16. About Plato

Plato makes the principles of the universe to be God, matter and (the) model. He says that God is the maker and orderer of this universe and its Providence. That matter is that which underlies all things, which matter he calls a recipient and a nurse. From which, after it had been set in order, came the four elements of which the cosmos is constructed, to wit, fire, air, earth and water, whence in turn all the other so-called compound things, viz., animals and plants have been constructed. But the model is the thought of God which Plato also calls ideas, to which giving heed as to an image in the soul, God fashioned all things. He said that God was without body or form and could only be comprehended by wise men; but that matter is potentially body, but not yet actively. For that being itself without form or quality, it receives forms and qualities to become body. That matter, therefore, is a principle and the same is coeval with God, and the cosmos is unbegotten. For, he says, it constructed itself out of itself. And in all ways it is like the unbegotten and is imperishable. But in so far as body is assumed to be composed of many qualities and ideas, it is so far begotten and perishable. But some Platonists mixed together the two opinions making up some such parable as this: to wit, that, as a wagon can remain undestroyed for ever if repaired part by part, as even though the parts perish every time, the wagon remains complete; so, the cosmos, although it perish part by part, is yet reconstructed and compensated for the parts taken away, and remains eternal.

Some again say that Plato declared God to be one, unbegotten and imperishable, as he says in the Laws:—“God, therefore, as the old story goes, holds the beginning and end and middle of all things that are.” Thus he shows Him to be one through His containing all things. But others say that Plato thought that there are many gods without limitation when he said, “God of gods, of whom I am the fashioner and father.” And yet others that he thinks them subject to limitation when he says: “Great Zeus, indeed, driving his winged chariot in heaven;” and when he gives the pedigree of the children of Uranos and Gê. Others again that he maintained the gods to be originated and that because they were originated they ought to perish utterly, but that by the will of God they remain imperishable as he says in the passage before quoted, “God of gods, of whom I am the fashioner and father, and who are formed by my will indissoluble.” So that if He wished them to be dissolved, dissolved they would easily be. But he accepts the nature of demons, and says some are good, and some bad.

And some say that he declared the soul to be unoriginated and imperishable when he says: “All soul is immortal for that which is ever moving is immortal,” and when he shows that it is self-moving and the beginning of movement. But others say that he makes it originated but imperishable through God’s will; and yet others composite and originated and perishable. For he also supposes that there is a mixing-bowl for it, and that it has a splendid body, but that everything originated must of necessity perish. But those who say that the soul is immortal are partly corroborated by those words wherein he says that there are judgments after death, and courts of justice in the house of Hades, and that the good meet with a good reward and that the wicked are subjected to punishments. Some therefore say that he also admits a change of bodies and the transfer of different pre-determined souls into other bodies according to the merit of each; and that after certain definite peregrinations they are again sent into this ordered world to give themselves another trial of their own choice. Others, however, say not, but that they obtain a place according to each one’s deserts. And they call to witness that he says some souls are with Zeus, but that others of good men are going round with other gods, and that others abide in everlasting punishments, (that is), so many as in this life have wrought evil and unjust deeds. And they say that he declared some conditions to be without intermediates, some with intermediates and some to be intermediates. Waking and sleep are without intermediates and so are all states like these. But there are those with intermediates like good and bad; and intermediates like grey which is between black and white or some other colour. And they say that he declares the things concerning the soul to be alone supremely good, but those of the body or external to it to be no longer supremely good, but only said to be so. And that these last are very often named intermediates also; for they can be used both well and ill. He says therefore that the virtues are extremes as to honour, but means as to substance. For there is nothing more honourable than virtue; but that which goes beyond or falls short of these virtues ends in vice. For instance, he says that these are the four virtues, to wit, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, and Fortitude, and that there follow on each of these two vices of excess and deficiency respectively. Thus on Prudence follow thoughtlessness by deficiency and cunning by excess; on Temperance, intemperance by deficiency and sluggishness by excess; on Justice, over-modesty by deficiency and greediness by excess; and on Fortitude, cowardice by deficiency and foolhardiness by excess. And these virtues when inborn in a man operate for his perfection and give him happiness. But he says that happiness is likeness to God as far as possible. And that any one is like God when he becomes holy and just with intention. For this he supposes to be the aim of the highest wisdom and virtue. But he says that the virtues follow one another in turn and are of one kind, and never oppose one another; but that the vices are many-shaped and sometimes follow and sometimes oppose one another.

He says, again, that there is destiny, not indeed that all things are according to destiny, but that we have some choice, as he says in these words: “The blame is on the chooser: God is blameless,” and again, “This is a law of Adrasteia.” And if he thus affirms the part of destiny, he knew also that something was in our choice. But he says that transgressions are involuntary. For to the most beautiful thing in us, which is the soul, none would admit something evil, that is, injustice; but that by ignorance and mistaking the good, thinking to do something fine, they arrive at the evil. And his explanation on this is most clear in the Republic, where he says: “And again do you dare to say that vice is disgraceful and hateful to God? How then does any one choose such an evil? He does it, you would say, who is overcome by the pleasures (of sense). Therefore this also is an involuntary action, if to overcome be a voluntary one. So that from all reasoning, reason proves injustice to be involuntary.” But some one objects to him about this: “Why then are men punished if they transgress involuntarily?” He answers: “So that they may be the more speedily freed from vice by undergoing correction.” For that to undergo correction is not bad but good, if thereby comes purification from vices, and that the rest of mankind hearing of it will not transgress, but will be on their guard against such error. He says, however, that the nature of evil comes not by God nor has it any special nature of its own; but it comes into being by contrariety and by following upon the good, either as excess or deficiency as we have before said about the virtues. Now Plato, as we have said above, bringing together the three divisions of general philosophy, thus philosophized.