Account of the Campaign of Waterloo Dictated by Napoleon

26th.—The Emperor went out early in the morning, before seven o’clock; he did not wish to disturb any of us. He began to work alone in the garden beneath the tent, where he sent for us all to breakfast with him. He continued there until two o’clock.

At dinner, he conversed a great deal about our situation in the island. He would not, he said, leave Longwood; he did not care for any visitors; but he was desirous that we should take some diversion, and find out some means of amusement. It would, he said, be a pleasure to him to see us move about and get abroad more.

The narrative of the battle of Waterloo, which the Emperor had dictated to General Gourgaud, was read by his desire. What a story! It is painful to think of it. The destinies of France suspended by so slight a thread!

This production was published in Europe in 1820. The measures contrived to transmit it clandestinely from St. Helena proved successful, in spite of every kind of vigilance. The instant this narrative appeared, every body was agreed as to its author. An exclamation burst from every quarter that Napoleon alone was capable of describing in that manner, and it is confidently stated that the Generalissimo, his antagonist, expressed himself precisely in the same way. What noble chapters! It would be impossible to attempt an analysis of them, or to pretend to convey their excellence in terms adequate to their merits. We literally transcribe, however, in this place, the last pages, containing, in the shape of a summary, nine observations of Napoleon, on the faults with which he has been reproached in that campaign.

They are points which will become classic, and we are of opinion that our readers will not be displeased at again finding here subjects which become, every time the occasion presents itself, topics of earnest and important discussion.

We shall preface these observations with a description, also from Napoleon’s dictation, of the resources which France still possessed after the loss of the battle.

“The situation of France was critical, but not desperate, after the battle of Waterloo. Every preparatory measure had been taken, on the supposition of the failure of the attack upon Belgium. Seventy thousand men were rallied on the 27th, between Paris and Laon; from 25 to 30,000, including the depôts of the guard, were on their march from Paris and the depots; General Rapp, with 25,000 men, chosen troops, was expected on the Marne, in the beginning of July; all the losses sustained in the materiel of the artillery had been repaired. Paris, alone, contained 500 pieces of field-artillery, and only 170 had been lost. Thus an army of 120,000 men, equal to that which had passed the Sambre on the 15th, with a train of artillery, consisting of 350 pieces of cannon, would cover Paris by the 1st of July. That capital possessed, independently of these means, for its defence, 36,000 men of the National Guard, 30,000 sharpshooters, 6000 gunners, 600 battering cannon, formidable entrenchments on the right bank of the Seine, and, in a few days, those of the left bank would have been entirely completed. The Anglo-Dutch and Prusso-Saxon armies, diminished, however, by more than 80,000 men, and no longer exceeding 140,000, could not cross the Somme with more than 90,000; they would have to wait there for the co-operation of the Austrian and Russian armies, which could not be on the Marne before the 15th of July. Paris had, consequently, twenty-five days to prepare for its defence, to complete the arming of its inhabitants, its fortifications, its supplies of provisions, and to draw troops from every point of France. Even by the 15th of July, not more than 30, or 40,000 men could have arrived on the Rhine. The mass of the Russian and Austrian armies could not take the field before a later period. Neither arms, nor ammunition, nor officers were wanting in the capital; the number of sharpshooters might be easily augmented to 80,000, and the field artillery could be increased to 600 pieces.

“Marshal Suchet, in conjunction with General Lécourbe, would have had, at the same time, upwards of 30,000 men before Lyons, independently of the garrison of that city, which would have been well armed, well supplied with provisions, and well protected by entrenchments. The defence of all the strong places was secured; they were commanded by chosen officers, and garrisoned by faithful troops. Every thing might be repaired, but decision, energy, and firmness, on the part of the officers, of the Government, of the Chambers, and of the whole nation, were necessary. It was requisite that France should be animated by the sentiment of honour, of glory, of national independence; that she should fix her eyes upon Rome after the battle of Cannæ, and not upon Carthage after that of Zama!!! If France had raised herself to that height, she would have been invincible. Her people contained more of the military elements than any other people in the world. The materiel of war existed in abundance, and was adequate to every want.

“On the 21st of June, Marshal Blucher and the Duke of Wellington entered the French territory at the head of two columns. On the 22nd, the powder magazine at Avesnes took fire, and the place surrendered. On the 24th, the Prussians entered Guise, and the Duke of Wellington was at Cambray. He was at Peronne on the 26th. During the whole of this time, the fortresses on the first, second, and third line in Flanders were invested. The two generals learned, however, on the 25th, the Emperor’s abdication, which had taken place on the 22d, the insurrection of the Chambers, the discouragement occasioned by these circumstances in the army, and the hopes excited among our internal enemies. From that moment, they thought only of marching upon the capital, under the walls of which they arrived at the latter end of June, with fewer than 90,000 men; an enterprise that would have proved fatal to them, and drawn on their total ruin, had they hazarded it in the presence of Napoleon: but that Prince had abdicated!!! The troops of the line at Paris, more than 6000 men of the depôts of the guard, the sharpshooters of the National Guard, chosen from among the people of that great capital, were devoted to him; they had it in their power to exterminate the domestic enemy!!! But in order to explain the motives which regulated his conduct in that important crisis, which was attended with such fatal results both for him and for France, the narrative must go back to an earlier period.

First Observation.—“The Emperor has been reproached, 1st, With having resigned the dictatorship, at the moment when France stood most in need of a dictator; 2nd, With having altered the constitutions of the empire, at a moment when it was necessary to think only of preserving it from invasion; 3rd, With having permitted the Vendeans to be alarmed, who had, at first, refused to take arms against the imperial government; 4th, With having assembled the Chambers, when he ought to have assembled the army; 5th, With having abdicated and left France at the mercy of a divided and inexperienced assembly; for, in fine, if it be true, that it was impossible for the Prince to save the country without the confidence of the nation, it is not less true that the nation could not, in these critical circumstances, preserve either its happiness or its independence without Napoleon.

Second Observation.—“The art, with which the movements of the different bodies of the army were concealed from the enemy’s knowledge, on the opening of the campaign, cannot be too attentively remarked. Marshal Blucher and the Duke of Wellington were surprised; they saw nothing, knew nothing, of the operations which were carrying on near their advanced posts.

“In order to attack the two hostile armies, the French might have out-flanked their right or left, or penetrated their centre. In the first case, they might have advanced by the way of Lisle, and fallen in with the Anglo-Dutch army; in the second, they might have moved forward by Givet and Charlemont, and have fallen in with the Prusso-Saxon army. These two armies would have remained united, since they must have been pressed the one upon the other, from the right to the left, and from the left to the right. The Emperor adopted the plan of covering his movements with the Sambre, and piercing the line of the two armies at Charleroi, their point of junction, executing his manœuvres with rapidity and skill. He thus discovered, in the secrets of the art, means to supply the place of 100,000 men, whom he needed. The plan was executed with boldness and prudence.

Third Observation.—“The character of several generals had been affected by the events of 1814; they had lost somewhat of that spirit, of that resolution, and that confidence, by which they had gained so much glory and so much contributed to the success of former campaigns.

“1st.—On the 15th of June, the third corps was to march at three o’clock in the morning, and arrive at Charleroi at ten; it did not arrive until three o’clock in the afternoon.

“2ndly.—The same day the attack on the woods in front of Fleurus, which had been ordered at four in the afternoon, did not take place until seven. Night came on before the troops could enter Fleurus, where the Commander in Chief had intended to establish his head-quarters the same day. The loss of seven hours was very vexatious on the opening of a campaign.

“3rdly.—Ney received orders to advance on the 16th with 43,000 men, who composed the left under his command, in front of Quatre-Bras, to take up a position there at day-break, and even to entrench himself; he hesitated, and lost eight hours. The Prince of Orange, with only 9000 men, retained, on the 16th until three o’clock in the afternoon, that important position. When at length, the Marshal received at twelve o’clock at noon the order dated from Fleurus, and saw, that the Emperor was on the point of attacking the Prussians, he advanced against Quatre-Bras, but only with half his force, leaving the other half to cover his retreat at the distance of two leagues in the rear; he forgot it until six in the evening, when he felt the want of it for his own defence. In other campaigns, that General would have made himself master of the position in front of Quatre-Bras at six o’clock in the morning; he would have routed and captured the whole of the Belgic division, and either turned the Prussian army by sending a detachment on the Namur road to fall on the rear of their line of battle; or, by moving rapidly along the road to Gennapes, he would have surprised and destroyed the Brunswick division on its march, and the fifth English division as it advanced from Brussels. He would have afterwards marched to meet the third and fourth English divisions, which were advancing by way of Nivelles, and were both destitute of cavalry and artillery, and overwhelmed with fatigue. Ney, who was always first in the heat of battle, forgot the troops that were not directly engaged. The courage which a Commander in Chief should display is different from that of a general of division, as that of the latter ought to differ from the bravery of a captain of grenadiers.

“4thly.—The advanced guard of the French army did not arrive on the 16th, in front of Waterloo, until six o’clock in the evening; it would have arrived at three but for some vexatious hesitations. The Emperor was very much mortified at the delay, and, pointing at the sun, exclaimed, “What would I now give to have the power of Joshua, and to stop its progress for two hours!”

Fourth Observation.—“The French soldier never displayed more bravery, cheerfulness, and enthusiasm; he was animated with the sentiment of his superiority over all the soldiers of Europe. His confidence in the Emperor was altogether unabated; it had, perhaps, increased: but he was suspicious and distrustful of his other Commanders. The treasons of 1814 were always in his thoughts, and he was uneasy at every movement which he did not understand; he thought he was betrayed. At the moment when the first cannon-shots were firing near St. Amand, an old corporal approached the Emperor and said: “Sire, beware of General Soult; be assured that he is a traitor.”—“Fear nothing,” replied the Emperor, “I can answer for him as for myself.” In the middle of the battle, an officer informed Marshal Soult that General Vandamme had gone over to the enemy, and that his soldiers demanded, with loud cries, that the Emperor should be made acquainted with it. At the close of the battle, a dragoon, with his sabre covered with blood, galloped up to him crying, “Sire, come instantly to the division. General Dhénin is persuading the dragoons to go over to the enemy.”—“Did you hear him?“—“No, Sire, but an officer, who is looking for you, saw him and ordered me to tell your Majesty.” During this time, the gallant General Dhénin received a cannon shot, which carried off one of his legs, after he had repulsed the enemy’s charge.

“On the 14th, in the evening, Lieutenant-General B——, Colonel C——, and V——, an officer of the staff, deserted and went over to the enemy. Their names will be held in execration as long as the French shall constitute a nation. The uneasy feelings of the troops had been considerably aggravated by that desertion. It appears nearly certain that the cry of Sauve qui peut was raised among the soldiers of the fourth division of the first corps, on the evening of the battle of Waterloo, when Marshal Blucher attacked the village of La Haye. That village was not defended as it ought to have been. It is equally probable that several officers, charged with the communication of orders, disappeared. But, if some officers deserted, not a single private was guilty of that crime. Several killed themselves on the field of battle, where they lay wounded, when they learned the defeat of the army.

Fifth Observation.—“In the battle of the 17th, the French army was divided into three bodies; 69,000 men under the Emperor’s command, marched against Brussels by the way of Charleroi; 34,000, under the command of Marshal Grouchy, directed their operations against that capital by way of Wavres, in pursuit of the Prussians; 7 or 8000 men remained on the field of battle at Ligny, of whom 3000, belonging to Girard’s division, were employed in assisting the wounded, and in forming a reserve for any unexpected casualty at Quatre-Bras; and 4 or 5000 continued with the reserve at Fleurus and at Charleroi. The 34,000 men under the command of Marshal Grouchy, with 108 pieces of cannon, were sufficient to drive the Prussian rear-guard from any position it might take up, to press upon the retreat of the conquered army, and to keep it in check. It was a glorious result of the victory of Ligny, to be thus enabled to oppose 34,000 men to an army which had consisted of 120,000. The 69,000 men, under the Emperor’s command, were sufficient to beat the Anglo-Dutch army, composed of 90,000. The disproportion which existed on the 15th between the two belligerent masses in the ratio of one to two, was materially changed, and it no longer exceeded three to four. Had the Anglo-Dutch army defeated the 69,000 men opposed to it, Napoleon might have been reproached with having ill-calculated his measures; but it is undeniable, even from the enemy’s admission, that, unless General Blucher had arrived, the Anglo-Dutch army would have been driven from the field of battle between eight and nine o’clock at night. If Marshal Blucher had not arrived at eight with his first and second corps, the march on Brussels with two columns, during the battle of the 17th, would have been attended with several advantages. The left would have pressed upon and kept in check the Anglo-Dutch army; the right, under the command of Marshal Grouchy, would have pursued and restrained the operations of the Prusso-Saxon army; and in the evening, the whole of the French army would have effected its junction on a line of less than five leagues from Mont Saint Jean to Wavres, with its advanced posts on the edge of the forest. But the fault committed by Marshal Grouchy, in stopping on the 17th at Gembloux, having marched scarcely two leagues in the course of the day, instead of pushing on three leagues more in front of Wavres, was aggravated and rendered irreparable by that which he committed the following day, the 18th, in losing twelve hours, and arriving at four o’clock in the afternoon in front of Wavres, when he should have been there at six in the morning.

“1st,—Grouchy, charged with the pursuit of Marshal Blucher, lost sight of him for twenty-four hours, from four o’clock in the afternoon of the 17th until a quarter past twelve at noon on the 18th.

“2dly,—The movement of the cavalry on the plain, while General Bulow’s attack was not yet repulsed, proved a distressing accident. It was the intention of the Commander in Chief to order that movement, but not until an hour later, and then it was to have been sustained by the sixteen battalions of infantry belonging to the guard, with one hundred pieces of cannon.

“3dly.—The horse grenadiers and the dragoons of the guard, under the command of General Guyot, engaged without orders. Thus, at five in the afternoon, the army found itself without a reserve of cavalry. If, at half past eight, that reserve had existed, the storm which swept all before it on the field of battle would have been dispersed, the enemy’s charges of cavalry driven back, and the two armies would have slept on the field, notwithstanding the successive arrivals of General Bulow and Marshal Blucher: the advantage would also have been in favour of the French army, as Marshal Grouchy’s 34,000 men, with 108 pieces of cannon, were fresh troops and bivouacked on the field of battle. The enemy’s two armies would have placed themselves in the night under cover of the forest of Soignes. The constant practice in every battle was for the horse-grenadiers and the dragoons of the guard never to lose sight of the Emperor, and never to make a charge but in consequence of an order verbally given by that Prince to the General who commanded them.

“Marshal Mortier, who was Commander in Chief of the guards, gave up the command on the 15th, at Beaumont, just as hostilities were on the point of commencing, and no one was appointed in his stead, which was attended with several inconvenient results.

Sixth Observation.—“1st, The French army manœuvred on the right of the Sambre, on the 13th and 14th. It encamped, the night between the 14th and 15th, within half a league of the Prussian advanced posts; and yet Marshal Blucher had no knowledge of it, and when, on the morning of the 15th, he learned at his head-quarters at Namur that the Emperor had entered Charleroi, the Prusso-Saxon army was still cantoned over an extent of thirty leagues; two days were necessary for him to effect the junction of his troops. It was his duty, from the 15th of May, to advance his head-quarters to Fleurus, to concentrate the cantonments of his army within a radius of eight leagues, with his advanced posts on the Meuse and Sambre. His army might then have been assembled at Ligny on the 15th at noon, to await in that position the attack of the French army, or to march against it in the evening of the 15th, for the purpose of driving it into the Sambre.

“2dly.—Yet, notwithstanding this surprise of Marshal Blucher, he persisted in the project of collecting his troops on the heights of Ligny, behind Fleurus, exposing himself to the hazard of being attacked before the arrival of his army. On the morning of the 16th, he had collected but two corps, and the French army was already at Fleurus. The third corps joined in the course of the day, but the fourth, commanded by General Bulow, was unable to get up in time for the battle. Marshal Blucher, the instant he learned the arrival of the French at Charleroi, that is to say, on the evening of the 15th, ought to have assigned, as a point of junction for his troops, neither Fleurus nor Ligny, which were under the enemy’s cannon, but Wavres, which the French could not have reached until the 17th. He would have also had the whole of the 16th, and the night between the 16th and 17th, to effect the total junction of his army.

“3dly.—After having lost the battle of Ligny, the Prussian General, instead of making his retreat on Wavres, ought to have effected it upon the army of the Duke of Wellington, whether at Quatre-Bras, where the latter had maintained himself, or at Waterloo. The whole of Marshal Blucher’s retreat on the morning of the 17th was contrary to common sense, since the two armies, which were, on the evening of the 16th, little more than three miles from each other, and had a fine road for their point of communication, in consequence of which their junction might have been considered as effected, found themselves, on the evening of the 17th, separated by a distance of nearly twelve miles, and by defiles and impassable ways.

“The Prussian General violated the three grand rules of war; 1st, To keep his cantonments near each other; 2dly, To assign as a point of junction a place where his troops can all assemble before those of the enemy; 3dly, To make his retreat upon his reinforcements.

Seventh Observation.—“1st, The Duke of Wellington was surprised in his cantonments; he ought to have concentrated them on the 15th of May, at eight leagues about Brussels, and kept advanced guards on the roads from Flanders. The French army was for three days manœuvring close upon his advanced posts; it had commenced hostilities twenty four hours, and its head-quarters had been twelve hours at Charleroi, and yet the English General was at Brussels, ignorant of what was passing, and all the cantonments of his army were still in full security, extended over a space of more than twenty leagues.

“2dly.—The Prince of Saxe-Weimar, who belonged to the Anglo-Dutch army, was, on the 16th, at four o’clock in the afternoon in position before Frasne, and knew that the French army was at Charleroi. If he had immediately despatched an aide-de-camp to Brussels, he would have arrived there at six in the evening; and yet the Duke of Wellington was not informed that the French army was at Charleroi until eleven at night. He thus lost five hours, in a crisis, and against a man, that rendered the loss of a single hour highly important.

“3dly.—The infantry, cavalry, and artillery of that army were in cantonments, so remote from each other that the infantry was engaged at Waterloo without cavalry or artillery, which exposed it to considerable loss, since it was obliged to form in close columns to make head against the charges of the cuirassiers, under the fire of fifty pieces of cannon. These brave men were slaughtered without cavalry to protect or artillery to avenge them. As the three branches of an army cannot, for an instant, dispense with each other’s assistance, they should be always cantoned and placed in such a way as to be able to assist each other.

“4th.—The English General, although surprised, assigned Quatre-Bras, which had been, for the last four-and-twentyfour-and-twenty hours in possession of the French, as the rallying point of his army. He exposed his troops to partial defeats as they gradually arrived; the danger which they incurred was still more considerable, since they came without artillery and without cavalry; he delivered up his infantry to his enemy piece-meal, and destitute of the assistance of the two other branches. He should have fixed upon Waterloo for his point of junction; he would then have had the day of the 16th, and the night between the 16th and 17th, an interval quite sufficient, to collect the whole of his army, infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The French could not have arrived until the 17th, and would have found all his troops in position.

Eighth Observation.—“1st, The English General gave battle at Waterloo on the 18th; that measure was contrary to the interests of his nation, to the general system of war adopted by the Allies, and to all the rules of war. It was not the interest of England, who wants so many men to recruit her armies in India, in her American colonies, and in her vast establishments, to expose herself, with a generous vivacity, to a sanguinary contest in which she might lose the only army she had, and expend, at the very least, her best blood. The plan of the Allies consisted in operating in a mass and in avoiding all partial actions. Nothing was more contrary to their interests and their plan than to expose the success of their cause in a doubtful battle with a nearly equal force, in which all the probabilities were against them. If the Anglo-Dutch army had been destroyed at Waterloo, of what use to the allies would have been the great number of armies that were preparing to cross the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees?

“2ndly.—The English General, in accepting the battle of Waterloo, placed his reliance on the co-operation of the Prussians, but that co-operation could not be carried into effect until the afternoon; he therefore continued exposed alone from four o’clock in the morning until five in the afternoon, that is to say, for thirteen hours; no battle lasts generally more than six hours; that co-operation was therefore an illusion.

“But, if he relied upon the co-operation of the Prussians, he must have supposed that the whole of the French army was opposed to him, and he must consequently have undertaken to defend his field of battle, during thirteen hours, with 90,000 men of different nations, against an army of 104,000 French. That calculation was evidently false; he could not have maintained himself three hours; the battle would have been decided by eight o’clock in the morning, and the Prussians would have arrived only to be taken in flank. Both armies would have been destroyed in one battle. If he calculated that a part of the French army had, conformably to the rules of war, pursued the Prussian army, he ought, in that case, to have been convinced that he could receive no assistance from it, and that the Prussians, beaten at Ligny, having lost from 25 to 30,000 men on the field of battle, having 20,000 scattered and dispersed over the country, and pursued by from 35 to 40,000 victorious French, would not have risked any fresh operation, and would have considered themselves scarcely sufficient to maintain a defensive position. In that case, the Anglo-Dutch army alone would have had to sustain the shock of 69,000 French during the whole of the 18th, and there is no Englishman who will not admit that the result of that struggle could not have been doubtful, and that their army was not so constituted as to be capable of sustaining the attack of the imperial army for four hours.

“During the whole of the night between the 17th and 18th, the weather was horrible, and the roads were impassable until nine o’clock in the morning. This loss of six hours from day-break, was entirely in the enemy’s favour; but could the English General stake the fate of such a struggle upon the weather which happened in the night between the 17th and 18th? Marshal Grouchy, with 34,000 men and 180 pieces of cannon, found out the secret, which one would suppose was not to be found out, of not being in the engagement of the 18th, either on the field of battle of Mont St. Jean or of Wavres. But, had that Marshal pledged himself to the English General to be led astray in so strange a manner? The conduct of Marshal Grouchy was as unexpected as that his army should, on its march, be swallowed up by an earthquake. Let us recapitulate. If Marshal Grouchy had been on the field of battle of Mont St. Jean, as he was supposed to be by the English General and the Prussian General, during the whole night between the 17th and 18th, and all the morning of the 18th, and the weather had allowed the French army to be drawn up in order of battle at four o’clock in the morning, the Anglo-Dutch army would have been dispersed and cut in pieces before seven; its ruin would have been complete, and if the weather had not allowed the French army to range itself in order of battle until ten, the fate of the Anglo-Dutch army would have been decided before one o’clock; the remains of it would have been driven either beyond the forest or in the direction of Hal, and there would have been quite time enough in the afternoon to go and meet Marshal Blucher, and treat him in a similar manner. If Marshal Grouchy had encamped in front of Wavres in the night between the 17th and 18th, no detachment could have been sent by the Prussians to save the English army, which must have been completely beaten by the 69,000 French opposed to it.

“3dly.—The position of Mont St. Jean was ill chosen. The first requisite of a field of battle is to be without defiles in its rear. The English General derived no advantage, during the battle, from his numerous cavalry; he did not think that he ought to be and would be attacked on the left; he believed that the attack would be made on his right. Notwithstanding the diversion operated in his favour by General Bulow’s 30,000 Prussians, he would have twice effected his retreat, during the battle, had that measure been possible. Thus, in reality, how strange and capricious are human events! the bad choice of his field of battle, which prevented all possibility of retreat, was the cause of his success!!!

Ninth Observation.—“It may be asked, what then should have been the conduct of the English General, after the battle of Ligny and the engagement of Quatre Bras? On this point posterity will not entertain two opinions: he ought, in the night between the 17th and 18th, to have crossed the forest of Soignes, by the road of Charleroi; the Prussian army ought also to have crossed it by the road of Wavres; the armies would have effected a junction by break of day in Brussels; left their rearguards for the defence of the forest, gained some days in order to give time to the Prussians, dispersed after the battle of Ligny, to join their army; reinforced themselves with fourteen English regiments, which were in garrison in the fortresses of Belgium, or had been just landed at Ostend, on their return from America, and let the Emperor of the French manœuvre as he pleased.

“Would he, with an army of 100,000 men have traversed the forest of Soignes to attack in an open country the two united armies, consisting of more than 200,000 men, and in position? It would have certainly been the most advantageous thing that could have happened to the allies. Would he have been content with taking up a position himself? He could not have long remained in an inactive state, since 300,000 Russians, Austrians, Bavarians, &c. were on their march to the Rhine; they would have been in a few weeks on the Marne, which would have compelled him to hasten to the assistance of his capital. It was then that the Anglo-Prussian army ought to have marched and effected its junction with the Allies, under the walls of Paris. It would have exposed itself to no risk, suffered no loss, and have acted conformably to the interests of the English nation, and the general plan of carrying on the war adopted by the Allies, and sanctioned by the rules of the military art. From the 15th to the 18th, the Duke of Wellington invariably manœuvred as his enemy wished; he executed nothing which the latter apprehended he would. The English infantry was firm and solid; the cavalry might have conducted itself better: the Anglo-Dutch army was twice saved, in the course of the day, by the Prussians—the first time before three o’clock, by the arrival of General Bulow with 30,000 men, and the second time by the arrival of Marshal Blucher with 31,000 men. In that battle, 69,000 French beat 120,000 men; the victory was wrested from them, between eight and nine, by 150,000 men.

“Let the feelings of the people of London be imagined, if they had been doomed to hear of the destruction of their army, and the prodigal waste of their best blood, in support of the cause of kings against that of nations, of privileges against equality, of the oligarchs against the liberals, and of the principles of the Holy Alliance against those of the sovereignty of the people!!!”