Contested Election

Friday, February 21.

Agreeably to the order of the day the Senate resumed the consideration of the report of the committee on the petition of Conrad Laub, and others, respecting the election of Mr. Gallatin to be a Senator of the United States.

Mr. Gallatin commenced his defence by laying down the principles on which he intended to argue. His was a very serious situation for a person to be placed in, who had been so long in America, and who had mingled with the inhabitants in the common cause, that he should afterwards be called before so solemn a tribunal, with an intention to wrest from him his right of citizenship. He confessed, that on this occasion his feelings were deeply interested, particularly as the manner of the counsel for the prosecutors was so personal, and went not only to deny him a seat in the Senate of the United States, but even to contest his citizenship, and denounce him as being yet an alien.

This was a matter of consequence to many thousands as well as himself, who have long considered themselves in possession of all the privileges of denizens, and yet may be deprived of their rights, if the doctrines of the counsel for the prosecutors should obtain any sanction from the body who were now to judge of its merits.

Mr. G. entered into a series of observations on the various points of law, &c., which had been adduced by Mr. Lewis, and he particularly remarked, that the Common Law of England was entirely inapplicable to the subject under consideration. He read the laws of Virginia respecting naturalization, &c., from which he insisted that he had long since become a citizen of the United States. He also quoted 1st Blackstone, p. 374, and Viner's Abridgment, vol. ii. p. 266, respecting the different acceptations of denizen and citizen, and he went back so far as the British statutes in 1740, to show the intention of the old Government was to naturalize all persons who would go and reside in the Colonies. He next mentioned the act of Pennsylvania, of the 31st of August, 1778, and commented on the principles generally entertained by most writers on the subjects of allegiance and citizenship. Blackstone, 266, &c.

An alien is a man born out of the allegiance of the King. But allegiance in England is not an allegiance to the country or to society, as it is understood in this country.

In order to explain the principle of reciprocity, he observed, that when the two crowns of England and Scotland were united under James, the inhabitants of Scotland became naturalized in England, as if they had been natural-born subjects of that country. The allegiance in Britain was personal to the King, and it has there this remarkable quality, that by the British laws allegiance can never be shaken off.

This country, before the Revolution, owed allegiance to the King, but that was destroyed by the Declaration of Independence, and then the inhabitants of the States became mutually citizens of every State reciprocally; and they continued so until such time as the States made laws of their own afterwards respecting naturalization.

As soon as separate governments existed, allegiance was due to each, and here the allegiance was a reality, it was to the Government and to society, whereas in Britain it is merely fictitious, being only to one man.

Every man who took an active part in the American Revolution, was a citizen according to the great laws of reason and of nature, and when afterwards positive laws were made, they were retrospective in regard to persons under this predicament, nor did those posterior laws invalidate the rights which they enjoy under the Confederation.

Mr. G. here mentioned his having been an inhabitant of Massachusetts before October, 1780, and he also observed, that the law passed in that State was decisive against the Common Law of England.

In quoting the laws of Massachusetts, which were passed in 1785, and afterwards, for naturalizing John Gardner, and James Martin, he remarked that they clearly implied that even a natural born subject, who had not acted in the Revolution, and an absentee, was not entitled to citizenship. He likewise took notice of the case of Mr. William Smith, of South Carolina, against whose election as a Representative in Congress, a petition was presented by Doctor Ramsay, although the decision of South Carolina on that subject was exactly the reverse of Massachusetts.

In speaking of the difficulties that occurred in explaining the terms citizen and alien, he ran over a number of cases, and asked whether if a person had arrived in the United States during the war, from Nova-Scotia, or elsewhere, and had taken an active part against the enemy, would he not be better entitled to the right of a citizen, than even those who afterwards subscribed to the acts? The counsel for the prosecutors had admitted that a person who had been one of the mass of the people, at the Declaration of Independence, was a citizen. On the same principle, until a law passes to disprove that a man who was active in the Revolution previous to the treaty of peace, was a citizen, he must be one ipse facto.

Mr. G. next read a quotation from the 1st vol. of Woodison, p. 382, an English writer, who acknowledged that all persons were aliens at the recognition of independence, and that is a more liberal construction than the council for the petitioners would admit of, for by this construction, our sailors, &c., ought to be naturalized, lest they be alarmed by the British.

The new Constitution of the United States requires certain qualifications for members of Congress, &c., but it does not deprive persons of their rights who were actually citizens before the constitution was ratified that made the States the United States. They were united by consent before, and consequently he was one of the people before the United States existed.

He went on to read from the Constitution of Massachusetts, and several other States, sundry clauses in support of his reasoning, and recapitulated the several heads of Mr. L.'s arguments, to each of which he replied.

Mr. G. said, that Mr. Lewis was unfortunate in producing the law of Pennsylvania, for, by proving too much, he had proved nothing, for the 42d sec. of the constitution is retrospective, and by acknowledging the Articles of Confederation to be the supreme law of the land, persons who were reciprocally citizens before, are still left in full possession of the right.

So far from any dangerous consequences arising on my construction of citizenship, said he, I think it must be evident, that there is more danger and absurdity in the counsel's own constructions. For, in remarking on the policy of nations, we find even slaves have been enfranchised by the great republics in times of common danger. The policy of America should be to make citizenship as easy as possible, for the purpose of encouraging population; even during the British dominion that was a principle laid down, and afterwards it was attempted to be varied; it is made one of the principal subjects of complaint in the Declaration of Independence, where it is expressly said, that the king endeavored to prevent the population of these States, by having laws made to obstruct the naturalization of foreigners.

If there were any dangerous consequences to be apprehended from the former regulations on this subject, they are all remedied by the new constitution.

Therefore, no ill consequence or absurdity can follow. The author of the Federalist supports this principle in vol. ii. p. 54, for he says, that it is a construction scarcely avoidable, that citizens of each of the States are mutually so in all of them.

The first words in the constitution, "We the People," furnished another argument in support of Mr. G's principles, which he turned to great advantage, still drawing an inference to show that Mr. L.'s construction of the subject was most liable to difficulties and to mischievous consequences.

He concluded by observing, that if there was any disfranchising clauses in the Constitution of the United States, tending to deprive citizens of antecedent rights, all such clauses must be construed favorably, and were evidently on his side. With regard to a sentence that had been added, by the advice of counsel, to the affidavit of Pelatiah Webster, he made some remarks which tended to establish his own personal character, which he trusted would be found, when traced back to his nativity, to stand the test; and that his right to a seat in the Senate would also stand upon an equally just foundation.

Mr. Lewis denied having ever seen the affidavit of Mr. Webster, until it was shown him at the time the examination before the committee was going forward.

Mr. Gallatin recriminated, that the clause of which he took notice, was not in the affidavit when Mr. Webster brought it to the committee, and that he had permitted it to be added with great reluctance. It was only the recital of a few words which passed between Mr. G. and Mr. W. in jest, some years since, wherein Mr. G. had ironically said his name was Sidney, probably alluding to some essays that had appeared in the newspapers under that signature, which had been generally attributed to the pen of another gentleman in the State.

Mr. Jackson, in order to bring the merits of the subject directly before the Senate, said he would move a resolution, that would have that effect; but upon Mr. Lewis's observing, that he had not yet closed his arguments, and at the instance of Mr. Butler, from South Carolina, who said he would second Mr. Jackson's motion hereafter, it was withdrawn for the present.

Ordered, That the further consideration thereof be postponed until to-morrow.