The Treaty with Great Britain (part 2)

The Legislature of Great Britain, he said, it was true, consisted of three branches, and that was almost the only feature in that Government resembling that of the United States. In Great Britain, their Executive is an hereditary Monarch, whereas the President of the United States is elected every four years. Their House of Lords consisted of bishops and an hereditary nobility—the bishops appointed by the Crown, and the nobility were increased at the King's pleasure; whilst the Senate of the United States is elected every six years. Gentlemen say the Senators are not elected by the people, but they are chosen by the Legislatures of the different States, who are elected by the people. The House of Commons in Britain, which is the only representation of the people their Government contains, is elected by a very small part of the people; and the Crown has such an influence in it as to be able to carry most questions at its pleasure. How could it then bear a comparison with that House, who were chosen by the whole people every two years? The absurdity might be admitted, in that Government, that the King had the power to make Treaties, and that the sanction of the Legislature was still necessary to give them legal validity, because the influence of the Crown was so great in both Houses as to carry any measure it pleased through them. But it would not do in this country. The comparison, therefore, betwixt the two Governments fails, and no arguments can be drawn from it.

The other argument respecting the danger of the power being placed solely in the Executive arose from the comparison with Great Britain. If the powers of the President and Senate of this country could with any tolerable degree of justice be compared to those of the King and House of Lords in Great Britain, as little taste as he had for revolutions, he would not say but he should be induced to join gentlemen, either by fraud or force, to overturn the constitution. He looked on the representation in the Senate to be as complete as in that House. Gentlemen were very fond of calling that House the popular branch of government. He agreed that a criticism on words was in general trifling. That gentlemen from Virginia might assert this, he allowed, as they had nineteen members out of the hundred and five in that House, and in the Senate only a fifteenth part of the body; but gentlemen did not mean, when they spoke on that subject, to have reference to particular States, but to the whole. The Senators and Representatives were regularly apportioned for the whole Union; and, though on different principles, were as completely represented in the one House as in the other.

Mr. C. concluded with saying, that he had no doubt the powers vested by the constitution were well vested; and if the constitution was fairly considered, little doubt could remain on the subject. But if the House passed the resolution now before the committee, he should not consider the question as decided; but if the construction was still insisted upon, he was happy the constitution was not wholly in their hands—that there were joined with them in the guardianship of it, the President, the Senate, and the people of the United States.

Mr. Hillhouse said, it was with diffidence he rose to speak on a subject which had been so copiously and ably handled by gentlemen who had preceded him. It had been his intention to have given a silent vote on the resolution on the table, but the turn which the debates had taken—involving an important constitutional question, relative to the powers vested in the different branches of Government—seemed to create a necessity of expressing his sentiments, lest by his vote he might seem to subscribe to certain doctrines in the latitude in which they had been laid down. And as he should differ in some respects from most of the gentlemen that had spoken, he asked the indulgence of the committee whilst he made a few remarks on a subject which he conceived to be of vast importance, as a wrong decision might give a direction to their government which might be of serious consequence.

On the one hand, he did not think that Treaties could not, under any circumstances, be the subject of Legislative consideration or discussion, and that they were not to look into them. It appeared to him, that they not only had the right, but that it was their indispensable duty to look into every Treaty, when called upon to aid in its operation; to see whether it had the constitutional forms; whether it related to objects within the province of the Treaty-making power, a power which is not unlimited. The objects upon which it can operate are understood and well defined, and if the Treaty-making power were to embrace other objects, their doings would have no more binding force than if the Legislature were to assume and exercise judicial powers under the name of legislation. It might be proper, also, to examine the merits of a Treaty, so far as to see whether it be of such a ruinous nature as, according to the law of nations, it would be null, and whether they would be justified in withholding Legislative provision to carry it into effect. He also considered Treaties as subject to Legislative control, so that their operation, so far as related to the people of the United States, might be suspended or annulled whenever, in the opinion of the Legislature, there was sufficient cause. And further, that the clause in the constitution which provides that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but "in consequence of appropriations made by law," as vesting in the different branches of Government a check adequate to every purpose of security.

On the other hand, he did not consider the House of Representatives as having a constitutional right to interfere in making Treaties, or that a Treaty needed any concurrence of that House, or Legislative sanction, to make it the law of the land. He had always supposed that Treaties were exactly on the footing of laws in their operation on antecedent laws, suspending and repealing such as were repugnant. Treaties may sometimes require Legislative aid to carry them into effect; so may laws, and they were constantly in the habit of making laws to carry into effect laws heretofore made.

After these preliminary observations, Mr. H. proceeded to inquire, not what ought to be, but what was the Constitution of the United States? We were not, he said, in Convention, but in the discharge of Legislative functions under the constitution; and to understand the extent of the powers intended to be granted in the second article, section two, by these words, "the President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur," we must advert to the general definition of the Treaty-making power—what objects it may embrace, and how far it can interfere with Legislative power. A Treaty is a compact entered into by two independent nations, for mutual advantage or defence. Nothing can, therefore, come within the Treaty-making power but what has a relation to both nations, and in which they have a mutual interest. The object of this power is to secure to our citizens advantages in foreign countries which are without or beyond our Legislative jurisdiction, to enable the Treaty-making power to obtain which, it must necessarily be authorized to give some consideration or equivalent therefor. If the United States authorize an agent to make a bargain or purchase, the power of binding the United States for a reasonable consideration is necessarily given. Whenever the Treaty-making power departs from these rules, it is without its jurisdiction, and such a Treaty would be of no validity. Under this view of the subject, if we look into our code of laws, we shall find few of them that can be affected, to any great degree, by the Treaty-making power. All laws regulating our own internal police, so far as the citizens of the United States alone are concerned, are wholly beyond its reach; no foreign nation having any interest or concern in that business, every attempt to interfere would be a mere nullity, as much as if two individuals were to enter into a contract to regulate the conduct or actions of a third person, who was no party to such contract. He could, he said, illustrate his idea more readily by adverting to a law, mentioned as being affected by the present Treaty, which was the revenue law; which provides that certain duties shall be paid on goods imported into the United States, and on goods coming in foreign bottoms ten per cent. advance on the amount of such duties. This is a law no Treaty can repeal, admitting the repealing power in its fullest latitude, because no foreign nation can have any interest or concern in the duties payable by our own citizens into our own Treasury. All that a Treaty could do, would be to suspend or arrest its operation, so far as the citizens or subjects of the nations with whom we treated, were or might be affected by it. The only operation which the British Treaty has upon that law is, that in consideration of our being freely admitted to the fur trade and the trade into Canada, which opens to the enterprise of our citizens a vast source of wealth and advantage, we only give in return to the subjects of the King of Great Britain the privilege of bringing, by land or inland navigation, into the United States, goods for which they pay no more duties than our citizens pay on goods imported in American bottoms. British subjects have always been permitted to reside and trade in the United States, and peltry is to be duty free in the territories of each. According to this definition of the Treaty-making power, and as far as he could judge, he said, it was correct; it cannot have that unlimited extension which has been ascribed to it. It cannot be that monster which has been described as about to swallow up all the Legislative powers of Congress; nor can there be any danger of the President and Senate having it in their power, by forming Treaties with an Indian tribe or a foreign nation, to legislate over the United States. The Treaty-making power cannot affect the Legislative power of Congress but in a very small and limited degree. Because a Treaty or an Executive act may, in some instances, arrest the operation or progress of a law, it is no argument against the existence of the power. In article first, section eighth, of the constitution, a specific power is granted to Congress to provide for the punishment of the counterfeiters of the securities or coins of the United States. In another article, the President is authorized generally to grant reprieves or pardons for offences against the United States, excepting in cases of impeachment. Can any one seriously contend that the President has not the power of granting a pardon to a counterfeiter of securities or coins, because it would suspend and defeat the operation of a law, on a subject, specially delegated to Congress? If this doctrine be true, that all Legislative power may be exercised by the Treaty-making power, Congress, under the old Confederation, had unlimited Legislative power over the States. The old Confederation vested in Congress an unlimited power to make Treaties, excepting only that the States were to be at liberty to impose like duties on foreigners as on their own people, and that the exportation or importation of goods was not to be prohibited. Was it ever imagined that, by this general power, Congress had a right, by forming a Treaty with a foreign power, to legislate over the States to any extent? Suppose Congress, instead of taking so much pains to persuade the States to consent to their laying the five per cent. impost, and in obtaining which they were finally defeated by the refusal of one State, after every possible exertion, had undertaken to have it done by Treaty? Would not the measures have been reprobated with one voice, and the Treaty considered as a nullity?

In the first place, in Art. I., organizing a Legislative body, and delegating to them, not all, but a part only of the Legislative power of the States, in these words: "All Legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress;" and among the specified powers, the right of regulating commerce with foreign nations. How were they to regulate commerce? Not by the exercise of the Treaty-making power. This article of the constitution has not the least relation to that kind of power: it was Legislative power only that was meant: it vested Congress with the whole power, as far as the object could be accomplished by a Legislative act; but this power would embrace but a small part of the objects which come within the term of regulating commerce with foreign nations; it could extend no further than the bounds of our own jurisdiction. There is not a single expression that looks like authorizing them to act in any other than their Legislative character.

The constitution then proceeds, in the second Article, to the establishment of an Executive power, to be vested in a President, and in the second section, says: "The President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." The most general terms are used, and such as under the old Confederation had been understood to embrace every kind of Treaty, commercial as well as others, and had been exercised in the most ample and unlimited manner, and the Treaties thus formed had been declared and adjudged to have the force and operation of a law, and that they repealed all laws that were opposed to them; and these Treaties were then in full force and operation, and were the supreme law of the land. It cannot be presumed that the framers of our constitution were ignorant of the laws of the land, or that they had not well attended to and examined Treaties, which, by the constitution, they were again about to declare to be the supreme law of the land under the new Government. Now, if it really was intended that the Treaty-making power should not be as broad, and have the same extension and operation as had been exercised under the old Confederation, or that there was to be a distinction between commercial Treaties and others, or that Treaties generally should not so operate as to repeal pre-existing laws, or that the concurrence of the House of Representatives, or sanction of Congress, should, under any circumstances, be necessary to give validity or force to a Treaty, how can we account for the total silence of the constitution on this subject, and that there should not be a single sentence in the whole instrument that even looks that way? If any limitation was intended, the convention certainly knew that it was necessary it should be inserted. When we examine the constitution, and see with what accuracy and care it is drawn up, how wonderfully every part of it is guarded, that there is not a single word but appears to have been carefully examined, and when we call to mind the members of that convention, and find them to have been the ablest and most accurate men of our country, we cannot presume that we should have been left to the sad alternative, for the purpose of explaining so important an article of our constitution, which might have been so easily made definite, to be obliged to resort to the British House of Commons for precedents, and those too which were derived from the most turbulent periods of the Government of that nation; when, it is a possible case, that the change of a Ministry, or the rage of party, might have been more immediately the object of pursuit than the true interest of the nation; more especially as the practice of our own Government, and the legal opinion of our own country, were directly opposed to such a construction. But if all this might be supposed not to have had sufficient weight to have induced the convention to have introduced such a limitation, or some intimation that such limitation was intended, they must have supposed it necessary when they handed out with the constitution, which were declared by the ratification thereof to be the supreme law of the land, Treaties of every description, commercial as well as others. To me, the language of this transaction is, we have, by one article of this constitution, granted the Treaty-making power, in general terms, to the President and Senate.

March 24.—[The question was taken on Mr. Livingston's resolution, which is in the following words:]

"Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to lay before this House a copy of the instructions to the Minister of the United States, who negotiated the Treaty with the King of Great Britain, communicated by his Message of the first of March, together with the correspondence and other documents relative to the said Treaty; excepting such of said papers as any existing negotiation may render improper to be disclosed."

The division on this resolution, in Committee of the Whole, was—for the resolution 61, against it 38—majority 23.

The resolution was then taken up in the House, and the yeas and nays being called upon it, were taken, and stood yeas 62, nays 37, as follows:

Yeas.—Theodorus Bailey, David Bard, Abraham Baldwin, Lemuel Benton, Thomas Blount, Richard Brent, Nathan Bryan, Dempsey Burges, Samuel J. Cabell, Gabriel Christie, Thomas Claiborne, John Clopton, Isaac Coles, Henry Dearborn, George Dent, Gabriel Duvall, Samuel Earle, William Findlay, Jesse Franklin, Albert Gallatin, William B. Giles, James Gillespie, Andrew Gregg, Christopher Greenup, William B. Grove, Wade Hampton, George Hancock, Carter B. Harrison, John Hathorn, Jonathan N. Havens, John Heath, James Holland, George Jackson, Aaron Kitchell, Edward Livingston, Matthew Locke, William Lyman, Samuel Maclay, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Milledge, Andrew Moore, Frederick A. Muhlenberg, Anthony New, John Nicholas, Alexander D. Orr, John Page, Josiah Parker, John Patton, Francis Preston, John Richards, Robert Rutherford, John S. Sherburne, Israel Smith, Samuel Smith, Thomas Sprigg, John Swanwick, Absalom Tatom, Philip Van Cortlandt, Joseph B. Varnum, Abraham Venable, and Richard Winn.

Nays.—Benjamin Bourne, Theophilus Bradbury, Daniel Buck, Joshua Coit, William Cooper, Abiel Foster, Dwight Foster, Nathaniel Freeman, jr., Ezekiel Gilbert, Nicholas Gilman, Henry Glenn, Benjamin Goodhue, Chauncey Goodrich, Roger Griswold, Robert Goodloe Harper, Thomas Hartley, James Hillhouse, William Hindman, John Wilkes Kittera, Samuel Lyman, Francis Malbone, William Vans Murray, John Reed, Theodore Sedgwick, Samuel Sitgreaves, Jeremiah Smith, Nathaniel Smith, Isaac Smith, William Smith, Zephaniah Swift, George Thatcher, Richard Thomas, Mark Thompson, Uriah Tracy, John E. Van Allen, Peleg Wadsworth, John Williams.

Recapitulation.—Yeas 62, nays 37, absent 5—104—the Speaker 1—whole number of Representatives 105.

Mr. Dayton, the Speaker, in Committee of the Whole, voted against the resolution.

March 25.—The committee, (Messrs. Livingston and Gallatin,) appointed to present the resolution agreed to yesterday to the President, reported, that the President answered, that he would take the resolution into consideration.

March 30.—The following Message was received from the President in answer to the resolution of the House:

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:

With the utmost attention I have considered your resolution of the 24th instant, requesting me to lay before your House a copy of the instructions to the Minister of the United States, who negotiated the Treaty with the King of Great Britain, together with the correspondence and other documents relative to that Treaty, excepting such of the said papers as any existing negotiation may render improper to be disclosed.

In deliberating upon this subject, it was impossible for me to lose sight of the principle which some have avowed in its discussion, or to avoid extending my views to the consequences which must flow from the admission of that principle.

I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated a disposition to withhold any information which the constitution has enjoined upon the President, as a duty, to give, or which could be required of him by either House of Congress as a right; and, with truth, I affirm, that it has been, as it will continue to be, while I have the honor to preside in the Government, my constant endeavor to harmonize with the other branches thereof, so far as the trust delegated to me by the people of the United States, and my sense of the obligation it imposes, to "preserve, protect, and defend the constitution," will permit.

The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution; and their success must often depend on secrecy; and even, when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations; or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other Powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making Treaties in the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; the principle on which the body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to demand, and to have, as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign Power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent.

It does not occur that the inspection of the papers asked for can be relative to any purpose under the cognizance of the House of Representatives, except that of an impeachment; which the resolution has not expressed. I repeat, that I have no disposition to withhold any information which the duty of my station will permit, or the public good shall require; to be disclosed; and, in fact, all the papers affecting the negotiation with Great Britain were laid before the Senate, when the Treaty itself was communicated for their consideration and advice.

The course which the debate has taken on the resolution of the House, leads to some observations on the mode of making Treaties under the Constitution of the United States.

Having been a member of the General Convention, and knowing the principles on which the constitution was formed, I have ever entertained but one opinion on this subject, and from the first establishment of the Government to this moment, my conduct has exemplified that opinion, that the power of making Treaties is exclusively vested in the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and that every Treaty so made, and promulgated, thenceforward becomes the law of the land. It is thus that the Treaty-making power has been understood by foreign nations, and in all the Treaties made with them, we have declared, and they have believed, that when ratified by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, they became obligatory. In this construction of the constitution every House of Representatives has heretofore acquiesced, and until the present time not a doubt or suspicion has appeared to my knowledge that this construction was not the true one. Nay, they have more than acquiesced; for until now, without controverting the obligation of such Treaties, they have made all the requisite provisions for carrying them into effect.

There is also reason to believe that this construction agrees with the opinions entertained by the State Conventions, when they were deliberating on the constitution, especially by those who objected to it, because there was not required in Commercial Treaties the consent of two-thirds of the whole number of the members of the Senate, instead of two-thirds of the Senators present, and because, in Treaties respecting territorial and certain other rights and claims, the concurrence of three-fourths of the whole number of the members of both Houses respectively was not made necessary.

It is a fact, declared by the General Convention, and universally understood, that the Constitution of the United States was the result of a spirit of amity and mutual concession. And it is well known that, under this influence, the smaller States were admitted to an equal representation in the Senate, with the larger States; and that this branch of the Government was invested with great powers; for, on the equal participation of those powers, the sovereignty and political safety of the smaller States were deemed essentially to depend.

If other proofs than these, and the plain letter of the constitution itself, be necessary to ascertain the point under consideration, they may be found in the Journals of the General Convention, which I have deposited in the office of the Department of State. In those Journals it will appear, that a proposition was made, "that no Treaty should be binding on the United States which was not ratified by a law," and that the proposition was explicitly rejected.

As, therefore, it is perfectly clear to my understanding, that the assent of the House of Representatives is not necessary to the validity of a Treaty; as the Treaty with Great Britain exhibits in itself all the objects requiring Legislative provision, and on these the papers called for can throw no light; and as it is essential to the due administration of the Government, that the boundaries fixed by the constitution between the different departments should be preserved—a just regard to the constitution and to the duty of my office, under all the circumstances of this case, forbid a compliance with your request.

G. WASHINGTON.

United States, March 80, 1796.