Allen v. Flood In the House of Lords, December 14, 1897. Reported in [1898] Appeal Cases, 1

The plaintiffs (now the respondents), Flood and Taylor, are members of the Shipwrights’ Provident Union. The defendant (now the appellant), Allen, is a member and the London delegate of the Independent Society of Boilermakers and Iron and Steel Shipbuilders. The latter society restricts the labor of its members to ironwork. The society of shipwrights permits its members to work either in wood or iron. The members of the boilermakers’ society are accustomed to claim that the proper business of shipwrights is to work in wood only, and that shipwrights who work in iron are trespassing on the trade of the boilermakers’ union.

In April, 1894, about forty men of the boilermakers’ society were engaged at the Regent Dock, Millwall, in repairing an iron ship, on the employment of the Glengall Iron Company. Flood and Taylor were at the same time employed by the Glengall Company to execute repairs upon the woodwork of the vessel. By the terms of their employment they were entitled to leave at the close of any day; and the Glengall Company might, at the close of any day cease to employ them further. The ironworkers were employed on similar terms.

The boilermakers, on discovering that Flood and Taylor had shortly before been employed by another firm (Mills & Knight) on the Thames in doing ironwork on a ship, became much excited, and began to talk of leaving their employment. One of them telegraphed for Allen, their London delegate. Allen came, dissuaded them from leaving work at dinner-time, and told them that they must wait and see how things were settled. Allen then had an interview with Halkett, the Glengall Company’s manager. As to what took place at this interview, the testimony at the subsequent trial was conflicting. The version most favorable to the plaintiffs was substantially as follows:—

Allen told Halkett that he (Allen) had been sent for because Flood and Taylor were known to have done ironwork in Mills & Knight’s yard, and that unless Flood and Taylor were discharged all the members of the boilermakers’ society would be “called out” or “knock off” work that day; that Halkett had no option; that there was no ill-feeling towards the Glengall Company or towards Flood and Taylor personally, but that the iron-men were doing their best to put an end to the practice of Shipwrights doing ironwork, and that wherever these men were employed, or other shipwrights who had done ironwork, the boilermakers would cease work,—in every yard on the Thames.

If the boilermakers had been called out, it would have stopped the Glengall Company’s business. For fear that the threat would be carried out, Halkett discharged Flood and Taylor at the close of the day.

An action was then brought by Flood and Taylor against three persons, viz., Allen, the London delegate; Jackson, the chairman; and Knight, the general secretary of the Boilermakers’ Society. The plaintiffs’ allegations were: that the defendants, maliciously and wrongfully and with intent to injure the plaintiffs, procured and induced the Glengall Company to break their contract with the plaintiffs and not to enter into new contracts with them; and also, maliciously, etc., intimidated and coerced the Glengall Company to break their contract with plaintiffs and not to enter into new contracts, and also unlawfully and maliciously conspired with others to do the above acts.

The case was tried by jury before Kennedy, J.

The learned judge ruled that there was not “a shred of evidence of any conspiracy at all;” that there was “no evidence of anything amounting to intimidation or coercion in any legal sense of the term;” and that there was no breach of contract.

The following questions, among others, were put to the jury:—

1. Did the defendant Allen maliciously induce the Glengall Iron Company to discharge the plaintiffs or either of them from their employment?

2. Did the defendant Allen maliciously induce the Glengall Iron Company not to engage the plaintiffs or either of them?

In putting these questions to the jury, Kennedy, J., gave some explanations, portions of which are, in substance, as follows: “The word ‘malice’ is a word of art in law, and it does not mean in this case a personal dislike, a personal feeling of resentment against the two plaintiffs. It is clear from the evidence of the men and of their employers that there was no such personal feeling in this case. The question that I want you to answer is, that, if you find he induced the Glengall Iron Company, by the threat which is suggested by the plaintiffs of calling out all the men on strike, did he do that with the malicious intention which I have endeavored to explain, that is, merely, not for the purpose of forwarding that which he believed to be his interest as a delegate of his union in the fair consideration of that interest but for the purpose of injuring these plaintiffs, and preventing them doing that which they were each of them entitled to do. ‘Maliciously’ means, connected with the word ‘induce,’ this,—that it was not for the mere purpose of forwarding fairly Allen’s own interests, but from the indirect motive of doing a mischief to the plaintiffs in their lawful business.”

The jury answered both questions in the affirmative; and also found that each plaintiff had suffered 20l. damages.

After consideration, Kennedy, J., entered judgment for the plaintiffs against Allen for 40l. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Lord Esher, M. R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ.); L. R. (1895) 2 Q. B. 21.

Against these decisions, Allen brought the present appeal to the House of Lords. The appeal was first argued in December, 1895. Their Lordships having required further argument, the appeal was reargued in March and April, 1897. The following Judges were summoned to attend at the second argument: Hawkins, Mathew, Cave, North, Wills, Grantham, Lawrence, and Wright, JJ.

At the close of the arguments, the following question was propounded to the Judges: Assuming the evidence given by the plaintiffs’ witnesses to be correct, was there any evidence of a cause of action fit to be left to the jury?

Mathew, J., and Wright, J., answered the question in the negative; and the other six Judges in the affirmative.

After the delivery of the opinions of the Judges, the House took time for consideration.

Dec. 14, 1897. Lord Halsbury, L. C.... The first objection made to the plaintiff’s right to recover for the loss which they thus undoubtedly suffered is that no right of the plaintiffs was infringed, and that the right contended for on their behalf is not a right recognized by law, or, at all events, only such a right as every one else is entitled to deprive them of if they stop short of physical violence or obstruction. I think the right to employ their labor as they will is a right both recognized by the law and sufficiently guarded by its provisions to make any undue interference with that right an actionable wrong.

Very early authorities in the law have recognized the right; and, in my view, no authority can be found which questions or qualifies it. The schoolmaster who complained that his scholars were being assaulted and brought an action, the quarry owner who complained that his servants were being menaced and molested, were both held to have a right of action. And it appears to me that the importance of those cases, and the principle established by them, have not been sufficiently considered. It is said that threats of violence or actual violence were unlawful means: the lawfulness of the means I will discuss hereafter. But the point on which these cases are important is the existence of the right. It was not the schoolmaster who was assaulted; it was not the quarry owner who was assaulted or threatened; but, nevertheless, the schoolmaster was held entitled to bring an action in respect of the loss of scholars attending his school, and the quarry owner in respect of the loss of workmen to his quarry. They were third persons; no violence or threats were applied to them, and the cause of action, which they had a right to insist on, was the indirect effect upon themselves of violence and threats applied to others.

My Lords, in my view these are binding authorities to show that the preliminary question, namely, whether there was any right of the plaintiffs to pursue their calling unmolested, must be answered in the affirmative. The question of what is the right invaded would seem to be reasonably answered, and the universality of the right to all Her Majesty’s subjects seems to me to be no argument against its existence. It is, indeed, part of that freedom from restraint, that liberty of action, which, in my view, may be found running through the principles of our law.

First it is said that the company were acting within their legal rights in discharging the plaintiffs. So they were; but does that affect the question of the responsibility of the person who caused them so to act by the means he used? The scholars who went away from the school were entitled to do so. The miners were entitled to cease working at the quarry. The natives were entitled to avoid running the risk of being shot; but the question is, What was the cause of their thus exercising their legal right?

The question must be whether what was done in fact, and what did in fact procure the dismissal of the plaintiff, was an actionable wrong or not. I have never heard that a man who was dismissed from his service by reason of some slander could not maintain an action against the slanderer because the master had a legal right to discharge him.

It will be observed that Kennedy, J., draws a distinction between the conduct which he assumes to be lawful on Allen’s part to do what he did do if it were merely for the purpose of forwarding that which he believed to be his interest as a delegate of his union in fair consideration of that interest on the one hand, and on the other hand his conduct if what he did was done for the purpose of injuring these plaintiffs.

My Lords, it appears to me that that is a direction of which the defendants cannot complain, since it puts what is to my mind an alternative more favorable to them. In my view, his belief that what he was doing was for his interest as a delegate of his union would not justify the doing of what he did do. It is alleged, and to my mind and to the mind of the jury proved, that the employers were compelled under pressure of the threats that he used to discharge the plaintiffs.

But the objection made by the defendants appears to be that the word “malicious” adds nothing; that if the thing was lawful it was lawful absolutely; if it was not lawful it was unlawful,—the addition of the word “malicious” can make no difference. The fallacy appears to me to reside in the assumption that everything must be absolutely lawful or absolutely unlawful. There are many things which may become lawful or unlawful according to circumstances.

In a decision of this House it has undoubtedly been held that whatever a man’s motives may be, he may dig into his own land and divert subterranean water which but for his so treating his own land might have reached his neighbor’s land. But that is because the neighbor had no right to the flow of the subterranean water in that direction, and he had an absolute right to do what he would with his own property. But what analogy has such a case with the intentional inflicting of injury upon another person’s property, reputation, or lawful occupation? To dig into one’s own land under the circumstances stated requires no cause or excuse. He may act from mere caprice, but his right on his own land is absolute, so long as he does not interfere with the rights of others.

But, referring to Bowen, L. J.’s observation, which to my mind is exactly accurate, “in order to justify the intentional doing of that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person’s property or trade,” you must have some just cause or excuse.

Now, the word “malicious” appears to me to negative just cause or excuse; and without attempting an exhaustive exposition of the word itself, it appears to me that, if I apply the language of Bowen, L. J., it is enough to show that this was within the meaning of the law “malicious.”

It appears to me that no better illustration can be given of the distinction on which I am insisting between an act which can be legally done and an act which cannot be so done because tainted with malice, than such a colloquy between the representative of the master and the representative of the men as might have been held on the occasion which has given rise to this action. If the representative of the men had in good faith and without indirect motive pointed out the inconvenience that might result from having two sets of men working together on the same ship, whose views upon the particular question were so diverse that it would be inexpedient to bring them together, no one could have complained; but if his object was to punish the men belonging to another union because on some former occasion they had worked on an iron ship, it seems to me that the difference of motive may make the whole difference between the lawfulness or unlawfulness of what he did.

I see it is suggested by one of your Lordships that the action for malicious prosecution is supposed to be an exception. I am not quite certain that I understand what is the proposition to which it is an exception. If it means that there is no other form of procedure known to the law wherein malice may make the distinction between a lawful and an unlawful act, I am unable to agree. Maliciously procuring a person to be made a bankrupt, maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause presenting a petition to wind up a company, or maliciously procuring an arrest, are equally cases wherein the state of mind of the person procuring the arrest may affect the question of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the act done.

Again, in slander or libel the right to preserve one’s character or business from attack appears to me quite as vague and general a right as it is suggested is the right to pursue one’s occupation unmolested; and it cannot be denied that in both these cases the lawfulness or unlawfulness of what is said or written may depend upon the absence or presence of malice.

Doubtless there are cases in which the mere presence of malice in an act done will not necessarily give a right of action, since no damage may result; and in this case, however malicious Allen’s intervention may have been, if the employers had defied Allen’s threats instead of yielding to them, the plaintiffs could not have succeeded in an action, because they would not have been injured: see Quartz Hill Co. v. Eyre, 11 Q. B. D. 674; Gibbs v. Pike, 9 M. & W. 351; Jenings v. Florence, (1857) 2 C. B. (N. S.) 467.

Lord Watson.... There is no expression in the verdict which can be held, either directly or by implication, to impeach the legality of the company’s conduct in discharging the respondents. The mere fact of an employer discharging or refusing to engage a workman does not imply or even suggest the absence of his legal right to do either as he may choose. It is true that the company is not a party to this suit; but it is also obvious that the character of the act induced, whether legal or illegal, may have a bearing upon the liability in law of the person who procured it. The whole pith of the verdict, in so far as it directly concerns the appellant, is contained in the word “maliciously,”—a word which is susceptible of many different meanings. The expression “maliciously induce,” as it occurs upon the face of the verdict, is ambiguous: it is capable of signifying that the appellant knowingly induced an act which of itself constituted a civil wrong, or it may simply mean that the appellant procured, with intent to injure the respondents, an act which, apart from motive, would not have amounted to a civil wrong; and it is, in my opinion, material to ascertain in which of these senses it was used by the jury.

Although the rule may be otherwise with regard to crimes, the law of England does not, according to my apprehension, take into account motive as constituting an element of civil wrong. Any invasion of the civil rights of another person is in itself a legal wrong, carrying with it liability to repair its necessary or natural consequences, in so far as these are injurious to the person whose right is infringed, whether the motive which prompted it be good, bad, or indifferent. But the existence of a bad motive, in the case of an act which is not in itself illegal, will not convert that act into a civil wrong for which reparation is due. A wrongful act, done knowingly and with a view to its injurious consequences, may, in the sense of law, be malicious; but such malice derives its essential character from the circumstance that the act done constitutes a violation of the law. There is a class of cases which have sometimes been referred to as evidencing that a bad motive may be an element in the composition of civil wrong; but in these cases the wrong must have its root in an act which the law generally regards as illegal, but excuses its perpetration in certain exceptional circumstances from considerations of public policy. These are well known as cases of privilege, in which the protection which the law gives to an individual who is within the scope of these considerations consists in this,—that he may with immunity commit an act which is a legal wrong and but for his privilege would afford a good cause of action against him, all that is required in order to raise the privilege and entitle him to protection being that he shall act honestly in the discharge of some duty which the law recognizes, and shall not be prompted by a desire to injure the person who is affected by his act. Accordingly, in a suit brought by that person, it is usual for him to allege and necessary for him to prove an intent to injure in order to destroy the privilege of the defendant. But none of these cases tend to establish that an act which does not amount to a legal wrong, and therefore needs no protection, can have privilege attached to it; and still less that an act in itself lawful is converted into a legal wrong if it was done from a bad motive.

[After quoting from Bowen, L. J., in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, and Bayley, J., in Bromage v. Prosser.]

The root of the principle is that, in any legal question, malice depends, not upon evil motive which influenced the mind of the actor, but upon the illegal character of the act which he contemplated and committed. In my opinion it is alike consistent with reason and common sense that when the act done is, apart from the feelings which prompted it, legal, the civil law ought to take no cognizance of its motive.

It does not appear to me to admit of doubt that the jury, in finding the action of the company to have been maliciously induced by the appellant, simply meant to affirm that the appellant was influenced by a bad motive, namely, an intention to injure the respondents in their trade or calling of shipwrights.

There are, in my opinion, two grounds only upon which a person who procures the act of another can be made legally responsible for its consequences. In the first place, he will incur liability if he knowingly and for his own ends induces that other person to commit an actionable wrong. In the second place, when the act induced is within the right of the immediate actor, and is therefore not wrongful in so far as he is concerned, it may yet be to the detriment of a third party; and in that case, according to the law laid down by the majority in Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, the inducer may be held liable if he can be shown to have procured his object by the use of illegal means directed against that third party.

Assuming that the Glengall Iron Company, in dispensing with the further services of the respondents, were guilty of no wrong, I am willing to take it that any person who procured their act might incur responsibility to those who were injuriously affected by it, if he employed unlawful means of inducement directed against them. According to the decision of the majority in Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, already referred to, a person who by illegal means, that is, means which in themselves are in the nature of civil wrongs, procures the lawful act of another, which act is calculated to injure, and does injure, a third party, commits a wrong for which he may be made answerable. So long as the word “means” is understood in its natural and proper sense, that rule appears to me to be intelligible; but I am altogether unable to appreciate the loose logic which confounds internal feeling with outward acts, and treats the motive of the actor as one of the means employed by him.

It has been maintained, and some of the learned judges who lent their assistance to the House have favored the argument, that the appellant used coercion as a means of compelling the Glengall Iron Company to terminate their connection with the respondents; but that conclusion does not appear to me to be the fair result of the evidence. If coercion, in the only legal sense of the term, was employed, it was a wrong done as much to the Glengall Iron Company, who are the parties said to have been coerced, as to the respondents. Its result might be prejudicial to the respondents, but its efficacy wholly depended upon its being directed against and operating upon the company. It must be kept in view that the question of what amounts to wrongful coercion in a legal sense involves the same considerations which I have discussed in relation to the elements of a civil wrong as committed by the immediate actor. According to my opinion, coercion, whatever be its nature, must, in order to infer the legal liability of the person who employs it, be intrinsically and irrespectively of its motive a wrongful act. According to the doctrine ventilated in Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q. B. 715, and the present case it need not amount to a wrong, but will become wrongful if it was prompted by a bad motive.

I have already indicated that, in my opinion, no light is thrown upon the decision of the present question by Pitt v. Donovan, 1 M. & S. 639, and other cases of that class. The defendant had in that case represented, contrary to the fact, that the plaintiff was insane at the time when he executed a particular deed. The communication was made to a person to whom the defendant was under a legal duty to make the disclosure if it had been true; and the defendant was in law absolved from the ordinary consequences of his having circulated a libel which was false and injurious, if he honestly believed it to be true. The law applicable in cases of that description is, I apprehend, beyond all doubt; but the rule by which the law in certain exceptional cases excuses the perpetration of a wrong, by reason of the absence of evil motive, is insufficient to establish or to support the converse and very different proposition, that the presence of an evil motive will convert a legal act into a legal wrong.

[The opinions of Lord Ashbourne, and Lord Morris, concurring with Lord Halsbury, are omitted.]

Lord Herschell.

Great stress was laid at the bar on the circumstance that in an action for maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause putting in motion legal process an evil motive is an essential ingredient. I have always understood and I think that has been the general understanding, that this was an exceptional case. The person against whom proceedings have been initiated without reasonable and probable cause is prima facie wronged. It might well have been held that an action always lay for thus putting the law in motion. But I apprehend that the person taking proceedings was saved from liability if he acted in good faith because it was thought that men might otherwise be too much deterred from enforcing the law, and that this would be disadvantageous to the public. Some of the learned judges cite actions of libel and slander as instances in which the legal liability depends on the presence or absence of malice. I think this is a mistake. The man who defames another by false allegations is liable to an action, however good his motive, and however honestly he believed in the statement he made. It is true that in a limited class of cases the law, under certain circumstances, regards the occasion as privileged, and exonerates the person who has made false defamatory statements from liability if he has made them in good faith. But if there be not that duty or interest which in law creates the privilege, then, though the person making the statements may have acted from the best of motives, and felt it his duty to make them, he is none the less liable. The gist of the action is that the statement was false and defamatory. Because in a strictly limited class of cases the law allows the defence that the statements were made in good faith, it seems to me, with all deference, illogical to affirm that malice constitutes one of the elements of the torts known to the law as libel and slander. But even if it could be established that in cases falling within certain well-defined categories, it is settled law that an evil motive renders actionable acts otherwise innocent, that is surely far from showing that such a motive always makes actionable acts prejudicial to another which are otherwise lawful, or that it does so in cases like the present utterly dissimilar from those within the categories referred to.

If the fact be that malice is the gist of the action for inducing or procuring an act to be done to the prejudice of another, and not that the act induced or procured is an unlawful one as being a breach of contract or otherwise, I can see no possible ground for confining the action to cases in which the thing induced is the not entering into a contract. It seems to me that it must equally lie in the case of every lawful act which one man induces another to do where his purpose is to injure his neighbor or to benefit himself at his expense. I cannot hold that such a proposition is tenable in principle, and no authority is to be found for it. I should be the last to suggest that the fact that there was no precedent was in all cases conclusive against the right to maintain an action. It is the function of the Courts to apply established legal principles to the changing circumstances and conditions of human life. But the motive of injuring one’s neighbor or of benefiting one’s self at his expense is as old as human nature. It must for centuries have moved men in countless instances to persuade others to do or to refrain from doing particular acts. The fact that under such circumstances no authority for an action founded on these elements has been discovered does go far to show that such an action cannot be maintained.

I now proceed to consider on principle the proposition advanced by the respondents, the alleged authorities for which I have been discussing. I do not doubt that every one has a right to pursue his trade or employment without “molestation” or “obstruction,” if those terms are used to imply some act in itself wrongful. This is only a branch of a much wider proposition, namely, that every one has a right to do any lawful act he pleases without molestation or obstruction. If it be intended to assert that an act not otherwise wrongful always becomes so if it interferes with another’s trade or employment, and needs to be excused or justified, I say that such a proposition in my opinion has no solid foundation in reason to rest upon. A man’s right not to work or not to pursue a particular trade or calling, or to determine when or where or with whom he will work, is in law a right of precisely the same nature, and entitled to just the same protection as a man’s right to trade or work. They are but examples of that wider right of which I have already spoken. That wider right embraces also the right of free speech. A man has a right to say what he pleases, to induce, to advise, to exhort, to command, provided he does not slander or deceive or commit any other of the wrongs known to the law of which speech may be the medium. Unless he is thus shown to have abused his right, why is he to be called upon to excuse or justify himself because his words may interfere with some one else in his calling?

[After stating the case of Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor.]

It was said that this was held lawful because the law sanctions acts which are done in furtherance of trade competition. I do not think the decision rests on so narrow a basis, but rather on this, that the acts by which the competition was pursued were all lawful acts, that they were acts not in themselves wrongful, but a mere exercise of the right to contract with whom, and when, and under what circumstances and upon what conditions they pleased. I am aware of no ground for saying that competition is regarded with special favor by the law; at all events, I see no reason why it should be so regarded. It may often press as hardly on individuals as the defendant’s acts are alleged to have done in the present case. But if the alleged exception could be established, why is not the present case within it? What was the object of the defendant, and the workmen he represented, but to assist themselves in their competition with the shipwrights? A man is entitled to take steps to compete to the best advantage in the employment of his labor, and to shut out, if he can, what he regards as unfair competition, just as much as if he was carrying on the business of a shipowner. The inducement the appellant used to further his end was the prospect that the members of his union would not work in company with what they deemed unfair rivals in their calling. What is the difference between this case and that of a union of shipowners who induce merchants not to enter into contracts with the plaintiffs, by the prospect that if at any time they employ the plaintiffs’ ships they will suffer the penalty of being made to pay higher charges than their neighbors at the time when the defendants’ ships alone visit the ports? In my opinion there is no difference in principle between the two cases.

Lord Macnaghten. My Lords, I am sorry to say that I must begin by recapitulating the facts of the case. For the findings of the jury, taken by themselves, do not convey to my mind any definite meaning. The jury have found that the appellant Allen “maliciously induced” the Glengall Iron Company to discharge the respondents from their service, and they have awarded damages in consequence. I do not know what the jury meant by the word “induced;” I am not sure that I know what they meant by the word “maliciously.” Sometimes, indeed, I rather doubt whether I quite understand that unhappy expression myself. I am therefore compelled to turn for help to the evidence at the trial, accepting, as I suppose the jury must have accepted, the account given by the respondents in preference to that offered by the appellant wherever there may be any shadow of difference between them.

[After a full statement of the evidence.]

Now before I proceed to consider the legal grounds on which Kennedy, J., and the Court of Appeal decided the case against Allen, I should like to ask what there was wrong in Allen’s conduct. He had nothing to do with the origin of the ill-feeling against Flood and Taylor. He did nothing to increase it. He went to the dock simply because he was sent for by one of the men of his union. It seems to be considered the duty of a district delegate to listen to the grievances of the members of his union within his district, and to settle the difficulty if possible. The jury found that the settlement of this dispute was a matter within Allen’s discretion. The only way in which he could settle it was by going and seeing the manager. There was surely nothing wrong in that. There was nothing wrong in his telling the manager that the iron-men would leave their work unless the two shipwrights against whom they had a grudge were dismissed, if he really believed that that was what his men intended to do. As far as their employers were concerned, the iron-men were perfectly free to leave their work for any reason, or for no reason, or even for a bad reason; any one of them might have gone singly to the manager, or they might have gone to him all together (if they went quietly and peaceably), and told him that they would not stay any longer with Flood and Taylor at work among them.

If so, it is difficult to see why fault should be found with Allen for going in their place and on their behalf and saying what they would have said themselves.

As regards the meaning of the word “induce,” I do not think the jury got much assistance. I rather gather from the summing-up that the jury were given to understand that if they thought that Allen merely represented the state of things as it was—and the feeling of the iron-men at the Regent’s Dock—they would be at liberty to answer the questions put to them about Allen in the negative. But the answer must be the other way if they thought that Allen went further, and assumed to represent the union, and to speak as if he had the power of the union at his back; that would be a threat and would amount to “inducing.” Now, I must say that I do not think it can be said that Allen did “induce” the company to discharge the plaintiffs. Certainly it cannot be truly said that he procured them to be discharged. It was not his act that prevented the company from continuing to employ them. If the whole story had been a fiction and an invention on his part I could have understood the finding of the jury. But I do not think there was any misrepresentation on Allen’s part. I do not think there was any exaggeration. Nor, indeed, was any such point made at the trial.

So we see now, I think, what the findings of the jury come to, if they are to be treated as being in accordance with the evidence. They must mean that Allen induced the company to discharge the plaintiffs, by representing to the manager, not otherwise than in accordance with the truth, the state of feeling in the yard, and the intentions of the workmen, and that he did so “maliciously,” because he must have known what the issue of his communication to the manager would be, and naturally perhaps he was not sorry to see an example made of persons obnoxious to his union. But is his conduct actionable? It would be very singular if it were. No action would lie against the company for discharging the two shipwrights. No action would lie against the iron-men for striking against them. No action would lie against the officers of the union for sanctioning such a strike. But if the respondents are right the person to answer in damages is the man who happened to be the medium of communication between the iron-men and the company,—the most innocent of the three parties concerned, for he neither set the “agitation” on foot, nor did he do anything to increase it, nor was his the order that put an end to the connection between employer and employed. It seems to me that the result would have been just the same if Edmonds had told Mr. Halkett what was going on in the yard, or if Mr. Halkett had learned it from Flood and Taylor themselves.

Even if I am wrong in my view of the evidence and the verdict, if the verdict amounts to a finding that Allen’s conduct was malicious in every sense of the word, and that he procured the dismissal of Flood and Taylor, that is, that it was his act and conduct alone which caused their dismissal, and if such a verdict were warranted by the evidence, I should still be of opinion that judgment was wrongly entered for the respondents. I do not think that there is any foundation in good sense or in authority for the proposition that a person who suffers loss by reason of another doing or not doing some act which that other is entitled to do or to abstain from doing at his own will and pleasure, whatever his real motive may be, has a remedy against a third person who, by persuasion or some other means not in itself unlawful, has brought about the act or omission from which the loss comes, even though it could be proved that such person was actuated by malice towards the plaintiff, and that his conduct, if it could be inquired into, was without justification or excuse.

The case may be different where the act itself to which the loss is traceable involves some breach of contract or some breach of duty, and amounts to an interference with legal rights. There the immediate agent is liable, and it may well be that the person in the background who pulls the strings is liable too, though it is not necessary in the present case to express any opinion on that point.

But if the immediate agent cannot be made liable, though he knows what he is about, and what the consequences of his action will be, it is difficult to see on what principle a person less directly connected with the affair can be made responsible unless malice has the effect of converting an act not in itself illegal or improper into an actionable wrong. But if that is the effect of malice, why is the immediate agent to escape? Above all, why is he to escape when there is no one else to blame and no one else answerable? And yet many cases may be put of harm done out of malice without any remedy being available at law. Suppose a man takes a transfer of a debt with which he has no concern for the purpose of ruining the debtor, and then makes him bankrupt out of spite, and so intentionally causes him to lose some benefit under a will or settlement,—suppose a man declines to give a servant a character because he is offended with the servant for leaving,—suppose a person of position takes away his custom from a country tradesman in a small village merely to injure him on account of some fancied grievance not connected with their dealings in the way of buying and selling,—no one, I think, would suggest that there could be any remedy at law in any of those cases. But suppose a customer, not content with taking away his own custom, says something not slanderous or otherwise actionable or even improper in itself to induce a friend of his not to employ the tradesman any more. Neither the one nor the other is liable for taking away his own custom. Is it possible that the one can be made liable for inducing the other not to employ the person against whom he has a grudge? If so, a fashionable dressmaker might now and then, I fancy, be plaintiff in a very interesting suit. The truth is, that questions of this sort belong to the province of morals rather than to the province of law. Against spite and malice the best safeguards are to be found in self-interest and public opinion. Much more harm than good would be done by encouraging or permitting inquiries into motives when the immediate act alleged to have caused the loss for which redress is sought is in itself innocent or neutral in character, and one which anybody may do or leave undone without fear of legal consequences. Such an inquisition would, I think, be intolerable, to say nothing of the probability of injustice being done by juries in a class of cases in which there would be ample room for speculation and wide scope for prejudice.

In order to prevent any possible misconstruction of the language I have used, I should like to add that in my opinion the decision of this case can have no bearing on any case which involves the element of oppressive combination. The vice of that form of terrorism commonly known by the name of “boycotting,” and other forms of oppressive combination, seems to me to depend on considerations which are, I think, in the present case, conspicuously absent.

Lord Shand.... The case was one of competition in labor, which, in my opinion, is in all essentials analogous to competition in trade, and to which the same principles must apply; and I ask myself what would be the thought of the application of the word “malicious” to the conduct of a tradesman who induces the customer of another tradesman to cease making purchases from one with whom he had long dealt, and instead to deal with him, a rival in trade. The case before the jury was, in my view, in no way different, except that in the one case there was competition in labor,—in the other there would be competition in trade.

Some of the learned consulted judges speak of Allen’s conduct as having been caused by a desire to inflict “punishment” on the shipwrights for past acts, and indicate that, if the shipwrights had been actually working at ironwork on the vessel at the time, the case would have been different.

I cannot agree in any such view. “Punishment” in a wide and popular sense may possibly be used, though incorrectly, to describe the boilermakers’ action; but it is quite clear that what they were resolved to do, and really did, was, while marking their sense of the injury which they thought (rightly or wrongly is not the question) the shipwrights were doing to them in trenching on their proper lines of business, to take a practical measure in their own defence. Their object was to benefit themselves in their own business as working boilermakers, and to prevent a recurrence in the future of what they considered an improper invasion on their special department of work. How this could possibly be regarded as “malicious,” even in any secondary sense that can reasonably be attributed to that term, I cannot see.

Coming now directly to the merits of the question in controversy in the case, the argument of the plaintiffs and the reasons for the opinions of the majority of the consulted judges seem to me to fail, because, although it is no doubt true that the plaintiffs were entitled to pursue their trade as workmen “without hindrance,” their right to do so was qualified by an equal right, and indeed the same right, on the part of other workmen. The hindrance must not be of an unlawful character. It must not be by unlawful action. Amongst the rights of all workmen is the right of competition. In the like manner and to the same extent as a workman has a right to pursue his work or labor without hindrance, a trader has a right to trade without hindrance. That right is subject to the right of others to trade also, and to subject him to competition,—competition which is in itself lawful, and which cannot be complained of where no unlawful means (in the sense I have already explained) have been employed. The matter has been settled in so far as competition in trade is concerned by the judgment of this House in the Mogul Steamship Co. Case, [1892] A. C. 25. I can see no reason for saying that a different principle should apply to competition in labor. In the course of such competition, and with a view to secure an advantage to himself, I can find no reason for saying that a workman is not within his legal rights in resolving that he will decline to work in the same employment with certain other persons, and in intimating that resolution to his employers.

[The opinions of Lord Davey and Lord James of Hereford, in favor of reversing the order of the Court of Appeal are omitted.]

Order of the Court of Appeal reversed and judgment entered for the appellant with costs here and below including the costs of the trial: cause remitted to the Queen’s Bench Division.