On Holland and King Louis.—Complaints of the Emperor Against the Members of His Family.—Matters of High Police, &C.—Letter to King Louis, the Emperor’s Brother

24th.—The Emperor sent for me at about half-past twelve to his closet. Our conversation turned upon the succession of authors through which the light of history has been transmitted to us from the remotest antiquity down to the present time. This led him to read that part of the first table of the Historical Atlas which gives a recapitulation of them, and presents the whole at one view.

The conversation turned on the diversities of the human species. The Emperor sent for Buffon, to throw light upon the question; and continued for some time employed in seeking information on the subject.

Having dressed, the Emperor sent for my son, and we worked three or four hours at the chapters of the Campaign of Italy.

When this was completed, the conversation, through a variety of subjects, turned upon Holland and King Louis, respecting whom he said some things worthy of observation.

“Louis is not destitute of intelligence,” said the Emperor, “and has a good heart; but even with these qualifications a man may commit many errors, and do a great deal of mischief. Louis is naturally inclined to be capricious and fantastical, and the works of Jean Jaques Rousseau have contributed to increase this disposition. Seeking to obtain a reputation for sensibility and beneficence, incapable by himself of enlarged views, and, at most, competent to local details, Louis acted like a Prefect rather than a king.

“No sooner had he arrived in Holland, than, fancying that nothing could be finer than to have it said that he was thenceforth a true Dutchman, he attached himself entirely to the party favourable to the English, promoted smuggling, and thus connived with our enemies. It became necessary from that moment to watch over him, and even to threaten to attack him. Louis, then, seeking a refuge against the weakness of his disposition in the most stubborn obstinacy, and mistaking a public scandal for an act of glory, fled from his throne, declaiming against me and against my insatiable ambition, my intolerable tyranny. What then remained for me to do? Was I to abandon Holland to our enemies? Ought I to have given it another King? But in that case could I have expected more from him than from my own brother? Did not all the kings that I created act nearly in the same manner? I therefore united Holland to the empire; and this act produced a most unfavourable impression in Europe, and contributed not a little to pave the way to our misfortunes.

“Louis was delighted to take Lucien as his model: Lucien had acted nearly in the same manner; and if, at a later period, he has repented, and has even nobly made amends for his errors, this conduct did honour to his character, but could not produce any favourable change in our affairs.

“On“On my return from Elba in 1815, Louis wrote a long letter to me from Rome, and sent an ambassador to me. It was his treaty, he said, the conditions upon which he would return to me. I answered that I would not make any treaty with him, that he was my brother, and that if he came back he would be well received.

“Will it be believed that one of his conditions was that he should be at liberty to divorce Hortense! I severely rebuked the negotiator for having dared to be the bearer of so absurd a proposal, and for having believed that such a measure could ever be made the subject of a negotiation. I reminded Louis that our family compact positively forbade it, and represented to him that it was not less forbidden by policy, morality, and public opinion. I farther assured him that, actuated by all these motives, if his children were to lose their state through his fault, I should feel more interested for them than for him, although he was my brother.

“Perhaps an excuse might be found for the caprice of Louis’s disposition in the deplorable state of his health, the age at which it became deranged, and the horrible circumstances which produced that derangement, and which must have had a considerable influence upon his mind; he was on the point of death on the occasion, and has, ever since, been subject to most cruel infirmities: he is almost paralytic on one side.

“It is certain, however,” added the Emperor, “that I have derived little assistance from my own family, and that they have severely injured me and the great cause. The energy of my disposition has often been extolled; but I have been a mere milksop, particularly with my family; and well they knew it after the first moment of anger was over, they always carried their point by perseverance and obstinacy. I became tired of the contest, and they did with me just as they pleased. These are great errors which I have committed. If, instead of this, each of them had given a common impulse to the different bodies which I placed under their direction, we should have marched on to the poles; every thing would have given way before us; we should have changed the face of the world; Europe would now enjoy the advantages of a new system, and we should have received the benedictions of mankind! I have not been so fortunate as Gengis Khan, with his four sons, each of whom rivalled the other in zeal for his service. No sooner had I made a man a king, than he thought himself king by the grace of God, so contagious is the use of the expression. He was then no longer a lieutenant, on whom I could rely, but another enemy whom I was obliged to guard against. His efforts were not directed towards seconding me, but towards rendering himself independent. They all immediately imagined that they were adored and preferred to me. From that moment I was in their way, I endangered their existence! Legitimate monarchs would not have behaved differently; would not have thought themselves more firmly established. Weak-minded men! who, when I fell, had occasion to convince themselves that the enemy did not even do them the honour to demand the surrender of their dignities, or even to allude to it. If they are now put under personal restraint, if they are subject to vexation, it must proceed, on the part of the conqueror, from a wish to impose the weight of power, or from the base motive of gratifying his vengeance. If the members of my family excite a strong interest amongst mankind, it is because they belong to me and to the common cause; but assuredly there is not the least danger of any movement being produced by any of them. Notwithstanding the philosophy of several of them (for some of them had said, after the fashion of the chamberlains of the Faubourg St-Germain, that they were forced to reign,) their fall must have been sensibly felt by them, for they had soon accommodated themselves to the pleasures and comforts of their station; they were all really kings. Thanks to my labours, all have enjoyed the advantages of royalty; I alone have known its cares. I have all the time carried the world on my shoulders; and this occupation, after all, is rather fatiguing.

“It will perhaps be asked, why I persisted in erecting states and kingdoms? The manners and the situation of Europe required it. Every time that another country was annexed to France, the act added to the universal alarm which already prevailed, excited loud murmurs, and diminished the chances of peace. Then why, will it be farther said, did I indulge in the vanity of placing every member of my family on a throne? (for the generality of people must have thought me actuated by vanity alone:) why did I not rather fix my choice upon private individuals possessing greater abilities? To this I reply that it is not with thrones as with the functions of a prefect; talents and abilities are so common in the present age, among the multitude, that one must be cautious to avoid awakening the idea of competition. In the agitation in which we were involved, and with our modern institutions, it was proper to think rather of consolidating and concentrating the hereditary right of succession, in order to avoid innumerable feuds, factions, and misfortunes. If there was any fault in my person and my elevation, consistently with the plan of universal harmony which I meditated for the repose and happiness of all, it was that I had risen at once from the multitude. I felt that I stood insulated and alone, and I cast out anchors on all sides into the sea around me. Where could I more naturally look for support than amongst my own relations? Could I expect more from strangers? And it must be admitted that if the members of my family have had the folly to break through these sacred ties, the morality of the people, superior to their blind infatuation, fulfilled in part my object. With them their subjects thought themselves more quiet, more united as in one family.

“To resume: acts of that importance were not to be considered lightly; they were involved in considerations of the highest order; they were connected with the tranquillity of mankind, the possibility of ameliorating its condition. If, notwithstanding all these measures, taken with the best intentions, it seems that no permanent good has been effected, we must admit the truth of this great maxim, that to govern is very difficult for those who wish to do it conscientiously.”

The following letter, of a very old date, will serve to throw great light upon the words of Napoleon, mentioned a few pages back, respecting the conduct of his brother in Holland.

At a later period, King Louis published a sort of account of his administration, addressed to the Dutch nation; it is particularly interesting, after having read the above paragraph and the accompanying letter, to take up that document of King Louis, in order to be able to form an opinion on the subject founded on a due knowledge of all the circumstances.

“Castle of Marach, 3d April, 1808.

“Sir and brother.—The auditor D——t delivered to me an hour ago your despatch, dated 22d March. I send a courier who will take this letter to you in Holland.

“The use you have just made of the privilege of mercy cannot but produce a very bad effect. This privilege is one of the finest and noblest attributes of the sovereign power. In order not to bring it into discredit, it must be used only in cases when the royal clemency is not detrimental to the ends of justice, or when it is calculated to leave an impression of being the result of generous feelings. The present case is that of a number of banditti, who attacked and murdered several custom-house officers, with the intention of smuggling afterwards without interruption. These people are condemned to death; and your Majesty extends the royal mercy to them ... to a set of murderers, to men whom nobody can pity. If they had been caught in the act of smuggling; if, in defending themselves, they had killed some of the officers, then you might perhaps have taken into consideration the situation of their families, and their own; and have shewn an example of a kind of paternal feeling, by modifying the severity of the law, by a commutation of punishment. It is in cases of condemnation for offences against the revenue laws, it is more particularly in cases of condemnation for political offences, that clemency is well applied. In these matters the principle is that, if it is the Sovereign who is attacked, there is a certain magnanimity in pardoning the offender. On the first report of an affair of that kind, the sympathy of the public is immediately excited in favour of the offender, and not of him who is to inflict the punishment. If the Prince remits the sentence, the people consider him superior to the offence, and the public clamour is directed against those who have offended him. If he follows the opposite system, he is thought vindictive and tyrannical. If he pardons atrocious crimes, he is looked upon as weak, or actuated by bad intentions.

“Do not fancy that the privilege of mercy can always be used without danger, and that society will always commend the exercise of it in the Sovereign. The Sovereign is blamed when he applies it in favour of murderers or great malefactors, because it then becomes injurious to the interests of the community. You have too frequently, and on too many occasions, extended the royal mercy. The kindness of your heart must not be listened to when it can become prejudicial to your people. In the affair of the Jews, I should have done as you did; but in that of the smugglers of Middelburg, I should not have pardoned on any account. Many reasons ought to have induced you to let justice take its course, and give the example of an execution which would have produced the excellent effect of preventing many crimes by the terror which it would have inspired. Public officers are murdered in the middle of the night—the murderers are condemned. Your Majesty commutes the punishment of death into a few years’ imprisonment! How much will this not tend to dishearten all the persons employed in the collection of your revenue! The political effect produced by it is also very bad, for the following reasons:—Holland was the channel through which England had, for many years, introduced her goods on the Continent. The Dutch merchants have made immense profits by this trade; and that is the reason why the Dutch nation is partial to England, and fond of smuggling, and why it hates France, who forbids smuggling and opposes England. The mercy which you have extended to these smugglers and murderers is a kind of compliment which you have paid to the taste of the Dutch for smuggling. You appear to make common cause with them,—and against whom? Against me.

“The Dutch love you: your disposition is amiable, your manners are unaffected, and you govern them according to their inclination; but you would make a beneficial use of the influence you possess if you shewed yourself positively determined to suppress smuggling, and if you opened their eyes to their real interests: they would then think that the system of prohibition is good, since it is observed by the King. I cannot see what advantage your Majesty can derive from a species of popularity which you would acquire at my expense. Certainly Holland is no longer what it was at the time of the treaty of Ryswick; and France is not in the situation in which it was placed during the last years of the reign of Louis XIV. If, therefore, Holland is unable to follow a system of policy independent of that of France, it must fulfil the conditions of the alliance.

“It is not to the present alone that sovereigns must accommodate their policy; the future must also be the object of their consideration. What is at this moment the situation of Europe? On one side, England, who possesses, by her sole exertions, a dominion to which the whole world has been hitherto compelled to submit. On the other side, the French Empire and the Continental States, which, strengthened by the union of their powers, cannot acquiesce in this supremacy exercised by England. Those states had also their colonies and a maritime trade; they possess an extent of coast much greater than England; but they have become disunited, and England has attacked the naval power of each separately: England has triumphed on every sea, and all navies have been destroyed. Russia, Sweden, France, and Spain, which possess such ample means for having ships and sailors, dare not venture to send a squadron out of their ports. It is, therefore, no longer from a confederation amongst the maritime powers—a confederation which it would be besides impossible to maintain, on account of the distance, and of the interference of the various interests of each with those of the others—that Europe can expect its maritime emancipation, and a system of peace, which can be established only by the will of England.

“I wish for peace; I wish to obtain it by every means compatible with the dignity of the power of France; at the expense of every sacrifice which our national honour can allow. Every day I feel more and more that peace is necessary; and the sovereigns of the Continent are as anxious for peace as I am. I feel no passionate prejudice against England; I bear her no insurmountable hatred: she has followed against me a system of repulsion; I have adopted against her the Continental system, not so much from a jealousy of ambition, as my enemies suppose, but in order to reduce England to the necessity of adjusting our differences. Let England be rich and prosperous; it is no concern of mine, provided France and her allies enjoy the same advantages.

“The Continental system has, therefore, no other object than to advance the moment when the public rights of Europe and of the French Empire will be definitively established. The sovereigns of the North observe and enforce strictly the system of prohibition, and their trade has been greatly benefited by it: the manufactures of Prussia may now compete with ours. You are aware that France, and the whole extent of coast which now forms part of the Empire, from the Gulf of Lyons to the extremity of the Adriatic, are strictly closed against the produce of foreign industry. I am about to adopt a measure with respect to the affairs of Spain, the result of which will be to wrest Portugal from England, and subject all the coasts of Spain, on both seas, to the influence of the policy of France. The coasts of the whole of Europe will then be closed against England, with the exception of those of Turkey, which I do not care about, as the Turks do not trade with Europe.

“Do you not perceive, from this statement, the fatal consequences that would result from the facilities given by Holland to the English for the introduction of their goods on the continent? They would enable England to levy upon us the subsidies which she would afterwards offer to other powers to fight against us. Your Majesty is as much interested as I am to guard against the crafty policy of the English Cabinet. A few years more, and England will wish for peace as much as we do. Observe the situation of your kingdom, and you will see that the system I allude to is more useful to yourself than it is to me. Holland is a maritime and commercial power; she possesses fine sea-ports, fleets, sailors, skilful commanders, and colonies, which do not cost any thing to the mother-country; and her inhabitants understand trade as well as the English. Has not Holland, therefore, an interest in defending all those advantages? May not peace restore her to the station she formerly held? Granted that her situation may be painful for a few years; but is not this preferable to making the King of Holland a mere governor for England, and Holland and her colonies a vassal of Great Britain? Yet the protection which you would afford to English commerce would lead to that result. The examples of Sicily and Portugal are still before your eyes.

“Await the result of the progress of time. You want to sell your spirits, and England wants to buy them. Point out the place where the English smugglers may come and fetch them; but let them pay for them in money and never in goods, positively never! Peace must at last be made; and you will then conclude a treaty of commerce with England. I may perhaps also make one with her, but in which our mutual interests shall be reciprocally guaranteed. If we must allow England to exercise a kind of supremacy on the sea, a supremacy which she will have purchased at the expense of her treasure and her blood, and which is the natural consequence of her geographical position and of her possessions in the three other parts of the globe; at least our flags will be at liberty to appear on the ocean without being exposed to insult, and our maritime trade will cease to be ruinous. For the present we must direct our efforts towards preventing England from interfering in the affairs of the Continent.

“I have been led on, from the consideration of the mercy which you have granted, to the above details, and I have entered into them because I feared that your Dutch Ministers may impress your Majesty’s mind with false notions.

“I wish you to reflect seriously upon the contents of this letter, and to render the different subjects it treats upon objects of the deliberations of your councils, in order that your Ministers may give a proper direction and tendency to their measures. Under no pretence whatever will France allow Holland to separate herself from the Continental system.

“With respect to these smugglers, since the fault has been committed, it cannot be undone. I advise you, however, not to leave them in the prison of Middelburg; it is too near the spot where the crime was perpetrated: send them to the remotest part of Holland. The present having no other object, &c.

(Signed) “Napoleon.”

During dinner the Emperor asked his groom how his horse was; the groom answered that it was well fed, in good spirits, and in excellent condition. “I hope he does not complain of me,” said the Emperor, “if ever horse led the life of a canon, it is assuredly this.” It is now two or three months since the Emperor was on horseback.