Memoirs, Correspondence and Manuscripts of General Lafayette Papyras Classics

← Memoirs, Correspondence and Manuscripts of General Lafayette

Chapter 27

Conclusion. 1st, I think it would be best to give me the corps.—2d,

If it be not given to me, I must instantly set out with the powers I demand. In either case, it is, unfortunately, necessary to reveal to me the secret, and set me immediately to work.

I shall have the honour, sir, of paying my respects to you during the procession.

Endnote:

1. This letter contains the basis of the plan which was finally adopted. We have been obliged to retrench several letters which relate to projects analogous to those presented at various periods by M. de Lafayette. It was at length determined to send an auxiliary corps even stronger than he had hoped to obtain. As to himself, he was to precede it to America, whither he repaired with political instructions from the French cabinet, and to resume a command in the army of the United States. His instructions are dated the 5th of March; his departure took place the 19th.

To His Excellency General Washington.~{1}

(Original.)

At the entrance of Boston harbour, April 27, 1780.

Here I am, my dear general, and, in the midst of the joy I feel in finding myself again one of your loving soldiers, I take but the time to tell you that I came from France on board a frigate which the king gave me for my passage. I have affairs of the utmost importance which I should at first communicate to you alone. In case my letter finds you anywhere this side of Philadelphia, I beg you will wait for me, and do assure you a great public good may be derived from it.

To-morrow we go up to the town, and the day after I shall set off in my usual way to joined my beloved and respected friend and general.

Adieu, my dear general; you will easily know the hand of your young soldier.

My compliments to the family.

Endnote:

1. The second of the measures discussed in the preceding letter was the one preferred, and M. de Lafayette embarked alone at the island of Aix.

To M. De Vergennes.

Waterburg, on the Boston road,

From the Camp, May 6th, 1780.

I have already had the honour of writing to you, sir, and of announcing to you the news of my arrival; but I place so much confidence in the kindness you express for me, that I do not hesitate to repeat the contents of my former letter. It was the 28th of April, after a voyage of thirty-eight days, and after having experienced both calms and contrary winds, that the Hermione entered the Boston harbour. I cannot sufficiently express my admiration of the frigate herself, and my gratitude to her commanding officers.

I can neither give you any certain information, sir, nor promise you any degree of accuracy respecting numbers and dates. General Washington can alone inform me of the truth; but this does appear to me certain;—

Our army is not numerous; the eastern states are occupied in recruiting it. Paper has been regulated by congress at forty for one: these are very high taxes, and they hope to be able to raise the finances a little, which are in a very low state; but, at present, I cannot give you any settled ideas upon this point.

The scarcity of horses, their price, and the want of provisions, have very much increased during my absence; but I assure you, sir, that, in a moral point of view, I continue to see a most favourable prospect for my American friends.

General Clinton has besieged Charlestown, and as he has eight or ten thousand men, and the report is spread that his vessels have crossed the bar, it is impossible not to fear for that place, unless Spanish or French vessels should come from the islands to its succour. Some troops from the army of General Washington have proceeded thither.

New York has only six or seven thousand garrisoned men; such is, at least, the public report, and I do not believe that the hostile forces are much more numerous at present. They say, at Boston, that there are only four thousand men; but I repeat, sir, that my gazettes cannot be at all accurate at present.

The English have but few vessels at Charlestown; at most they have only, I think, one or two at New York. It is said here, and every one seems to believe it, that if some French forces were to arrive at this moment, they might strike some decisive blows.

Be pleased, sir, to accept the assurance of the warm and respectful affection with which I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. Some American officers, just come from New York, assure me that a frigate has, arrived with important despatches from the English government. Don Juan de Miralles, who has been long established at Philadelphia, and who knows M. d'Aranda, died at Morristown; he was buried with much honour.

From General Washington.

(Original.)

Morristown, May, 1783.

My dear Marquis,—Your welcome favour of the 27th of April came to my hands yesterday. I received it with all the joy that the sincerest friendship would dictate, and with that impatience which an ardent desire to see you could not fail to inspire. I am sorry I do not know your route through the State of New York, that I might with certainty send a small party of horse, all I have at this place, to meet and escort you safely through the Tory settlements, between this place and the North River. At all events, Major Gibbs will go as far as Compton, where the roads unite, to meet you and will proceed from thence, as circumstances may direct, either towards King's Ferry or New Windsor. I most sincerely congratulate you on your safe arrival in America, and shall embrace you with all the warmth of an affectionate friend, when you come to head-quarters, where a bed is prepared for you. Adieu till we meet. Yours, &c.~{1}

Endnote:

1. General Washington expressed, in several letters, the pleasure he felt at M. de Lafayette's return. (See his letters of the 13th and 14th of May.) The 16th of May, the congress declared, by a public resolution, that "they consider his return as a fresh proof of the disinterested zeal and persevering attachment which have justly recommended him to the public confidence and applause, and that they receive with pleasure a tender of the further services of so gallant and meritorious an officer."—(Journal of Congress, May 20th.)

It was afterwards resolved that the commander-in-chief, after having received the communications M. de Lafayette had to make to him, was to take the proper measures which were most likely to forward the success of the plan they had in view. The communications related to the expected arrival of a French squadron and land forces. The plan in contemplation was to make some attacks, especially on New York.

To the Count De Rochambeau.

Philadelphia, 19th May, 1780.

Sir,—This letter will be handed to you by M. de Galvan, a French officer in the service of the United States, and you may receive with confidence the various accounts which he will have the honour to give you. I have appointed him to await your arrival at Cape Henry, and you will see that my instructions to this officer are in conformity with those which I have received from the Count de Vergennes.~{1}

I reached Boston on the 26th of April. On the morning of the 10th of May, I was at head-quarters, and after passing four days with General Washington, I went to meet the Chevalier de la Luzerne. The military preparations and the political measures which it was necessary for us to attend to, have delayed M. de Galvan up to the present moment. I now hasten to despatch him to his destination, and shall keep him informed of whatever news may be interesting to you, continuing to add the ideas of the general, with regard to the best means of improving present circumstances.

Immediately upon my arrival, confidential persons were sent out to procure plans and details upon the different points which become interesting for the operations of this campaign. As to other matters, the Chevalier de la Luzerne has had the goodness to enable me, as far as possible, to fulfil my instructions, and he has taken the first measures requisite to procure a supply of food and other necessaries for the land and naval forces. Although the scarcity of all things is infinitely greater than when I left America, the precautions taken before-hand by the Chevalier de la Luzerne, and the measures we are now taking here, render it certain that the French will not be in want, either of flour or of fresh meat.

I will now give you a summary of the present situation of the enemy on the continent. I shall say nothing of Canada, or Halifax, or the Penobscot, from whence we are expecting news, and which, for the moment, are not of essential importance. Rhode Island is in our possession; you can enter it in full security; letters, signals, and pilots will await you there, agreeably to my instructions. Your magazines, your sick, and all your unnecessary baggage, can go up the Providence by water; I shall soon send to Rhode Island more particular information on this point.

The enemy have, at the present moment, seven thousand men of their best troops employed at the siege of Charlestown; they have also some ships of the line without the harbour; one vessel of fifty guns, two frigates of forty-four, and several smaller vessels. According to news from New York, Charlestown still held out on the 3rd of this month. On the Islands of New York, Long Island, and Staten Island, the forces of the enemy consisted of eight thousand regular troops, a few militia, upon which they place no dependence, and a small number of royalists, very contemptible in all respects. They have only one ship of seventy-four guns, and some frigates. The American army is in three divisions; one guards the fort of West Point and keeps open the North River; another is in South Carolina; and the third, which is the largest, is in the Jerseys, under the immediate command of General Washington. This last division, not very numerous at present, will be increased in a few days; and for that reason, I shall defer till another letter giving you a more exact account of its situation.

Your voyage is known at New York. Advices were immediately sent on to Charlestown, recalling either the troops, or at least the ships of war. They are erecting fortifications on the Island, and preparing vessels loaded with stones to obstruct the passage; in a word, if it be true that the present divided state of the English forces seems to insure their destruction, and to promise us the conquest of New York, it is equally true that, at the moment of your arrival, if by good fortune things remain in their present state, we shall have no time to lose in taking advantage of those favourable circumstances.

At the same time that I here execute the orders of my general, and communicate to you the sentiments of my friend, permit me to assure you of the strong desire of our army to do whatever may please you, and how much we shall all endeavour to merit the friendship and the esteem of troops, whose assistance at the present moment is so essential to us. You will find amongst us a great deal of good will, a great deal of sincerity, and above all, a great desire to be agreeable to you.

I send a duplicate of this letter to the Chevalier de Ternay, and I shall send the same to Point Judith and Seaconnet; so that in case you should make land at Rhode Island, you may at once sail for Sandy Hook. The next letter which I shall have the honour to write to you, will be dated at headquarters. The confidence of General Washington, which M. de Galvan has deserved, and the means which he has of fulfilling his instructions, all assure me that you will be satisfied with our choice. I have the honour to be, &c.

Endnote:

1. The instructions given to M. de Lafayette by the minister of foreign affairs, (5th March, 1780), were, that, to prevent any mistake or delay, he was to place, both on Rhode Island and on Cape Henry (the mouth of the Chesapeake), a French officer, to await the arrival of the French squadron, which was to land at one of those two points, and to give it all the information it might require on its arrival. This letter was consequently given to M. de Galvan, and he repaired to Cape Henry, but vainly expected those frigates: they landed at Rhode Island, they left Brest the 2nd of May, under the orders of the Chevalier de Ternay, and appeared before Newport the 10th of July. This letter was delivered afterwards to M. de Rochambeau, as well as several others, which want of space and interest do not allow us to insert.

To General Washington.

(Original.)

Camp at Preakness, July 4th, 1780.

You know, my dear general, that I am very anxious to see the army well clothed for this campaign; the importance of such a measure is on every account obvious, and from the knowledge I have of the auxiliary troops that are coming, I can so well demonstrate its necessity that I shall for the present but attend to the means of executing it.

In the space of six months (we know from experience) the coats of our soldiers begin to be worn out, so that there is no great inconvenience in giving some new clothes to the draftsmen, and after they shall be discharged, the number of the remaining soldiers will not much exceed six or seven thousand men; as those very men will have been completely clothed by the middle of July, I think I make full allowance for them by keeping in store the seven thousand unmade suits that have been shipped by Mr. Ross.

If more are wanted in the course of next summer, I engage to go over to France and bring back ten thousand complete suits properly conveyed.

Excluding wagoners, servants, and all such people who do not want to be uniformly clothed, we may calculate the continental army to consist of fourteen thousand men in the field. There may be found in the army four thousand coats and waistcoats which are not absolutely bad, four thousand stocks or cravats, and one thousand pretty good hats.

We may get from the stores fifteen thousand overalls, ten thousand pairs of shoes, three thousand round hats, and some few shirts.

There are also six or seven hundred coats of every colour, to which may be added about three or four hundred of the same kind, and some indifferent hats found in the army, &c.

A small quantity of buff and red cloth to be bought for the facings of the Pennsylvanian and Jersey lines.

The four thousand good hats in the stores or in the army to be cut round, or cocked in the form of caps, but to be in an uniform manner.

All the articles now in the possession of the clothier-general, to be immediately ordered to North River, and, if necessary, wagons should be pressed for their speedy transportation.

I will write a letter to the Chevalier de Ternay, wherein I will desire him to send to the most convenient place the clothing which has been put under his convoy.

We shall then have ten thousand new coats and waistcoats, and four thousand old ones, the whole of an uniform ground, ten thousand new hats and stocks, and four thousand old ones, five and twenty thousand overalls, more than twenty thousand shirts, and thirty thousand pairs of shoes.

Each soldier enlisted for the war, let them even be ten thousand, shall have, if you choose, a new complete suit, one hat, one stock, two shirts, two pairs of overalls, and two pairs of shoes.

Each draftsman, if he has not the same, will at least receive a decent uniform coat, one stock, one hat, one pair of overalls, and two pairs of shoes; he will not certainly come out but well provided with shirts.

By the above mentioned arrangement, there remain about a thousand coats of every colour, a thousand hats, which are not absolutely bad, and two thousand pairs of shoes; these I propose to give to such men as will not appear under arms in the field, and, if necessary, some hunting-shirts may be added to the said clothing.

The dragoons are generally better clothed than the infantry, and we might very easily complete their coats or stable-jackets, as each different regiment could adopt a different colour.

As soon as the French clothing comes, I wish the whole army to be clothed at once, in observing to give the round hats to some particular brigades, for the sake of uniformity, and to turn up the facings according to the plan agreed.

There will be then no excuse for the officers who, out of neglect, should suffer their men to lose a single article, and the most strict orders may be given for that purpose.

The French arms that are coming might be put in the hands of soldiers enlisted for the war.

I wish that there was a distinction of one woollen epaulette for the corporal, and two for the serjeant.

As to the feathers, (become a distinction of ranks,) I wish such as have been pointed out might be forbidden to other officers, and for the light division I shall beg the leave of wearing a black and red feather, which I have imported for the purpose.

These ideas, my dear general, are not given to you as a great stroke of genius, but I heartily wish something of the kind may be thought proper.

To Mm. Le Comte De Rochambeau, and Le Chevalier De Ternay.~{1}

Camp, before Dobb's Ferry, Aug. 9, 1780.

Gentlemen,—I arrived two days ago at head quarters, and in consequence of the mission I was charged with, my first care was to render an account of our conversations; but the most minute details of them are so important, and the fate of America, and the glory of France, depend so completely upon the result of our combinations here, that, in order to feel more certain of having perfectly understood your meaning, I will submit to you a summary of our conversations, and entreat you to write me word immediately whether I have rightly understood your meaning. Before quitting Rhode Island, gentlemen, I should have taken this precaution, if General Washington's march against New York had not obliged me to join my division, at the very moment when, from our further arrangements, you most required some information.

1st. I have described to you the actual situation of America, the exhausted state in which I found her, and the momentary efforts she had made, which could only have been produced by the hope of being delivered, by one decisive blow, from the tyranny of the English.

I told you those efforts were so enormous, when we consider the state of our finances, and the failure of all our resources, that I do not expect to see them renewed during another campaign. I added that on the 1st of November we should no longer have any militia, that the 1st of January one half of our continental army would be disbanded, and I took the liberty of saying, in my own name, that I thought it necessary, as a political measure, to enter into action this campaign; and this I had ascertained also to be the case, by sounding, on my journey, the wishes of the people.

2nd. I confirmed what I have already had the honour of writing to you respecting the continental troops, and the militia whom we are to have with us. I told you that by counting the enemies in New York at fourteen thousand men, of which ten thousand are regulars, and four thousand very bad militia, I thought their numbers were somewhat exaggerated, and that it was necessary to begin by deducting the sailors employed by Admiral Arbuthnot. As to the fortifications, I said that the American troops would take charge of New York, and that the fort of Brooklyn (upon which you might operate in concert with a division of our troops) is merely an earthen work of four bastions, with a ditch and a shed, containing from a thousand to fifteen hundred men, and having in front another smaller work, which cannot contain more than a hundred men. I added that nothing could prevent a regular approach upon Brooklyn, and that that post is the key of New York.

3rd. I explained to you General Washington's plan, and told you that the moment you began your march, he would repair to Morrisania, where, I again repeat, he would establish batteries that would close the passage of Hell's Gate, and secure the one from the continent to Long Island, so as to have nothing to fear from the enemy's ships. Whilst awaiting your arrival, gentlemen, our army would entrench itself at Morrisania, or, if possible, on the Island of New York, and would place itself in a situation to detach a corps of troops, as soon as you shall have approached us, either by coming by land to Westchester, and passing afterwards under favour of our batteries, or by repairing by sea to Wistown, or any other bay in that neighbourhood. General Washington would furnish a sufficient corps of Americans, and fifteen large cannon, to co-operate with your troops, and he believes that with these forces, and united with artillery, the point of Brooklyn might soon be taken, and consequently the town of New York.

4th. I represented to you that Long Island was a rich country, which, even alter the destruction effected by the English, still possesses some resources; that we might feel certain of being joined there by the militia of the island; and, in short, that with the assistance of our Morrisanian under-batteries, and still more with a battery on the Island of New York, we should assure the communication between Long Island and the continent. From these various circumstances, my own private opinion would decidedly be to commence our action, if the fleet could be placed in security, before we possessed any superiority of naval force.

5th. I strongly insisted upon the necessity of taking possession, as soon as possible, of the New York harbour. I requested M. de Ternay to examine that point with the pilots I gave him, and by the immense advantages of that measure I hoped that, either with the aid of land forces on the side of Sandy Hook, or merely by the superiority of his own naval force, he would be enabled to accomplish the object we had feared his attempting when we expected him with Admiral Graves.

6th. When proposing to you to send your magazines to Providence, I told you that Rhode Island was completely useless to the Americans, but very important for the succours arriving from France, in case, however, no army should be necessary to preserve it; that if the English were to commit the fault of taking it, a superior fleet, aided by forces from the continent, would always have the power of retaking it.

7th. I ended by having the honour of telling you, gentlemen, that in order to operate upon New York it would be necessary not to commence later than the first days of September; and, after this explanation, I said that General Washington, feeling the most perfect confidence in you, was very desirous of having your opinion upon the subject, and would only undertake what might appear to you most advantageous.

This, gentlemen, is what I had the honour of saying to you, and this is what you did me the honour to reply to:—

1st. That the succour sent to the United States was anything rather than trifling; that the second division was to set out a short time after you, and, that it might justly be expected every instant; that it would consist at least of two thousand five hundred, and, in all probability, of a still greater number of troops; that it was to be sent by three ships, but that, according to all appearances, a larger number of vessels would be granted; that the only reason which could prevent its arriving before the 1st of September, would be the impossibility of a junction between the French and Spanish fleets, and that, in the latter case, it would arrive, at farthest, by the end of autumn, and would then be a great deal stronger; that M. de Guichen has been apprised of our projects, and has received the order to facilitate them; that, consequently, the Chevalier de Ternay has written to him for the five promised vessels; and that, from all these circumstances, you hoped to be able to act before the end of the campaign, but did not doubt, at least, having the power of furnishing us with very superior forces for this winter, and for the next campaign.

2nd. The project of attacking Brooklyn was extremely agreeable to you, and appeared to you the most proper measure for the reduction of New York; but you think that we ought to have upon that Island a force at least equal to that which the enemy may offer us, and you added that by leaving a counterfeit at New York, they may fall on the corps of Long Island, with nearly their whole army, which contingency, you will perceive, had been already provided for by Washington's arrangements.

3rd. You appeared to me doubtful whether it would be possible to stop the enemy at the passage of Morrisania, but on this point I can give you no decisive information. The idea of repairing by land to Westchester appeared less agreeable to you than that of going by sea into a bay of Long Island. As to the landing, the Count de Rochambeau looks upon it as a very long operation, and, from his own experience on the subject, he believes that it would require nearly three weeks to land an army, with all its accoutrements, for a campaign and siege. You desired to have every possible information concerning Brooklyn, in order to be able to make calculations accordingly for the artillery and engineer service. You appeared to me to consider a naval superiority as necessary, even at the commencement of the campaign; but it is true that this idea may partly proceed from your doubts relating to the communication concerning Morrisania.

5th. The Chevalier de Ternay conceives it would be difficult to take possession of New York harbour, and hopes to accomplish the same object by the situation in which he has placed his cruisers. He does not think that his seventy-fours can enter, but from the difference of opinion which I ventured to express, as to the importance at least of occupying the harbour, he told me he would again attend to this project. As to his manner of protecting the disembarkation, it would be to cruise in the Sound, and his frigates, and one or two vessels, would enter into the bay at the place where the troops should land.

6th. Rhode Island appears to you a very important point to preserve; but if M. de Ternay should have the superiority, you think, as we do, that it would be unnecessary to leave a garrison there during the attack of New York. The Count de Rochambeau desired me to assure General Washington that, in every case, upon receiving an order, he would instantly repair to that spot which the commander-in-chief should appoint. I told him, also, that the French generals wished that it were possible to have an interview with him.

At the termination of our conversation, we decided upon the following measures, of which I consequently gave an account to General Washington.

1st. You have written to France to urge the speedy arrival and augmentation of the promised succours. You have already asked for the five vessels of M. de Guichen, and I have also taken charge of another letter, which repeats the same request, and which will pass through the hands of the Chevalier de la Luzerne.

2d. As soon as you receive news of the arrival either of the second division or of the ships from the West Indies, you will immediately despatch a messenger to General Washington; and, whilst our army is marching towards Westchester, and your own making preparation for embarkation, M. de Ternay will endeavour to effect his junction.

3d. If the French fleet should be equal to that of the enemy, it will immediately enter into a contest for superiority; if it should be superior, it will take the French troops instantly on board, and carry them towards the bay intended for their landing.

4th. A spot shall be chosen from whence the ships may protect the operation, and which will also afford to the troops first landed a position well sheltered by the fire from the ships, and behind which the remainder of the troops may join them; or by advancing with all the landed troops, the right and left wings may be so placed as to cover the last of the disembarkation. The spot selected shall be situated in such a manner that the corps of the American army intended for this particular expedition, may arrive and land at the very moment of the landing of the Count de Rochambeau, and that their general may be able to co-operate instantly with the French general.

5th. According to the number of French troops in a state to operate, General Washington will either conduct himself, or send to Long Island, a sufficient number of troops to obtain a force nearly equal to that of the enemy, and he will also have a corps of troops of nearly the same strength as the one opposed to him, either at Westchester or in the Island of New York.

6th. The Chevalier de Ternay will examine, attentively, the possibility of forcing the passage of Sandy Hook, and if it be deemed practicable, will attain that important end.

7th. As soon as the arms, clothes, and ammunition, belonging to the United States, shall arrive, the Chevalier de Ternay will have the goodness, without giving them time to enter the harbour, to send them with a convoy of frigates, or, if the batteries be not yet erected, by a ship of the line, to that point in the Sound which General Washington may judge proper to select.

8th. The French fleet will take charge of the boats we shall require, which will be delivered up to them at Providence; they will also land us all the powder that they can do without themselves; this does not amount, at present, to more than thirty thousand pounds.

9th. I shall send to the French generals all the correct information I may obtain respecting the passage of the Sound by Hell Gate; I shall communicate to them, likewise, all the details relating to Brooklyn, and they will send us the calculations which have been made in consequence by the artillery and engineers,—from thence we shall decide what must be sent with the American Long Island corps for these two companies. Some doubts are entertained by the French generals concerning the two points of this last article; I shall send them from home some information respecting that subject, of which I had before the honour of speaking to them.

10th. The invalids, magazines, &c., shall be sent to Providence, and the batteries of that river are to be placed by us in proper order. It is clearly specified that the instant the expected naval superiority of force arrives, the French are not to lose a single day in commencing their co-operative measures.

Such is, gentlemen, the abridgment of the account rendered to General Washington; and it will serve as the basis for his preparations, as well as a rule for the future elucidations you may receive. From the confidence with which he has honoured me, I was obliged to settle finally all that it was possible for me to arrange with you,—the fate of America, in short, appears to be dependent upon your activity or repose during the remainder of this summer. I attach the greatest importance to all your ideas being clearly rendered, and I entreat you to lose no time in writing a few words to say whether I have understood your meaning.

A short time after my departure, gentlemen, you must have learnt that General Clinton, fearing for New York; had been obliged, by a sudden movement of our army, to enclose himself in that island. The army is at present near Dobb's Ferry, ten miles above King's Bridge, on the right side of the North River, and our advance guard is nearly three miles before it.

If General Clinton, with a force and position equal to our own, should judge proper to fight, we shall give him a favourable opportunity of doing so, and he may take advantage of that kind of challenge to make the most impartial trial of the English and Hessian against the American troops.

I shall wait here, most impatiently, gentlemen, your answer to this letter. I shall have the honour of communicating to you the various advices General Washington may find it expedient to send you. The first intelligence of the arrival of the ships is very necessary to our peace of mind, and from an intimate knowledge of our situation, I assure you, gentlemen, in my own private name and person, that it is important to act during this campaign, that all the troops you may hope to obtain from France next year, as well as all the projects of which you may flatter yourselves, will never repair the fatal consequences of our present inactivity. Without resources in America, all foreign succours would prove of no avail; and although, in every case, you may rely wholly upon us, I think it important to take advantage of the moment when you may find here a co-operation, without which you will not be able to achieve anything for the American cause.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. Such, gentlemen, is the long official letter which I have the honour of writing to you, but I cannot send it without thanking you for the kindness you expressed for me at Rhode Island, and presenting you the assurance of my sincere and respectful attachment.

Endnote:

1. General Heath, who commanded the militia in the state of Rhode Island, announced, on the 13th of July, the arrival of the French squadron to Washington, who was then stationed with his staff at Bergen. M. de Lafayette set out instantly, bearing instructions from the general-in-chief dated the 15th, to meet the French Generals and to concert with them. Washington had long formed a plan of offensive operations, for the reduction of the town and garrison of New York (letter to General Greene the 14th of July); this plan was to take effect on condition, first, that the French and American troops should form a junction; second, that the French should have a decided naval superiority over the united forces of Admiral Graves and Admiral Arbuthnot. In nine letters, written between the 20th of July and the 1st of August, which would not perhaps have offered much interest to the reader, M. de Lafayette rendered an account of his mission, of which a short analysis will give the principal details.

The first letters relate to the multiplied difficulties he encountered in the states of Connecticut and Rhode Island, in collecting provisions, clothing, arms, and, above all, powder, in sufficient quantities for the projected expedition. These difficulties were much increased by the insufficiency of every kind of munition brought by the French squadron, which but half realized the promises of the French cabinet. M. de Lafayette repaired to Newport the 25th, and found the army, which had been disembarked, encamped in Rhode Island, and M. de Rochambeau much occupied by the news of an important attack, and, in fact, four of the enemy's ships appeared on the 19th, and nine or ten more two days after, before Block Island. Sir Henry Clinton had on his side left New York. By a combination of his land and sea forces, he intended to surprise the French army. But he experienced some delay; his soldiers could only embark in the transports the 27th; there was a wrong understanding between him and Admiral Arbuthnot. He learnt that the French had fortified themselves at Newport, and that the neighbouring militia had joined them; and at length that General Washington was making a rapid movement upon New York. He hastened to pass over the Sound, and landed his troops on the 31st.

M. de Lafayette, who had always felt doubtful, himself, of Clinton's making the attack, had then the opportunity of discussing with the allies the project for an offensive operation. He was extremely anxious to put it into execution, and General Washington was desirous also of doing the same.

The thing was, however, difficult. Although the capture of New York had always been one of the objects of the French ministry, the instructions of M. de Rochambeau prescribed to him to attach great importance to the station of Rhode Island, and to endeavour to make it the basis for his other operations. He was therefore reluctant to quit it in order to march upon New York. M. de Ternay, at the same time, considered it as impossible to enter with his ships of war into the harbour of that town, and contented himself with promising a blockade; he did not, besides, possess that naval superiority which could only be obtained by the arrival of the second division, which was so vainly expected from France, or by the junction of the squadron of M. de Guichen, then in the West Indies, to whom M. de Lafayette had written to promote that object. M. de Rochambeau's own opinion was, however, in favour of offensive measures, and he promised to conform, according to his instructions, to the orders of the general-in-chief. Everything was discussed and regulated in two or three conferences, which took place from the end of July to the commencement of August, between MM. de Rochambeau, de Ternay, and de Lafayette. The result of these conferences is resumed in a letter, to which is annexed this note—

In the suppressed letters it is also seen that the French troops evinced the greatest ardour, and that the good intelligence that reigned between the two allies completely justified the expectations of M. de Lafayette, and the measures he had proposed. He wrote, in a letter of the 31st, to General Washington:—

"The French army hate the idea of staying here, and want to join you. They swear at those that speak of waiting the second division: they are enraged to be blockaded in this harbour. As to their dispositions towards the inhabitants and our troops, and the dispositions of the inhabitants and the militia for them, they are such as I may wish. You would have been glad the other day to see two hundred and fifty of our drafts that came on from Connanicut, without provisions and tents, and who were mixed in such a way with the French troops, that every French soldier and officer took an American with him, and divided his bed and his supper in the most friendly manner. The patience and sobriety of our militia are so much admired by the French officers, that, two days ago, a French colonel called all his officers together, to take the good examples which were given to the French soldiers by the American troops. So far are they gone in their admiration, that they find a great deal to say in favour of General Varnum, and his escort of militia dragoons, who fill up all the streets of Newport. On the other band, the French discipline is such, that chickens and pigs walk between the tents without being disturbed, and that there is in the camp a corn-field, of which not one leaf has been touched. The Tories don't know what to say to it."—(ORIGINAL.)—(Letters of Washington from the 14th of July to the 5th of August, 1780, and Appendix, Nos. 1 and 8, VOL. vii.)

From the Count De Rochambeau to M. De Lafayette.

Newport, August 12th, 1780.

I received, my dear marquis, the letter you did me the honour of writing the 9th of August; permit me to send you, in reply, the one I had the honour of addressing to our general on the 10th of this month, to express to him the opinion you asked for by his desire. I am only now, therefore, waiting for his last orders, and I have earnestly requested him to grant me the favour of an interview, that the admiral and I may receive from his own lips the last plan he has decided upon; we should do more in a quarter of an hour's conversation than we could do by multiplied despatches. I am as thoroughly convinced as any person can be of the truth of what your letters mentioned, that it was his marching which had detained Clinton, who intended to come and attack us; but I must observe to you also, at the same time, that there was much reason to hope that he would have been well beaten here, and during that time our general would have taken New York. As to your observation, my dear marquis, that the position of the French at Rhode Island is of no use to the Americans, I reply:—

First, That I never heard it had been injurious to any one of them.

Second, That it would be well to reflect that the position of the French corps may have had something to do with Clinton's evacuation of the continent, when he has been obliged to confine himself to Long Island and New York; that, in short, while the French fleet is guarded here by an assembled and a superior naval force, your American shores are undisturbed, your privateers are making considerable prizes, and your maritime commerce enjoys perfect liberty. It appears to me, that, in so comfortable a situation, it is easy to wait patiently the naval and land forces that the king assured me should, be sent; that, in short, as I have received no letter from France since my departure; I can only flatter myself that the second division is already on the road, and is bringing me despatches, since, if it had been blockaded by superior forces, some sort of advice would have been sent me from the shores of France. I fear those savannahs and other events of the kind, of which I have seen so many during the course of my life. There exists a principle in war, as in geometry, vis unita fortior. I am, however, awaiting orders from our generalissimo, and I entreat him to grant the admiral and myself an interview. I will join the latter's despatch to this packet as soon as I receive it.

I beg you to accept, my dear marquis, the assurance of my sincerest affection.

To Mm. De Rochambeau and De Ternay.

Camp, August 18th, 1780.

GENTLEMEN,—As I wish to submit the same observations to you both, permit me to address this letter to you in common, and permit me also (without pretending to complain of the interpretation you have given to my last letter) to accuse myself of having explained my own meaning in a very awkward manner.

On my return here, gentlemen, General Washington asked me for an account of our conversations. You know that he had given me full powers to explain to you our situation, and to settle finally the plan of the campaign. When he knew that you wished to confer with him, he again wrote me word that I was to arrange everything in his name, as if he were himself present. It was natural that he should wish to know what I said to you, what you replied, and what we had finally decided upon. He thought that the best manner of collecting our ideas was to write them down; and I, fearing to say a single word that was not precisely according to your intentions, thought it more polite, more respectful towards you, to submit to your examination the written account which my general had requested. I may add, at this place, gentlemen, that the general, thinking that you were only acquainted with our position from what I had the honour of saying to you, did not consider the previous letters he had received as answers to what I had undertaken to explain to you. All that I said to you, gentlemen, concerning Rhode Island, the passage of Hell Gate, the harbour of New York, and the disembarkation, was from the reiterated orders of General Washington; and as to the political opinions, which I will dispense myself with expressing in future, because they must come from the Chevalier de la Luzerne, I, assure you that if, as your own countryman, it was more delicate for me to give them in my own name, they are not less conformable to the ideas of General Washington. The only time when I took the liberty of speaking for myself was, when, wearied by the questions that have been made to me by a thousand American individuals upon the second division, and the superiority of the English at this present period, I yielded to my ardent wish of entering at once on action, and to the hope of commencing our operations immediately. If I have been to blame, I think it can only be in this one instance.

I believe that the march towards New York has recalled Clinton from the bay of Huntington, but I believe that if he had been guilty of the folly of attacking you, he would have both lost at Rhode Island a portion of his army, owing to our French troops, and the Island of New York by our attack. This was my opinion, and the one I found most prevalent here, and I also think that it is very unfortunate for the common cause that General Clinton did not pursue his enterprise. Is it I who could imagine the contrary?—I who have always been laughed at for thinking it impossible that the French could ever be beaten!

When, after having received three letters from General Washington, and held twenty conversations with him on the subject, I thought it proper to tell you in what point of view we looked upon Rhode Island, I do not think it ever occurred to me to say you had injured any person by staying there, and as to the advantage America derives from having a French squadron and French troops, allow me to mention, gentlemen, that M. d'Estaing found me formerly well disposed to acknowledge this truth; that for more than eighteen months, and especially since the commencement of last summer, I held a regular correspondence with the French government, to represent to it the utility of such a measure; and, although the gratitude of the Americans does not by any means require being excited, few hours pass without my employing a part of my time in pointing out to them the advantages that you may procure for them even when inferior to the hostile forces, and in which I do not take the measures most proper to publish this truth from the extremity of Canada to that of Florida, as I may prove to you by the few copies of letters which I have preserved.

As to the political opinions with which I took the liberty of closing my letter, although I acknowledge having committed the fault of expressing them to you, I am certain beforehand that, from an intimate acquaintance with the American character and resources, the Chevalier de la Luzerne and General Washington are both of my opinion.

I will do all that depends upon me, gentlemen, to prevail upon the general to meet you half way; but, from his proximity to the enemy, and from the present situation of the army, which he has never quitted since the commencement of the war, I fear it will appear to him very difficult to absent himself. Whenever you have any orders to give me, look upon me as a man who, you must well know, idolizes his own country with a peculiar degree of enthusiasm, and who unites to that feeling (the strongest one of his heart) the respectful affection with which he has the honour of being, &c.

To M. De Rochambeau.

Camp, August 18th, 1780.

Having written, sir, one letter to you in common with the Chevalier de Ternay, permit me to address myself to you with the frankness authorised by the warm affection I have felt, and endeavoured to prove to you, from my earliest youth. Although your letter expresses your usual kindness for me, I observed a few sentences in it which, without being individually applied to me, prove to me that my last epistle displeased you. After having been engaged night and day for four months, in preparing the minds of the people to receive, respect, and love you; after all I have said to make them sensible of the advantages they derived from your residence at Rhode Island, and after having made use of my own popularity to propagate this truth; in short, sir, after all that my patriotism and affection for you have dictated to me, my feelings were unavoidably hurt by your giving such an unfavourable turn to my letter, and one which had never for a moment occurred to myself. If in that letter I have offended or displeased you; if, for example, you disapprove of that written account which General Washington asked for, and which I thought I ought to submit to you, I give you my word of honour that I thought I was doing a very simple thing; so simple, indeed, that I should have considered I was wronging you by not doing it.

If you had heard that second division spoken of, sir, as I have done; if you knew how strongly the English and the Tories endeavour to persuade the Americans that France only wishes to kindle, without extinguishing the flame, you would readily conceive that my desire of silencing those reports might have inspired me, perhaps, with too much warmth. I will confide to you that, thus placed in a foreign country, my self love is wounded by seeing the French blockaded at Rhode Island, and the pain I feel induces me to wish the operations to commence. As to what you write to me, sir, respecting Rhode Island, if I were to give you an account of all I have said, written, and inserted in the public papers; if you had heard me, frequently in the midst of a group of American peasants, relating the conduct of the French at Newport; if you were only to pass three days here with me, you would see the injustice of your reproach.

If I have offended you, I ask your pardon, for two reasons; first, because I am sincerely attached to you; and secondly, because it is my earnest wish to do everything I can to please you here. As a private individual, in all places your commands will ever be laws to me, and for the meanest Frenchmen here I would make every possible sacrifice rather than not contribute to their glory, comfort, and union with the Americans. Such, sir, are my feelings, and although you have imagined some which are very foreign to my heart, I forget that injustice to think only of my sincere attachment to you.

P.S. I am far from thinking, sir, that I am in any degree the cause of the sentiments that are experienced in this country for yourself and the officers of your army. I am not so vain as to have entertained such an idea; but I have had the advantage of knowing you, and I was, therefore, able to foresee what would occur on your arrival, and to circulate the opinions adopted by all those who have personally known you. I am convinced, and no one here can deny it, that but for your arrival, American affairs would have gone on badly this campaign; but, in our present situation, this alone is not sufficient, and it is important to gain advantages over the enemy. Believe, that when I wrote in my own name, that opinion did not belong to myself alone; my only fault was writing with warmth, in an official manner, that which you would have forgiven on account of my youth, if I had addressed it as a friend to yourself alone; but my intentions were so pure, that I was as much surprised as pained by your letter, and that is saying a great deal.

From M. De Rochambeau.

Newport, August 27th, 1780.

Permit an aged father, my dear marquis, to reply to you as he would do to a son whom he tenderly loves and esteems. You know me well enough to feel convinced that I do not require being excited, that when I, at my age, form a resolution founded upon military and state reasons, and supported by circumstances, no possible instigation can induce me to change my mind without a positive order from my general. I am happy to say that his despatches, on the contrary, inform me that my ideas correspond substantially with his own, as to all those points which would allow us to turn this into an offensive operation, and that we only differ in relation to some small details, on which a slight explanation, or his commands, would suffice to remove all difficulties in an instant. As a Frenchman, you feel humiliated, my dear friend, at seeing an English squadron blockading in this country, with a decided superiority of frigates and ships, the Chevalier de Ternay's squadron; but console yourself, my dear marquis, the port of Brest has been blockaded for two months by an English fleet, and this is what prevents the second division from setting out under the escort of M. de Bougainville. If you had made the two last wars, you would have heard nothing spoken of but these same blockades; I hope that M. de Guichen, on one side, and M. de Gaston, on the other, will revenge us for these momentary mortifications.

It is always right, my dear marquis, to believe that Frenchmen are invincible; but I, after an experience of forty years, am going to confide a great secret to you: there are no men more easily beaten when they have lost confidence in their chiefs, and they lose it instantly when their lives have been compromised, owing to any private or personal ambition. If I have been so fortunate as to have retained their confidence until the present moment, I may declare, upon the most scrupulous examination of my own conscience, that I owe it entirely to this fact, that, of about fifteen thousand men who have been killed or wounded under my command, of various ranks, and in the most bloody actions, I have not to reproach myself with having caused the death of a single man for my own personal advantage.

You wrote to the Chevalier de Chastellux, my dear marquis, that the interview I requested of our general has embarrassed him, because it only becomes necessary after the arrival of the second division, when there will be quite time enough to act. But you must surely have forgotten that I have unceasingly requested that interview immediately, and that it is absolutely necessary that he, the admiral, and I, should concert together all our projects and details, that in case one of the three chances should occur and enable us to act offensively, our movements may be prompt and decisive. In one of these three cases, my dear marquis, you will find in your old prudent father some remnants of vigour and activity. Be ever convinced of my sincere affection, and that if I pointed out to you very gently what displeased me in your last despatch, I felt at the time convinced that the warmth of your heart had somewhat impaired the coolness of your judgment. Retain that latter quality in the council-room, and reserve all the former for the hour of action. It is always the aged father, Rochambeau, who is addressing his dear son Lafayette, whom he loves, and will ever love and esteem until his latest breath.

To the Chevalier De La Luzerne.

Robinson House, opposite W. Point, Sept. 26, 1780.

When I parted from you yesterday, sir, to come and breakfast here with General Arnold, we were far from foreseeing the event which I am now going to relate to you.~{1}

You will shudder at the danger to which we have been exposed; you will admire the miraculous chain of unexpected events and singular chances that have saved us; but you will be still more astonished when you learn by what instruments this conspiracy has been formed. West Point was sold—and sold by Arnold: the same man who formerly acquired glory by rendering such immense services to his country. He had lately entered into a horrible compact with the enemy, and but for the accident that brought us here at a certain hour, but for the combination of chances that threw the adjutant-general of the English army in the hands of some peasants, beyond the limits of our stations, West Point and the North River, we should both at present, in all probability, be in possession of the enemy.

When we set out yesterday for Fishkill, we were preceded by one of my aides-de-camp, and one of General Knox's, who found General Arnold and his wife at breakfast, and sat down at table with them. Whilst they were together, two letters were given to Arnold, which apprised him of the arrestration of the spy. He ordered a horse to be saddled, went into his wife's room to tell her he was ruined, and desired his aide-de-camp to inform General Washington that he was going to West Point and would return in the course of an hour.

On our arrival here, we crossed the river and went to examine the works. You may conceive our astonishment when we learnt, on our return, that the arrested spy was Major André, adjutant-general of the English army; and when amongst his papers were discovered the copy of an important council of war, the state of the garrison and works, and observations upon various means of attack and defence, the whole in Arnold's own hand writing.

The adjutant-general wrote also to the general, avowing his name and situation. Orders were sent to arrest Arnold; but he escaped in a boat, got on board the English frigate the Vulture, and as no person suspected his flight, he was not stopped at any post. Colonel Hamilton, who had gone in pursuit of him, received soon after, by a flag of truce, a letter from Arnold to the general, in which he entered into no details to justify his treachery, and a letter from the English commander, Robertson, who, in a very insolent manner, demanded that the adjutant-general should be delivered up to them, as he had only acted with the permission of General Arnold.

The first care of the general has been to assemble, at West Point, the troops that, under various pretences, Arnold had dispersed. We remain here to watch over the safety of a fort, that the English may respect less as they become better acquainted with it. Continental troops have been summoned here, and as Arnold's advice may determine Clinton to make a sudden movement, the army has received orders to be prepared to march at a moment's warning.

Endnote:

1. The project of an expedition against New York had not been abandoned: it was still canvassed by letter. General Washington agreed with the French generals as to the necessity of waiting for a naval reinforcement. The latter insisted upon having a conference with the General and M. de Lafayette. (See especially Washington's Letter of the 21st August, vol. vii. p. 169.) That long deferred conference was at length granted, and it was fixed that it should take place at Hartford (Connecticut). Washington left his army the 18th of September. It will be recollected that it was his interview with Arnold at the passage of the Hudson, that induced the latter to take the steps which led to the discovery of the conspiracy. (See above.) Some days after, M. de Rochambeau wrote thus to M. de Lafayette:—

"Providence has declared itself for us, my dear marquis,—and that important interview, which I have so long wished for, and which has given me so much pleasure, has been crowned by a peculiar mark of the favour of Heaven. The Chevalier de la Luzerne has not yet arrived; I took the liberty of opening your letter to him, in which I found all the details of that horrible conspiracy, and I am penetrated with mingled feelings, of grief at the event itself, and joy at its discovery."

TO MADAME DE TESSÉ.

Camp, on the right side of the North River, near the Island of New York, October 4th, 1780.

A French frigate arriving from America,—the son of M. de Rochambeau on board! Good God, what a commotion all that will excite, and how much trouble inquisitive people will take to discover the secrets of the ministers. But I, my dear cousin, will confide to you our secret. The French army has arrived at Rhode Island, and has not quitted that spot. M. de Ternay's seven vessels have been blockaded the whole time, and the English have nineteen vessels here under that lucky commander, Rodney. We Americans, without money, without pay, and without provisions, by holding out fair promises, have succeeded in forming an army, which has been offering to fight a battle with the English for the last three months, but which cannot without vessels reach the island of New York. Gates, who was no favourite of mine, has become still less so since he has allowed himself to be beaten in the south. But all this is quite as monontonous as a European war, and catastrophes are necessary to excite and sustain the interest of men.

You must know, then, my cousin, that a certain General Arnold, of some reputation in the world, was our commander at West Point, a fort on the North River, whose importance the Duke d'Ayen will explain to you. General Washington and I, returning from Hartford, where we had held a conference with the French generals, discovered a conspiracy of the highest importance. We owe that discovery to an almost incredible combination of accidents. West Point was sold by Arnold, and we were consequently lost. The traitor has fled to join the enemy.

I received letters from you by the fleet, and by the Alliance, and I am impatiently expecting more recent ones. The nation will not be pleased with the state of tranquillity in which we remain. But as we have no ships, we can only wait for the enemy's blows, and General Clinton does not appear in any haste to attack us. As to ourselves, we republicans preach lectures to our sovereign master, the people, to induce him to recommence his exertions. In the mean while we practise so much frugality, and are in such a state of poverty and nudity, that I trust an account will be kept in the next world, whilst we remain in purgatory, of all we have suffered here.

Poircy~{1} is here, and although he does not find a St. Germain in this part of the world, he accustoms himself extremely well, I assure you, to a soldier's life. I thank you from the bottom of my heart for all the news you gave me. Although they afforded me the greatest pleasure, I scarcely dare reply to them, from the fear that my answers may appear to come from another world. I saw in the paper that the King of Spain was dead: has God, then, punished him for having conferred the title of grandee upon M. de Montbarrey?

I need not tell you that I am in good health, for that is, you know, my usual custom. My situation here is as agreeable as possible. I am in high favour, I believe, with the French army: the American army shew me every possible kindness and attention. I have the command of a flying corps, composed of the elite of the troops. My friend General Washington continues to be everything to me that I before described to you.

Adieu, my dear cousin. When shall I again see you? I pray that God may grant us an honourable peace, and that I may embrace my friends, and I willingly, for my own part, will give up my share of the glory in the hope eventually to win.

Present my affectionate regards to M. de Tesse, M. de Mun, M. Tenai, and the baron;~{2} I was on the point of saying, embrace his daughter for me.

Endnotes:

1. Secretary. The Marshal de Noailles had a house at Saint Germain.

2. The Baron de Tott.

To Madame De Lafayette.

Near Fort Lee, opposite Fort Washington, on the North River, Oct. 7th, 1780.

You must have already learnt, my dearest love, all that can interest you relating to myself, from my arrival at Boston until my voyage to Rhode Island, which place public affairs, and the desire of seeing my friends, induced me to visit soon after my landing. I have been since to Hartford in Connecticut, to be present at an interview between the French generals and General Washington: of all my young friends, Damas ~{1} was the only one who accompanied us. The viscount~{2} and I often write to each other, but we do not meet, and the poor man remains shut up in Rhode Island; the French squadron detains the army there, and is itself detained by nineteen ships of the line and sundry other ships of war, upon which M. Rodney proudly exhibits the British colours. So long as our naval inferiority lasts, you need feel no anxiety about the health of your friends in America.

I must speak to you, however, about my health; it continues excellent, and has not been interrupted for a single moment; a soldier's mode of living is extremely frugal, and the general officers of the rebel army fare very differently from the French army at Newport. You have probably heard that, on my arrival in America, I found the army of General Washington very weak in numbers, and still more so in resources. Our prospects were not brilliant, and the loss of Charleston was for us a most heavy blow, but the desire of co-operating with their allies gave new vigour to the states. General Washington's army increased more than half in number, and more than ten thousand militia were added to it, who would have come forward if we had acted offensively. Associations of merchants and patriotic banks were formed to supply the army with subsistence. The ladies made, and are still making, subscriptions, to afford succour to the soldiers. When that idea was first proposed, I made myself your ambassador to the ladies of Philadelphia, and you are inscribed on the list for a hundred guineas. General Gates had in the south an army quite sufficient for defence; but he has been completely beaten in Carolina. The fruit of all these labours has been, to prove to the French that the Americans desire nothing better than to second their views upon England, to prove to the English that the flame of liberty was not wholly extinguished in America, and to keep us, during the whole campaign, in daily expectation of a battle, which General Clinton, although equal to us in number, has never thought proper to accept. If we had only had ships, we should have been enabled to do a great deal more.

As I know that all that interests me deeply is also interesting to you, I will tell you that we are much occupied by an important system, which would secure to us a considerable army during the whole war, and would bring into action all the resources which America is capable of making. God grant that the nation may understand its true interests, and our affairs will go on without difficulty!

M. de Rochambeau and M. de Ternay, as well as all the other French officers, conduct themselves extremely well here. A little ebullition of frankness gave rise to a slight altercation between those generals and myself. As I perceived I could not convince them, and that it was important for the public good that we should remain friends; I declared, with due humility, that I had been mistaken, that I had committed an error, and, in short, in proper terms, I asked their pardon, which produced such an excellent effect that we are now on a more amicable footing than ever.

I command a flying corps, which always forms an advance guard, and is quite independent of the great army; this is far too grand for our pacific situation.

On the Hackensack River, Oct. 8th, 1780.

You will learn, my dearest love, an important event, which has exposed America to the greatest danger. A frightful conspiracy has been planned by the celebrated Arnold: he sold to the English the fort of West Point, which was under his command, and, consequently, the whole navigation of the river: the plot was within an ace of succeeding, and quite as many chances combined together to discover it as in that affair of the Alliance, which I have so often described to you.~{3} After our journey to Hartford, General Washington passed by West Point, which was not on his road; but he was desirous of shewing me the works that had been constructed since my departure for France. Detained by various accidents upon the road, we arrived at the traitor's house just as he received the letters which announced that he had been discovered. He had not time to intercept those proofs of infamy, and consequently he could only make his escape towards New York half an hour before our arrival.

The adjutant-general of the English army has been arrested under a feigned name and dress. He was an important person, the friend and confidant of General Clinton. He behaved with so much frankness, courage, and delicacy, that I could not help lamenting his unhappy fate.

I received, with great delight, the letters of my dear sisters; I shall write to them to-morrow; but I shall send this scrawl, as I fear the frigate may depart. I finish my letter in this place, having begun it rather more close to the enemy: we had approached them to protect a small enterprise, in which a detachment of my advance-guard has been engaged, and which only ended by capturing two officers, and fifteen men and horses. We are now marching towards a place you will find marked upon the map Sotawa, whither the grand army is also to repair. I shall write to Madame d'Ayen and to my sisters.

Sotawa Bridge, October 10th, 1780.

I am closing my letter, but before sealing it, I must again speak to you for a moment of my affection. General Washington was much pleased by the kind messages which I delivered from you; he desires me to present to you his tender regards; he is affectionately attached to George, and is much gratified by the name we have given him. We often speak of you and of the little family. Adieu, adieu.

Endnotes:

1. The Count Charles de Damas, died a peer of France under the restoration.

2. The Viscount de Noailles.

3. The conspiracy discovered on board the frigate which brought home M. de Lafayette, in September, 1779.

To General Washington.

(Original.)

Light Camp, October 30th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—In our conversations upon military operations you have often told me that, since the beginning of the campaign, your eyes were turned towards a project upon which I generally agree in opinion with you, and beg leave to offer some observations.

Far from lessening my desire of finishing the campaign by some brilliant stroke, the project of Staten Island, though it miscarried, has strengthened my opinions, as I have clearly seen, by the details of this operation, that we should, in all human probability, have succeeded, and that our men were fully equal to any enterprise of that kind.~{1}

My reasons for wishing to undertake something are these:—1st. Any enterprise will please the people of this country, and shew them that when we have men we do not lie still; and even a defeat (provided it was not fatal) would have its good consequences. 2ndly. The French court have often complained to me of the inactivity of the American army, who, before the alliance, had distinguished themselves by their spirit of enterprise. They have often told me, your friends leave us now to fight their battles, and do no more risk themselves: it is, moreover, of the greatest political importance to let them know, that, on our side, we were ready to co-operate. Be sure, my dear general, that many people's interest will be to let it be believed that we were not ready, and if anything may engage the ministry to give us the asked for support, it will be our proving to the nation that, on our side, we had been ready. So far was the Chevalier de la Luzerne convinced of this (and on this point the minister's interest is the same as ours) that he was made happy by my mentioning to him the Staten Island affair. I well know the court of Versailles, and were I to go to it, I should think it very impolitic to go there unless we had done something. 3rdly. It is more than probable that mediators will interfere this winter by a negotiation. Then England will say, how can we give up people whom we consider as half conquered; their best city has been taken by an army not much superior to the people that were to defend it; their southern army was routed almost as soon as looked at by the British troops New York is so much ours, that they dare not approach it, and General Washington's army does not exceed five thousand men. What shall France answer? Principally now that from the letters I have received I find the Charleston affair has brought our arms into contempt. But what difference, if France might say, the American army has taken, sword in hand, your best works; they have offered to you the battle upon your own island, and, perhaps they may add (for news increases in travelling), they are now in possession of New York.

Upon these considerations, my dear general, what I want is this, to find an expedition which may wear a brilliant aspect, and afford probable advantages, also an immense, though very remote one, which, if unsuccessful, may not turn fatal to us, for the loss of two or three hundred men, half of them being enlisted for two months, I do not consider as a ruinous adventure.

The basis of the plan will be, that Fort Washington, being in our possession, may, with the Fort Lee batteries, protect our crossing North River, and be a security for our retreat, principally if some works are added on the point of embarkation. The taking of Fort Washington we may demonstrate to be very probable, and upon that point you are of my opinion.

The enemy have, on the upper part of the Island from fifteen hundred to two thousand men, who would immediately occupy all the other upper posts. Their army on Long Island would repair to New York, and there would also retire the troops posted at Harlem.

As soon as Fort Washington should be ours, the army would cross over to the island, and those of West Point arrive in the same time (which calculation may be easily done) so that we should effectually possess all the upper posts, or cut them off from their main army. Some militia would come to our assistance, and as these posts are not well furnished with provisions we should take them, at least, by famine.

The enemy's army consists of nine thousand men: they must certainly leave one thousand men in their several posts; fifteen hundred of them, at least, will be either killed at Fort Washington or blocked up at Laurel Hill, and they will then have between six and seven thousand men to attack ten. The two thousand militia (in supposing that they durst take them out) I do not mention, because we may have four thousand militia for them: under such circumstances it is, probable that Sir Henry Clinton will venture a battle. If he does, and by chance beat us, we retire under Fort Washington; but, if we beat him, his works will be at such a distance, that he will be ruined in the retreat. If, on the contrary, he knows that the French army is coming, and if we spread the report of a second division, or of Count de Guichen being upon the coasts, he will keep in his works, and we will, some way or other, carry the upper posts. When we are upon the spot we may reconnoitre New York, and see if something is to be done. If Clinton was making a forage into the Jerseys, I should be clear for pushing to the city.

If we undertake, the circumstances of the weather make it necessary that we undertake immediately. I would move the army, as soon as possible, to our position near the new bridge. This movement may invite Clinton in the Jerseys, and bring us nearer to the point of execution.

Though my private glory and yours, my dear general, both of which are very dear to my heart, are greatly interested, not so much for the opinions of America, as for those of Europe, in our doing something this campaign, I hope you know me too well to think I should insist upon steps of this nature unless I knew that they were politically necessary, and had a sufficient military probability.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The six hundred men of Luzerne's legion might be got in twelve days. If our movements had no other effect but to make a diversion in favour of the south, it would, on that footing, meet with the approbation of the world, and perhaps impeach the operations of General Leslie.

Endnote:

1. M. de Lafayette had taken, since the 7th of August, command of the corps of light infantry, consisting of six companies of men, selected in different lines of the army. Those battalions were divided into two brigades; one under the command of General Hand, the other of General Poor. The inactivity of the army was very opposite to the character and policy of M. de Lafayette; he endeavoured incessantly to find means of putting an end to it, at least as far as regarded himself. The 14th of August he had written to General Washington to ask his permission to attempt a nocturnal surprise on the two camps of Hessians established at New York Island. At the beginning of October, he attempted an expedition on Italian Island, which could not be accomplished, owing to a mistake made by the administration of the materality of the army. This letter, and the letters of the 13th of November, allude to this circumstance. We have been obliged to retrench ten letters, which relate solely to the unimportant incidents of a war of observation.

From General Washington to the Marquis De Lafayette.

(Original.)

Head-quarters, 30th October, 1780.

It is impossible, my dear marquis, to desire more ardently than I do, to terminate the campaign by some happy stroke; but we must consult our means rather than our wishes, and not endeavour to better our affairs by attempting things which, for want of success, may make them worse. We are to lament that there has been a misapprehension of our circumstances in Europe; but to endeavour to recover our reputation, we should take care that we do not injure it more. Ever since it became evident that the allied arms could not co-operate this campaign, I have had an eye to the point you mention, determined, if a favourable opening should offer, to embrace it; but, so far as my information goes, the enterprise would not be warranted; it would, in my opinion, be imprudent to throw an army of ten thousand men upon an island against nine thousand, exclusive of seamen and militia. This, from the accounts we have, appears to be the enemy's force. All we can do at present, therefore, is to endeavour to gain a more certain knowledge of their situation, and act accordingly. This I have been some time employed in doing, but hitherto with little success. I shall thank you for any aids you can afford. Arnold's flight seems to have frightened all my intelligencers out of their senses. I am sincerely and affectionately yours.

To General Washington.

(Original.)

Light Camp, November 13th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—In revolving in my mind the chances of discovery by moonlight, and, on the other hand, the inconveniences of staying longer than you wish under our tents, I have thought if there was any position which might enable us to take advantage of the first hours of the night. How far the sending of the Pennsylvanians towards Aquakanac, and going ourselves to the Hukinsac~{1} position, may awaken the enemy, I cannot pretend to say. The most difficult affair in this would be the article of the boats. Colonel Smith will go tomorrow morning to West Point, unless any intelligence received at head-quarters had made it useful that the enterprise be attempted soon, in which case he would go and reconnoitre the place. Suppose he was to bring from West Point Colonel Gouvion, who has often examined the place with the eye of an engineer. These ideas, my dear general, have rather started into any mind, than become fixed, and I thought I would communicate them.

Most affectionately and respectfully yours,

Lafayette.

The Marquis de Laval Montmorency, one of the most illustrious families in France, is on his way to the camp. The Chevalier de Chastellux, a relation and friend of mine, major-general in the French army, is also coming. I every day expect my brother-in-law, and his friend, Count de Charlus, only son to the Marquis de Castries, who enjoys a great consideration in France, and has won the battle of Closter Camp. The Duke of Lauzun has also written to me that he would come soon.~{2} These five gentlemen may, by their existence at home, be considered as the first people in the French army. This little history I give you before their arrival, in consequence of what you have desired from me at the beginning.

I write some letters to the commanding officers at Fishkill, West Point, and King's Ferry, so that the gentlemen may be directed to come by the best road to my quarters, from which I will present them to you. I think the letters ought to be sent as soon as possible.

P.S. As General Heath commands in all these parts, I think, upon recollection, that I had better write to him alone. You might also send him a line on the subject.

Endnotes:

1. The general-in-chief projected an attack on the posts of the northern part of New York. While General Heath was to attract, by a feint, the attention of the enemy, Washington was to march in advance, and M. de Lafayette to attack Fort Washington. This expedition, for which great preparations had been made, terminated in a few reconnoitring parties. The campaign closed without an engagement.

2. The Marquis de Laval, is the Duke de Laval, who died under the restoration. The Chevalier de Chastellux is well known by his works. The Count de Charlus is at present the Duke de Castries, member of the chamber of peers. M. de Lauzun has been general in the service of the French republic.

To General Washington

(Original.)

Paramus, November the 28th, 1780.

My dear General,—We arrived last night at this place, and were much favoured by the weather in our recognising of the Island, where, I confess, my feelings were different from what I had experienced when looking at these forts with a hopeful eye. I saw the fatal sentry alluded to, Colonel Gouvion, on an upper battery of Jeffery's Hook. I also saw a small vessel playing off this Hook, but quite a trifling thing, without guns, and but two men on board. Nothing else on the river but the usual guards of spiting devil.

As you have been pleased to consult me on the choice of an adjutant-general, I will repeat here, my dear general, that though I have a claim upon General Hand, in every other point of view, his zeal, obedience, and love of discipline, have given me a very good opinion of him.

Colonel Smith has been by me wholly employed in that line, and I can assure you that he will perfectly answer your purpose.

Unless, however, you were to cast your eye on a man who, I think, would suit better than any other in the world. Hamilton is, I confess, the officer whom I should like to see in that station. With equal advantages, his services deserve from you the preference to any other. His knowledge of your opinions and intentions on military arrangements, his love of discipline, the superiority he would have over all the others, principally when both armies shall operate together, and his uncommon abilities, are calculated to render him perfectly agreeable to you. His utility would be increased by this preferment; and on other points he could render important services. An adjutant-general ought always to be with the commander-in-chief. Hamilton should, therefore, remain in your family, and his great industry in business would render him perfectly serviceable in all circumstances. On every public or private account, my dear general, I would advise you to take him.

I shall, on my arrival at Philadelphia, write you how those matters are going, upon which I build my private schemes. But I heartily wish that some account or other from Europe may enable you to act this winter on maritime operations. I hate the idea of being from you for so long a time; but I think I ought not to stay idle. At all events, I must return when your army takes the field.

I flatter myself with the hope of meeting Mrs. Washington on the road. Adieu, my dear general, most affectionately and respectfully yours.

To His Excellency General Washington.~{1}

(Original.)

Philadelphia, December 5th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—By my letter of yesterday I have mentioned to you that a Spanish expedition was intended against St. Augustine. They mean to set out at the end of December, which will certainly delay them till the middle of January. It consists of twelve ships of the line, some frigates, bomb ketches, and a large number of troops. I have advised the minister to communicate officially to you this intelligence, and also to Count de Rochambeau, that proper means, if convenient, may be taken to improve it.

For my part, my dear general, I have conducted myself agreeably to what you said to me in our last conversations, that if, in the course of the winter, a naval superiority was obtained, our business should be to push for the southward, and that you would take for that purpose four thousand French and two thousand Americans. Nothing against New York can be undertaken before the end of May. Anything, therefore, that could employ us during February, March, and April, is worthy of our attention.

The confederacy was going to sail for some clothing which we have in the West Indies. No time was left to wait for an answer from you. I knew perfectly your sense of this affair. I therefore, with the advice of Chevalier de la Luzerne, wrote him a letter dated from Camp, wherein I explained to him that something might be done in conjunction for the public good. My opinion is strengthened by your sentiments on this matter, without, however, bringing myself, and still less yourself, to make any formal application to the Spanish generals.

Inclosed you will find a copy of this letter, the first part of which mentions that if, after having landed their troops in Florida, they would send their ships of the line for us, we might, at three weeks notice before the departure of the squadron, have in readiness six thousand men for a powerful diversion in Carolina. Their own interest is the only thing I seem to consider in this business, and I endeavour to invite Spanish caution in this measure; but, unless a more particular application is made, I do not believe that this part of my letter will have any effect.

The second part will, I hope, be productive of some good for America. I urge the necessity immediately to open a correspondence with General Greene that he may, by his manoeuvres, facilitate the operation of Spain. I tell them, that unless they land a corps of troops on the boundaries of Georgia, with a view at least to threaten Augusta and Savannah, their expedition will run a great risk. I advise the measure of cruizing off Charleston Harbour, the whole under the idea of their own interest.

I have also written to the naval French commander in the West Indies, advising him to succour Chevalier de Ternay, which I know he will not do. But I take this opportunity of condemning their foolish neglect, in not appearing on our coasts when they return to Europe; and I do also advise that, in their cruizes from St. Domingo, they may sometimes appear off Savannah and Charlestown Harbour. Inclosed you will find a copy of this letter.

Though I always speak of the beginning of February, it is, however, certain, that any time in February would be convenient to go to the southward. March and April are more than sufficient for the taking of Charlestown; and in all cases, I know, from our last conversations, that you wish for a naval superiority this winter, in order to succour the southern states.

I had this morning, my dear general, a long conversation with the Chevalier de la Luzerne, relating to a southern operation. He is, as well as myself, clearly of opinion, that unless a formal application and a plan of campaign be proposed to them, they will not send their ships to us. In this last case their coming ought still to be questioned. But if you thought it better to try, you might propose to the French generals to send a frigate there, and see, with them, what might be done in conjunction. Suppose they were to take four thousand men, leaving some, and the militia, at Rhode Island. We could on our part muster two thousand Americans. However, the Spaniards are so positive and strict in following literally their instructions that I do not believe anything will engage them to come. But my letter, which I look upon as a mere cipher on the first proposition, will, I hope, engage, them to impart their projects to General Greene, and of course this diversion will become useful to us.

Suppose Count de Rochambeau and Chevalier de Ternay were to send to Havanna a copy of your letter, I think they ought to intrust it to Viscount de Noailles, who will soon return to Rhode Island, and whose name is highly respected by the court of Spain for many particular reasons, too long to be mentioned here.

I have seen Mr. Ross, and find that very little clothing is to be for the present expected. They have some arms on board the Alliance, and, I think, a hundred bales of cloth on board a vessel under Jones's convoy. The remainder will come with the Serapis. Unless the storm has forced Jones to put in some French harbour, he may be expected every minute.

The assembly of Pennsylvania have before them the affair of the recruits; but proper arrangements are not properly supported. They are fond of voluntary enlistments. I have an appointment for to-morrow with General Mifflin, where I will debate this matter with him.

To-morrow, my dear general, I will go to Brandywine with Chevalier de Chastellux, and also to Red Bank, Fort Mifflin, &c. On my return I hope to find news from France, and I will write you my determination about my going to the southward.

Inclosed you will find a newspaper, wherein congress have printed a letter from General Gates, relating to a new success of Sumpter.

Congress have lately received letters from Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams, but nothing very particular. They have more fully written by other opportunities that are expected. Portugal has entered into the convention of neutrality, and with such conditions as to shew their partiality to our side of the question.

Adieu, my dear general, most respectfully and affectionately.

Endnote:

1. The winter, according to custom, causing the dispersion of the army, M. de Lafayette repaired to Philadelphia to be nearer arrivals and intelligence from Europe. It was there he first conceived the project of going to serve in the south under General Greene, who was to make a winter campaign. As regards the project of making a division in Florida, with the co-operation of the Spaniards, he seconded it with ardour, and to General Washington, M. de la Luzerne, and the Spanish commanders, he wrote long letters on the subject, which have but little interest, owing to the project not having been attended with any important result: those letters have been omitted.

From General Washington to the Marquis De Lafayette.

(Original.)

New Windsor, 14th December, 1780.

My dear Marquis,—Soon after despatching my last letter to you, your favour dated at Paramus was put into my hands by Colonel Gouvion. The Chevalier de la Luzerne's despatches came in time for the post, which is the only means left me for the conveyance of letters; there not being so much money in the hands of the quartermaster-general (I believe I might go further, and say in those of the whole army,) as would bear the expense of an express to Rhode Island. I could not get one the other day to ride so far as Compton.

I am now writing to the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay, on the subject of your several letters. When their answer arrives, I will communicate the contents to you. You must be convinced, from what passed at the interview at Hartford, that my command of the French troops at Rhode Island stands upon a very limited scale, and that it would be impolitic and fruitless in me to propose any measures of co-operation to a third power, without their concurrence; consequently an application from you, antecedently to an official proposition from the minister of France, the gentlemen at the head of the French armament at Rhode Island, congress, or myself, could only be considered as coming from a private gentleman; it is, therefore, my advice to you to postpone your correspondence with the Spanish generals, and let your influence come in hereafter, as auxiliary to something more formal and official. I do not hesitate to give it clearly as my opinion to you, (but this opinion and this business should be concealed behind a curtain,) that the favourable moment of the Spanish operations in the Floridas ought to be improved to the utmost extent of our means, provided the Spaniards, by a junction of their maritime force with that of his most Christian Majesty, under the command of the Chevalier de Ternay, will give us a secure convoy, and engage not to leave us until the operations shall be at an end, or it can be done by consent of parties.

I am very thankful to the minister for permitting, and to you for communicating to General Greene, intelligence of the Spanish movement towards the Floridas. It may have a happy influence on his measures, and it may be equally advantageous to the Spaniards. Your expressions of personal attachment and affection to me are flattering and pleasing, and fill me with gratitude. It is unnecessary, I trust, on my part, to give you assurances of mutual regard, because I hope you are convinced in your own choice to go to the southern army or to stay with this, circumstances and inclination alone must govern you. It would add to my pleasure if I could encourage your hope of Colonel Nevill's exchange. I refused to interest myself in the exchange of my own aide. General Lincoln's were exchanged with himself, and upon that occasion, for I know of no other, congress passed a resolution, prohibiting exchanges out of the order of captivity.

Under one general head, I shall express my concern for your disappointment of letters, our disappointment of clothes, and disappointment in the mode of raising men; but I shall congratulate you on the late change of the administration of France,~{1} as it seems to be consonant to your wishes, and to encourage hope. I am much pleased at the friendly disposition of Portugal. Much good, I hope, will result from the combination of the maritime powers. I am in very confined quarters; little better than those at Valley Forge, but such as they are I shall welcome into them your friends on their return to Rhode Island. I am, &c.

Endnote:

1. Endnote 1: The Marquis de Castries had succeeded, as minister of the navy, to M. de Sartine. This change gave rise to the hope that France would send the promised succours, and that expectation induced M. de Lafayette to renounce his journey to the south.

To M. De Vergennes.~{1}

New Windsor, on the North River, Jan. 30th, 1781.

The letters which I had the honour of writing to you, sir, and which were dated the 20th May, 19th July, 4th and 16th December, have, I hope, reached you safely. Since the arrival of the squadron, your despatch of the 3rd of June is the only one I have received. The Chevalier de la Luzerne has only received one letter of the same month, and none have yet reached the officers of the army and squadron.

The first copy of this letter will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, aide-de-camp to General Washington, who is charged by congress with a private mission. Permit me to recommend to you this officer as a man who, by his integrity, frankness, and patriotism, must be extremely acceptable to government.

According to the instructions of congress, he will place before you the actual state of our affairs, which demand, I think more than ever, the most serious attention. As to the opinions which I may allow myself to express, sir, they entirely correspond with those I have hitherto expressed, and the very slight alterations observable in them have been occasioned by a change of time, prejudices, and circumstances.

With a naval inferiority, it is impossible to make war in America. It is that which prevents us from attacking any point that might be carried with two or three thousand men. It is that which reduces us to defensive operations, as dangerous as they are humiliating. The English are conscious of this truth, and all their movements prove how much they desire to retain the empire of the sea. The harbours, the country, and all the resources it offers, appear to invite us to send thither a naval force. If we had possessed but a maritime superiority this spring, much might have been achieved with the army that M. de Rochambeau brought with him, and it would not have been necessary to have awaited the division he announced to us. If M. de Guichen had stopped at Rhode Island, on his way to France, Arbuthnot would have been ruined, and not all Rodney's efforts could have prevented our gaining victories. Since the hour of the arrival of the French, their inferiority has never for one moment ceased, and the English and the Tories have dared to say that France wished to kindle, without extinguishing the flame. This calumny becomes more dangerous at a period when the English detachments are wasting the south; when, under the protection of some frigates, corps of fifteen hundred men are repairing to Virginia, without our being able to get to them. On the whole continent, with the exception of the Islands of Newport, it is physically impossible that we should carry on an offensive war without ships, and even on those Islands the difficulty of transportation, the scarcity of provisions, and many other inconveniences, render all attempts too precarious to enable us to form any settled plan of campaign.

The result, sir, of all this is, that the advantage of the United States being the object of the war, and the progress of the enemy on that continent being the true means of prolonging it, and of rendering it, perhaps, even injurious to us, it becomes, in a political and military point of view, necessary to give us, both by vessels sent from France, and by a great movement in the fleet in the Islands, a decided naval superiority for the next campaign; and also, sir, to give us money enough to place the American forces in a state of activity; fifteen thousand of the regular army, and ten thousand, or, if we choose it, a still greater number of militia in this part of the country; a southern army, of which I cannot tell precisely the extent, but which will be formed by the five southern states, with all means of supporting in this country such a considerable force. Such, sir, are the resources that you may employ against the common enemy; immense sums of money could not transport resources of equal value from Europe to America, but these, without a succour of money, although established on the very theatre of war, will become useless; and that succour, which was always very important, is now absolutely necessary.

The last campaign took place without a shilling having been spent; all that credit, persuasion, and force could achieve, has been done,—but that can hold out no longer: that miracle, of which I believe no similar example can be found, cannot be renewed, and our exertions having been made to obtain an army for the war, we must depend on you to enable us to make use of it.

From my peculiar situation, sir, and from what it has enabled me to know and see, I think it is my duty to call your attention to the American soldiers and on the part they must take in the operations of the next campaign. The continental troops have as much courage and real discipline as those that are opposed to them. They are more inured to privation, more patient than Europeans, who, on these two points, cannot be compared to them. They have several officers of great merit, without mentioning those who have served during the last wars, and from their own talents have acquired knowledge intuitively; they have been formed by the daily experience of several campaigns, in which, the armies being small, and the country a rugged one, all the battalions of the line were obliged to serve as advance-guards and light troops. The recruits whom we are expecting, and who only bear, in truth, the name of recruits, have frequently fought battles in the same regiments which they are now re-entering, and have seen more gun-shots than three-fourths of the European soldiers. As to the militia, they are only armed peasants, who have occasionally fought, and who are not deficient in ardour and discipline, but whose services would be most useful in the labours of a siege. This, sir, is the faithful picture that I think myself obliged to send you, and which it is not my interest to paint in glowing colours, because it would be more glorious to succeed with slighter means. The Chevalier de la Luzerne, who, having himself seen our soldiers, will give you a detailed and disinterested account of them, will doubtless tell you, as I do, that you may depend upon our regular troops. The result of this digression, sir, is, to insist still more earnestly on the necessity of sending money to put the American troops in movement, and to repeat that well-known truth, that a pecuniary succour and a naval superiority must be the two principal objects of the next campaign.

It would take us too long to examine the faults that have been committed, and the efforts that the states may still endeavour to make: we must return to the former point, that, under present circumstances, money is requisite to derive any advantage from the American resources; that the means which have been substituted for funds are almost completely worn out; that those to which we are at present reduced, do not fulfil the proposed end, and are opposed to the ideas which induced the nation to commence the revolution; that, consequently, we require money to restore to the army that degree of activity without which it cannot operate in an efficacious manner. Clothes, arms, ammunition, are comprised in the same article, and Colonel Laurens carries with him a copy of the former list, from which some deductions have been made. I will content myself with saying, that nothing of any importance has been sent us, that it is necessary to clothe the American army, that it requires arms, and, to be enabled to besiege places, a great augmentation of powder. As these expenses relate to the pecuniary succours, and are those which will strike most forcibly individuals, both of the army and nation, I think it important that the government should prepare them with promptness, and send them in a secure manner.

If it should appear strange, sir, to call that completion of the army a great effort, I would beg to observe, that hunger, cold, nudity, and labour, the certainty of receiving no pay, clothes, or necessary food, being the prospects held out to the American soldier, they must be but little inviting to citizens who are, generally speaking, accustomed to live at home with some degree of comfort; and the English having had sufficient time to think of all the naval points, the attacks of next year will be anything rather than surprises, and our forces must increase in proportion to their precautions. I could have wished that there had been some French troops, and my confidence in the decrease of prejudice has been even greater than that of congress, General Washington, or your minister at that time. The advance-guard of the Count de Rochambeau, although inactive itself from want of ships, by its presence alone has rendered an essential service to America: if it had not arrived, the campaign would have been a ruinous one. When I consider the present state of feeling, my opinion, as I have had the honour of telling you before, would be to send hither, for the expedition of New York, a division of about ten thousand Frenchmen.

In our conference at Hartford, sir, the calculations were of course made, not according to the fortifications actually existing, but according to those they might intend erecting. The answers General Washington thought proper to make to the questions put by the Count de Rochambeau, have been long since carried to you by the Amazon. A proposal to ask for a corps of fifteen thousand Frenchmen could only be acceptable to the commander-in-chief. But if that surplus were to lessen the sum of money by means with which fifteen thousand regular troops, ten thousand militia, and a southern army should be put into motion; if it were to lessen the number of ships that would enable us to act in all places, and with a decided superiority;—I must again repeat, that pecuniary succours and a naval superiority are the two most essential points; that the same quantity of money would, put into action here, double that number of American soldiers; and that, without ships, a few thousand men more would be but of little use to us.

The admirable discipline of the French corps, in addition to the honour it confers on M. de Rochambeau and the soldiers under his command, fulfils a still more important aim, by impressing on the minds of the Americans the highest idea of our nation.

The wisdom of the government, in placing that corps under the orders of General Washington, allows me only to repeat how essential it is that his authority should be complete, and without any sort of restriction. The talents, prudence, delicacy, and knowledge of country, which are all united in him in the greatest degree of perfection, are qualities of which one only would suffice to ensure the rigid observance of the instructions which I bear; and the longer I remain here, the more frilly am I convinced that each of them is equally necessary to the harmony and success of the whole affair.

We have had, lately, sir, an important mutiny, of which Colonel Laurens will give you the details.~{2} A corps of Pennsylvanian troops, almost wholly composed of strangers, and stationed at Morristown (Jersey), unanimously rose against their officers, and, under the direction of one of their sergeants, marched on to Princetown. The civil authorities repaired thither, to afford them the justice they demanded. To be in want of food and clothes, to serve for more than a year without pay, some of them, indeed, having been forced to serve a whole year beyond their engagement, are evils to which no army would submit. It is singular enough that those mutineers should have hung up the envoys of General Clinton. The greatest part of the soldiers are disbanded, but they are to re-enter the service, and to join the recruits in different regiments of the state. I am not less positive as to the number of men we shall have in our continental army. Some troops belonging to the Jerseys, seduced by example, and being those next to the Pennsylvanians, which were composed of the greatest number of foreigners, wished to take the same method of obtaining justice; but General Washington, having taken the management of this affair in his own hands, sent forward a detachment; the mutineers submitted, and their chiefs were punished. It is impossible to pass too high encomiums upon the New England troops, almost all national ones, whose cause was at bottom the same, and who, in spite of their nudity, crossed heavy snows to march against the mutineers. This proves, sir, that human patience may have some limits, but that soldier citizens will endure far more than strangers. These events furnish another argument for the necessity of obtaining money.

I flatter myself, sir, that the government, conscious that the ensuing campaign may be a decisive one, will occupy itself seriously of rendering it favourable to us. The taking of New York would destroy the power of the English on this continent, and a short continuation of naval superiority would secure to us the easy conquest of all the other parts of the United States. As to the taking of New York, which it would be rash to consider easy, but absurd to respect the town as if it were a fortified one, it is, I believe, well authenticated, and General Washington has no doubt upon the subject, that with the means proposed in my letter, we should obtain possession of it in the course of the summer.

It is, I believe, important to turn, as far as possible, the enemy's attention towards Canada.

When General Washington gave Colonel Laurens his opinion respecting military affairs and the operations of the campaign, he also put down in writing some ideas on our present situation, and communicated to me that letter, which contains the substance of several of his conversations with me. I take the liberty of requesting the king's minister, to ask to see that letter. Our situation is not painted in flattering colours; but the general speaks from the sad experience of our embarrassments, and I agree with him, sir, that it is indispensable for us to obtain some pecuniary succours, and a decided naval superiority.

You must certainly have learnt, sir, that the defeat of Ferguson, and some other successes of ours, having disarranged the plans of Lord Cornwallis, General Leslie re-embarked to form the junction by water, and that he has since arrived at Charlestown. Arnold, became an English general, and honoured by the confidence of that nation, is at this moment at the head of a British detachment. Having landed in Virginia, he took possession of Richmond for some hours, and destroyed some public and private property: he must now have retired into a safe harbour, or has, perhaps, joined some other expedition. At the very moment when the English fancied that we were in the most awkward situation from the mutiny of some troops, General Washington sent a detachment on the left side of the Hudson, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hull, supported by General Parsons, which surprised, at Westchester, a corps of three hundred men under Colonel Delancey, wounded several, killed thirty, took sixty prisoners, burnt all the barracks and provisions, and retired, after having destroyed a bridge of communication with the Island of New York.

The general is soon to pass some days with the French troops at Rhode Island, and I shall accompany him on that journey.

I have the honour to be, sir, with equal affection and respect, &c. &c:

New Windsor, February 4th, 1781.

By a letter from M. de Rochambeau, sir, we learn that the English squadron in Gardiner's Bay has suffered severely from a gale of wind. A seventy-four, it is said, has run on shore; the London, of ninety guns, is dismasted, and M. Destouches~{3} was preparing to take advantage of this event. But you will receive more circumstantial, and perhaps more certain details, by letters from Rhode Island, and we are also ourselves expecting some, to fix more positively our own ideas and hopes. General Knox, commander of our artillery, a man of great merit and extreme probity, has just reported to the general the result of a mission which had been given him in the New England States. The spirit of patriotism and the zeal he found,—the exertions they are making to levy troops, either for the whole duration of the war, or for (what amounts, I trust, to the same thing) the period of three years, surpass our most sanguine hopes; and as they have twenty regiments in the continental service, I can only urge, in a still more positive manner, what I have already had the honour in writing to you.

Endnotes:

1. This letter was written in ciphers. It is inserted here exactly as it was first deciphered at the archives of foreign affairs. To avoid repetitions, we have not inserted the answers of the minister; these were written in a tone of confidence and friendship, and accord almost on every point with the ideas of M. de Lafayette, which were, in a measure, adopted by the cabinet of Versailles for the approaching campaign.

2. The revolt of the Pennsylvanian line is of the 2nd of January. It was appeased ten days afterwards, and imitated, the 20th of the same month, by the New Jersey troops.—(See the Letters of Washington at that period, and the Appendix, No. x. vol. vii.)

3. M. Destouches had replaced in the command of the frigates M. de Ternay, deceased the 15th December, after a short illness.

To Madame De Lafayette.

New Windsor, in the North River, February 2nd, 1781.

The person who will deliver this to you, my dearest love, is a man I am much attached to, and whom I wish you to become intimate with. He is the son of president Laurens, who has been lately established in the Tower of London;~{1} he is lieutenant-colonel in our service, and aide-de-camp to General Washington; he has been sent by congress on a private mission to the court of France. I knew him well during the two first campaigns, and his probity, frankness, and patriotism, have attached me extremely to him. General Washington is very fond of him; and of all the Americans whom you have hitherto seen, he is the one I most particularly wish you to receive with kindness. If I were in France, he should live entirely at my house, and I would introduce him to all my friends (I have even introduced him to some by letter); and give him every opportunity in my power of making acquaintance, and of passing his time agreeably at Versailles; and in my absence, I entreat you to replace me. Introduce him to Madame d'Ayen, the Marshal de Mouchy, the Marshal de Noailles, and treat him in every respect as a friend of the family: he will tell you all that has occurred during our campaign, the situation in which we are at present placed, and give you all details relating to myself.

Since my arrival here, my health has not for a moment failed. The air of this country agrees with me extremely well, and exercise is very beneficial to me. My exertions during the last campaign did not lead me into much danger, and in that respect we have not, in truth, much to boast. The French squadron has remained constantly blockaded in Rhode Island, and I imagine that the Chevalier Ternay died of grief in consequence of this event. However this may be, he is positively dead. He was a very rough and obstinate man, but firm, and clear in all his views, and, taking all things into consideration, we have sustained a great loss. The French army has remained at Newport, and although its presence has been very useful to us, although it has disconcerted some plans of the enemy which would have been very injurious to us, it might have done still more good if it had, not been thus blockaded.

Several Frenchmen have passed by head quarters. They have all been delighted with General Washington, and I perceive with pleasure that he will be much beloved by the auxiliary troops. Laval and Custine disputed together during the whole journey, and at each station would have done much better than the American and English generals, but never both in the same manner. The viscount and Damas have taken a long journey on the continent; we have also had the Count des Deux-Ponts, whom I like very much; M. de Charlus is at present in Philadelphia. I intend setting out about the 15th, for Rhode Island, and I shall accompany General Washington during his visit to the French army. When you recollect how those poor rebels were looked upon in France, when I came to be hung with them, and when you reflect upon my warm affection for General Washington, you will conceive how delightful it will be for me to witness his reception there as generalissimo of the combined armies of the two nations.

The Americans continue to testify for me the greatest kindness: there is no proof of affection and confidence which I do not receive each day from the army and nation. I am serving here in the most agreeable manner possible. At every campaign I command a separate flying corps, composed of chosen troops; I experience for the American officers and soldiers that friendship which arises from having shared with them, for a length of time, dangers, sufferings, and both good and evil fortune. We began by struggling together; our affairs have often been at the lowest possible ebb. It is gratifying to me to crown this work with them, by giving the European troops a high idea of the soldiers who have been formed with us. To all these various motives of interest for the cause and army, are joined my sentiments of regard for General Washington: amongst his aides-de-camp there is one man I like very much, and of whom I have often spoken to you; this is Colonel Hamilton.

I depend on Colonel Laurens to give you the details of our campaign. We remained sufficiently near the English to merit the accusation of boldness; but they would not take advantage of any of the opportunities we offered them. We are all in winter quarters in this part of the country. There is some activity in the south, and I was preparing to go there; but the wishes of General Washington, and the hope of being useful to my countrymen, have detained me here. The corps I command having returned to the regiments, I have established myself at head-quarters. America made great efforts last summer, and has renewed them this winter, but in a more durable manner, by only making engagements for the war, and I trust that none will have cause to be dissatisfied with us.

Arnold, who has now become an English general, landed in Virginia, with a corps, which appears well pleased to serve under his orders. There is no accounting for taste; but I do not feel sorry, I own, to see our enemies rather degrade themselves, by employing one of our generals, whose talents, even before we knew his treachery, we held in light estimation: abilities must, in truth, be rare in New York. But whilst speaking of baseness, Colonel Laurens will tell you of the fine embassy sent by General Clinton to some mutinous soldiers. He will describe to you also the details of that mutiny; the means employed to arrest it with the Pennsylvanians, and also those we employed with the Jersey troops. This only proves, however, that human patience has its limits, as no European army would endure the tenth part of such sufferings, that citizens alone can support nudity, hunger, cold, labour, and the absolute want of that pay which is necessary to soldiers, who are more hardy and more patient, I believe, than any others in existence.

Embrace our children a thousand and a thousand times for me; their father, although a wanderer, is not less tender, not less constantly occupied with them, and not less happy at receiving news from them. My heart dwells with peculiar delight on the moment when those dear children will be presented to me by you, and when we may embrace and caress them together. Do you think that Anastasia will recollect me? Embrace tenderly for me my dear and amiable viscountess, Madame du Roure, my two sisters, de Noailles and d'Ayen, &c. &c.

Endnote:

1. He was detained both as a prisoner of war and a rebel. The 18th of October, Madame de Lafayette had herself written in his favour to M. de Vergennes, a letter which is still preserved, in the archives of foreign affairs.

To General Washington.

(Original)

Elk, March the 8th, 1781.

My dear general,—Your letter of the 1st inst. did not come to hand until last evening, and I hasted to answer to its contents, though I should, in a few hours, be better able to inform you of my movements.~{1}

From what I hear of the difficulties to convoy us down the bay, I very much apprehend that the winds will not permit any frigate to come up. Count de Rochambeau thinks his troops equal to the business, and wishes that they alone may display their zeal and shed their blood for an expedition which all America has so much at heart. The measures he is taking may be influenced by laudable motives, but I suspect they are not entirely free from selfish considerations. God grant this may not be productive of bad consequences. Baron de Viomenil will also want to do every thing alone. As to the French troops, their zeal is laudable, and I wish their chiefs would reserve it for the time when we may co-operate with an assurance of success.

I heartily feel, my dear general, for the honour of our arms, and think it would be derogatory to them had not this detachment some share in the enterprise. This consideration induces me to embark immediately, and our soldiers will gladly put up with the inconveniences that attend the scarcity of vessels. We shall have those armed ones (though the largest has only twelve guns) and with this every body assures us that we may go without any danger to Annapolis. For my part I am not yet determined what to do; but if I see no danger to our small fleet in going to Annapolis, and if I can get Commodore Nicholson to take the command of it, I shall perhaps proceed in a small boat to Hampton, where my presence can alone enable me to procure a frigate, and where I will try to cool the impetuosity or correct the political mistakes of both barons.~{2}

Whichever determination I take, a great deal must be personally risked, but I hope to manage things so as to commit no imprudence with the excellent detachment whose glory is as dear, and whose safety is much dearer, to me than my own. I have written to General Greene, and will write to the governors, either to get intelligence or to prepare means to operate; but (General Greene excepted) I do not give them any hint of our intentions further than the expedition against Portsmouth.

When a man has delicate games to play, and when chance may influence so much his success or miscarriage, he must submit to blame in case of misfortune. But your esteem, my dear general, and your affection, will not depend upon events. With the highest respect and most tender friendship, &c.

Endnotes:

1. An instruction of the 20th of February, enjoined to General Lafayette to take the command of a detachment assembled at Peekskill, to act in conjunction with the militia, and some vessels of M. Destouches. He was to proceed by a rapid march to Hampton, on the Chesapeak bay, to surprise Arnold at Portsmouth: he had orders to return back immediately if he learnt that the latter had quitted Virginia, or that the French commander had lost his naval superiority. M. de Lafayette reached Pompton the 23rd, (from whence he wrote to the general-in-chief,) Philadelphia the 2nd, and Head-of-Elk the 3rd of March. Washington, however, had himself repaired to Newport to urge the departure of M. Destouches, which event he announced in a letter of the 11th. The result of his encounter on the 16th with Admiral Arbuthnot was to oblige the squadron to return to Newport, and M. de Lafayette to begin his retreat on the 24th. He spoke himself in the following terms of the expedition of which this letter treats:—

"Dr. Ramsay and Mr. Marshall speak of the expedition attempted against Arnold, and the circumstances which caused its failure. Lafayette's detachment was composed of twelve hundred of those soldiers of light infantry which had formed, the preceding year, the advance guard of the army: these were drawn from regiments of the four states of New England and Jersey. Gordon has truly related that, after conducting them by water from Head-of-Elk to Annapolis, he went himself in an open canoe to Elizabethtown to accelerate the preparations. The expedition having failed, he was obliged to return to Annapolis, where his continental troops had remained, vainly expecting that the French frigates would come to escort them. It was a bold and skilful stroke in him to take advantage of a favourable moment to convoy the American flotilla from Annapolis to Head-of-Elk, and the detachment had scarcely arrived when General Washington, announcing to him that General Phillips, with more than two thousand chosen men, had gone to reinforce Arnold, and take the command in Virginia, which was to become the centre of active operations, desired him to defend the state as well and as long as the weakness of his means allowed."—(Manuscript, No. 2.)

2. Viomenil and Steuben.

To General Washington.

(Original.)

On board the Dolphin, March 9th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—Here I am at the mouth of Elk River, and the fleet under my command will proceed to Annapolis, where I am assured they can go without danger. They are protected by the Nesbitt, of twelve guns, some field-pieces on board the vessel that carries Colonel Stevens, and we are going to meet an eight-gun and a six-gun-vessel from Baltimore. With this escort, we may go as far as Annapolis. No vessel of the enemy ever ventured so far up, and if by chance they should, our force is superior to any cruizer they have in the bay. At Annapolis we shall meet Commodore Nicholson, whom I have requested, by a letter, to take the general command of our fleet, and if there was the least danger, to proceed farther down. They are to remain at Annapolis until I send them new orders.

As to myself, my dear general, I have taken a small boat armed with swivels, and on board of which I have put thirty soldiers. I will precede the fleet to Annapolis, where I am to be met by intelligence, and conformable to the state of things below, will determine my personal movements and those of the fleet.

With a full conviction that (unless you arrived in time at Rhode Island) no frigate will be sent to us I think it my duty to the troops I command, and the country I serve, to overlook some little personal danger, that I may ask for a frigate myself; and in order to add weight to my application, I have clapped on board my boat the only son of the minister of the French Navy, whom I shall take out to speak if circumstances require it.

Our men were much crowded at first, but I unload the vessels as we go along, and take possession of every boat that comes in my way.

These are, my dear general, the measures I thought proper to take. The detachment is, I hope, free from danger, and my caution on this point has been so far as to be called timidity by every seaman I have consulted. Captain Martin, of the Nesbitt, who has been recommended by General Gist, makes himself answerable for the safe arrival of the fleet at Annapolis before to-morrow evening.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To General Washington.

(Original.)

Williamsburg, March the 23rd 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—By former letters your excellency has been acquainted with my motions, from my arrival at the head of Elk to the time of my landing at this place. The march of the detachment to Elk had been very rapid and performed in the best order. Owing to the activity of Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens, a train of artillery had been provided at Philadelphia, and notwithstanding some disappointments, namely, that relating to the want of vessels, no delay should have been imputed to us in this co-operation. Having received your excellency's letter, by which the sailing of the French fleet became a matter of certainty, I determined to transport the detachment to Annapolis, and did it for many essential reasons. The navigation of the bay is such that the going in and the going out of Elk River requires a different wind from those which are fair to go up and down the bay. Our stopping at Annapolis, and making some preparations on the road to Carolina, might be of use to deceive the enemy. But above all, I thought, with your excellency, that it was important, both to the success of the operation and the honour of our arms, that the detachment should be brought to cooperate, and from the time when the French were to sail and the winds that blew for some days, I had no doubt but that our allies were in the Chesapeak, before we could arrive at Annapolis.

Owing to the good disposition of Commodore Nicholson, whom I requested to take charge of our small fleet, the detachment was safely lodged in the harbour of Annapolis; and in the conviction that my presence here was necessary, not so much for preparations which Baron de Steuben provided, as for settling our plans with the French, and obtaining an immediate convoy for the detachment, I thought it better to run some risk than to neglect anything that could forward the success of the operation, and the glory of the troops under my command.

On my arrival at this place, I was surprised to hear that no French fleet had appeared, but attributed it to delays and chances so frequent in naval matters. My first object was to request that nothing be taken for this expedition which could have been intended for, or useful to, the southern army, whose welfare appeared to me more interesting than our success. My second object has been to examine what had been prepared, to gather and forward every requisite for a vigorous co-operation, besides a number of militia amounting to five thousand; I can assure your excellency that nothing has been wanting to ensure a complete success.

As the position of the enemy had not yet been reconnoitred, I went to General Muhlenberg's camp, near Suffolk, and after he had taken a position nearer to Portsmouth, we marched down with some troops to view the enemy's works. This brought on a trifling skirmish; during which we were able to see something; but the insufficiency of ammunition, which had been for many days expected, prevented my engaging far enough to push the enemy's outposts, and our reconnoitring was postponed to the 21st,—when, on the 20th, Major MacPherson, an officer for whom I have the highest confidence and esteem, sent me word from Hampton, where he was stationed, that a fleet had come to anchor within the Capes. So far it was probable that this fleet was that of M. Destouches, that Arnold himself appeared to be in great confusion, and his vessels, notwithstanding many signals, durst not, for a long time, venture down. An officer of the French navy bore down upon them from York, and nothing could equal my surprise in hearing from Major MacPherson, that the fleet announced by a former letter certainly belonged to the enemy.

Upon this intelligence, the militia were removed to their former position, and I requested Baron de Steuben (from whom, out of delicacy, I would not take the command until the co-operation was begun, or the continental troops arrived) to take such measures as would put out of the enemy's reach the several articles that had been prepared. On my return to this place, I could not hear more particular accounts of the fleet. Some people think they are coming from Europe; but I believe them to be the fleet from Gardiner's Bay. They are said to be twelve sail in all, frigates included. I have sent spies on board and shall forward their report to head-quarters.

Having certain accounts that the French had sailed on the 8th, with a favourable wind, I must think that they are coming to this place, or were beaten in an engagement, or are gone somewhere else. In these three cases, I think it my duty to stay here until I hear something more, which must be in a little time. But as your excellency will certainly recal a detachment composed of the flower of each regiment, whose loss would be immense to the army under your immediate command, and as my instructions are to march them back as soon as we lose the naval superiority in this quarter, I have sent them orders to move at the first notice which I will send to-morrow or the day after, or upon a letter from your excellency, which my aide-de-camp is empowered to open.

Had I not been here upon the spot, I am sure that I should have waited an immense time before I knew what to think of this fleet, and my presence at this place was the speediest means of forwarding the detachment either to Hampton or your excellency's immediate army. By private letters, we hear that General Greene had, on the 19th, an engagement with Lord Cornwallis. The honour of keeping the field was not on our side. The enemy lost more men than we did. General Greene displayed his usual prudence and abilities, both in making his dispositions and posting his troops at ten miles from the first field of battle, where they bid defiance to the enemy, and are in a situation to check his progress.

From General Washington to the Marquis De Lafayette.

(Original.)

New Windsor, 6th April, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,—Since my letter to you of yesterday,~{1} I have attentively considered of what vast importance it will be to reinforce General Greene as speedily as possible; more especially as there can be little doubt that the detachment under General Phillips, if not part of that now under the command of General Arnold, will ultimately join, or in some degree co-operate with Lord Cornwallis. I have communicated to the general officers at present with the army my sentiments on the subject; and they are unanimously of opinion that the detachment under your command should proceed and join the southern army. Your being already three hundred miles advanced, which is nearly half way, is the reason that operates against any which can be offered in favour of marching that detachment back. You will therefore, immediately at the receipt of this, turn the detachment to the southward. Inform General Greene that you are upon your march to join him, and take his directions as to your route, when you begin to approach him. Previously to that, you will be guided by your own judgment, and by the roads on which you will be most likely to find subsistence for the troops and horses. It will be well to advise Governor Jefferson of your intended march through the state of Virginia, or, perhaps, it will answer a good purpose were you to go forward to Richmond yourself, after putting the troops in motion, and having made some necessary arrangement for their progress.

You will take with you the light artillery and smallest mortars, with their stores and the musket cartridges. But let these follow, under a proper escort, rather than impede the march of the detachment, which ought to move as expeditiously as possible without injury to them. The heavy artillery and stores you will leave at some proper and safe place, if it cannot be conveniently transported to Christiana River, from whence it will be easily got to Philadelphia. You may leave to the option of Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens to proceed or not, as he may think proper; his family is in peculiar circumstances, and he left it with the expectation of being absent for a short time. Should there be other officers under similar circumstances, you may make them the same offers, and they shall be relieved.

I am, my dear marquis, yours, &c.

Endnote:

1. This related merely to the expedition which had lately failed. Washington deplored its result, which had been occasioned by maritime events, but he approved and eulogised the conduct of M. de Lafayette.

To General Washington.

(Original.)

Elk, April 8th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—Your excellency's letters of the 5th and 6th instant are just come to hand, and before I answer their contents, I beg leave to give you a summary account of the measures I have lately taken. As to the part of my conduct you have been acquainted with, I am happy, my dear general, to find it has met with your approbation.

When the return of the British fleet put it out of doubt that nothing could be undertaken for the present against Portsmouth, I sent pressing orders to Annapolis, in order to have everything in readiness, and even to move the troops by land to the Head-of-Elk. I myself hastened back to Maryland, but confess I could not resist the ardent desire I had of seeing your relations, and, above all, your mother, at Fredericksburg. For that purpose I went some miles out of my way, and, in order to conciliate my private happiness to duties of a public nature, I recovered by riding in the night those few hours which I had consecrated to my satisfaction. I had also the pleasure of seeing Mount Vernon, and was very unhappy that my duty and my anxiety for the execution of your orders prevented my paying a visit to Mr. Curtis.~{1}

On my arrival at Annapolis, I found that our preparations were far from promising a speedy departure. The difficulty of getting wagons and horses is immense. No boats sufficient to cross over the ferries. The state is very desirous of keeping us as long as possible, as they were scared by the apparition of the Hope, twenty guns, and the Monk, eighteen guns, who blockaded the harbour, and who (as appeared by intercepted letters) were determined to oppose our movements.

In these circumstances, I thought it better to continue my preparations for a journey by land, which, I am told, would have lasted ten days, on account of ferries, and, in the meanwhile, had two eighteen-pounders put on board a small sloop, which appeared ridiculous to some, but proved to be of great service. In the morning of the 6th, Commodore Nicholson went out with the sloop and another vessel, full of men. Whether the sound of eighteen pounders, or the fear of being boarded, operated upon the enemy, I am not able to say; but, after some manoeuvres, they retreated so far as to render it prudent for us to sail to this place. Every vessel with troops and stores was sent in the night by the commodore, to whom I am vastly obliged; and having brought the rear with the sloop and other vessels, I arrived this morning at Elk. It is reported that the ships have returned to their stations; if so, they must have been reinforced; their commander had already applied for an augmentation of force.

Before I left Annapolis, hearing that General Greene was in want of ammunition, I took the liberty of leaving for the southern army four six-pounders, with three hundred rounds each, nearly a hundred thousand cartridges, and some small matters, which I left to the care of the governor and General Smallwood, requesting them to have wagons and horses impressed, to send them to a place of safety, where they must be by this time. I also wrote to the governor of Virginia, to General Greene, and the baron. These stores will set off in a few days, under the care of a detachment, for the Maryland line, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart.

In consequence of previous orders, everything was in readiness for our movement. The troops were ordered to march the next morning, and I expect a sufficiency of vessels is now at Wilmington or Christiana Creek; so that I am in hopes to join your excellency in a very few days. Your letter of the 6th, ordering me to the southward, is just come to hand. Had I been still at Annapolis, or upon the road by land, and of course with the same means to return that I had to advance, your commands should have been immediately obeyed; but necessity keeps us here for some days, and as your letters arrived in two days, your answer to this must be here before we are in a situation to move.

When your excellency wrote to me, I was supposed to be at Annapolis, or very near that place, with the means of returning, which makes a great difference. Another circumstance, still more material, is, that, instead of joining either Arnold or Phillips (if Phillips be there), Lord Cornwallis is so disabled as to be forced to a retreat, as appears from General Greene's letter.

To these considerations I have added this one, which is decisive: that being fitted only to march twelve miles, part of it in the State of Delaware, and a part of our provisions being asked for from Philadelphia, it is impossible to have the necessary apparatus to march and subsist, or to cross ferries on our way to the southern army, so as to leave this place under four or five days. As to a transportation through the bay, we cannot expect the same good luck of frightening an enemy, who must know how despicable our preparations are; and we must, at least, wait for the return of look-out boats which, if sent immediately, will not possibly return under five or six days.

In these circumstances, my dear general, I am going to make every preparation to march to Virginia, so as to be ready as soon as possible. I shall keep here the vessels, and will also keep those which have been ordered to Christiana Creek. This state of suspense will distract the enemy's conjectures, and put me in a situation to execute your excellency's orders, which will be here before I can be able to move with any degree of advantage towards the southward.

Had it been possible to obey to-morrow morning, I would have done it immediately; but since I am obliged to make preparations, I beg leave to make these observations, which I should have been allowed to present, had I been at the meeting of general officers.

The troops I have with me being taken from every northern regiment, have often (though without mentioning it) been very uneasy at the idea of joining the southern army. They want clothes; shoes particularly; they expect to receive clothes and money from their states. This would be a great disappointment for both officers and men. Both thought at first they were sent out for a few days, and provided themselves accordingly; both came cheerfully to this expedition, but both have had already their fears at the idea of going to the southward. They will certainly obey, but they will be unhappy, and some will desert.

Had this corps considered themselves as light infantry, destined for the campaign, to be separated from their regiments, it would be attended with less inconveniences; and such a corps, in the course of the campaign, might be brought there without difficulty, particularly by water, as they would be prepared accordingly.

Supposing the Jersey line were to join the detachment of their troops at this place, it would hardly make any difference, as we have been but five days coming from Morristown to the Head-of-Elk.

These considerations, my dear general, I beg you to be convinced, are not influenced by personal motives. I should most certainly prefer to be in a situation to attack New York, nor should I like, in an operation against New York, to see you deprived of the New England light infantry; but I think with you, that these motives are not to influence our determination, if this be the best way to help General Greene.

By the letters I have received from my two friends, Marquis de Castries and Count de Vergennes, I am assured that we shall soon get an answer to our propositions against New York, and am strongly led to hope that, having a naval superiority, the army under your immediate command will not remain inactive.

At all events, my dear general, I will use my best endeavours to be ready to move either way as soon as possible; and have the honour to be, with the highest respect and affection, &c.

Endnote:

1. Son of Mrs. Washington by a former marriage.

To Colonel Hamilton.

(Original.)

Susquehannah Ferry, 18th April, 1781.

Dear Hamilton,~{1}—You are so sensible a fellow, that you can certainly explain to me what is the matter that New York should be given up; that our letters to France go for nothing; that when the French are coming, I am going. This last matter gives great uneasiness to the minister of France. All this is not comprehensible to me, who, having been long from head-quarters, have lost the course of intelligence.

Have you left the family, my dear sir? I suppose so. But from love to the general, for whom you know my affection, I ardently wish it was not the case. Many, many reasons conspire to this desire of mine; but if you do leave it, and if I go to exile, come and partake it with me. Yours, &c.

Endnote:

1. The 11th of April, Washington renewed, with more detail, his instructions upon the movement to the south, and General Greene, desiring to carry the theatre of war into South Carolina, urged General Lafayette to march upon the capital of Virginia. The latter made his preparations accordingly, and with great activity, in spite of the regret he experienced, and the difficulties he encountered. He deplored, in truth, that long-promised expedition on New York being abandoned; and he had to combat the repugnance of the troops, who threatened to become weakened by desertion. This was the subject of several long letters we have thought proper to suppress. He wrote, also, frequently, to Colonel Hamilton, and we may see some of those letters in the life of the latter. We have only inserted this one letter, which expresses all he felt. Hamilton, at that period, having had a coolness with Washington, wished to quit his staff; and it was in reality as an officer of the line that he took part in the siege of Yorktown.—(See his Life, vol. i., chap. xiii.)

To General Washington.

(Original.)

Baltimore, April 18th, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—Every one of my letters were written in so lamentable a tone, that I am happy to give you a pleasanter prospect. The anxiety I feel to relieve your mind from a small part of those many solicitudes and cares which our circumstances conspire to gather upon you, is the reason of my sending this letter by the chain of communication, and with a particular recommendation. When I left Susquehannah Ferry, it was the general opinion that we could not have six hundred men by the time we should arrive at our destination. This, and the shocking situation of the men offered the more gloomy prospects, as the board of war have confessed their total inability to afford us relief. Under these circumstances, I have employed every personal exertion, and have the pleasure to inform you that desertion has, I hope, been put to an end.

On my arrival on this side of the Susquehannah, I made an order for the troops, wherein I endeavoured to throw a kind of infamy upon desertion, and to improve every particular affection of theirs. Since then, desertion has been lessened. Two deserters have been taken up; one of whom has been hanged to-day, and the other (being an excellent soldier) will be forgiven, but dismissed from the corps, as well as another soldier who behaved amiss. To these measures, I have added one which my feelings for the sufferings of the soldiers, and the peculiarity of their circumstances, have prompted me to adopt.

The merchants of Baltimore lent me a sum of about 2,000l., which will procure some shirts, linen, overalls, shoes, and a few hats. The ladies will make up the shirts, and the overalls will be made by the detachment, so that our soldiers have a chance of being a little more comfortable. The money is lent upon my credit, and I become security for the payment of it in two years' time, when, by the French laws, I may better dispose of my estate. But before that time, I shall use my influence with the French court, in order to have this sum of money added to any loan congress may have been able to obtain from them.

In case you are told, my dear general, that my whole baggage has been taken in the bay, I am sorry I cannot discountenance the report. But when the mention of papers and maps is made, do not apprehend anything bad for the papers or maps you have put in my possession. Nothing has been lost but writing paper and printed maps. The fact is this: when at York, I had some continental soldiers and my baggage to send up in a safe barge and an unsafe boat. I, of course, gave the barge to the soldiers, who easily went to Annapolis. The baggage was put into the boat, and has not been since heard of. But being aware of the danger; I took by land with me every article that was, on public accounts, in the least valuable. By a letter from Baron de Steuben, dated Chesterfield Court House the 10th of April, I find that General Phillips has at Portsmouth 1500 or 2000 men added to the force under Arnold. Proper allowance being made for exaggerations, I apprehend that his whole army amounts to 2800 men, which obliges me to hasten my march to Fredericksburg and Richmond, where I expect to receive orders from General Greene.

The importance of celerity, the desire of lengthening the way home, and immense delays that would stop me for an age, have determined me to leave our tents, artillery, &c., under a guard, and with orders to follow as fast as possible, while the rest of the detachment, by forced marches, and with impressed wagons and horses, will hasten to Fredericksburg or Richmond, and by this derange the calculations of the enemy. We set off to-morrow, and this rapid mode of travelling, added to my other precautions, will, I hope, keep up our spirits and good humour.~{1}

I am, my dear general, &c.

P. S. The word lessened does not convey a sufficient idea of what experience has proved to be true, to the honour of our excellent soldiers. It had been announced in general orders, that the detachment was intended to fight an enemy far superior in number, under difficulties of every sort. That the general was, for his part, determined to encounter them, but that such of the soldiers as had an inclination to abandon him, might dispense with the danger and crime of desertion, as every one of them who should apply to head-quarters for a pass to join their corps in the north might be sure to obtain it immediately.

Endnote:

1. This letter announces the real commencement of the Virginian campaign. M. de Lafayette marched upon Richmond, and thus wrote on the 4th of May:—

"The leaving of my artillery appears a strange whim, but had I waited for it, Richmond had been lost. It is not without trouble I have made this rapid march. General Phillips has expressed to a flag officer the astonishment he felt at our celerity; and when on the 30th, as he was going to give the signal to attack, he reconnoitred our position, Mr. Osburn, who was with him, says, that he flew into a violent passion, and swore vengeance against me and the corps I had brought with me."

The subsequent operations are given in detail, both in the Memoirs, and in a relation of the campaign; it was, therefore, thought proper to suppress the greatest part of the letters in which M. de Lafayette gave an account of them to General Washington. To each of those letters is usually annexed a copy of his official reports to General Greene.

To General Washington.

(Original.)

Alexandria, April 23rd, 1781.

My Dear General,—Great happiness is derived from friendship, and I experience it particularly in the attachment which unites me to you. But friendship has its duties, and the man who likes you best, will be the first to let you know everything in which you may be concerned.

When the enemy came to your house, many negroes deserted to them. This piece of news did not affect me much, as I little value these matters. But you cannot conceive how unhappy I have been to hear that Mr. Lund Washington went on board the enemy's vessels, and consented to give them provisions.

This being done by the gentleman who, in some measure, represents you at your house, will certainly have a bad effect, and contrasts with spirited answers from some neighbours that have had their houses burnt accordingly.

You will do what you think proper about it, my dear general; but, as your friend, it was my duty confidentially to mention the circumstances.

With the help of some wagons and horses, we got, in two days, from the camp, near Baltimore, to this place. We halted yesterday, and having made a small bargain for a few pair of shoes, are now marching to Fredericksburg. No official account from Phillips, but I am told they are removing stores from Richmond and Petersburg. I am surprised nobody writes to me, and hope soon to receive intelligence.

Our men are in high spirits. Their honour having been interested in this affair, they have made a point to come with us; and murmurs, as well as desertion, are entirely out of fashion. Requesting my best respects to Mrs. Washington, and my compliments to the family, I have the honour to be, with those sentiments which you know, &c.

From General Washington to Marquis De Lafayette.

(Original.)

New Windsor, May 4, 1781.

MY DEAR MARQUIS,—The freedom of your communications is an evidence to me of the sincerity of your attachment, and every fresh instance of this gives pleasure and adds strength to the bond which unites us in friendship. In this light I view the intimation respecting the conduct of Mr. Lund Washington. Some days previous to the receipt of your letter, which only came to my hands yesterday, I received an account of this transaction from that gentleman himself, and immediately wrote and forwarded the answer, of which the enclosed is a copy. This letter, which was written in the moment of my obtaining the first intimation of the matter, may be considered as a testimony of my disapprobation of his conduct, and the transmission of it to you, as a proof of my friendship; because I wish you to be assured, that no man can condemn the measure more sincerely than I do.

A false idea, arising from the consideration of his being my steward, and in that character more the trustee and guardian of my property than the representative of my honour, has misled his judgment and plunged him into error, upon the appearance of desertion among my negroes, and danger to my buildings; for sure I am, that no man is more firmly opposed to the enemy than he is. From a thorough conviction of this, and of his integrity, I entrusted every species of my property to his care, without reservation or fear of his abusing it. The last paragraph of my letter to him was occasioned by an expression of his fear, that all the estates convenient to the river would be stripped of their negroes and moveable property.

I am very happy to find that desertion has ceased, and content has taken place, in the detachment you command. Before this letter can reach you, you must have taken your ultimate resolution upon the proposal contained in my letters of the 21st and 22nd ultimo, and have made the consequent arrangements. I shall be silent, therefore, on the subject of them, and only beg, in case you should not return to this army, and the papers were not lost with your other baggage (on which event give me leave to express my concern) that you would permit M. Capitaine to furnish me with copies of the drafts, and the remarks of the pilots (taken at Colonel Day's) on the entrance of the harbour of New York. It is possible they may be wanted, and I am not able to furnish them without your assistance.

Mrs. Washington and the rest of my small family, which, at present, consists only of Tilghman and Humphreys, join me in cordial salutations, and, with sentiments of the purest esteem and most affectionate regard, I remain, my dear marquis, &c.

From General Washington to Lund Washington.

(Original.)

New Windsor, April 30, 1781.

Dear Lund,—I am very sorry to hear of your loss; I am a little sorry to hear of my own; but that which gives me most concern is, that you should go on board the enemy's vessels, and furnish them with refreshments. It would have been a less painful circumstance to me to have heard that, in consequence of your non-compliance with their request, they had burnt my house and laid the plantation in ruins. You ought to have considered yourself as my representative, and should have reflected on the bad example of communicating with the enemy, and making a voluntary offer of refreshments to them, with a view to prevent a conflagration.

It was not in your power, I acknowledge, to prevent them from sending a flag on shore, and you did right to meet it; but you should, in the same instant that the business of it was unfolded, have declared explicitly, that it was improper for you to yield to the request; after which, if they had proceeded to help themselves by force, you could but have submitted, and, being unprovided for defence, this was to be preferred to a feeble opposition, which only serves as a pretext to burn and destroy.

I am thoroughly persuaded that you acted from your best judgment, and believe that your desire to preserve my property, and rescue the buildings from impending danger, was your governing motive; but to go on board their vessels, carry them refreshments, commune with a parcel of plundering scoundrels, and request a favour by asking a surrender of my negroes, was exceedingly ill judged, and, it is to be feared, will be unhappy in its consequences, as it will be a precedent for others, and, may be, become a subject of animadversion.

I have no doubt of the enemy's intention to prosecute the plundering plan they have begun; and, unless a stop can be put to it by the arrival of a superior naval force, I have as little doubt of its ending in the loss of all my negroes, and in the destruction of my houses. But I am prepared for the event, under the prospect of which, if you could deposit in a place of safety the most valuable and less bulky articles, it might be consistent with policy and prudence, and a means of preserving them hereafter. Such and so many things as are necessary for common and present use must be retained, and must run their chance through the fiery trial of this summer. I am sincerely, yours.

To General Washington.

(Original.)

Camp Wilton, on James River, May 17, 1781.

Dear General,—My correspondence with one of the British generals, and my refusal of a correspondence with the other, may be, perhaps, misrepresented, I shall therefore give an account of what has passed, and I hope your excellency and General Greene will approve of my conduct. On the arrival of our detachment at Richmond, three letters were brought by a flag, which I have the honour to inclose, and which, as commander of the troops in this state, it became my duty to answer. The enclosed letters were successively sent in pursuit of General Phillips, who received them both with a degree of politeness that seemed to apologize for his unbecoming style. General Phillips being dead of a fever, an officer was sent with a passport and letters from General Arnold. I requested the gentleman to come to my quarters, and having asked if General Phillips was dead,~{1} to which he answered in the negative, I made it a pretence not to receive a letter from General Arnold, which, being dated head-quarters, and directed to the commanding officer of the American troops, ought to come from the British general chief in command. I did, however, observe, should any officers have written to me I should have been happy to receive their letters. The next day the officer returned with the same passport and letter, and informed me that he were now at liberty to declare that Phillips was dead, and Arnold was commander-in-chief of the British army in Virginia. The high station of General Arnold having obliged me to an explanation, the enclosed note was sent to the officer of the flag, and the American officer verbally assured him that were I requested to put in writing a minute account of my motives, my regard for the British army was such that I would cheerfully comply with the demand.

Last evening, a flag of ours returned from Petersburg, who had been sent by the commander of the advanced corps, and happened to be on his way while the British officer was at our picquets. Inclosed is the note written by General Arnold, in which he announces his determination of sending our officers and men to the West Indies.

The British general cannot but perfectly know that I am not to treat of partial exchanges, and that the fate of the continental prisoners must be regulated by a superior authority to that with which I am invested.

With the highest respect, I have the honour to be, &c.

Endnote:

1. Gordon places the death of General Phillips on the 13th of May: he was very ill in his bed, when a cannon ball traversed his bed-room. General Phillips commanded at Minden the battery whose cannon killed the father of M. de Lafayette.

From General Phillips to the Marquis De Lafayette.

(Original.)

British Camp, at Osborn, April 28, 1781.

SIR,—It is a principle of the British army engaged in the present war, which they esteem as an unfortunate one, to conduct it with every attention to humanity and the laws of war; and in the necessary destruction of public stores of every kind, to prevent, as far as possible, that of private property. I call upon the inhabitants of Yorktown, Williamsburg, Petersburg, and Chesterfield, for a proof of the mild treatment they have received from the king's troops; in particular at Petersburg, when the town was saved by the labour of the soldiers, which otherwise must have perished by the wilful inactivity of its inhabitants.

I have now a charge of the deepest nature to make against the American arms: that of having fired upon the king's troops by a flag of truce vessel; and, to render the conduct as discordant to the laws of arms, the flag was flying the whole time at the mast head, seeming to sport in the violation of the most sacred laws of war.

You are sensible, sir, that I am authorized to inflict the severest punishment in return for this bad conduct, and that towns and villages lay at the mercy of the king's troops, and it is to that mercy alone you can justly appeal for their not being reduced to ashes. The compassion, and benevolence of disposition, which has marked the British character in the present contest, still govern the conduct of the king's officers, and I shall willingly remit the infliction of any redress we have a right to claim, provided the persons who fired from the flag of truce vessel are delivered into my possession, and a public disavowal made by you of their conduct. Should you, sir, refuse this, I hereby make you answerable for any desolation which may follow in consequence.

Your ships of war, and all other vessels, not actually in our possession in James River, are, however, driven beyond a possibility of escaping, and are in the predicament and condition of a town blockaded by land, where it is contrary to the rules of war that any public stores should be destroyed. I shall therefore demand from you, sir, a full account of whatever may be destroyed on board vessels or otherwise, and need not mention to you what the rules of war are in these cases.

I am, sir, your most humble servant,

W. Phillips.

From General Phillips to the Marquis De Lafayette.

(Original.)

Camp at Osborn, April 29th, 1781.

Sir,—When I was at Williamsburg, and at Petersburg, I gave several inhabitants and country people protections for their persons and properties. I did this without asking, or even considering, whether these people were either friends or foes, actuated by no other motive than that of pure humanity. I understand, from almost undoubted authority, that several of these persons have been taken up by their malicious neighbours, and sent to your quarters, where preparations are making for their being ill treated; a report which I sincerely hope may be without foundation. I repeat to you, sir, that my protections were given generally from a wish that, in the destruction of public stores, as little damage as possible might be done to private property, and to the persons of individuals; but at any rate, I shall insist upon my signs manual being held sacred, and I am obliged to declare to you, sir, that if any persons, under the description I have given, receive ill treatment, I shall be under the necessity of sending to Petersburg, and giving that chastisement to the illiberal persecutors of innocent people, which their conduct shall deserve. And I further declare to you, sir, should any person be put to death, under the pretence of their being spies of, or friends to, the British government, I will make the shores of James River an example of terror to the rest of Virginia. It is from the violent measures, resolutions of the present house of delegates, council, and governor of Virginia, that I am impelled to use this language, which the common temper of my disposition is hurt at. I shall hope that you, sir, whom I have understood to be a gentleman of liberal principles, will not countenance, still less permit to be carried into execution, the barbarous spirit which seems to prevail in the council of the present civil power of this colony.

I do assure you, sir, I am extremely inclined to carry on this unfortunate contest with every degree of humanity, and I will believe you intend doing the same.

I am, sir, your most obedient humble servant,

W. Phillips.

To Major General Phillips.

(Original.)

American camp, April 30th, 1781.

Sir,—Your letters of the 26th, 28th, and 29th, came yesterday to hand. The duplicate dated at Petersburg being rather of a private nature, it has been delivered to Major-General Baron de Steuben. I am sorry the mode of your request has delayed the civility that had been immediately intended.

From the beginning of this war, which you observe is an unfortunate one to Great Britain, the proceedings of the British troops have been hitherto so far from evincing benevolence of disposition, that your long absence~{1} from the scene of action is the only way I have to account for your panegyrics. I give you my honour, sir, that the charge against a flag vessel shall be strictly inquired into, and in case the report made to you is better grounded than the contrary one I have received, you shall obtain every redress in my power, that you have any right to expect. This complaint I beg leave to consider as the only part in your letter that requires an answer. Such articles as the requiring that the persons of spies be held sacred, cannot certainly be serious.

The style of your letters, sir, obliges me to tell you, that should your future favours be wanting in that regard due to the civil and military authority in the United States, which cannot but be construed into a want of respect to the American nation, I shall not think it consistent with the dignity of an American officer to continue the correspondence.

I have the honour to be, your most obedient servant,

Lafayette.

Endnote:

1. General Phillips had been made prisoner at Saratoga.

To Major General Phillips.

(Original.)

May 3rd, 1781.

Sir,—Your assertion relating to the flag vessel was so positive, that it becomes necessary for me to set you right in this matter. Inclosed I have the honour to send you some depositions, by which it is clearly proved that there has been on our side no violation of flags.

I have the honour to be, sir, your humble servant,

Lafayette

Note for Captain Emyne.

May 15th, 1781.

The Major-General Marquis de Lafayette has the honour to present his compliments to Captain Emyne, and begs him to recollect that, on the supposition of the death of General Phillips, he said, "that he should know in that case what to do." From regard to the English army, he had made use of the most polite pretence for declining all correspondence with the English general who is at this moment commander-in-chief. But he now finds himself obliged to give a positive denial. In case any other English officer should honour him with a letter, he would always be happy to give the officers every testimony of his esteem.

Note from General Arnold to Captain Ragedale.

Brigadier-General Arnold presents his compliments to Captain Ragedale, and takes the liberty of informing him, that the flag of truce having been sent by Brigadier-General Nelson, who is not commander-in-chief of the American army, is an inadmissible act. The letters are accordingly sent back unopened. If Captain Ragedale thinks proper to leave them with the servants, a receipt must be given for them.

Brigadier-General Arnold has given orders that the officers lately taken in that place should be sent to New York; their baggage will follow soon after them, and all the officers and soldiers of the American army that shall be taken prisoners in future, shall be sent to the West Indies, unless a cartel be immediately granted for the exchange of prisoners, as General Arnold has repeatedly demanded.

Head-quarters, at Petersburg, 17th May, 1781.

To General Washington.

(Original.)

Richmond, May 24th, 1781,

MY DEAR GENERAL,—My official letter, a copy of which I send to congress, will let you know the situation of affairs in this quarter. I ardently wish my conduct may meet with your approbation. Had I followed the first impulsion of my temper, I should have risked something more; but I have been guarding against my own warmth; and this consideration, that a general defeat, which, with such a proportion of militia, must be expected, would involve this state and our affairs in ruin, has rendered me extremely cautious in my movements. Indeed, I am more embarrassed to move, more crippled in my projects, than we have been in the northern states. As I am for the present fixed in the command of the troops in this state, I beg it as a great favour that you will send me Colonel Gouvion. Should a junction be made with General Greene, he will act as my aide-de-camp. Had the Pennsylvanians arrived before Lord Cornwallis, I was determined to attack the enemy, and have no doubt but what we should have been successful. Their unaccountable delay cannot be too much lamented, and will make an immense difference to the fate of this campaign. Should they have arrived time enough to support me in the reception of Lord Cornwallis's first stroke, I should still have thought it well enough; but from an answer of General Wayne, received this day, and dated the 19th, I am afraid that at this moment they have hardly left Yorktown.

Public stores and private property being removed from Richmond, this place is a less important object.

I don't believe it would be prudent to expose the troops for the sake of a few houses, most of which are empty; but I am wavering between two inconveniences. Were I to fight a battle, I should be cut to pieces, the militia dispersed, and the arms lost. Were I to decline fighting, the country would think itself given up. I am therefore determined to skirmish, but not to engage too far, and particularly to take care against their immense and excellent body of horse, whom the militia fear as they would so many wild beasts.

A letter from General Greene to General Sumner is dated 5th May, seven miles below Camden. The baron is going to him with some recruits, and will get more in North Carolina. When the Pennsylvanians come, I am only to keep them a few days, which I will improve as well as I can. Cavalry is very necessary to us. I wish Lauzun's legion could come. I am sure he will like to serve with me, and as General Greene gave me command of the troops in this state, Lauzun might remain with me in Virginia. If not, Shelden's dragoons might be sent. As to Moylan, I do not believe he will be ready for a long time.

Were I anyways equal to the enemy, I should be extremely happy in my present command, but I am not strong enough even to get beaten. Government in this state has no energy, and laws have no force. But I hope this assembly will put matters upon a better footing. I had a great deal of trouble to put the departments in a tolerable train; our expenses were enormous, and yet we can get nothing. Arrangements for the present seem to put on a better face, but for this superiority of the enemy, which will chase us wherever they please. They can overrun the country, and, until the Pennsylvanians arrive, we are next to nothing in point of opposition to so large a force. This country begins to be as familiar to me as Tappan and Bergen. Our soldiers are hitherto very healthy: I have turned doctor, and regulate their diet. Adieu, my dear general. Let me hear sometimes from you; your letters are a great happiness to your affectionate friend, &c.

To General Washington.

(Original.)

Camp, 28th June, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—Inclosed, I have the honour to send you a copy of my letter to General Greene. The enemy have been so kind as to retire before us.~{1}

Twice I gave them a chance of fighting (taking care not to engage farther than I pleased), but they continued their retrograde motions. Our numbers are, I think, exaggerated to them, and our seeming boldness confirms the opinion.

I thought, at first, Lord Cornwallis wanted to get me as low down as possible, and use his cavalry to advantage. But it appears that he does not as yet come out, and our position will admit of a partial affair. His lordship had (exclusive of the reinforcement from Portsmouth, said to be six hundred) four thousand men, eight hundred of whom were dragoons, or mounted infantry. Our force is about equal to his, but only one thousand five hundred regulars and fifty dragoons. Our little action more particularly marks the retreat of the enemy. From the place whence he first began to retire to Williamsburg is upwards of one hundred miles. The old arms at the Point of Fork have been taken out of the water. The cannon was thrown into the river, undamaged, when they marched back to Richmond; so that his lordship did us no harm of any consequence, but lost an immense part of his former conquests, and did not make any in this state. General Greene only demanded of me to hold my ground in Virginia. But the movements of Lord Cornwallis may answer better purposes than that in the political line. Adieu, my dear general; I don't know but what we shall, in our turn, become the pursuing enemy; and in the meanwhile, have the honour to be, &c.

Endnote:

1. It was the 20th of May that Lord Cornwallis effected his junction with the troops of Arnold, whose unexpected opposition re-established the affairs of the English in Virginia. The war became from that moment extremely active, and the movements of the two armies very complicated. M. de Lafayette maintained his position, and experienced no other check than the loss of some magazines, at the forks of James River, which had been confided to the care of Baron Steuben. His position was, however, rather a defensive one, until the period at which that letter was written, when the English abandoned Richmond. Cornwallis obtained, and usually by the aid of negroes, the best horses of Virginia. He had mounted an advance-guard of Tarleton on race-hores, who, like birds of prey, seized all they met with, so that they had taken many couriers who were bearers of letters. Cornwallis stopped once during his retrograde march on Williamsburg; the Americans being close to him, it was thought an affair would take place, but he continued on his road. It was before he reached Williamsburg that his rear-guard was attacked by the advance corps of Lafayette under Colonel Butler. He evacuated Williamsburg the 4th; Lafayette had done all he could to convince him that his own forces were more considerable than they really were. Either the night of, or two nights before, the evacuation of Williamsburg, a double spy had taken a false order of the day to Lord Cornwallis,—found, he said, in the camp,—which ordered General Morgan's division to take a certain position in the line. The fact was, that General Morgan had arrived in person, but unaccompanied by troops: Dr. Gordon justly observes, that Lord Cornwallis, from Charlestown to Williamsburg, had made more than eleven hundred miles, without counting deviations, which amounts, reckoning those deviations, to five hundred leagues. The whole march through North Carolina and Virginia, and the campaign against Lafayette, were effected without tents or equipages, which confers honour on the activity of Lord Cornwallis, and justifies the reputation he had acquired, of being the best British general employed in that war.—(Extract of Manuscript, No. 2.)