, which had on board a crowd made up of every description of persons. So that the garrison of the citadel, which was small in number, could be supported from the stock they had previously laid in without importing any, while that which they imported was not sufficient for the supply of the Tarentines and the fleet. At length the fleet was sent away with greater satisfaction than it was received. The scarcity of provisions, however, was not much relieved by it; because when the protection by sea was removed corn could not be brought in.

At the close of the same summer, Marcus Marcellus arriving at the city from his province of Sicily, an audience of the senate was given him by Caius Calpurnius, the praetor, in the temple of Bellona. Here, after discoursing on the services he had performed, and complaining in gentle terms, not on his own account more than that of his soldiers, that after having completely reduced the province, he had not been allowed to bring home his army, he requested that he might be allowed to enter the city in triumph; this he did not obtain. A long debate took place on the question, whether it was less consistent to deny a triumph on his return to him, in whose name, when absent, a supplication had been decreed and honours paid to the immortal gods, for successes obtained under his conduct; or, when they had ordered him to deliver over his army to a successor, which would not have been decreed unless there were still war in the province, to allow him to triumph, as if the war had been terminated, when the army, the evidence of the triumph being deserved or undeserved, were absent. As a middle course between the two opinions, it was resolved that he should enter the city in ovation. The plebeian tribunes, by direction of the senate, proposed to the people, that Marcus Marcellus should be invested with command during the day on which he should enter the city in ovation. The day before he entered the city he triumphed on the Alban mount; after which he entered the city in ovation, having a great quantity of spoils carried before him, together with a model of the capture of Syracuse. The catapultas and ballistas, and every other instrument of war were carried; likewise the rich ornaments laid up by its kings during a long continuance of peace; a quantity of wrought silver and brass, and other articles, with precious garments, and a number of celebrated statues, with which Syracuse had been adorned in such a manner as to rank among the chief Grecian cities in that respect. Eight elephants were also led as an emblem of victory over the Carthaginians. Sosis, the Syracusan, and Mericus, the Spaniard, who preceded him with golden crowns, formed not the least interesting part of the spectacle; under the guidance of one of whom the Romans had entered Syracuse by night, while the other had betrayed to them the island and the garrison in it. To both of them the freedom of the city was given, and five hundred acres of land each. Sosis was to have his portion in the Syracusan territory, out of the lands which had belonged either to the kings or the enemies of the Roman people, together with a house at Syracuse, which had belonged to any one of those persons who had been punished according to the laws of war. Mericus and the Spaniards who had come over with him were ordered to have a city and lands assigned to them in Sicily, which had belonged to some of those who had revolted from the Romans. It was given in charge to Marcus Cornelius to assign them the city and lands wherever he thought proper. In the same country, four hundred acres of land were decreed to Belligenes, by whose means Mericus had been persuaded to come over. After the departure of Marcellus from Sicily, a Carthaginian fleet landed eight thousand infantry and three thousand Numidian cavalry. To these the Murgantian territories revolted; Hybla, Macella, and certain other towns of less note followed their defection. The Numidians also, headed by Mutines, ranging without restraint through the whole of Sicily, ravaged with fire the lands of the allies of the Romans. In addition to these unfortunate circumstances, the Roman soldiers, incensed partly because they had not been taken from the province with their general, and partly because they had been forbidden to winter in towns, discharged their duties negligently, and wanted a a leader more than inclination for a mutiny. Amid these difficulties Marcus Cornelius, the praetor, sometimes by soothing, at other times by reproving them, pacified the minds of the soldiers; and reduced to obedience all the states which had revolted; out of which he gave Murgantia to those Spaniards who were entitled to a city and land, in conformity with the decree of the senate.

As both the consuls had Apulia for their province, and as there was now less to be apprehended from Hannibal and the Carthaginians, they were directed to draw lots for the provinces of Apulia and Macedonia. Macedonia fell to the lot of Sulpicius, who succeeded Laevinus. Fulvius having been called to Rome on account of the election, held an assembly to elect new consuls; when the junior Veturian century, which had the right of voting first, named Titus Manlius Torquatus and Titus Otacilius. A crowd collecting round Manlius, who was present, to congratulate him, and it being certain that the people would concur in his election, he went, surrounded as he was with a multitude of persons, to the tribunal of the consul, and requested that he would listen to a few words from him; and that he would order the century which had voted to be recalled. While all present were waiting impatiently to hear what it was he was going to ask, he alleged as an excuse the weakness of his eyes; observing, that "a pilot or a general might fairly be charged with presumption who should request that the lives and fortunes of others might be intrusted to him, when in every thing which was to be done he must make use of other people's eyes. Therefore he requested, that, if it seemed good to him, he would order the junior Veturian century to come and vote again; and to recollect, while electing consuls, the war which they had in Italy, and the present exigencies of the state. That their ears had scarcely yet ceased to ring with the noise and tumult raised by the enemy, when but a few months ago they nearly scaled the walls of Rome." This speech was followed by the century's shouting out, one and all, that "they would not in the least alter their vote, but would name the same persons for consuls;" when Torquatus replied, "neither shall I as consul be able to put up with your conduct, nor will you be satisfied with my government. Go back and vote again, and consider that you have a Punic war in Italy, and that the leader of your enemies is Hannibal." Upon this the century, moved by the authority of the man and the shouts of admirers around, besought the consul to summon the elder Veturian century; for they were desirous of conferring with persons older than themselves, and to name the consuls in accordance with their advice. The elder Veturian century having been summoned, time was allowed them to confer with the others by themselves in the ovile. The elders said that there were three persons whom they ought to deliberate about electing, two of them having already served all the offices of honour, namely, Quintus Fabius and Marcus Marcellus; and if they wished so particularly to elect some fresh person as consul to act against the Carthaginians, that Marcus Valerius Laevinus had carried on operations against king Philip by sea and land with signal success. Thus, three persons having been proposed to them to deliberate about, the seniors were dismissed, and the juniors proceeded to vote. They named as consuls, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, then glorious with the conquest of Sicily, and Marcus Valerius, both in their absence. All the centuries followed the recommendation of that which voted first. Let men now ridicule the admirers of antiquity. Even if there existed a republic of wise men, which the learned rather imagine than know of; for my own part I cannot persuade myself that there could possibly be a nobility of sounder judgment, and more moderate in their desire of power, or a people better moralled. Indeed that a century of juniors should have been willing to consult their elders, as to the persons to whom they should intrust a command by their vote, is rendered scarcely probable by the contempt and levity with which the parental authority is treated by children in the present age.

The assembly for the election of praetors was then held, at which Publius Manlius Vulso, Lucius Manlius Acidinus, Caius Laetorius, and Lucius Cincius Alimentus were elected. It happened that just as the elections were concluded, news was brought that Titus Otacilius, whom it seemed the people would have made consul in his absence, with Titus Manlius, had not the course of the elections been interrupted, had died in Sicily. The games in honour of Apollo had been performed the preceding year, and on the motion of Calpurnius, the praetor, that they should be performed this year also, the senate decreed that they should be vowed every year for the time to come. The same year several prodigies were seen and reported. At the temple of Concord, a statue of Victory, which stood on the roof, having been struck by lightning and thrown down, stuck among the figures of Victory, which were among the ornaments under the eaves, and did not fall to the ground from thence. Both from Anagnia and Fregellae it was reported that a wall and some gates had been struck by lightning. That in the forum of Sudertum streams of blood had continued flowing through a whole day; at Eretum, that there had been a shower of stones; and at Reate, that a mule had brought forth. These prodigies were expiated with victims of the larger sort, the people were commanded to offer up prayers for one day, and perform the nine days' sacred rite. Several of the public priests died off this year, and fresh ones were appointed. In the room of Manius Aemilius Numida, decemvir for sacred rites, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus was appointed; in the room of Manius Pomponius Matho, the pontiff, Caius Livius; in the room of Spurius Carvilius Maximus, the augur, Marcus Servilius. As Titus Otacilius Crassus, a pontiff, died after the year was concluded, no person was nominated to succeed him. Caius Claudius, flamen of Jupiter, retired from his office, because he had distributed the entrails improperly.

During the same time Marcus Valerius Laevinus, having first sounded the intentions of the leading men by means of secret conferences, came with some light ships to a council of the Aetolians, which had been previously appointed to meet for this very purpose. Here having proudly pointed to the capture of Syracuse and Capua, as proofs of the success of the Roman arms in Sicily and Italy, he added, that "it was a custom with the Romans, handed down to them from their ancestors, to respect their allies; some of whom they had received into their state, and had admitted to the same privileges they enjoyed themselves, while others they treated so favourably that they chose rather to be allies than citizens. That the Aetolians would be honoured by them so much the more, because they were the first of the nations across the sea which had entered into friendship with them. That Philip and the Macedonians were troublesome neighbours to them, but that he had broken their strength and spirits already, and would still further reduce them to that degree, that they should not only evacuate the cities which they had violently taken from the Aetolians, but have Macedonia itself disturbed with war. And that as to the Acarnanians, whose separation from their body was a source of grief to the Aetolians, he would place them again under their ancient system of jurisdiction and dominion." These assertions and promises of the Roman general, Scopas, who was at that time praetor of the nation, and Dorymachus, a leading man among the Aetolians, confirmed on their own authority, extolling the power and greatness of the Roman people with less reserve, and with greater force of conviction. However, the hope of recovering Acarnania principally moved them. The terms, therefore, were reduced to writing, on which they should enter into alliance and friendship with the Roman people, and it was added, that "if it were agreeable to them and they wished it, the Eleans and Lacedaemonians, with Attalus, Pleuratus, and Scerdilaedas, should be included on the same conditions." Attalus was king of Asia; the latter, kings of the Thracians and Illyrians. The conditions were, that "the Aetolians should immediately make war on Philip by land, in which the Romans should assist, with not less than twenty quinqueremes. That the site and buildings, together with the walls and lands, of all the cities as far as Corcyra, should become the property of the Aetolians, every other kind of booty, of the Romans. That the Romans should endeavour to put the Aetolians in possession of Acarnania. If the Aetolians should make peace with Philip, they should insert a stipulation that the peace should stand good only on condition that they abstained from hostilities against the Romans, their allies, and the states subject to them. In like manner, if the Romans should form an alliance with the king, that they should provide that he should not have liberty to make war upon the Aetolians and their allies." Such were the terms agreed upon; and copies of them having been made, they were laid up two years afterwards by the Aetolians at Olympia, and by the Romans in the Capitol, that they might be attested by these consecrated records. The delay had been occasioned by the Aetolian ambassadors' having been detained at Rome. This, however, did not form an impediment to the war's proceeding. Both the Aetolians immediately commenced war against Philip, and Laevinus taking, all but the citadel, Zacynthus, a small island near to Aetolia, and having one city of the same name with the island; and also taking Aeniadae and Nasus from the Acarnanians, annexed them to the Aetolians; and also considering that Philip was sufficiently engaged in war with his neighbours to prevent his thinking of Italy, the Carthaginians, and his compact with Hannibal, he retired to Corcyra.

To Philip intelligence of the defection of the Aetolians was brought while in winter quarters at Pella. As he was about to march an army into Greece at the beginning of the spring, he undertook a sudden expedition into the territories of Oricum and Apollonia, in order that Macedonia might not be molested by the Illyrians, and the cities bordering upon them, in consequence of the terror he would thus strike them with in turn. The Apollonians came out to oppose him, but he drove them, terrified and dismayed, within their walls. After devastating the adjacent parts of Illyricum he turned his course into Pelagonia, with the same expedition. He then took Sintia, a town of the Dardanians, which would have afforded them a passage into Macedonia. Having with the greatest despatch performed these achievements, not forgetting the war made upon him by the Aetolians and Romans in conjunction, he marched down into Thessaly through Pelagonia, Lyncus, and Bottiaea. He trusted that people might be induced to take part with him in the war against the Aetolians, and, therefore, leaving Perseus with four thousand armed men at the gorge, which formed the entrance into Thessaly, to prevent the Aetolians from passing it, before he should be occupied with more important business, he marched his army into Macedonia, and thence into Thrace and Maedica. This nation had been accustomed to make incursions into Macedonia when they perceived the king engaged in a foreign war, and the kingdom left unprotected. Accordingly, he began to devastate the lands in the neighbourhood of Phragandae, and to lay siege to the city Jamphorina, the capital and chief fortress of Maedica. Scopas, on hearing that the king had gone into Thrace, and was engaged in a war there, armed all the Aetolian youths, and prepared to invade Acarnania. The Acarnanian nation, unequal to their enemy in point of strength, and seeing that they had lost Aeniadae and Nasus, and moreover that the Roman arms were threatening them, prepare the war rather with rage than prudence. Having sent their wives, children, and those who were above sixty years old into the neighbouring parts of Epirus, all who were between the ages of fifteen and sixty, bound each other by an oath not to return unless victorious. That no one might receive into his city or house, or admit to his table or hearth, such as should retire from the field vanquished, they drew up a form of direful execration against their countrymen who should do so; and the most solemn entreaty they could devise, to friendly states. At the same time they entreated the Epirotes to bury in one tomb such of their men as should fall in the encounter, adding this inscription over their remains: HERE LIE THE ACARNANIANS, WHO DIED WHILE FIGHTING IN DEFENCE OF THEIR COUNTRY, AGAINST THE VIOLENCE AND INJUSTICE OF THE AETOLIANS. Having worked up their courage to the highest pitch by these means, they fixed their camp at the extreme borders of their country in the way of the enemy; and sending messengers to Philip to inform him of the critical situation in which they stood, they obliged him to suspend the war in which he was engaged, though he had gained possession of Jamphorina by surrender, and had succeeded in other respects. The ardour of the Aetolians was damped, in the first instance, by the news of the combination formed by the Acarnanians; but afterwards the intelligence of Philip's approach compelled them even to retreat into the interior of the country. Nor did Philip proceed farther than Dium, though he had marched with great expedition to prevent the Acarnanians being overpowered; and when he had received information that the Aetolians had returned out of Acarnania, he also returned to Pella.

Laevinus set sail from Corcyra in the beginning of the spring, and doubling the promontory Leucate, arrived at Naupactus; when he gave notice that he should go thence to Anticyra, in order that Scopas and the Aetolians might be ready there to join him. Anticyra is situated in Locris, on the left hand as you enter the Corinthian Gulf. The distance between Naupactus and this place is short both by sea and land. In about three days after, the attack upon this place commenced on both elements. The attack from the sea produced the greatest effect, because there were on board the ships engines and machines of every description, and because the Romans besieged from that quarter. In a few days, therefore, the town surrendered, and was delivered over to the Aetolians, the booty, according to compact, was given up to the Romans. Laevinus then received a letter informing him, that he had been elected consul in his absence, and that Publius Sulpicius was coming as his successor. He arrived at Rome later than he was generally expected, being detained by a lingering illness. Marcus Marcellus, having entered upon the consulship on the ides of March, assembled the senate on that day merely for form's sake He declared, that "in the absence of his colleague he would not enter into any question relative to the state or the provinces." He said, "he well knew there were crowds of Sicilians in the neighbourhood of the city at the country-houses of those who maligned him, whom he was so far from wishing to prevent from openly publishing, at Rome, the charges which had been circulated and got up against him by his enemies, that did they not pretend that they entertained some fear of speaking of a consul in the absence of his colleague, he would forthwith have given them a hearing of the senate. That when his colleague had arrived, he would not allow any business to be transacted before the Sicilians were brought before the senate. That Marcus Cornelius had in a manner held a levy throughout all Sicily, in order that as many as possible might come to Rome to prefer complaints against him, that the same person had filled the city with letters containing false representations that there was still war in Sicily, in order to detract from his merit." The consul, having acquired on that day the reputation of having a well-regulated mind, dismissed the senate, and it appeared that there would be almost a total suspension of every kind of business till the other consul returned to the city. The want of employment, as usual, produced expressions of discontent among the people. They complained of the length of the war, that the lands around the city were devastated wherever Hannibal had marched his hostile troops; that Italy was exhausted by levies, and that almost every year their armies were cut to pieces, that the consuls elected were both of them fond of war, men over-enterprising and impetuous, who would probably stir up war in a time of profound peace, and therefore were the less likely to allow the state to breathe in time of war.