Ravenga v. Mackintosh In the King’s Bench, May 8, 1824. Reported in 2 Barnewall & Cresswell, 693

This was an action for a malicious arrest: plea not guilty. At the trial before Abbott, C. J., at the London sittings after last Hilary term, the jury was directed to find a verdict for the defendant, if they were of opinion that, at the time when the arrest was made, Mackintosh acted truly and sincerely upon the faith of the opinion given by his professional adviser, actually believing that Ravenga was personally liable, and that he might be lawfully arrested, and that he (Mackintosh) could recover in that action; but to find for the plaintiff, if they were of opinion that Mackintosh believed that he must fail in the action, and that he intended to use the opinion as a protection, in case the proceedings were afterwards called in question; and that he made the arrest, not with a view of obtaining his debt, but to compel the plaintiff to sanction the debentures. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, with £250 damages.

The Attorney-General now moved for a new trial.

Bayley, J. I have no doubt that in this case there was a want of probable cause. I accede to the proposition, that if a party lays all the facts of his case fairly before counsel, and acts bona fide upon the opinion given by that counsel (however erroneous that opinion may be), he is not liable to an action of this description. A party, however, may take the opinions of six different persons, of which three are one way and three another. It is therefore a question for the jury, whether he acted bona fide on the opinion, believing that he had a cause of action. The jury in this case have found, and there was abundant evidence to justify them in drawing the conclusion, that the defendant did not act bona fide, and that he did not believe that he had any cause of action whatever. Assuming that the defendant’s belief that he had a cause of action would amount to a probable cause, still, after the jury have found that he did not believe that he had any cause of action whatever, the judge would have been bound to say, that he had not reasonable or probable cause of action.

Rule refused.