A Selection of Cases on the Law of Torts Papyras Classics

← A Selection of Cases on the Law of Torts

Chapter 52

Schwabacker v. Riddle Supreme Court, Illinois, June 20, 1891. Reported in 99 Illinois Reports, 343

Action for deceit, brought by Riddle against Schwabacker et als., alleging that, in the purchase of property to be taken at the invoice price, Riddle was cheated out of the sum of $2677.09 by fraudulent representations made by defendants in regard to the amount the goods purchased inventoried. On trial there was a verdict for plaintiff. Some of the instructions are stated in the opinion. Judgment in favor of Riddle. Schwabacker et als. appealed.

Craig, C. J.... Instruction No. 2 reads as follows:—

“If a party misrepresents a fact within his own knowledge, to the injury of a third party, an action will lie for damages, if any, for such misrepresentation.”

This instruction is liable to several serious objections. In the first place, a misrepresentation, to be actionable, must be a material one, or no action will lie. In the second place, in an action for deceit no recovery can be had unless the plaintiff himself exercised ordinary prudence to guard against the deception and fraud practised upon him, unless he has been thrown off his guard by the other party. These two principles were entirely ignored by the instruction, and the jury, under this direction of the court, was at liberty to find against the defendants if they misrepresented any immaterial fact, however remote, and the plaintiff exercised no precaution whatever to guard against imposition. This is not a sound rule to be adopted, and as the instruction was calculated to mislead the jury, it ought not to have been given.


Instruction No. 13, given for the plaintiff, reads as follows:—

“It is not necessary, in this case, that the plaintiff should show any prior conspiracy or combination between the defendants to defraud the plaintiff; it is enough if the evidence shows that a sale was made to Riddle, or Riddle and Fosbender, and that the agreed price was for the value of the property, as shown by a certain invoice, and that notes were to be taken for the amount, and that the defendants had notes drawn for $2677.09 more than the value of the property as shown by such invoice; and if the plaintiff, before signing the notes, asked if they were for the amount of the invoice, and Fosbender said they were, in the presence and hearing of the other defendants, and if Riddle relied upon such statement in signing the notes, which was known to the defendants, then such conduct and representations would amount to a fraud in the other defendants, if they resulted in damages to the plaintiff.”

[After stating an objection to this instruction.]

Again, under this instruction a recovery may be had although the plaintiff was deceived from a total want of reasonable care on his part. At the time the notes were signed, as we understand the evidence of plaintiff himself, the invoice, which showed the correct amount of the goods, was present, and in the hands of one of the defendants. If that be true, and it could have been obtained and inspected by the plaintiff, and he failed and neglected to do so, but relied upon a statement made by Fosbender at the time, it was for the jury to determine whether, under the evidence, he had exercised proper diligence to guard against deception, and if he did not, he could not recover. But this principle was ignored in this and other instructions given for the plaintiff. Indeed, this principle is not stated, but seems to be ignored in all of the instructions given for the plaintiff. This last instruction, in our judgment, was calculated to mislead the jury.


Judgment reversed.