The Treaty with Great Britain

Friday, April 15.

The House then resolved itself into a committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, when, having read the resolution for carrying the British Treaty into effect—

Mr. Buck rose, and wished the question to be taken upon Mr. Maclay's resolution. This was opposed by Mr. Madison and Mr. Hillhouse, and then Mr. Madison addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. M. said, on a subject of such extent and importance, he should not attempt to go through all the observations that might be applicable to it. A general view of the subject was all that he meant at present. His omissions would be more than supplied by others who might enter into the discussion.

The proposition immediately before the committee was, that the Treaty with Great Britain ought to be carried into effect by such provisions as depended on the House of Representatives. This was the point immediately in question. But it would be proper in examining it to keep in view also the proposition of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Maclay) which had been referred to the committee, and which would be taken up, of course, if the immediate question should be decided in the negative.

If the proposition for carrying the Treaty into effect be agreed to, it must be from one of three considerations: either that the Legislature is bound by a constitutional necessity to pass the requisite laws without examining the merits of the Treaty, or that, on such examination, the Treaty is deemed in itself a good one, or that there are good extraneous reasons for putting it into force, although it be in itself a good one, or that there are good extraneous reasons for putting it into force, although it be in itself a bad Treaty.

The first consideration being excluded by the decision of the House, that they have a right to judge of the expediency or inexpediency of passing laws relative to Treaties; the question first to be examined must relate to the merits of the Treaty. He then proceeded to consider the Treaty under three aspects: first, as it related to the execution of the Treaty of Peace in 1783; secondly, as it determines the several points in the law of nations; thirdly, as it respects the commerce between the two nations.

First. He would not inquire on which side the blame lay, of having first violated the Treaty of 1783, or of having most contributed to delay its execution, although he did not shrink from the task under any apprehension that the result could be disadvantageous to this country. The Treaty itself had waived this inquiry, and professed to adjust all controversies on this subject, without regard to the mutual complaints or pretensions of the parties. It was, therefore, justly and naturally to be expected, that the arrangements for carrying that Treaty into effect would have been founded in the most exact and scrupulous reciprocity. Was this the case? He was sorry, that on the contrary, the arrangements were founded on the grossest violation of that principle.

There were two articles which had not been executed by Great Britain; that which related to the negroes and other property carried away, and that which required a surrender of the posts. The article unexecuted by the United States was, that which required payment of all bona fide debts, according to the Treaty now in question: this article is now to be carried into the most complete effect by the United States, and damages to the last fraction are to be paid for the delay. Is there a reciprocal stipulation by Great Britain with respect to the articles unexecuted by her? Nothing like it. She is wholly absolved from the obligation to fulfil one of the articles, viz: that relating to the negroes, &c., and she is to make no compensation whatever for delaying to fulfil the other, viz: the surrender of the posts.

It has been urged in apology for those very unequal stipulations, that the injury resulting from a forbearance to surrender the posts, was not susceptible of any precise liquidation into pecuniary damages. However plausible this might appear, it was by no means satisfactory. Commissioners, such as were appointed, with full discretion for other purposes, might have been charged with this subject, and if they could not have done exact justice, might have mitigated the injustice of doing nothing.

Apologies have been attempted also for the very extraordinary abandonment of the compensation due for the negroes, &c. It was said to be at least doubtful whether this claim was authorized by the seventh article of the Treaty of Peace, and that Great Britain had uniformly denied the meaning put by the United States on that article. In reply he made two remarks. First, that it was not true that Great Britain had uniformly denied the American construction of that article; on the contrary, he believed, it could be proved, that till of late, Great Britain had uniformly admitted this construction, and had rejected the claim on no other ground than the alleged violation of the fourth article on the part of the United States.

But had it been true that Great Britain had uniformly asserted a different construction of the article, and refused to accede to ours, what ought to have been done? Ought we to have at once acceded to hers? By no means. Each party had an equal right to interpret the compact; and if they could not agree, they ought to have done in this what they did in other cases where they could not agree; that is, have referred the settlement of the meaning of the compact to an arbitration. To give up the claim altogether, was to admit, either that Great Britain had a better right than the United States to explain the controverted point, or that the United States had done something which in justice called for a sacrifice of their equal right.

It was evident, he thought, from this view of the subject, that the arrangements with respect to the Treaty of Peace were frequently wanting both in justice and reciprocity.

Besides the omissions in favor of Great Britain, already pointed out with respect to the execution of the Treaty of Peace, he observed, that conditions were annexed to the partial execution of it in the surrender of the Western posts, which increased the general inequality of this part of the Treaty, and essentially affected the value of those objects.

The value of the posts to the United States was to be estimated by their influence, 1st. on the Indian trade; 2d. on the conduct and temper of the Indians towards the United States.

Their influence on the Indian trade depended principally on the exclusive command they gave to the several carrying places connected with the posts. These places were understood to be of such importance in this respect, that those who possessed them exclusively would have a monopoly, or nearly a monopoly, of the lucrative intercourse with a great part of the savage nations. Great Britain having hitherto possessed these places exclusively, has possessed this advantage. It was expected that the exclusive transfer of them would transfer the advantage to the United States. By the Treaty now concluded, the carrying places are to be enjoyed in common, and it will be determined by the respective advantages under which British and American traders will engage in the trade, which of them is to share most in it. In this point of view he thought the regulation highly impolitic and injurious. He would say little of the advantage which the British would have in their superior capital: that must be encountered in all our commercial rivalships. But there was another consideration which ought to have great weight on this subject. The goods imported for the Indian trade through Canada pay no duties. Those imported through the United States for that trade, will have paid duties from seven to ten per cent., and every one must see that a drawback is impracticable, or would be attended with an expense which the business would not bear. So far, then, as the importance of the posts is to be considered in a commercial view, they are, in a very great measure, stripped of it by the condition annexed to the surrender of them. Instead of a monopoly in our favor, the carrying places are made common under circumstances which may leave a monopoly in the hands of Great Britain. And this is done, too, by an article which is to last for ever.

Second. The influence of the posts on the general conduct of the Indians, is well known to depend chiefly on their influence on the Indian trade. In proportion, therefore, as the condition annexed to the surrender of posts affects the one, it must affect the other. If the British should continue to enjoy the Indian trade, they would continue to influence the Indian conduct; if not in the same degree as heretofore, at least in so great a degree as to condemn the article in question.

He took notice also of the inequality of the stipulation which opened all the ports of the United States, as the condition of having those of an unimportant province of Great Britain opened in return.

With respect to the Mississippi he could not but consider the clause relating to it as being singularly reprehensible. Happily the adjustment of our claims with Spain had been brought about before any evil operation of the clause had been experienced. But the tendency of it, he thought, could not be doubted. It was the more remarkable, that this extension of the privileges of Great Britain on the Mississippi beyond those in the Treaty of Peace, should have been admitted into the new Treaty, because it is supposed by the Treaty itself, that Great Britain may be deprived, by her real boundary, of all pretensions to a share in the banks and waters of the Mississippi.

Secondly. With respect to the great points in the law of nations, comprehended in the stipulations of the Treaty, the same want of real reciprocity, and the same sacrifice of the interests of the United States, were conspicuous.

It was well known to have been a great and favorite object with the United States, "that free ships make free goods." They have established this principle in all their other Treaties. They have witnessed with anxiety the general effort, and the successful advances towards incorporating this principle into the law of nations; a principle friendly to all neutral nations, and particularly interesting to the United States. He knew that at a former period it had been conceded on the part of the United States that the law of nations stood as the present Treaty regulates it. But it did not follow that more than acquiescence in that doctrine was proper. There was an evident distinction between silently acquiescing in it, and giving it the support of a formal and positive stipulation. The former was all that could have been required, and the latter was more than ought to have been unnecessarily yielded.

The article prohibiting sequestration was next considered by Mr. M. He said he should probably be among the last who would be disposed to resort to such an expedient for redress. But he could not approve of a perpetual and irrecoverable abandonment of a defensive weapon, the existence of which might render the use of it unnecessary. The situation of this country in relation to Great Britain was a peculiar one. As we had not fleets and armies to command a respect for our rights, we ought to keep in our hands all such means as our situation gave us. This article was another instance in which no regard was paid to reciprocity. British subjects, it was well known, had and were likely to have in this country a great deal of the property of the King made sacred. American citizens, it was as well known, had little, and were likely to have little of the kind in Great Britain. If a real reciprocity had been intended, why were not other kinds of private property, as vessels and their cargoes, equally protected against violation? These, even within the jurisdiction of Great Britain, are left open to seizure and sequestration, if Great Britain finds it expedient. And why was not property on the high seas under the protection of the law of nations, which is said to be a part of the law of the land, made secure by a like stipulation? This would have given a face of equality and reciprocity to the bargain. But nothing of the sort makes a part of it; where Great Britain had a particular interest at stake, the Treaty watchfully provides for it; when the United States have an equal interest at stake and equally entitled to protection, it is abandoned to all the dangers which it has experienced.

After taking this brief notice of the positive evils in this part of the Treaty, he might, he said, add the various omissions which were chargeable on it. But as he should not pretend to exhaust the subject, he would mention one only: the not providing for the respect due to the exhibition of sea papers. He could not but regard this omission as truly extraordinary, when he observed that in almost every modern Treaty, and particularly all our other Treaties, an article on this subject was regularly inserted. Indeed, it had become almost an article of course in the Treaties of the present century.

Thirdly. The commercial articles of the Treaty presented the third aspect under which he was to consider it. In the free intercourse stipulated between the United States and Great Britain, it could not be pretended that any advantage was gained by the former. A Treaty was surely not necessary to induce Great Britain to receive our raw materials and to sell us her manufactures. On the other hand, consider what was given up by the United States.

When the Government came into operation, it is well known that the American tonnage employed in the British trade bore the most inconsiderable proportion to the British tonnage. There being nothing on our side to contract the influence of capital and other circumstances on the British side, that disproportion was the natural state of things. As some balance to the British advantages, and particularly that of her capital, our laws had made several regulations in favor of our shipping, among which was the important encouragement resulting from the difference of ten per cent. in the duties paid by American and foreign vessels. Under this encouragement the American tonnage has increased in a very respectable proportion to the British tonnage. Nor has Great Britain ever deemed it prudent to attempt any countervailing measures for her shipping, well knowing that we could easily keep up the differences by further measures on our side. But by the Treaty, she has reserved to herself the right to take such countervailing measures against our existing regulations; and we have surrendered our rights to pursue further defensive measures against the influence of her capital. It is justly to be apprehended, therefore, that under such a restoration of the former state of things, the American tonnage will relapse to its former disproportion to the British tonnage.

When he turned his attention to the West India branch of the subject, there was still greater cause for wonder and dissatisfaction. As the Treaty now stood, Great Britain was left as free as she ever had been to continue the entire monopoly of the intercourse to British vessels. Recollecting, as he did, and as every member of the committee must do, the whole history of this subject from the peace of 1783, through every subsequent stage of our Independence down to the mission of the late Envoy, it was impossible for him to express his astonishment that any Treaty of Commerce should have ever been acceded to which abandoned the very object for which such a Treaty was ever contemplated. He never could have believed that the time was so near when all the principles, claims, and calculations, which have heretofore prevailed among all classes of people, in every part of the Union, on this interesting point, were to be so completely renounced. A Treaty of Commerce with Great Britain, excluding a reciprocity for our vessels in the West India trade, is a phenomenon which had filled him with more surprise than he knew how to express.

He then pointed to the clause which restrains the United States from imposing prohibitions or duties in any case on Britain which did not extend to all other nations; observing that the clause made it impossible to operate on the unreasonable policy of that nation, without suspending our commerce at the same time with all other nations whose regulations with respect to us might be ever so favorable and satisfactory.

The fifteenth article had another extraordinary feature, which must strike every observer. In other Treaties, putting the parties on the footing of the most favored nation, it was stipulated that where new favors were granted to a particular nation in return for favors received, the party claiming the new favor should pay the price of it. This was just and proper where the footing of the most favored nation is established at all. But this article gives to Great Britain the full benefit of all privileges that may be granted to any other nation, without requiring from her the same or equivalent privileges with those granted by such nation. Hence it would happen that if Spain, Portugal, or France, should open their Colonial ports to the United States in consideration of certain privileges in our trade, the same privileges would result gratis, and ipso facto, to Great Britain. He considered this stipulation as peculiarly impolitic, and that it could not fail, in the view of the committee, to form a very solid and weighty objection to the Treaty.

He was not unaware of the stress that would be laid on the article relating to the East Indies. He should leave to others better acquainted than himself with this branch of the subject to explain it. He made two observations, however: one was, that judicious and well informed gentlemen, equally judicious and well informed with any who could be consulted, considered the article as offering not a shadow of advantage to the United States. The other was, that no privilege was stipulated which had not been uniformly heretofore granted without stipulation; and as the grant could have proceeded from no motive but a pure regard to the British interest in that country, there was every reasonable security that the trade would continue open as it had been, under the influence of the same consideration.

Such being the character of the Treaty, with respect to the execution of the Treaty of Peace, the great principles of the Law of Nations, and the regulations of commerce, it never could be viewed as having any claim to be carried into effect on its own account.

He should conclude, he said, with taking notice of two considerations which had been much used as inducements to carrying the Treaty into effect.

1. It was said that the greater part of the Treaty was to continue two years only after the present war in Europe; and that no very great evils could grow out of it within that period. To this he replied, in the first place, that ten of the articles containing many very objectionable stipulations were perpetual. In the next place, that it would be in the power of Great Britain, at the expiration of the other articles, to produce the same causes for a renewal of them, as are now urged in their favor. If we are now to enforce the Treaty, lest Great Britain should stir up the Indians, and refuse to pay the merchants for the property of which she has plundered them, can she not at the end of two or three years plunder them again to the same or a greater amount? cannot the same apprehensions also be then revived with respect to the Indians, and will not the arguments then be as strong as they are now, for renewing the same Treaty, or making any other equal sacrifice that her purposes may dictate?

2. It was asked, what would be the consequence of refusing to carry the Treaty into effect? He answered, that the only supposable consequence was, that the Executive, if governed by the prudence and patriotism which he did not doubt would govern that department, would, of course, pursue the measures most likely to obtain a reconsideration and remodification of the offensive parts of the Treaty. The idea of war, as a consequence of refusing to give effect to the Treaty, was too visionary and incredible to be admitted into the question. No man would say that the United States, if an independent people, had not a right to judge of their own interests, and to decline any Treaty that did not duly provide for them. A refusal, therefore, in such cases, could give no cause, nor pretext, nor provocation, for war or for any just resentment. But apart from this, was it conceivable that Great Britain, with all the dangers and embarrassments which are thickening upon her, would wantonly make war on a country which was the best market she had in the world for her manufactures, which paid her an annual balance in specie of ten or twelve millions of dollars, and whose supplies were moreover essential to an important part of her dominions? Such a degree of infatuation ought not to be ascribed to any nation. And at the present crisis, for reasons well known, an unprovoked war with Great Britain, on this country, would argue a degree of madness greater than under any other circumstances that could well be imagined.

With all the objections therefore to the Treaty which he had stated, he hoped that it would not now be carried into effect; and that an opportunity would take place for reconsidering the subject on principles more just and more favorable to the United States.

When Mr. Madison had concluded,

Mr. S. Lyman rose.—I do not rise, said Mr. L., with an intention to go into a detail upon this subject, or to exhibit a comparative view of the advantages and disadvantages which may attend the operation of this Treaty, but only to make a few remarks, which may be considered as preparatory to a more minute discussion.

Although I believe a discussion of this Treaty is not strictly in order, because it does not come before us immediately as a subject of debate and legislation, but as a piece of information from the Executive, yet I have no doubt but that a thorough discussion of its principles may produce a happy effect; for I believe the more it is understood, the less various will be Our sentiments, the greater the degree of unanimity among ourselves, so much the greater will be the unanimity among our constituents. This unanimity is an object of the greatest magnitude, not only as the source of national respectability and honor, but as the only true source of national happiness and prosperity; it is therefore the indispensable duty of Government to maintain internal peace and tranquillity, and upon this ground alone it is I am willing the Treaty should be thoroughly discussed. I am sensible this Treaty presents itself with an unfavorable aspect, and what is the reason? Is it not because we have entertained too exalted ideas of our own national importance? A generous and noble pride we ought to entertain as a nation, and without this pride we should be guilty of ingratitude to Heaven, for Providence has placed within our reach all the resources of national strength and greatness, but we are yet among the nations in a state of minority—a minor must solicit favors, he cannot challenge them. Did we go to the Emperor of Morocco, or to the Dey of Algiers, and challenge a passage for our ships up the Mediterranean? No; but we solicited, and pay dear for that passage; or did we go to the King of Spain, and demand a free navigation of the Mississippi? No; but we negotiated, and success has attended that negotiation; or could we have gone to the King of England, and challenged a participation with his subjects in the commerce of the East and West Indies? Certainly we could not. What then should we have done? Would it have been best to have traded with them upon sufferance, and so to have maintained a precarious kind of commerce? Certainly this would not have done, for in that case we should have been constantly dependent upon the caprice of a capricious Court; this would be extremely mortifying indeed. Commerce, like all other kind of business, ought to be carried on upon generous and open principles, otherwise we establish a system of deceit that would be favorable to pirates and freebooters.

Under those circumstances what could we have done? We could not have carved for ourselves, for our strength and greatness were not sufficient; we therefore had to go with the modesty of a minor, and to solicit; and what was the natural consequence of this solicitation? Why, at the first interview with the British Minister, he determined to exact of us at least a complete fulfilment of all that a former Treaty required; and what was that? It was a payment of our bona fide debts; what could we do? He produced our contract, and we said nothing; moral rectitude required a fulfilment of this: it was in vain to say, you have interrupted our commerce, you have carried off our negroes, you have retained the Western posts, and thereby occasioned an expensive and bloody war with the Indians. Some of this language, perhaps, would have had weight with the British Minister, if he had been acting in his private capacity, but he felt and acted like the Minister of a great and powerful nation; interest and glory are their objects, and moral considerations are too apt to vanish before these. It is true, by the law of nature, commerce ought to be free and uninterrupted, but by the law of nations it is otherwise; and what nation shall gainsay this law? We certainly cannot, our strength and greatness are not yet fully ripe; and if they were, we should, in practice, deny this law of nature, and should ratify and confirm this law of nations. Thus, Mr. Chairman, we see that interest and force govern among the nations. I have made these preliminary observations in order that we might contemplate the Treaty upon its true ground, for a want of reciprocity has been a heavy charge brought against it.

I have read this Treaty with care and attention, and I am free to own that upon the first perusal of it I had a prejudice against it; it appeared to me that some of its stipulations were too favorable for Britain, and too disadvantageous to ourselves; but we certainly had an able negotiator, and I verily believe he did his utmost to serve his country; the more I have attended to the subject, the more I am reconciled to it. I find the gentlemen who are interested in commerce are almost universally satisfied with the commercial regulations; but there is a more weighty charge brought against it than of a want of reciprocity; it is even said by some to be unconstitutional. This is a heavy charge indeed, and if it is well founded we ought to prevent its operation, for we are sent here as the guardians of the rights of our fellow-citizens, and for that purpose are sworn to support their constitution; if it is unconstitutional, it is a nullity; it is not binding upon the nation; we ought to reject it; but if it is constitutional, and not extremely pernicious, it becomes the supreme law of the land, and we are in that case bound to obey it.

When Mr. Lyman had taken his seat,

Mr. Swanwick addressed the Chair:—One of the most characteristic and strong points of difference that exists between republican and despotic forms of government, said Mr. S., consists in their greater or lesser degree of haste in making or adopting laws. Where the will of a despot is the only law, his simple volition is sufficient to call for the prompt obedience of the subject; but in our happy government, the numerous checks and balances it prescribes every where oppose themselves to haste, to error, or inadvertency, in the formation of laws. In acts of the smallest importance, we see daily that after they have undergone every possible chance of fair and impartial discussion in the House, they are transmitted to another, who equally proceed to revise, correct, and amend them; and even this not being deemed sufficient to secure, as it were, against all possibility of danger, they are sent to the President, who has ten days to consider, and who may return them with his objections. These we are bound respectfully to inscribe on our journals; and if we disagree in opinion with the President, the majority of two-thirds of both branches is requisite to give validity to the law. Do not we discover in all this infinite caution, and a wish rather not to act at all, by the difference of the branches among each other, than to act imprudently or precipitantly; and can we imagine that a constitution thus guarded with respect to laws of little consequence, hath left without a check the immense power of making Treaties, embracing, as in the instrument before us, all our greatest interests, whether they may be of territory, of agriculture, commerce, navigation, or manufacture, and this for an indefinite length of time? No. By one of the guards of that constitution relative to appropriations of money, this Treaty hath, in the last stage of its progress, come before us; we have resolved according to our best judgment of the constitution, and, as we have seen above, according to the meaning and spirit of it, that we have a right to judge of the expediency or inexpediency of carrying it into effect. This will depend on its merits; and this is the discussion now before us. If, in the event, we shall be found to differ in opinion with the other branches as to this subject, it will involve no more animosity or crimination against them than if we differed as to an ordinary law. To what purpose then to sound the alarm, and to ring the tocsin from Georgia to New Hampshire? Do we impeach the Executive? Do we charge bribery or corruption? No, sir.

These preliminary remarks I have thought essential, previously to going into a consideration of the merits of the Treaty itself, which hath already been so ably considered by the gentleman last up from Virginia, (Mr. Madison,) whose mildness of manner and suavity of address were certainly calculated to inspire any thing else than the angry passions so greatly deprecated by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. S. Lyman.) These, I hope, will be carefully avoided on all sides, and the debate be concluded with the same good temper and moderation in which it is begun.

I must confess, Mr. Chairman, that the first point of view in which this Treaty struck me with surprise was, the attitude Great Britain assumes in it of dictating laws and usages of reception and conduct different towards us, in every different parcel of her empire, while the surface of our country is entirely laid open to her in one general and advantageous point of admission. In Europe, we are told we may freely enter her ports. In the West Indies, we were to sail in canoes of seventy tons burden. In the East Indies we are not to settle or reside without leave of the local government. In the seaports of Canada and Nova Scotia, we are not to be admitted at all; while all our rivers and countries are opened without the least reserve; yet surely our all was as dear to us as the all of any other nation, and not to have been parted with but on equivalent terms.

But let us consider the articles distinctly:—first, as to the Mississippi; Great Britain is admitted as freely to navigate on this river, and to frequent the ports on its banks, as we are to go to those on the Thames; yet, it is strange to remark, that, at the time we made the stipulation, we had not ourselves obtained the right we gave. We have since obtained it by Treaty with Spain, and on terms absolutely contradictory to those contained in the British Treaty.

The next of the permanent articles I shall notice, is that which respects British debts. It is somewhat remarkable, that the commissioners, who are to judge of these, are permitted the power of adjournment from place to place—a very favorable stipulation for the creditors, whilst the Commissioners on Spoliations, by article 7, are to act only in London, whereby the American claimant must pass with his papers, or send them across the Atlantic, and engage lawyers in a country where law is unusually dear; a circumstance which will deter many from applying at all, and occasion great loss to the United States. I observe, too, that the awards of the Commissioners of British debts are to be paid out of the treasury as awarded by the commissioners. I am surprised not to find in the Report of the Secretary of State, on appropriations to carry this Treaty into effect, some calculation as to the probable amount of these debts, or some provision for lodging, for this purpose, money in the treasury. Gentlemen would then have known the extent to which they were going; but, at present, they can form no judgment on the subject of the money wanted, or of the funds from whence that money is to come.

Much hath been said about the tenth article, relative to the sequestration of debts. To be against the adoption of this article, hath been supposed to imply an unwillingness to pay debts lawfully contracted, and very copious abuse hath been thrown on the largest and most populous State in this Union, as having for motive of its opposition, this principle. To say nothing of the degrading nature of such an admission, with respect to the honor of our own country, which ought always to induce us to think the most favorably of it, is it true? Is it true, that an unwillingness to pay debts hath been the principal cause of opposition to this Treaty? Among the names opposed to it, are to be found some as respectable for independence and fortune as any on the Continent. To instance only one of a number, I may cite the celebrated Pennsylvania farmer, John Dickenson, Esq., one of the richest men in these parts of the country, attached to no party, living in great retirement, with a name honorable for the most virtuous efforts in the American Revolution. Can it be supposed that such a character as this is influenced by such a motive? Surely not. Whence arises, then, the opposition? It arises from a conviction that the admission of this article is degrading to the national character. During a late session of Congress an honorable member from New Jersey, (Mr. Dayton, the present Speaker) fired by a laudable indignation at the robberies committed on our commerce by the British, moved for a provisional sequestration of their property. No sooner was this done, than we saw a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, dated the 16th of January, 1795, recommending the United States to pass a permanent law against sequestration of property in the funds. Congress not having acted on this part of the report, though they adopted other parts, we now see the clause attempted to be brought into a law by way of a Treaty. And it is more singular, as, at the very time the article was agreed to in England, all the European nations were actually sequestering the property of each other.

After having thus reviewed the first ten or permanent articles, I think it must appear obvious that the result is, that we have ceded the right to navigate the Mississippi on terms different to those on which we received it from Spain; that we have consented to receive the Western posts on terms that afford too much danger of disturbances by a mixed intercourse of our people, British subjects and Indians; that we have provided, certainly, for an indefinite amount of British debts: whilst our claim for spoliations is left to be decided by commissioners at London, who meet without power of adjournment, and under very extensive latitude of judging according to what may appear to them to be the law of nations, in a country where that law his been twisted so as always to serve as a pretext for spoliations against us; and we have agreed never, in future, to consent to sequestrations, or confiscations, in case, by war or national difference, our property afloat should be confiscated or sequestered by Great Britain to any amount. Let any impartial mind, then, judge of the expediency, on our part, of voting efficacy to so ruinous a contract.

I come now to consider the remaining articles of a more temporary nature. The 12th article merits consideration, because, though not included in the general arrangement as ratified, being only suspended, its principles are not wholly abandoned, but left, like a cloud, still to hang over us. This 12th article was intended to regulate our intercourse with the British West Indies, and contemplated the singular provision that we should only navigate thither in vessels of seventy tons burden, whilst the British themselves might put in the employ vessels of any size. How degrading such a stipulation, it is not difficult to conceive! We supply these islands with what the inhabitants have always acknowledged they could get so well nowhere else, and yet our tonnage is to be thus restricted, while theirs is left open to employ vessels of any description. But this is not all: for the sake of getting admission into a few inconsiderable British ports in the West Indies, we are to give up the carriage in our own shipping of cotton, one of our own staple articles, and of sugar, coffee, and indigo, the produce of the French, Spanish, Danish, Swedish, or Dutch islands. How strange a mistake as to the geography of this Western Archipelago, in which the carriage of the produce of St. Domingo alone is worth more nearly than the entire admission to all the other islands put together! The principle contained in this 12th article, thus suspended, ought to have been utterly contradicted or annulled. While existing even in its suspended form, it will prevent my voting for this Treaty, of whose chains it is only an absent link.

But we are told whatever may be our fate in the West, all our losses are to be balanced in the East Indies; and we are carried from our own neighborhood, to be sure, to a great distance, in order to have repaid all our sacrifices. Let us examine this 13th article respecting the East India trade, and see if it does not bear a very strict analogy to the West India article that has been exploded.

We are to be admitted, it is true, in vessels of any size, but not suffered to settle or reside without leave of the local Government—that is, of the British East India Company. Of all the despotisms in the world that of a mercantile monopolizing company is the worst; yet into such hands we are to fall, and from them to solicit leave to reside or travel in the country. What security can there be for a commerce thus precariously conducted, in which your rivals are your judge?

The consumption of India goods being in a great degree out of the question in England, the Company, who have an annual revenue of a million and a half sterling to receive from their possessions in India, have hitherto sold them at vendue in Leadenhall street; and I believe, considering the credit our merchants usually obtained in London on those goods, and the low price the Company sold them at, they could afford to supply us cheaper in England than we could get them from India in time of peace. I find the East India Company themselves state, in 1788, that seventeen-twentieths of the calicoes imported by them were exported, and twelve-twentieths of the muslins also exported, thereby realizing, as they term it, the tribute which India pays to Great Britain through the medium of its commerce. In 1793 the Company state the internal consumption of India calicoes and muslins to be reduced in Britain to almost nothing. They add, every shop offers British muslins for sale, equal in appearance, and of more elegant patterns than those of India, for one-fourth, or perhaps more than one-third less in price. They say nine-tenths of all muslins and calicoes are sold for exportation.

The 15th article is one of the most objectionable of the whole Treaty, because it fundamentally contradicts all the provisions heretofore made by our Government for the encouragement and protection of the navigation of this country. By it it is settled that, so far as respects us, no tonnage duties shall be laid on British vessels but what shall be laid on those of all other nations; no duties on British articles but what shall be laid on those of every other nation; no embargo to affect Britain but what affects all other nations alike; American bottoms are left exposed to be charged, in the European British ports, tonnage duties equal to those laid on British bottoms here; countervailing duties may be laid in England to equalize the difference of duties on European or Asiatic goods imported here in British or American vessels; and no additional difference in tonnage or duties of this kind is to be made hereafter.

These principles deserve to be separately examined. They virtually repeal all the laws heretofore made as to navigation and impost, by indirectly equalizing the tonnage and duties on the British and American vessels; and they restrain, in future, the powers of Congress on some of the most important regulations of foreign commerce that could come before them.

On a review, then, of the commercial articles, they may be summed up as follows: West India trade left blank by the suspension of the 12th article. East India trade subjected to a condition of residence, rendering it precarious, and restricted to a landing of the goods exported in the United States, not known to have ever been imposed in any way similar, on any other nation trading to Bengal, while all nations are constantly allowed an equal liberty of trading there with ourselves. European, and both these trades, liable to an equalization of tonnage and duties, that cannot but operate unfavorably to the American navigation. Should the countervailing duties take place in the British ports in Europe on American vessels, they will probably be shut out of them altogether. In time of foreign war, our ships deprived of the neutral rights of carrying allowed them by Treaty with France and Spain, and exposed to be captured and detained on suspicion, as now daily happens. Naval stores exposed to confiscation by England, when shipped, at a time when she is at war, to the ports of her enemies.

In all these instances our navigation is materially endangered and exposed, without any equivalent advantages. May it not now well be asked, Whence it comes that this interest of navigation hath become less an object of care to us than at the time we passed the laws of duty and impost on foreign ships and goods imported into them? I stated the other day my ideas of the immense importance of navigation. Mr. Burke gave the following opinion of a branch of it in 1775:

"As to the wealth which the Colonies have drawn from the sea by their fisheries, you had all that matter fully opened at your bar. You surely thought those acquisitions of value, for they seemed even to excite your envy; and yet the spirit with which that enterprising employment has been exercised, ought rather, in my opinion, to have raised your esteem and admiration. And pray, sir, what in the world is equal to it? Pass by the other parts, and look at the manner in which the people of New England have of late carried on the whale fishery. Whilst we follow them among the tumbling mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating into the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson's Bay and Davis's Straits; whilst we are looking for them beneath the Arctic Circle, we hear that they have pierced into the opposite region of Polar cold, that they are at the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen Serpent of South Falkland Island, which, seeming too remote and romantic an object for the grasp of national ambition, is but a stage and resting place in the progress of their victorious industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat more discouraging to them than the accumulated winter of both the poles. We know that whilst some of them draw the line and strike the harpoon on the coast of Africa, others run the longitude, and pursue their gigantic game along the coast of Brazil. No sea but what is vexed by their fisheries, no climate that is not witness to their toils. Neither the perseverance of Holland, nor the activity of France, nor the dexterous and firm sagacity of English enterprise, ever carried this most perilous mode of hardy industry to the extent to which it has been pushed by this recent people—a people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and not yet hardened into the bone of manhood. When I contemplate those things, when I know that the Colonies in general owe little or nothing to any care of ours, and that they are not squeezed into this happy form by the constraints of watchful and suspicious governments, but that through a wise and salutary neglect a generous nature has been suffered to take her own way to perfection—when I reflect upon these effects, when I see how profitable they have been to us, I feel all the pride of power sink, and all presumption in the wisdom of human contrivance melt and die away within me."

Since then our navigation has had the growth of a man arrived at full age, (twenty-one,) and become extended to an immense size; yet was it so unprotected that, in this year, the United States wanting to remit, out of some cargoes of sugar and coffee shipped on private account, money to pay the interest of their debts in Holland, they were under the necessity of asking passports for these cargoes of the French and British Ministers, to let this property pass in safety over the Atlantic; and I have seen it boasted in some of our papers, that orders were issued by the British Government to their Port Admirals to respect these passports thus given by their minister or agent here; so the United States left their own merchants to carry their sugar and coffee as they might, but obtained passes for ships, in the proceeds of whose sales they were interested. What a strange circumstance, this! The American Government sailing secure under passes—the private merchant exposed!

But it is asked, if this Treaty be so unfavorable to commerce, why are the merchants so much in favor of it?

They explain the reason themselves. They are influenced by the present rather than future interests. Five millions of spoliations they look to the Treaty to repay; their property afloat, they fear to be taken, and war they dread; but is there really weight in these arguments? I am as largely interested as any individual among them in shipping, and have suffered the loss of one of my cargoes at Bermuda, for which my underwriters have made me only a partial allowance; but I neither dread any war on the part of England, situated as she now is, nor expect any payment of my loss from the Treaty. To a nation to whom she offers bounties to carry her provisions, and who is so excellent a customer for her manufactures, she will not be easily induced to offer hostilities that shall go to the extent of war; and the Commissioners on Spoliations are to act in London merely as arbitrators of the law of nations, on whom our claim of spoliations is at best but a very uncertain dependence. The merchants in sundry parts of the United States having thought it so, have claimed the interference of Congress in advancing them the money, they rather doubted getting any where else.

Considering, then, this Treaty as merely a bargain exhibiting little or no profit and much to lose, I separate it from all considerations foreign to itself. I judge it on its own merits, and these must lead me to vote for the proposition to suspend appropriations, especially in a moment when our seamen continue to be impressed and our ships to be taken.