Section III. Dangerous Use of Land

FLETCHER v. RYLANDS In the Exchequer, May 5, 1865. Reported in 3 Hurlstone & Coltman, 774. FLETCHER v. RYLANDS In the Exchequer Chamber, May 14, 1866. Reported in Law Reports, 1 Exchequer, 265. RYLANDS v. FLETCHER In the House of Lords, July 17, 1868. Reported in Law Reports, 3 House of Lords, 330.

In November, 1861, Fletcher brought an action against Rylands and Horrocks to recover damages for an injury caused to his mines by water flowing into them from a reservoir which defendants had constructed. The declaration (set out in L. R. 1 Exch. 265, 266) contained three counts, each count alleging negligence on the part of the defendants. The case came on for trial at the Liverpool Summer Assizes, 1862, when a verdict was entered for the plaintiff, subject to an award to be thereafter made by an arbitrator. Subsequently the arbitrator was directed, instead of making an award, to state a special case for the consideration of the Court of Exchequer.

The material facts in the special case stated by the arbitrator were as follows:—

Fletcher, under a lease from Lord Wilton, and under arrangements with other landowners, was working coal mines under certain lands. He had worked the mines up to a spot where he came upon old horizontal passages of disused mines, and also upon vertical shafts which seemed filled with marl and rubbish.

Rylands and Horrocks owned a mill standing on land near that under which Fletcher’s mines were worked. With permission of Lord Wilton, they constructed on Lord Wilton’s land a reservoir to supply water to their mill. They employed a competent engineer and competent contractors to construct the reservoir. It was not known to Rylands and Horrocks, nor to any of the persons employed by them, that any coal had ever been worked under or near the site of the reservoir; but in point of fact the coal under the site of the reservoir had been partially worked at some time or other beyond living memory, and there were old coal workings under the site of the reservoir communicating by means of other and intervening old underground workings with the recent workings of Fletcher.

In the course of constructing and excavating for the bed of the said reservoir, five old shafts, running vertically downwards, were met with in the portion of land selected for the site of the said reservoir. At the time they were so met with the sides or walls of at least three of them were constructed of timber, and were still in existence, but the shafts themselves were filled up with marl, or soil of the same kind as the marl or soil which immediately surrounded them, and it was not known to, or suspected by, the defendants, or any of the persons employed by them in or about the planning or constructing of the said reservoir, that they were (as they afterwards proved to be) shafts which had been made for the purpose of getting the coal under the land in which the said reservoir was made, or that they led down to coal workings under the site of the said reservoir.

For the selection of the site of the said reservoir, and for the planning and constructing thereof, it was necessary that the defendants should employ an engineer and contractors, and they did employ for those purposes a competent engineer and competent contractors, by and under whom the said site was selected and the said reservoir was planned and constructed, and on the part of the defendants themselves there was no personal negligence or default whatever in or about or in relation to the selection of the said site, or in or about the planning or construction of the said reservoir; but in point of fact reasonable and proper care and skill were not exercised by or on the part of the persons so employed by them, with reference to the shafts so met with as aforesaid, to provide for the sufficiency of the said reservoir to bear the pressure of water which, when filled to the height proposed, it would have to bear.

The said reservoir was completed about the beginning of December, 1860, when the defendants caused the same to be partially filled with water, and on the morning of the 11th December in the same year, whilst the reservoir was so partially filled, one of the shafts which had been so met with as aforesaid gave way and burst downwards; in consequence of which the water of the reservoir flowed into the old workings underneath, and by means of the underground communications so then existing between those old coal workings and the plaintiff’s coal workings in the plaintiff’s colliery, as above described, large quantities of the water so flowing from the said reservoir as aforesaid found their way into the said coal workings in the plaintiff’s colliery, and by reason thereof the said colliery became and was flooded, and the working thereof was obliged to be and was for a time necessarily suspended.

The question for the opinion of the Court was whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages from the defendants by reason of the matters thus stated by the arbitrator.

The Court of Exchequer (Pollock, C. B., and Martin, B., concurring; Bramwell, B., dissenting) gave judgment for defendants.

Plaintiff brought error in the Exchequer Chamber.

May 14, 1866. The judgment of the Court (Willes, Blackburn, Keating, Mellor, Montague Smith, and Lush, JJ.) was delivered by

Blackburn, J. This was a special case stated by an arbitrator, under an order of nisi prius, in which the question for the Court is stated to be, whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover any and, if any, what damages from the defendants by reason of the matters thereinbefore stated.

In the Court of Exchequer, the Chief Baron and Martin, B., were of opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover at all, Bramwell, B., being of a different opinion. The judgment in the Exchequer was consequently given for the defendants, in conformity with the opinion of the majority of the Court. The only question argued before us was whether this judgment was right, nothing being said about the measure of damages in case the plaintiff should be held entitled to recover. We have come to the conclusion that the opinion of Bramwell, B., was right, and that the answer to the question should be that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages from the defendants by reason of the matters stated in the case, and consequently that the judgment below should be reversed, but we cannot at present say to what damages the plaintiff is entitled.

It appears from the statement in the case that the plaintiff was damaged by his property being flooded by water which, without any fault on his part, broke out of a reservoir constructed on the defendants’ land by the defendants’ orders, and maintained by the defendants.

It appears from the statement in the case [see pp. 267–268], that the coal under the defendants’ land had, at some remote period, been worked out; but this was unknown at the time when the defendants gave directions to erect the reservoir, and the water in the reservoir would not have escaped from the defendants’ land, and no mischief would have been done to the plaintiff, but for this latent defect in the defendants’ subsoil. And it further appears [see pp. 268–269] that the defendants selected competent engineers and contractors to make their reservoir, and themselves personally continued in total ignorance of what we have called the latent defect in the subsoil; but that these persons employed by them in the course of the work became aware of the existence of the ancient shafts filled up with soil, though they did not know or suspect that they were shafts communicating with old workings.

It is found that the defendants, personally, were free from all blame, but that in fact proper care and skill was not used by the persons employed by them to provide for the sufficiency of the reservoir with reference to these shafts. The consequence was that the reservoir when filled with water burst into the shafts, the water flowed down through them into the old workings, and thence into the plaintiff’s mine, and there did the mischief.

The plaintiff, though free from all blame on his part, must bear the loss, unless he can establish that it was the consequence of some default for which the defendants are responsible. The question of law therefore arises, what is the obligation which the law casts on a person who, like the defendants, lawfully brings on his land something which, though harmless whilst it remains there, will naturally do mischief if it escape out of his land. It is agreed on all hands that he must take care to keep in that which he has brought on the land and keeps there, in order that it may not escape and damage his neighbors; but the question arises whether the duty which the law casts upon him, under such circumstances, is an absolute duty to keep it in at his peril, or is, as the majority of the Court of Exchequer have thought, merely a duty to take all reasonable and prudent precautions in order to keep it in, but no more. If the first be the law, the person who has brought on his land and kept there something dangerous, and failed to keep it in, is responsible for all the natural consequences of its escape. If the second be the limit of his duty, he would not be answerable except on proof of negligence, and consequently would not be answerable for escape arising from any latent defect which ordinary prudence and skill could not detect.

Supposing the second to be the correct view of the law, a further question arises subsidiary to the first, viz., whether the defendants are not so far identified with the contractors whom they employed as to be responsible for the consequences of their want of care and skill in making the reservoir in fact insufficient with reference to the old shafts, of the existence of which they were aware, though they had not ascertained where the shafts went to.

We think that the true rule of law is that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default; or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient. The general rule, as above stated, seems on principle just. The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbor, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbor’s reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbor’s privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapors of his neighbor’s alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbor, who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbor’s, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there, so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences. And upon authority, this we think is established to be the law, whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches.

The case that has most commonly occurred and which is most frequently to be found in the books is as to the obligation of the owner of cattle which he has brought on his land to prevent their escaping and doing mischief. The law as to them seems to be perfectly settled from early times; the owner must keep them in at his peril, or he will be answerable for the natural consequences of their escape; that is, with regard to tame beasts, for the grass they eat and trample upon, though not for any injury to the person of others, for our ancestors have settled that it is not the general nature of horses to kick, or bulls to gore; but if the owner knows that the beast has a vicious propensity to attack man, he will be answerable for that too.

As early as the Year Book, 20 Ed. 4, 11, placitum 10, Brian, C. J., lays down the doctrine in terms very much resembling those used by Lord Holt in Tenant v. Goldwin, 2 Ld. Raym. 1089, 1 Salk. 360, which will be referred to afterwards. It was trespass with cattle. Plea, that the defendant’s land adjoined a place where defendant had common, that the cattle strayed from the common, and defendant drove them back as soon as he could. It was held a bad plea. Brian, C. J., says: “It behoves him to use his common so that he shall do no hurt to another man, and if the land in which he has common be not enclosed, it behoves him to keep the beasts in the common and out of the land of any other.” He adds, when it was proposed to amend by pleading that they were driven out of the common by dogs, that although that might give a right of action against the master of the dogs, it was no defence to the action of trespass by the person on whose land the cattle went. In the recent case of Cox v. Burbidge, 13 C. B. N. S. 438, 32 L. J. C. P. 89, Williams, J., says: “I apprehend the general rule of law to be perfectly plain. If I am the owner of an animal in which by law the right of property can exist, I am bound to take care that it does not stray into the land of my neighbor, and I am liable for any trespass it may commit, and for the ordinary consequences of that trespass. Whether or not the escape of the animal is due to my negligence is altogether immaterial.” So in May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 112, the Court, after an elaborate examination of the old precedents and authorities, came to the conclusion that “a person keeping a mischievous animal, with knowledge of its propensities, is bound to keep it secure at his peril.” And in 1 Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, 430, Lord Hale states that where one keeps a beast, knowing its nature or habits are such that the natural consequence of his being loose is that he will harm men, the owner “must at his peril keep him up safe from doing hurt; for though he use his diligence to keep him up, if he escape and do harm, the owner is liable to answer damages;” though, as he proceeds to show, he will not be liable criminally without proof of want of care. In these latter authorities the point under consideration was damage to the person, and what was decided was, that where it was known that hurt to the person was the natural consequence of the animal being loose, the owner should be responsible in damages for such hurt, though where it was not known to be so, the owner was not responsible for such damages; but where the damage is, like eating grass or other ordinary ingredients in damage feasant, the natural consequence of the escape, the rule as to keeping in the animal is the same. In Com. Dig. Droit. (M. 2), it is said that “if the owner of 200 acres in a common moor enfeoffs B. of 50 acres, B. ought to enclose at his peril, to prevent damage by his cattle to the other 150 acres. For if his cattle escape thither they may be distrained damage feasant. So the owner of the 150 acres ought to prevent his cattle from doing damage to the 50 acres at his peril.” The authority cited is Dyer, 372 b., where the decision was that the cattle might be distrained; the inference from that decision, that the owner was bound to keep in his cattle at his peril, is, we think, legitimate, and we have the high authority of Comyns for saying that such is the law. In the note to Fitzherbert, Nat. Brevium, 128, which is attributed to Lord Hale, it is said, “If A. and B. have lands adjoining, where there is no enclosure, the one shall have trespass against the other on an escape of their beasts respectively: Dyer, 372, Rastal Ent. 621, 20 Ed. 4, 10; although wild dogs, &c., drive the cattle of the one into the lands of the other.” No case is known to us on which in replevin it has ever been attempted to plead in bar to an avowry for distress damage feasant, that the cattle had escaped without any negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and surely if that could have been a good plea in bar, the facts must often have been such as would have supported it. These authorities, and the absence of any authority to the contrary, justify Williams, J., in saying, as he does in Cox v. Burbidge, supra, that the law is clear that in actions for damage occasioned by animals that have not been kept in by their owners, it is quite immaterial whether the escape is by negligence or not.

As has been already said, there does not appear to be any difference in principle between the extent of the duty cast on him who brings cattle on his land to keep them in, and the extent of the duty imposed on him who brings on his land water, filth, or stenches, or any other thing which will, if it escape, naturally do damage, to prevent their escaping and injuring his neighbor; and the case of Tenant v. Goldwin, supra, is an express authority that the duty is the same, and is, to keep them in at his peril.

As Martin, B., in his judgment below, appears not to have understood that case in the same manner as we do, it is proper to examine it in some detail. It was a motion in arrest of judgment after judgment by default, and therefore all that was well pleaded in the declaration was admitted to be true. The declaration is set out at full length in the report in 6 Mod. p. 311. It alleged that the plaintiff had a cellar which lay contiguous to a messuage of the defendant, “and used (solebat) to be separated and fenced from a privy house of office, parcel of the said messuage of defendant, by a thick and close wall, which belongs to the said messuage of the defendant, and by the defendant of right ought to have been repaired (jure debuit reparari).” Yet he did not repair it, and for want of repair filth flowed into plaintiff’s cellar. The case is reported by Salkeld, who argued it, in 6 Mod., and by Lord Raymond, whose report is the fullest. The objection taken was that there was nothing to show that the defendant was under any obligation to repair the wall, that, it was said, being a charge not of common right, and the allegation that the wall de jure debuit reparari by the defendant being an inference of law which did not arise from the facts alleged. Salkeld argued that this general mode of stating the right was sufficient in a declaration, and also that the duty alleged did of common right result from the facts stated. It is not now material to inquire whether he was or was not right on the pleading point. All three reports concur in saying that Lord Holt, during the argument, intimated an opinion against him on that, but that after consideration the Court gave judgment for him on the second ground. In the report of 6 Mod. 314, it is stated: “And at another day per totam curiam. The declaration is good; for there is a sufficient cause of action appearing in it; but not upon the word ‘solebat.’ If the defendant has a house of office enclosed with a wall which is his, he is of common right bound to use it so as not to annoy another.... The reason here is, that one must use his own so as thereby not to hurt another, and as of common right one is bound to keep his cattle from trespassing on his neighbor, so he is bound to use anything that is his so as not to hurt another by such use.... Suppose one sells a piece of pasture lying open to another piece of pasture which the vendor has, the vendee is bound to keep his cattle from running into the vendor’s piece; so of dung or anything else.” There is here an evident allusion to the same case in Dyer, see ante, p. 334, as is referred to in Com. Dig. Droit. (M. 2). Lord Raymond in his report, 2 Ld. Raym. at p. 1092, says: “The last day of term, Holt, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court that the declaration was sufficient. He said that upon the face of this declaration there appeared a sufficient cause of action to entitle the plaintiff to have his judgment; that they did not go upon the solebat, or the jure debuit reparari, as if it were enough to say that the plaintiff had a house and the defendant had a wall, and he ought to repair the wall; but if the defendant has a house of office, and the wall which separates the house of office from the plaintiff’s house is all the defendant’s, he is of common right bound to repair it.... The reason of this case is upon this account, that every one must so use his own as not to do damage to another; and as every man is bound so to look to his cattle as to keep them out of his neighbor’s ground, that so he may receive no damage; so he must keep in the filth of his house of office that it may not flow in upon and damnify his neighbor.... So if a man has two pieces of pasture which lie open to one another, and sells one piece, the vendee must keep in his cattle so as they shall not trespass upon the vendor. So a man shall not lay his dung so high as to damage his neighbor, and the reason of these cases is because every man must so use his own as not to damnify another.” Salkeld, who had been counsel in the case, reports the judgment much more concisely (1 Salk. 361), but to the same effect; he says: “The reason he gave for his judgment was because it was the defendant’s wall and the defendant’s filth, and he was bound of common right to keep his wall so as his filth might not damnify his neighbor, and that it was a trespass on his neighbor, as if his beasts should escape, or one should make a great heap on the border of his ground, and it should tumble and roll down upon his neighbor’s, ... he must repair the wall of his house of office, for he whose dirt it is must keep it that it may not trespass.” It is worth noticing how completely the reason of Lord Holt corresponds with that of Brian, C. J., in the cases already cited in 20 Ed. 4. Martin, B., in the Court below says that he thinks this was a case without difficulty, because the defendant had, by letting judgment go by default, admitted his liability to repair the wall, and that he cannot see how it is an authority for any case in which no such liability is admitted. But a perusal of the report will show that it was because Lord Holt and his colleagues thought (no matter for this purpose whether rightly or wrongly) that the liability was not admitted, that they took so much trouble to consider what liability the law would raise from the admitted facts, and it does therefore seem to us to be a very weighty authority in support of the position that he who brings and keeps anything, no matter whether beasts, or filth, or clean water, or a heap of earth or dung on his premises, must at his peril prevent it from getting on his neighbor’s, or make good all the damage which is the natural consequence of its doing so. No case has been found in which the question as to the liability for noxious vapors escaping from a man’s works by inevitable accident has been discussed, but the following case will illustrate it. Some years ago several actions were brought against the occupiers of some alkali works at Liverpool for the damage alleged to be caused by the chlorine fumes of their works. The defendants proved that they at great expense erected contrivances by which the fumes of chlorine were condensed and sold as muriatic acid, and they called a great body of scientific evidence to prove that this apparatus was so perfect that no fumes possibly could escape from the defendants’ chimneys. On this evidence it was pressed upon the jury that the plaintiff’s damage must have been due to some of the numerous other chimneys in the neighborhood; the jury, however, being satisfied that the mischief was occasioned by chlorine, drew the conclusion that it had escaped from the defendants’ works somehow, and in each case found for the plaintiff. No attempt was made to disturb these verdicts on the ground that the defendants had taken every precaution which prudence or skill could suggest to keep those fumes in, and that they could not be responsible unless negligence were shown; yet, if the law be as laid down by the majority of the Court of Exchequer, it would have been a very obvious defence. If it had been raised the answer would probably have been that the uniform course of pleading in actions on such nuisances is to say that the defendant caused the noisome vapors to arise on his premises, and suffered them to come on the plaintiff’s, without stating that there was any want of care or skill in the defendant, and that the case of Tenant v. Goldwin, supra, showed that this was founded on the general rule of law, that he whose stuff it is must keep it that it may not trespass. There is no difference in this respect between chlorine and water; both will, if they escape, do damage, the one by scorching and the other by drowning, and he who brings them there must at his peril see that they do not escape and do that mischief. What is said by Gibbs, C. J., in Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 44, though not necessary for the decision of the case, shows that that very learned judge took the same view of the law that was taken by Lord Holt. But it was further said by Martin, B., that when damage is done to personal property, or even to the person, by collision, either upon land or at sea, there must be negligence in the party doing the damage to render him legally responsible; and this is no doubt true, and as was pointed out by Mr. Mellish during his argument before us, this is not confined to cases of collision, for there are many cases in which proof of negligence is essential, as, for instance, where an unruly horse gets on the footpath of a public street and kills a passenger, Hammack v. White, 11 C. B. N. S. 588; 31 L. J. (C. P.) 129; or where a person in a dock is struck by the falling of a bale of cotton which the defendant’s servants are lowering: Scott v. London Dock Company, 3 H. & C. 596; 35 L. J. (Ex.) 17, 220; and many other similar cases may be found. But we think these cases distinguishable from the present. Traffic on the highways, whether by land or sea, cannot be conducted without exposing those whose persons or property are near it to some inevitable risk; and that being so, those who go on the highway, or have their property adjacent to it, may well be held to do so subject to their taking upon themselves the risk of injury from that inevitable danger; and persons who by the license of the owner pass near to warehouses where goods are being raised or lowered, certainly do so subject to the inevitable risk of accident. In neither case, therefore, can they recover without proof of want of care or skill occasioning the accident; and it is believed that all the cases in which inevitable accident has been held an excuse for what prima facie was a trespass, can be explained on the same principle, viz., that the circumstances were such as to show that the plaintiff had taken that risk upon himself. But there is no ground for saying that the plaintiff here took upon himself any risk arising from the uses to which the defendants should choose to apply their land. He neither knew what these might be, nor could he in any way control the defendants, or hinder their building what reservoirs they liked, and storing up in them what water they pleased, so long as the defendants succeeded in preventing the water which they there brought from interfering with the plaintiff’s property.

The view which we take of the first point renders it unnecessary to consider whether the defendants would or would not be responsible for the want of care and skill in the persons employed by them, under the circumstances stated in the case [pp. 268–269].

We are of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, but as we have not heard any argument as to the amount, we are not able to give judgment for what damages. The parties probably will empower their counsel to agree on the amount of damages; should they differ on the principle the case may be mentioned again.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

Rylands and Horrocks brought error in the House of Lords against the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber, which had reversed the judgment of the Court of Exchequer.

[Arguments omitted.]

The Lord Chancellor (Lord Cairns). My Lords, in this case the plaintiff (I may use the description of the parties in the action) is the occupier of a mine and works under a close of land. The defendants are the owners of a mill in his neighborhood, and they proposed to make a reservoir for the purpose of keeping and storing water to be used about their mill upon another close of land, which, for the purposes of this case, may be taken as being adjoining to the close of the plaintiff, although in point of fact some intervening land lay between the two. Underneath the close of land of the defendants on which they proposed to construct their reservoir there were certain old and disused mining passages and works. There were five vertical shafts and some horizontal shafts communicating with them. The vertical shafts had been filled up with soil and rubbish, and it does not appear that any person was aware of the existence either of the vertical shafts or of the horizontal works communicating with them. In the course of the working by the plaintiff of his mine he had gradually worked through the seams of coal underneath the close, and had come into contact with the old and disused works underneath the close of the defendants.

In that state of things the reservoir of the defendants was constructed. It was constructed by them through the agency and inspection of an engineer and contractor. Personally, the defendants appear to have taken no part in the works, or to have been aware of any want of security connected with them. As regards the engineer and the contractor, we must take it from the case that they did not exercise, as far as they were concerned, that reasonable care and caution which they might have exercised, taking notice, as they appear to have taken notice, of the vertical shafts filled up in the manner which I have mentioned. However, my Lords, when the reservoir was constructed and filled, or partly filled, with water, the weight of the water bearing upon the disused and imperfectly filled-up vertical shafts, broke through those shafts. The water passed down them and into the horizontal workings, and from the horizontal workings under the close of the defendants it passed on into the workings under the close of the plaintiff, and flooded his mine, causing considerable damage, for which this action was brought.

The Court of Exchequer, when the special case stating the facts to which I have referred was argued, was of opinion that the plaintiff had established no cause of action. The Court of Exchequer Chamber, before which an appeal from this judgment was argued, was of a contrary opinion, and the judges there unanimously arrived at the conclusion that there was a cause of action, and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages.

My Lords, the principles on which this case must be determined appear to me to be extremely simple. The defendants, treating them as the owners or occupiers of the close on which the reservoir was constructed, might lawfully have used that close for any purpose for which it might in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be used; and if, in what I may term the natural user of that land, there had been any accumulation of water, either on the surface or under ground, and if, by the operation of the laws of nature, that accumulation of water had passed off into the close occupied by the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not have complained that that result had taken place. If he had desired to guard himself against it, it would have lain upon him to have done so by leaving, or by interposing, some barrier between his close and the close of the defendants in order to have prevented that operation of the laws of nature.

As an illustration of that principle, I may refer to a case which was cited in the argument before your Lordships, the case of Smith v. Kenrick, in the Court of Common Pleas, 7 C. B. 515.

On the other hand, if the defendants, not stopping at the natural use of their close, had desired to use it for any purpose which I may term a non-natural use, for the purpose of introducing into the close that which in its natural condition was not in or upon it, for the purpose of introducing water either above or below ground in quantities and in a manner not the result of any work or operation on or under the land; and if in consequence of their doing so, or in consequence of any imperfection in the mode of their doing so, the water came to escape and to pass off into the close of the plaintiff, then it appears to me that that which the defendants were doing they were doing at their own peril; and if in the course of their doing it the evil arose to which I have referred, the evil, namely, of the escape of the water and its passing away to the close of the plaintiff and injuring the plaintiff, then for the consequence of that, in my opinion, the defendants would be liable. As the case of Smith v. Kenrick is an illustration of the first principle to which I have referred, so also the second principle to which I have referred is well illustrated by another case in the same Court, the case of Baird v. Williamson, 15 C. B. N. S. 317, which was also cited in the argument at the Bar.

My Lords, these simple principles, if they are well founded, as it appears to me they are, really dispose of this case.

The same result is arrived at on the principles referred to by Mr. Justice Blackburn in his judgment in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, where he states the opinion of that Court as to the law in these words: “We think that the true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default; or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient. The general rule, as above stated, seems on principle just. The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbor, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbor’s reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbor’s privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapors of his neighbor’s alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbor who has brought something on his own property (which was not naturally there), harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows will be mischievous if it gets on his neighbor’s, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there, so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequence. And upon authority this we think is established to be the law, whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches.”

My Lords, in that opinion I must say I entirely concur. Therefore, I have to move your Lordships that the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber be affirmed, and that the present appeal be dismissed with costs.

Lord Cranworth. My Lords, I concur with my noble and learned friend in thinking that the rule of law was correctly stated by Mr. Justice Blackburn in delivering the opinion of the Exchequer Chamber. If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it should escape, may cause damage to his neighbor, he does so at his peril. If it does escape and cause damage, he is responsible, however careful he may have been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage.

In considering whether a defendant is liable to a plaintiff for damage which the plaintiff may have sustained, the question in general is not whether the defendant has acted with due care and caution, but whether his acts have occasioned the damage. This is all well explained in the old case of Lambert v. Bessey, reported by Sir Thomas Raymond (Sir T. Raym. 421). And the doctrine is founded on good sense. For when one person, in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer. He is bound sic uti suo ut non lædat alienum. This is the principle of law applicable to cases like the present, and I do not discover in the authorities which were cited anything conflicting with it.

The doctrine appears to me to be well illustrated by the two modern cases in the Court of Common Pleas referred to by my noble and learned friend. I allude to the two cases of Smith v. Kenrick, supra, and Baird v. Williamson, supra. In the former the owner of a coal mine on the higher level worked out the whole of his coal, leaving no barrier between his mine and the mine on the lower level, so that the water percolating through the upper mine flowed into the lower mine, and obstructed the owner of it in getting his coal. It was held that the owner of the lower mine had no ground of complaint. The defendant, the owner of the upper mine, had a right to remove all his coal. The damage sustained by the plaintiff was occasioned by the natural flow or percolation of water from the upper strata. There was no obligation on the defendant to protect the plaintiff against this. It was his business to erect or leave a sufficient barrier to keep out the water, or to adopt proper means for so conducting the water as that it should not impede him in his workings. The water in that case was only left by the defendant to flow in its natural course.

But in the later case of Baird v. Williamson, the defendant, the owner of the upper mine, did not merely suffer the water to flow through his mine without leaving a barrier between it and the mine below, but in order to work in his own mine beneficially he pumped up quantities of water which passed into the plaintiff’s mine in addition to that which would have naturally reached it, and so occasioned him damage. Though this was done without negligence and in the due working of his own mine, yet he was held to be responsible for the damage so occasioned. It was in consequence of his act, whether skilfully or unskilfully performed, that the plaintiff had been damaged, and he was therefore held liable for the consequences. The damage in the former case may be treated as having arisen from the act of God; in the latter, from the act of the defendant.

Applying the principle of these decisions to the case now before the House, I come without hesitation to the conclusion that the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber was right. The plaintiff had a right to work his coal through the lands of Mr. Whitehead and up to the old workings. If water naturally rising in the defendants’ land (we may treat the land as the land of the defendants for the purpose of this case) had by percolation found its way down to the plaintiff’s mine through the old workings, and so had impeded his operations, that would not have afforded him any ground of complaint. Even if all the old workings had been made by the plaintiff, he would have done no more than he was entitled to do; for, according to the principle acted on in Smith v. Kenrick, the person working the mine under the close in which the reservoir was made had a right to win and carry away all the coal without leaving any wall or barrier against Whitehead’s land. But that is not the real state of the case. The defendants, in order to effect an object of their own, brought on to their land, or on to land which for this purpose may be treated as being theirs, a large accumulated mass of water, and stored it up in a reservoir. The consequence of this was damage to the plaintiff, and for that damage, however skilfully and carefully the accumulation was made, the defendants, according to the principles and authorities to which I have adverted, were certainly responsible.

I concur, therefore, with my noble and learned friend in thinking that the judgment below must be affirmed, and that there must be judgment for the defendant in error.

Judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber affirmed.

NICHOLS v. MARSLAND In the Exchequer, June 12, 1875. Reported in Law Reports, 10 Exchequer, 255. NICHOLS v. MARSLAND In the Court of Appeal, December 1, 1876. Reported in Law Reports, 2 Exchequer Division, 1.

The plaintiff sued as the surveyor for the County of Chester of bridges repairable at the expense of the county.

The first count of the declaration alleged that the defendant was possessed of lands and of artificial pools constructed thereon for receiving and holding, and wherein were kept, large quantities of water, yet the defendant took so little and such bad care of the pools and the water therein that large quantities of water escaped from the pools and destroyed four county bridges, whereby the inhabitants of the county incurred expense in repairing and rebuilding them.

The second count alleged that the defendant was possessed of large quantities of water collected and contained in three artificial pools of the defendant near to four county bridges, and stated the breach as in the first count.

Plea, not guilty, and issue thereon.

At the trial before Cockburn, C. J., at the Chester Summer Assizes, 1874, the plaintiff’s witnesses gave evidence to the following effect: The defendant occupied a mansion-house and grounds at Henbury, in the County of Chester. A natural stream called Bagbrook, which rose in higher lands, ran through the defendant’s grounds, and after leaving them flowed under the four county bridges in question. After entering the defendant’s grounds the stream was diverted and dammed up by an artificial embankment into a pool of three acres in area called “the upper pool,” from which it escaped over a weir in the embankment, and was again similarly dammed up by an artificial embankment into the “middle pool,” which was between one and two acres in area. Escaping over a weir in the embankment, it was again dammed up into “the lower pool,” which was between eight and nine acres in area, and from which the stream escaped into its natural and original course.

About five o’clock P. M. on the 18th of June, 1872, occurred a terrible thunder storm, accompanied by heavy rain, which continued till about three o’clock A. M. on the 19th. The rainfall was greater and more violent than any within the memory of the witnesses, and swelled the stream both above and in the defendant’s grounds. On the morning of the 19th it was found that during the night the violence and volume of the water had carried away the artificial embankments of the three pools, the accumulated water in which, being thus suddenly let loose, had swelled the stream below the pools so that it carried away and destroyed the county bridges mentioned in the declaration. At the pools were paddles for letting off the water, but for several years they had been out of working order.

Some engineers and other witnesses gave evidence that in their opinion the weir in the upper pool was far too small for a pool of that size, and that the mischief happened through the insufficiency of the means for carrying off the water. It was not proved when these ornamental pools were constructed, but it appeared that they had existed before the defendant began to occupy the property, and that no similar accident had ever occurred within the knowledge of the witnesses.

After hearing the address of the defendant’s counsel, the jury said they did not wish to hear his witnesses, and that in their opinion the accident was caused by vis major. In answer to Cockburn, C. J., they found that there was no negligence in the construction or maintenance of the works, and that the rain was most excessive. Cockburn, C. J., being of opinion that the rainfall, though extraordinary and unprecedented, did not amount to vis major or excuse the defendant from liability, entered the verdict for the plaintiff for 4092l., the agreed amount, reserving leave to the defendant to move to enter it for her if the Court (who were to draw inferences of fact) should be of opinion that the rainfall amounted to vis major, and so distinguished the case from Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330.

A rule nisi having been accordingly obtained to enter the verdict for the defendant on the ground that there was no proof of liability, the plaintiff on showing cause to be at liberty to contend that a new trial should be granted on the ground that the finding of the jury was against the weight of evidence—

May 27. McIntyre, Q. C., and Coxon, for the plaintiff, showed cause. The defendant, having for her own purposes and advantage stored a dangerous element on her premises, is liable if that element escapes and injures the property of another, even though the escape be caused by an earthquake or any form of vis major.

[Cleasby, B. Was not the flood brought on to the defendant’s land by vis major?]

The pools were made by those through whom the defendant claims, and if there had been no pools the water of the natural stream would have escaped without doing injury. The case falls within the rule laid down by the judgment in Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 1 Ex. 265, 279, delivered by Blackburn, J.: “We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default, or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God.” This passage was cited with approval by Lord Cairns, C., and Lord Cranworth on appeal. L. R. 3 H. L. 330, 339, 340.

[Cleasby, B. There the defendant brought the water on to his own land. Not so here.]

The intimation that vis major would perhaps be an excuse is not confirmed by any decision or any other dictum. But the facts here do not amount to vis major. If the weirs had been larger, or the banks stronger, the mischief would not have happened. Vis major means something which cannot be foreseen or resisted, as an earthquake or an act of the Queen’s enemies.

Hughes and Dunn (Sir J. Holker, S. G., with them), in support of the rule, cited Broom’s Legal Maxims, 5th ed. p. 230: “The act of God signifies in legal phraseology any inevitable accident occurring without the intervention of man, and may indeed be considered to mean something in opposition to the act of man, as storms, tempests, and lightning: per Mansfield, C. J., in Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 33; Trent Navigation v. Wood, 3 Esp. 131; Rex v. Somerset, 8 T. R. 312.” Also Amies v. Stevens, 1 Str. 127; Smith v. Fletcher, L. R. 9 Ex. 64; May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 101; and Jackson v. Smithson, 15 M. & W. 563.

[The question of the verdict being against the evidence was then argued.]

Cur. adv. vult.

June 12. The judgment of the Court (Kelly, C. B., Bramwell, and Cleasby, BB.) was read by

Bramwell, B. In this case I understand the jury to have found that all reasonable care had been taken by the defendant, that the banks were fit for all events to be anticipated, and the weirs broad enough; that the storm was of such violence as to be properly called the act of God, or vis major. No doubt, as was said by Mr. McIntyre, a shower is the act of God as much as a storm; so is an earthquake in this country: yet every one understands that a storm, supernatural in one sense, may properly, like an earthquake in this country, be called the act of God, or vis major. No doubt not the act of God or a vis major in the sense that it was physically impossible to resist it, but in the sense that it was practically impossible to do so. Had the banks been twice as strong, or if that would not do, ten times, and ten times as high, and the weir ten times as wide, the mischief might not have happened. But those are not practical conditions, they are such that to enforce them would prevent the reasonable use of property in the way most beneficial to the community.

So understanding the finding of the jury, I am of opinion the defendant is not liable. What has the defendant done wrong? What right of the plaintiff has she infringed? She has done nothing wrong, she has infringed no right. It is not the defendant who let loose the water and sent it to destroy the bridges. She did indeed store it, and store it in such quantities that, if it was let loose, it would do, as it did, mischief. But suppose a stranger let it loose, would the defendant be liable? If so, then if a mischievous boy bored a hole in a cistern in any London house, and the water did mischief to a neighbor, the occupier of the house would be liable. That cannot be. Then why is the defendant liable if some agent over which she has no control lets the water out? Mr. McIntyre contended that she would be in all cases of the water being let out, whether by a stranger or the Queen’s enemies, or by natural causes, as lightning or an earthquake. Why? What is the difference between a reservoir and a stack of chimneys for such a question as this? Here the defendant stored a lot of water for her own purposes; in the case of the chimneys some one has put a ton of bricks fifty feet high for his own purposes; both equally harmless if they stay where placed, and equally mischievous if they do not. The water is no more a wild or savage animal than the bricks while at rest, nor more so when in motion: both have the same property of obeying the law of gravitation. Could it be said that no one could have a stack of chimneys except on the terms of being liable for any damage done by their being overthrown by a hurricane or an earthquake? If so, it would be dangerous to have a tree, for a wind might come so strong as to blow it out of the ground into a neighbor’s land and cause it to do damage; or a field of ripe wheat, which might be fired by lightning and do mischief.

I admit that it is not a question of negligence. A man may use all care to keep the water in, or the stack of chimneys standing, but would be liable if through any defect, though latent, the water escaped or the bricks fell. But here the act is that of an agent he cannot control.

This case differs wholly from Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 1 Ex. 265, 279. There the defendant poured the water into the plaintiff’s mine. He did not know he was doing so; but he did it as much as though he had poured it into an open channel which led to the mine without his knowing it. Here the defendant merely brought it to a place whence another agent let it loose. I am by no means sure that the likeness of a wild animal is exact. I am by no means sure that if a man kept a tiger, and lightning broke his chain, and he got loose and did mischief, that the man who kept him would not be liable. But this case and the case I put of the chimneys, are not cases of keeping a dangerous beast for amusement, but of a reasonable use of property in a way beneficial to the community. I think this analogy has made some of the difficulty in this case. Water stored in a reservoir may be the only practical mode of supplying a district and so adapting it for habitation. I refer to my judgment [3 H. & C. 788; 34 L. J. (Ex.) 181] in Fletcher v. Rylands, and I repeat that here the plaintiff had no right that has been infringed, and the defendant has done no wrong. The plaintiff’s right is to say to the defendant, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas, and that the defendant has done, and no more.

The Chief Baron and my brother Cleasby agree in this judgment. As to the plaintiff’s application for a new trial on the ground that the finding of the jury is against evidence, we have spoken to Cockburn, C. J.; he is not dissatisfied therewith, and we cannot see it is wrong. Consequently the rule will be absolute to enter a verdict for the defendant.

Rule absolute.

In Court of Appeal.

Cotton, Q. C. (McIntyre, Q. C., and Coxon with him), for the plaintiff, appellant.

Assuming the jury to be right in finding that the defendant was not guilty of negligence, and that the rainfall amounted to vis major, or the act of God, still the defendant is liable because she has, without necessity and voluntarily for her own pleasure, stored on her premises an element which was liable to be let loose, and which, if let loose, would be dangerous to her neighbors. Even if she be considered innocent of wrong-doing, why should the plaintiff suffer for the defendant’s voluntary act of turning an otherwise harmless stream into a source of danger? But for the defendant’s embankments, the excessive rainfall would have escaped without doing injury.

Gorst, Q. C., and Hughes (Dunn with them), for defendant, cited Carstairs v. Taylor, L. R. 6 Ex. 217; McCoy v. Danbey, 20 Penn. State, 85; Tennent v. Earl of Glasgow, 1 Court of Session Cases, 3d series, 133.

The judgment of the Court (Cockburn, C. J., James, and Mellish, L.JJ., and Baggallay, J. A.) was read by

Mellish, L. J. This was an action brought by the county surveyor [under 43 Geo. 3, c. 59, s. 4] of the County of Chester against the defendant to recover damages on account of the destruction of four county bridges which had been carried away by the bursting of some reservoirs. At the trial before Cockburn, C. J., it appeared that the defendant was the owner of a series of artificial ornamental lakes, which had existed for a great number of years, and had never, previous to the 18th day of June, 1872, caused any damage. On that day, however, after a most unusual fall of rain, the lakes overflowed, the dams at their end gave way, and the water out of the lakes carried away the county bridges lower down the stream. The jury found that there was no negligence either in the construction or the maintenance of the reservoirs, but that if the flood could have been anticipated, the effect might have been prevented. Upon this finding the Lord Chief Justice, acting on the decision in Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330, as the nearest authority applicable to the case, directed a verdict for the plaintiff, but gave leave to move to enter a verdict for the defendant. The Court of Exchequer have ordered the verdict to be entered for the defendant, and from their decision an appeal has been brought before us.

The appellant relied upon the decision in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, supra. In that case the rule of law on which the case was decided was thus laid down by Mr. Justice Blackburn in the Exchequer Chamber [L. R. 1 Ex. 279]: “We think the true rule of law is that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default; or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing of the sort exists here it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.” It appears to us that we have two questions to consider: First, the question of law, which was left undecided in Rylands v. Fletcher, supra,—Can the defendant excuse herself by showing that the escape of the water was owing to vis major, or, as it is termed in the law books, the “act of God?” And, secondly, if she can, did she in fact make out that the escape was so occasioned?

Now, with respect to the first question, the ordinary rule of law is that when the law creates a duty and the party is disabled from performing it without any default of his own, by the act of God, or the King’s enemies, the law will excuse him; but when a party by his own contract creates a duty, he is bound to make it good notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity. We can see no good reason why that rule should not be applied to the case before us. The duty of keeping the water in and preventing its escape is a duty imposed by the law, and not one created by contract. If, indeed, the making a reservoir was a wrongful act in itself, it might be right to hold that a person could not escape from the consequences of his own wrongful act. But it seems to us absurd to hold that the making or the keeping a reservoir is a wrongful act in itself. The wrongful act is not the making or keeping the reservoir, but the allowing or causing the water to escape. If, indeed, the damages were occasioned by the act of the party without more—as where a man accumulates water on his own land, but, owing to the peculiar nature or condition of the soil, the water escapes and does damage to his neighbor—the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, supra, establishes that he must be held liable. The accumulation of water in a reservoir is not in itself wrongful; but the making it and suffering the water to escape, if damage ensue, constitute a wrong. But the present case is distinguished from that of Rylands v. Fletcher, supra, in this, that it is not the act of the defendant in keeping this reservoir, an act in itself lawful, which alone leads to the escape of the water, and so renders wrongful that which but for such escape would have been lawful. It is the supervening vis major of the water caused by the flood, which, superadded to the water in the reservoir (which of itself would have been innocuous), causes the disaster. A defendant cannot, in our opinion, be properly said to have caused or allowed the water to escape, if the act of God or the Queen’s enemies was the real cause of its escaping without any fault on the part of the defendant. If a reservoir was destroyed by an earthquake, or the Queen’s enemies destroyed it in conducting some warlike operation, it would be contrary to all reason and justice to hold the owner of the reservoir liable for any damage that might be done by the escape of the water. We are of opinion, therefore, that the defendant was entitled to excuse herself by proving that the water escaped through the act of God.

The remaining question is, did the defendant make out that the escape of the water was owing to the act of God? Now the jury have distinctly found, not only that there was no negligence in the construction or the maintenance of the reservoirs, but that the flood was so great that it could not reasonably have been anticipated, although, if it had been anticipated, the effect might have been prevented; and this seems to us in substance a finding that the escape of the water was owing to the act of God. However great the flood had been, if it had not been greater than floods that had happened before and might be expected to occur again, the defendant might not have made out that she was free from fault; but we think she ought not to be held liable because she did not prevent the effect of an extraordinary act of nature, which she could not anticipate. In the late case of Nugent v. Smith, 1 C. P. D. 423, we held that a carrier might be protected from liability for a loss occasioned by the act of God, if the loss by no reasonable precaution could be prevented, although it was not absolutely impossible to prevent it.

It was indeed ingeniously argued for the appellant that at any rate the escape of the water was not owing solely to the act of God, because the weight of the water originally in the reservoirs must have contributed to break down the dams, as well as the extraordinary water brought in by the flood. We think, however, that the extraordinary quantity of water brought in by the flood is in point of law the sole proximate cause of the escape of the water. It is the last drop which makes the cup overflow.

On the whole we are of opinion that the judgment of the Court of Exchequer ought to be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

BOX v. JUBB In the Exchequer Division, February 25, 1879. Reported in Law Reports, 4 Exchequer Division, 76.

Case stated in an action brought in the County Court of Yorkshire, holden at Bradford, to recover damages by reason of the overflowing of a reservoir of the defendants.

1. The defendants are the owners and occupiers of a woollen clothmill situate at Batley, in the county of York, and for the necessary supply of water to the mill is a reservoir, also belonging to the defendants. Such mill and reservoir have been built, and constructed, and used, as at the time of the overflowing of the reservoir hereinafter mentioned, for many years.

2. The plaintiff is the tenant of premises adjoining the reservoir.

3. The reservoir is supplied with water from a main drain or watercourse. The surplus water from the reservoir passes through an outlet into the main drain or watercourse. The inlet and outlet are furnished with proper doors or sluices, so as (when required) to close the communications between the reservoir and the main drain or watercourse.

4. The whole of the premises are within the borough of Batley, and the defendants have the right to use the main drain or watercourse by obtaining a supply of water therefrom and discharging their surplus water thereinto, as hereinbefore stated, but have otherwise no control over the drain or watercourse, which does not belong to them.

5. In the month of December, 1877, the plaintiff’s premises were flooded by reason of the overflowing of the defendants’ reservoir.

6. Such overflowing was caused by the emptying of a large quantity of water from a reservoir, the property of a third party, into the main drain or watercourse at a point considerably above the defendants’ premises, and by an obstruction in the main drain or watercourse below the outlet of the defendants’ reservoir, whereby the water from such main drain or watercourse was forced through the doors or sluices (which were closed at the time) into the defendants’ reservoir.

7. Such obstruction was caused by circumstances over which the defendants had no control, and without their knowledge; and had it not been for such obstruction the overflowing of the reservoir would not have happened.

8. The defendants’ reservoir, and the communications between it and the main drain or watercourse, and the doors or sluices, are constructed and maintained in a proper manner, so as to prevent the overflowing of the reservoir under all ordinary circumstances.

9. No negligence or wrongful act is attributable to either party.

Under the circumstances the judge of the County Court was of opinion that the defendants were liable for the damage sustained by the plaintiff, and accordingly gave judgment for the plaintiff.

The question for the opinion of the Court, having regard to the facts set out in the case, was whether the defendants were liable for the damage sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the flooding of his premises, such flooding being caused by water from a reservoir belonging to a third party, over which the defendants had no control, and without any knowledge or negligence on defendants’ part, the overflowing of the defendants’ reservoir being occasioned by the act of a third party, over whom the defendants had no control, and no wrongful act or negligence being attributable to the defendants, and the direct cause of the damage being the obstruction in the main drain or watercourse, which was caused by circumstances over which the defendants had no control and without their knowledge.

Kelly, C. B. I think this judgment must be reversed. The case states that for many years the defendants have been possessed of a reservoir to which there are gates or sluices. There has been an overflow from the reservoir which has caused damage to the plaintiff. The question is, what was the cause of this overflow? Was it anything for which the defendants are responsible—did it proceed from their act or default, or from that of a stranger over which they had no control? The case is abundantly clear on this, proving beyond a doubt that the defendants had no control over the causes of the overflow, and no knowledge of the existence of the obstruction. The matters complained of took place through no default or breach of duty of the defendants, but were caused by a stranger over whom and at a spot where they had no control. It seems to me to be immaterial whether this is called vis major or the unlawful act of a stranger; it is sufficient to say that the defendants had no means of preventing the occurrence. I think the defendants could not possibly have been expected to anticipate that which happened here, and the law does not require them to construct their reservoir and the sluices and gates leading to it to meet any amount of pressure which the wrongful act of a third person may impose. The judgment must be entered for the defendants.

Pollock, B. I also think the defendants are entitled to judgment. Looking at the facts stated, that the defendants had no control over the main drain, and no knowledge of or control over the obstruction, apart from the cases, what wrong have the defendants done for which they should be held liable? The case of Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330, is quite distinguishable. The case of Nichols v. Marsland, L. R. 10 Ex. 255, 14 Eng. R. 538, is more in point. The illustrations put in that case clearly go to show that if the person who has collected the water has done all that skill and judgment can do he is not liable for damage by acts over which he has no control. In the judgment of the Court of Appeals, 2 Ex. D. 1, at p. 5, Mellish, L. J., adopts the principle laid down by this Court. He says: “If indeed the damages were occasioned by the act of the party without more—as where a man accumulates water on his own land, but owing to the peculiar nature or condition of the soil the water escapes and does damage to his neighbor—the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, supra, establishes that he must be held liable.” Here this water has not been accumulated by the defendants, but has come from elsewhere and added to that which was properly and safely there. For this the defendants, in my opinion, both on principle and authority, cannot be held liable.

Judgment for the defendants.

MARSHALL v. WELWOOD Supreme Court of New Jersey, June Term, 1876. Reported in 38 New Jersey Law Reports, 339.

Suit for damages done to the property of the plaintiff by the bursting of the boiler of a steam-engine on the adjoining property of the defendant Welwood. Garside, the other defendant, had sold this boiler to Welwood, and was experimenting with it at the time of the explosion.

The case came before the Court on a motion for a new trial, the verdict having gone for the plaintiff against both defendants.

Argued at February Term, 1876, before Beasley, C. J., and Woodhull, Van Syckel, and Scudder, JJ.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Beasley, C. J. The judge, at the trial of this cause, charged, among other matters, that as the evidence incontestably showed that one of the defendants, Welwood, was the owner of the boiler which caused the damage, he was liable in the action, unless it appeared that the same was not being run by him, or his agent, at the time of the explosion. The proposition propounded was, that a person is responsible for the immediate consequences of the bursting of a steam boiler, in use by him, irrespective of any question as to negligence or want of skill on his part.

This view of the law is in accordance with the principles maintained, with great learning and force of reasoning, in some of the late English decisions. In this class the leading case was that of Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 1 Exch. 265, which was a suit on account of damage done by water escaping on to the premises of the plaintiff from a reservoir which the defendant had constructed, with due care and skill, on his own land. The judgment was put on a general ground, for the Court said: “We think the true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief, if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.” This result was deemed just, and was sought to be vindicated on the theory that it is but reasonable that a person who has brought something on his own property, which was not naturally there, harmless to others, so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous, if it gets on his neighbor’s, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues, if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. This principle would evidently apply to, and rule, the present case: for water is no more likely to escape from a reservoir and do damage, than steam is from a boiler; and, therefore, if he who collects the former force upon his property, and seeks, with care and skill, to keep it there, is answerable for his want of success, so is he who, under similar conditions, endeavors to deal with the latter. There is nothing unlawful in introducing water into a properly constructed reservoir on a person’s own land, nor raising steam in a boiler of proper quality; neither act, when performed, is a nuisance per se; and the inquiry consequently is, whether in the doing of such lawful act the party who does it is an insurer against all flaws in the apparatus employed, no matter how secret, or unascertainable by the use of every reasonable test, such flaws may be. This English adjudication takes the affirmative side of the question, conceding, however, that the subject is not controlled by any express decision, and that it is to be investigated with reference to the general grounds of jurisprudence. I have said the doctrine involved has been learnedly treated, and the decision is of great weight, and yet its reasoning has failed to convince me of the correctness of the result to which it leads, and such result is clearly opposed to the course which judicial opinion has taken in this country. The fallacy in the process of argument by which judgment is reached in this case of Fletcher v. Rylands, appears to me to consist in this: that the rule mainly applicable to a class of cases which, I think, should be regarded as, in a great degree, exceptional, is amplified and extended into a general, if not universal, principle. The principal instance upon which reliance is placed is the well-known obligation of the owner of cattle, to prevent them from escaping from his land and doing mischief. The law as to this point is perfectly settled, and has been settled from the earliest times, and is to the effect that the owner must take charge of his cattle at his peril, and if they evade his custody he is, in some measure, responsible for the consequences. This is the doctrine of the Year Books, but I do not find that it is grounded in any theoretical principle, making a man answerable for his acts or omissions, without regard to his culpability. That in this particular case of escaping cattle so stringent an obligation upon the owner should grow up, was not unnatural. That the beasts of the landowner should be successfully restrained, was a condition of considerable importance to the unmolested enjoyment of property, and the right to plead that the escape had occurred by inevitable accident would have seriously impaired, if it did not entirely frustrate, the process of distress damage feasant. Custom has had much to do in giving shape to the law, and what is highly convenient readily runs into usage, and is accepted as a rule. It would but rarely occur that cattle would escape from a vigilant owner, and in this instance such rare exceptions seem to have passed unnoticed, for there appears to be no example of the point having been presented for judicial consideration; for the conclusion of the liability of the unnegligent owner rests in dicta, and not in express decision. But waiving this, there is a consideration which seems to me to show that this obligation which is put upon the owner of errant cattle should not be taken to be a principle applicable, in a general way, to the use or ownership of property, which is this: that the owner of such cattle is, after all, liable only sub modo for the injury done by them, that is, he is responsible, with regard to tame beasts who have no exceptionally vicious disposition so far as is known, for the grass they eat, and such like injuries, but not for the hurt they may inflict upon the person of others,—a restriction on liability which is hardly consistent with the notion that this class of cases proceeds from a principle so wide as to embrace all persons whose lawful acts produce, without fault in them, and in an indirect manner, ill results which disastrously affect innocent persons. If the principle ruling these cases was so broad as this, conformity to it would require that the person being the cause of the mischief should stand as an indemnifier against the whole of the damage. It appears to me, therefore, that this rule, which applies to damage done by straying cattle, was carried beyond its true bounds, when it was appealed to [in] proof that a person in law is answerable for the natural consequences of his acts, such acts being lawful in themselves, and having been done with proper care and skill.

The only other cases which were referred to in support of the judgment under consideration were those of one who was sued for not keeping the wall of his privy in repair, to the detriment of his neighbor, being the case of Tenant v. Goulding, 1 Salk. 21, and several actions which it is said had been brought against the owners of some alkali works for damages alleged to have been caused by the chlorine fumes escaping from their works [which], the case showed, had been erected upon the best scientific principles. But I am compelled to think that these cases are but a slender basis for the large structure put upon it. The case of Tenant v. Goulding presented merely the question whether a landowner is bound in favor of his neighbor to keep the wall of his privy in repair, and the Court held that he was, and that he was responsible if, for want of such reparation, the filth escaped on the adjoining land. No question was mooted as to his liability in case the privy had been constructed with care and skill with a view to prevent the escape of its contents, and had been kept in a state of repair. Not to repair a receptacle of this kind when it was in want of repairs was, in itself, a prima facie case of negligence, and it seems to me that all the Court decided was to hold so.

But this consideration is also to be noticed, both with respect to this last case, and that of the injurious fumes from the alkali works, that in truth they stand somewhat by themselves, and having this peculiarity: that the things in their nature partake largely of the character of nuisances. Take the alkali works as an example. Placed in a town, under ordinary circumstances, they would be a nuisance. When the attempt is made by scientific methods to prevent the escape of the fumes, it is an attempt to legalize that which is illegal, and the consequence is, it may well be held that, failing in the attempt, the nuisance remains.

I cannot agree that, from these indications, the broad doctrine is to be drawn that a man in law is an insurer that the acts which he does, such acts being lawful and done with care, shall not injuriously affect others. The decisions cited are not so much examples of legal maxims as of exceptions to such maxims; for they stand opposed, and in contrast to principles, which it seems to me must be considered much more general in their operation and elementary in their nature.

The common rule, quite institutional in its character, is that, in order to sustain an action for a tort, the damage complained of must have come from a wrongful act. Mr. Addison, in his work on Torts, Vol. I, p. 3, very correctly states this rule. He says: “A man may, however, sustain grievous damage at the hands of another, and yet, if it be the result of inevitable accident, or a lawful act, done in a lawful manner, without any carelessness or negligence, there is no legal injury, and no tort giving rise to an action of damages.” Among other examples, he refers to an act of force, done in necessary self-defence, causing injury to an innocent bystander, which he characterizes as damnum sine injuria,—“for no man does wrong or contracts guilt in defending himself against an aggressor.” Other instances of a like kind are noted, such as the lawful obstruction of the view from the windows of dwelling-houses; or the turning aside, to the detriment of another, the current of the sea or river, by means of walls or dikes. Many illustrations, of the same bearing, are to be found scattered through the books of reports. Thus, Dyer, 25 b, says: “That if a man have a dog which has killed sheep, the master of the dog being ignorant of such quality and property of the dog, the master shall not be punished for that killing.” This case belongs to a numerous, well-known class, where animals which are usually harmless do damage, the decisions being that, under such conditions, the owners of the animals are not responsible. Akin to these in principle are cases of injuries done to innocent persons by horses in the charge of their owners, becoming ungovernable by reason of unexpected causes; or where a person in a dock was struck by the falling of a bale of cotton which the defendants’ servants were lowering, Scott v. London Dock Co., 3 H. & C. 596; or in cases of collision, either on land or sea. Hammack v. White, 11 C. B. n. s. 588.

It is true that these cases of injury done to personal property, or to persons, are, in the case of Fletcher v. Rylands, sought to be distinguished from other damages, on the ground that they are done in the course of traffic on the highways, whether by land or sea, which cannot be conducted without exposing those whose persons or property are near it to some inevitable risk. But this explanation is not sufficiently comprehensive, for, if a frightened horse should, in his flight, break into an inclosure, no matter how far removed from the highway, the owner would not be answerable for the damage done. Nor is the reason upon which it rests satisfactory, for, if traffic cannot be carried on without some risk, why can it not be said with the same truth, that the other affairs of life, though they be transacted away from the highways, cannot be carried on without some risk; and if such risk is, in the one case, to be borne by innocent persons, why not in the other? Business done upon private property may be a part of traffic as well as that done by the means of the highway, and no reason is perceived why the same favor is not to be extended to it in both situations. But, besides this, the reason thus assigned for the immunity of him who is the unwilling producer of the damage has not been the ground on which the decisions illustrative of the rule have been put; that ground has been that the person sought to be charged had not done any unlawful act. Everywhere, in all the branches of the law, the general principle that blame must be imputable as a ground of responsibility for damage proceeding from a lawful act, is apparent. A passenger is injured by the breaking of an axle of a public conveyance; the carrier is not liable, unless negligence can be shown. A man’s guest is hurt by the falling of a chandelier; a suit will not lie against the host, without proof that he knew, or ought to have known of the existence of the danger. If the steam-engine which did the mischief in the present case had been in use in driving a train of cars on a railroad, and had, in that situation, exploded, and had inflicted injuries on travellers or by-standers, it could not have been pretended that such damage was actionable, in the absence of the element of negligence or unskilfulness. By changing the place of the accident to private property, I cannot agree that a different rule obtains.

It seems to me, therefore, that in this case it was necessary to submit the matter, as a question of fact for the jury, whether the occurrence doing the damage complained of, was the product of pure accident, or the result of want of care or skill on the part of the defendant or his agents.

This view of the subject is taken in the American decisions. A case, in all respects in point, is that of Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476; S. C. 10 Am. Rep. 623. The facts were essentially the same with those of the principal case. It was an action growing out of the explosion of a steam boiler upon private property, and the ruling was that such action could not be sustained without proof of fault or negligence. In that report the line of cases is so fully set out that it is unnecessary here to repeat them.

The rule should be made absolute.

BROWN v. COLLINS Supreme Court, New Hampshire, June, 1873. Reported in 53 New Hampshire Reports, 442.

Trespass, by Albert H. Brown against Lester Collins, to recover the value of a stone post on which was a street lamp, situated in front of his place of business in the village of Tilton. The post stood upon the plaintiff’s land, but near the southerly line of the main highway leading through the village and within four feet of said line. There was nothing to indicate the line of the highway, nor any fence or other obstruction between the highway, as travelled, and the post. The highway crosses the railroad near the place of accident, and the stone post stood about fifty feet from the railroad track at the crossing. The defendant was in the highway, at or near the railroad crossing, with a pair of horses loaded with grain, going to the grist-mill in Tilton village. The horses became frightened by an engine on the railroad near the crossing, and by reason thereof became unmanageable, and ran, striking the post with the end of the pole and breaking it off near the ground, destroying the lamp with the post. No other injury was done by the accident. The shock produced by the collision with the post threw the defendant from his seat in the wagon, and he struck on the ground between the horses, but suffered no injury except a slight concussion. The defendant was in the use of ordinary care and skill in managing his team, until they became frightened as aforesaid.

The foregoing facts were agreed upon for the purpose of raising the question of the right of the plaintiff to recover in this action.

Doe, J. It is agreed that the defendant was in the use of ordinary care and skill in managing his horses, until they were frightened; and that they then became unmanageable, and ran against and broke a post on the plaintiff’s land. It is not explicitly stated that the defendant was without actual fault,—that he was not guilty of any malice, or unreasonable unskilfulness or negligence; but it is to be inferred that the fact was so; and we decide the case on that ground. We take the case as one where, without actual fault in the defendant, his horses broke from his control, ran away with him, went upon the plaintiff’s land, and did damage there, against the will, intent, and desire of the defendant.

Sir Thomas Raymond’s report of Lambert & Olliot v. Bessey, T. Raym. 421, and Bessey v. Olliot & Lambert, T. Raym. 467, is, “The question was this: A gaoler takes from the bailiff a prisoner arrested by him out of the bailiff’s jurisdiction, Whether the gaoler be liable to an action of false imprisonment? and the judges of the common pleas did all hold that he was; and of that opinion I am, for these reasons.

“1. In all civil acts, the law doth not so much regard the intent of the actor, as the loss and damage of the party suffering; and therefore Mich. 6 E. 4, 7 a. pl. 18. Trespass quare vi & armis clausum fregit & herbam suam pedibus conculcando consumpsit in six acres. The defendant pleads that he hath an acre lying next the said six acres, and upon it a hedge of thorns, and he cut the thorns, and they, ipso invito, fell upon the plaintiff’s land, and the defendant took them off as soon as he could, which is the same trespass; and the plaintiff demurred; and adjudged for the plaintiff; for though a man doth a lawful thing, yet if any damage do thereby befall another, he shall answer for it if he could have avoided it. As if a man lop a tree, and the boughs fall upon another, ipso invito, yet an action lies. If a man shoot at butts, and hurt another unawares, an action lies. I have land through which a river runs to your mill, and I lop the fallows growing upon the river side, which accidentally stop the water, so as your mill is hindered, an action lies. If I am building my own house, and a piece of timber falls on my neighbor’s house, and breaks part of it, an action lies. If a man assault me, and I lift up my staff to defend myself, and, in lifting it up, hit another, an action lies by that person, and yet I did a lawful thing. And the reason of all these cases is, because he that is damaged ought to be recompensed. But otherwise it is in criminal cases, for there actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.

“Mich. 23. Car. 1. B. R.—Stile 72, Guilbert versus Stone. Trespass for entering his close, and taking away his horse. The defendant pleads, that he, for fear of his life, by threats of twelve men, went into the plaintiff’s house, and took the horse. The plaintiff demurred; and adjudged for the plaintiff, because threats could not excuse the defendant, and make satisfaction to the plaintiff.

“Hob. 134, Weaver versus Ward. Trespass of assault and battery. The defendant pleads, that he was a trained soldier in London, and he and the plaintiff were skirmishing with their company, and the defendant, with his musket, casualiter & per infortunium & contra voluntatem suam in discharging of his gun hurt the plaintiff; and resolved no good plea. So here, though the defendant knew not of the wrongful taking of the plaintiff, yet that will not make any recompense for the wrong the plaintiff hath sustained.... But the three other judges resolved, that the defendant, the gaoler, could not be charged, because he could not have notice whether the prisoner was legally arrested or not.”

In Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 3 H. L. 330, Lord Cranworth said: “In considering whether a defendant is liable to a plaintiff for damage which the plaintiff may have sustained, the question in general is not whether the defendant has acted with due care and caution, but whether his acts have occasioned the damage. This is all well explained in the old case of Lambert v. Bessey, reported by Sir Thomas Raymond (Sir T. Raym. 421). And the doctrine is founded on good sense. For when one person, in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer.”

The head-note of Weaver v. Ward. Hob. 134, is: “If one trained soldier wound another, in skirmishing for exercise, an action of trespass will lie, unless it shall appear from the defendant’s plea that he was guilty of no negligence, and that the injury was inevitable.” The reason of the decision, as reported, was this: “For though it were agreed, that if men tilt or tourney in the presence of the king, or if two masters of defence playing their prizes kill one another, that this shall be no felony; or if a lunatic kill a man, or the like; because felony must be done animo felonico; yet in trespass, which tends only to give damages according to hurt or loss, it is not so; and therefore if a lunatic hurt a man, he shall be answerable in trespass; and therefore no man shall be excused of a trespass (for this is the nature of an excuse, and not of a justification, prout ei bene licuit), except it may be judged utterly without his fault; as if a man by force take my hand and strike you; or if here the defendant had said that the plaintiff ran across his piece when it was discharging; or had set forth the case with the circumstances, so as it had appeared to the Court that it had been inevitable, and that the defendant had committed no negligence to give occasion to the hurt.”

There may be some ground to argue that “utterly without his fault,” “inevitable,” and “no negligence,” in the sense intended, in that case, mean no more than the modern phrase “ordinary and reasonable care and prudence;” and that, in such a case, at the present time, to hold a plea good that alleges the exercise of reasonable care, without setting forth all “the circumstances” or evidence sustaining the plea, would be substantially in compliance with the law of that case, due allowance being made for the difference of legal language used at different periods, and the difference in the forms of pleading. But the drift of the ancient English authorities on the law of torts seems to differ materially from the view now prevailing in this country. Formerly, in England, there seems to have been no well-defined test of an actionable tort. Defendants were often held liable “because,” as Raymond says, “he that is damaged ought to be recompensed;” and not because, upon some clearly stated principle of law founded on actual culpability, public policy, or natural justice, he was entitled to compensation from the defendant. The law was supposed to regard “the loss and damage of the party suffering,” more than the negligence and blameworthiness of the defendant: but how much more it regarded the former than the latter, was a question not settled, and very little investigated. “The loss and damage of the party suffering,” if without relief, would be a hardship to him; relief compulsorily furnished by the other party would often be a hardship to him; when and why the “loss and damage” should, and when and why they should not, be transferred from one to the other, by process of law, were problems not solved in a philosophical manner. There were precedents, established upon superficial, crude, and undigested notions; but no application of the general system of legal reason to this subject.

Mr. Holmes says: “It may safely be stated that all the more ancient examples are traceable to conceptions of a much ruder sort (than actual fault), and in modern times to more or less definitely thought-out views of public policy. The old writs in trespass did not allege, nor was it necessary to show, anything savoring of culpability. It was enough that a certain event had happened, and it was not even necessary that the act should be done intentionally, though innocently. An accidental blow was as good a cause of action as an intentional one. On the other hand, when, as in Rylands v. Fletcher, modern courts hold a man liable for the escape of water from a reservoir which he has built upon his land, or for the escape of cattle, although he is not alleged to have been negligent, they do not proceed upon the ground that there is an element of culpability in making such a reservoir, or in keeping cattle, sufficient to charge the defendant as soon as a damnum occurs, but on the principle that it is politic to make those who go into extra-hazardous employments take the risk on their own shoulders.” He alludes to the fact that “there is no certainty what will be thought extra-hazardous in a certain jurisdiction at a certain time,” but suggests that many particular instances point to the general principle of liability for the consequences of extra-hazardous undertakings as the tacitly assumed ground of decision 7 Am. Law Rev. 652, 653, 662; 2 Kent Com. (12th ed.) 561, n. 1; 4 id. 110, n. 1. If the hazardous nature of things or of acts is adopted as the test, or one of the tests, and the English authorities are taken as the standard of what is to be regarded as hazardous, “it will be necessary to go the length of saying that an owner of real property is liable for all damage resulting to his neighbor’s property from anything done upon his own land” (Mellish’s argument in Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 1 Ex. 272), and that an individual is answerable “who, for his own benefit, makes an improvement on his own land, according to his best skill and diligence, and not foreseeing it will produce any injury to his neighbor, if he thereby unwittingly injure his neighbor”—Gibbs, C. J., in Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 44, approved by Blackburn, J., in Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 1 Ex. 286. If danger is adopted as a test, and the English authorities are abandoned, the fact of danger, controverted in each case, will present a question for the jury, and expand the issue of tort or no tort into a question of reasonableness, in a form much broader than has been generally used; or courts will be left to devise tests of peril, under varying influences of time and place that may not immediately produce a uniform, consistent, and permanent rule.

It would seem that some of the early English decisions were based on a view as narrow as that which regards nothing but the hardship “of the party suffering;” disregards the question whether, by transferring the hardship to the other party, anything more will be done than substitute one suffering party for another; and does not consider what legal reason can be given for relieving the party who has suffered, by making another suffer the expense of his relief. For some of those decisions, better reasons may now be given than were thought of when the decisions were announced: but whether a satisfactory test of an actionable tort can be extracted from the ancient authorities, and whether the few modern cases that carry out the doctrine of those authorities as far as it is carried in Fletcher v. Rylands (3 H. & C. 774; L. R. 1 Ex. 265; L. R. 3 H. L. 330) can be sustained, is very doubtful. The current of American authority is very strongly against some of the leading English cases.

One of the strongest presentations of the extreme English view is by Blackburn, J., who says, in Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 1 Ex. 279, 280, 281, 282: “We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default; or perhaps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient. The general rule, as above stated, seems, on principle, just. The person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbor, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbor’s reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbor’s privy, or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapors of his neighbor’s alkali works, is damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbor, who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his neighbor’s, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued, and it seems but just that he should, at his peril, keep it there so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequences. And upon authority, this we think is established to be the law, whether the things so brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches. The case that has most commonly occurred, and which is most frequently to be found in the books, is as to the obligation of the owner of cattle which he has brought on his land, to prevent their escaping and doing mischief. The law, as to them, seems to be perfectly settled from early times: the owner must keep them in at his peril, or he will be answerable for the natural consequences of their escape,—that is, with regard to tame beasts, for the grass they eat and trample upon, though not for any injury to the person of others, for our ancestors have settled that it is not the general nature of horses to kick, or bulls to gore [or he might have added, dogs to bite],—but if the owner knows that the beast has a vicious propensity to attack man, he will be answerable for that too.... In these latter authorities [relating to animals called mischievous or ferocious], the point under consideration was damage to the person; and what was decided was, that where it was known that hurt to the person was the natural consequence of the animal being loose, the owner should be responsible in damages for such hurt though where it was not known to be so, the owner was not responsible for such damages; but where the damage is, like eating grass or other ordinary ingredients in damage feasant, the natural consequence of the escape, the rule as to keeping in the animal is the same.... There does not appear to be any difference, in principle, between the extent of the duty cast on him who brings cattle on his land to keep them in, and the extent of the duty imposed on him who brings on his land water, filth, or stenches, or any other thing, which will, if it escape, naturally do damage, to prevent their escaping and injuring his neighbor.”

This seems to be substantially an adoption of the early authorities, and an extension of the ancient practice of holding the defendant liable, in some cases, on the partial view that regarded the misfortune of the plaintiff upon whom a damage had fallen, and required no legal reason for transferring the damage to the defendant. The ancient rule was, that a person in whose house, or on whose land, a fire accidentally originated, which spread to his neighbor’s property and destroyed it, must make good the loss. Filliter v. Phippard, 11 A. & E. N. S. 347, 354; Tubervil v. Stamp, 1 Comyns, 32; S. C. 1 Salk. 13; Com. Dig., Action upon the case for Negligence (A 6); 1 Arch. N. P. 539; Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H. & C. 790, 793; Russell v. Fabyan, 34 N. H. 218, 225. No inquiry was made into the reason of putting upon him his neighbor’s loss as well as his own. The rule of such cases is applied, by Blackburn, to everything which a man brings on his land, which will, if it escape, naturally do damage. One result of such a doctrine is, that every one building a fire on his own hearth, for necessary purposes, with the utmost care, does so at the peril, not only of losing his own house, but of being irretrievably ruined if a spark from his chimney starts a conflagration which lays waste the neighborhood. “In conflict with the rule, as laid down in the English cases, is a class of cases in reference to damage from fire communicated from the adjoining premises. Fire, like water or steam, is likely to produce mischief if it escapes and goes beyond control; and yet it has never been held in this country that one building a fire upon his own premises can be made liable if it escapes upon his neighbor’s premises, and does him damage without proof of negligence.” Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476, 487.

Everything that a man can bring on his land is capable of escaping,—against his will, and without his fault, with or without assistance, in some form, solid, liquid, or gaseous, changed or unchanged by the transforming processes of nature or art,—and of doing damage after its escape. Moreover, if there is a legal principle that makes a man liable for the natural consequences of the escape of things which he brings on his land, the application of such a principle cannot be limited to those things; it must be applied to all his acts that disturb the original order of creation; or, at least, to all things which he undertakes to possess or control anywhere, and which were not used and enjoyed in what is called the natural or primitive condition of mankind, whatever that may have been. This is going back a long way for a standard of legal rights, and adopting an arbitrary test of responsibility that confounds all degrees of danger, pays no heed to the essential elements of actual fault, puts a clog upon natural and reasonably necessary uses of matter, and tends to embarrass and obstruct much of the work which it seems to be man’s duty carefully to do. The distinction made by Lord Cairns, Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330, between a natural and a non-natural use of land, if he meant anything more than the difference between a reasonable use and an unreasonable one, is not established in the law. Even if the arbitrary test were applied only to things which a man brings on his land, it would still recognize the peculiar rights of savage life in a wilderness, ignore the rights growing out of a civilized state of society, and make a distinction not warranted by the enlightened spirit of the common law: it would impose a penalty upon efforts, made in a reasonable, skilful, and careful manner, to rise above a condition of barbarism. It is impossible that legal principle can throw so serious an obstacle in the way of progress and improvement. Natural rights are, in general, legal rights; and the rights of civilization are, in a legal sense, as natural as any others. “Most of the rights of property, as well as of person, in the social state, are not absolute but relative,” Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 485; and, if men ever were in any other than the social state, it is neither necessary nor expedient that they should now govern themselves on the theory that they ought to live in some other state. The common law does not usually establish tests of responsibility on any other basis than the propriety of their living in the social state, and the relative and qualified character of the rights incident to that state.

In Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 1 Ex. 286, 287, Mr. Justice Blackburn, commenting upon the remark of Mr. Baron Martin, “that, when damage is done to personal property, or even to the person, by collision, either upon land or at sea, there must be negligence in the party doing the damage to render him legally responsible,” says,—“This is no doubt true; and, as was pointed out by Mr. Mellish during his argument before us, this is not confined to cases of collision, for there are many cases in which proof of negligence is essential, as, for instance, where an unruly horse gets on the footpath of a public street and kills a passenger, Hammack v. White, 11 C. B. N. S. 588, 31 L. J. (C. P.) 129; or where a person in a dock is struck by the falling of a bale of cotton which the defendant’s servants are lowering, Scott v. London Docks Company, 3 H. & C. 596, 35 L. J. (Ex.) 17, 220; and many other similar cases may be found. But we think these cases distinguishable from the present. Traffic on the highways, whether by land or sea, cannot be conducted without exposing those whose persons or property are near it to some inevitable risk; and that being so, those who go on the highway, or have their property adjacent to it, may well be held to do so subject to their taking upon themselves the risk of injury from that inevitable danger; and persons who, by the license of the owner, pass near to warehouses where goods are being raised or lowered, certainly do so subject to the inevitable risk of accident. In neither case, therefore, can they recover without proof of want of care or skill occasioning the accident; and it is believed that all the cases in which inevitable accident has been held an excuse for what, prima facie, was a trespass, can be explained on the same principle, viz., that the circumstances were such as to show that the plaintiff had taken that risk upon himself.” This would be authority for holding, in the present case, that the plaintiff, by having his post near the street, took upon himself the risk of its being broken by an inevitable accident carrying a traveller off the street. But such a doctrine would open more questions, and more difficult ones, than it would settle. At what distance from a highway would an object be near it? What part of London is not near a street? And then, as the defendant had as good a right to be at home with his horses as to be in the highway, why might not his neighbor, by electing to live in an inhabited country, as well be held to take upon himself the risk of an inevitable accident happening by reason of the country being inhabited, as to assume a highway risk by living near a road? If neighborhood is the test, who are a man’s neighbors but the whole human race? If a person, by remaining in England, is held to take upon himself one class of the inevitable dangers of that country because he could avoid that class by migrating to a region of solitude, why should he not, for a like reason, also be held to expose himself voluntarily to other classes of the inevitable dangers of that country? And where does this reasoning end?

It is not improbable that the rules of liability for damage done by brutes or by fire, found in the early English cases, were introduced by sacerdotal influence, from what was supposed to be the Roman or the Hebrew law. 7 Am. L. Rev. 652, note; 1 Domat Civil Law (Strahan’s translation, 2d ed.), 304, 305, 306, 312, 313; Exodus xxi 28–32, 36; xxii. 5, 6, 9. It would not be singular if these rules should be spontaneously produced at a certain period in the life of any community. Where they first appeared is of little consequence in the present inquiry. They were certainly introduced in England at an immature stage of English jurisprudence, and an undeveloped state of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, when the nation had not settled down to those modern, progressive, industrial pursuits which the spirit of the common law, adapted to all conditions of society, encourages and defends. They were introduced when the development of many of the rational rules now universally recognized as principles of the common law had not been demanded by the growth of intelligence, trade, and productive enterprise,—when the common law had not been set forth in the precedents, as a coherent and logical system on many subjects other than the tenures of real estate. At all events, whatever may be said of the origin of those rules, to extend them, as they were extended in Rylands v. Fletcher, seems to us contrary to the analogies and the general principles of the common law, as now established. To extend them to the present case would be contrary to American authority as well as to our understanding of legal principles.

The difficulty under which the plaintiff might labor in proving the culpability of the defendant,—which is sometimes given as a reason for imposing an absolute liability without evidence of negligence,—Rixford v. Smith, 52 N. H. 355, 359, or changing the burden of proof, Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H. 553, 568, 569, 574, 575, seems not to have been given in the English cases relating to damage done by brutes or fire. And, however large or small the class of cases in which such a difficulty may be the foundation of a rule of law, since the difficulty has been so much reduced by the abolition of witness disabilities, the present case is not one of that class.

There are many cases where a man is held liable for taking, converting (C. R. Co. v. Foster, 51 N. H. 490) or destroying property, or doing something else, or causing it to be done, intentionally, under a claim of right, and without any actual fault. “Probably one half of the cases in which trespass de bonis asportatis is maintained, arise from a mere misapprehension of legal rights.” Metcalf, J., in Stanley v. Gaylord, 1 Cush. 536, 551. When a defendant erroneously supposed, without any fault of either party, that he had a right to do what he did, and his act, done in the assertion of his supposed right, turns out to have been an interference with the plaintiff’s property, he is generally held to have assumed the risk of maintaining the right which he asserted, and the responsibility of the natural consequences of his voluntary act. But when there was no fault on his part, and the damage was not caused by his voluntary and intended act; or by an act of which he knew, or ought to have known, the damage would be a necessary, probable, or natural consequence; or by an act which he knew or ought to have known, to be unlawful,—we understand the general rule to be, that he is not liable. Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62; Aaron v. State, 31 Ga. 167; Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75; and Judge Redfield’s note to that case in 4 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 532; Townshend on Slander, secs. 67, 88, p. 128, n. 1 (2d ed.). In Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292, the defendant, having interfered to part his dog and the plaintiff’s which were fighting, in raising a stick for that purpose accidentally struck the plaintiff, and injured him. It was held, that parting the dogs was a lawful and proper act which the defendant might do by the use of proper and safe means; and that if the plaintiff’s injury was caused by such an act done with due care and all proper precautions, the defendant was not liable. In the decision, there is the important suggestion that some of the apparent confusion in the authorities has arisen from discussions of the question whether a party’s remedy is in trespass or case, and from the statement that when the injury comes from a direct act, trespass lies, and when the damage is consequential, case is the proper form of action,—the remark concerning the immediate effect of an act being made with reference to damage for which it is admitted there is a remedy of some kind, and on the question of the proper remedy, not on the general question of liability. Judge Shaw, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “We think, as the result of all the authorities, the rule is correctly stated by Mr. Greenleaf, that the plaintiff must come prepared with evidence to show either that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant was in fault; for if the injury was unavoidable, and the conduct of the defendant was free from blame, he will not be liable. 2 Greenl. Ev., secs. 85 to 92; Wakeman v. Robinson, 1 Bing. 213. If, in the prosecution of a lawful act, a casualty purely accidental arises, no action can be supported for an injury arising therefrom. Davis v. Saunders, 2 Chit. R. 639; Com. Dig. Battery, A. (Day’s ed.) and notes; Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62;” James v. Campbell, 5 C. & P. 372; Alderson v. Waistell, 1 C. & K. 358.

Whatever may be the rule or the exception, or the reason of it, in case of insanity, Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134; Com. Dig. Battery, A. note d, Hammond’s ed.; Dormay v. Borradaile, 5 M. G. & S. 380; Sedgwick on Damages, 455, 456, 2d ed.; Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 225; Krom v. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. 647; Horner v. Marshall, 5 Munf. 466; Yeates v. Reed, 4 Blackf. 463, and whatever may be the full legal definitions of necessity, inevitable danger, and unavoidable accident, the occurrence complained of in this case was one for which the defendant is not liable, unless every one is liable for all damage done by superior force overpowering him, and using him or his property as an instrument of violence. The defendant, being without fault, was as innocent as if the pole of his wagon had been hurled on the plaintiff’s land by a whirlwind, or he himself, by a stronger man, had been thrown through the plaintiff’s window. Upon the facts stated, taken in the sense in which we understand them, the defendant is entitled to judgment. 1 Hilliard on Torts, ch. 3, 3d ed.; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476; Parrot v. Wells, 15 Wall. 524, 537; Roche v. M. G. L. Co., 5 Wis. 55; Eastman v. Co., 44 N. H. 143, 156.

Case discharged.

McCORD RUBBER CO. v. St. JOSEPH WATER CO. Supreme Court, Missouri, May 25, 1904. Reported in 181 Missouri Reports, 678.

Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court.

Action for damages for the flooding of plaintiff’s cellar with water caused by defendant’s negligence, whereby a large quantity of its goods stored in the cellar were damaged. Answer, a general denial.

Defendant company supplied water distributed through pipes and mains from reservoirs. A service pipe from a main carried water to a building occupied by one August. There was a bursting in a “fish trap” used in connection with the service pipe. Water escaped on to the premises of August, and from thence to the adjoining premises of the plaintiff company. The jury found a verdict for the defendant. In view of the instructions given, this verdict must be regarded as negativing the allegations of negligence contained in the plaintiff’s pleading.

Judgment having been rendered for defendant, the plaintiff appealed.

[Arguments and part of opinion omitted.]

Valliant, J.... III. The plaintiff contends, however, that the defendants are liable regardless of whether they were guilty of any negligence directly causing the accident. This contention rests in the theory that one who brings into his premises anything that is liable to escape, and liable to inflict injury on his neighbors if it should escape, brings it there at his peril, and is responsible for any injury that it may cause.

That contention rests for its authority on the decision in Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330. In the briefs of the learned counsel for respondents, reference is made to a large number of authorities going to show that the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher has not been approved generally in America, and that it has been modified in England. Among the authorities so referred to are Griffith v. Lewis, 17 Mo. App. 605; Murphy v. Gillum, 73 Mo. App. 487; Cooley on Torts, 570; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476; Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 442.

But in the facts, the case at bar is distinguished from Rylands v. Fletcher.

[After stating the facts of Rylands v. Fletcher, and quoting from the opinion of Lord Chancellor Cairns.] There is a wide difference between a great volume of water collected in a reservoir in dangerous proximity to the premises of another and water brought into a house through pipes in the manner usual in all cities, for the ordinary use of the occupants of the house. Whilst water so brought into a house cannot literally be said to have come in in the course of what might be called in the language above quoted of the Lord Chancellor “natural user” of the premises, yet it is brought in by the method universally in use in cities and is not to be treated as an unnatural gathering of a dangerous agent. The law applicable to the caging of ferocious animals is not applicable to water brought into a house by pipes in the usual manner.

The learned counsel for the plaintiff tried their case on the theory that the defendants were negligent, and that is the only theory on which they could have tried it.

Judgment affirmed.

GILES v. WALKER In the Queen’s Bench Division, March 27, 1890. Reported in Law Reports, 24 Queen’s Bench Division, 656.

Appeal from the Leicester County Court.

The defendant, a farmer, occupied land which had originally been forest land, but which had some years prior to 1883, when the defendant’s occupation of it commenced, been brought into cultivation by the then occupier. The forest land prior to cultivation did not bear thistles; but immediately upon its being cultivated thistles sprang up all over it. The defendant neglected to mow the thistles periodically so as to prevent them from seeding, and in the years 1887 and 1888 there were thousands of thistles on his land in full seed. The consequence was that the thistle seeds were blown by the wind in large quantities on to the adjoining land of the plaintiff, where they took root and did damage. The plaintiff sued the defendant for such damage in the county court. The judge left to the jury the question whether the defendant in not cutting the thistles had been guilty of negligence. The jury found that he was negligent, and judgment was accordingly entered for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed.

Toller, for the defendant. The facts of this case do not establish any cause of action. The judge was wrong in leaving the question of negligence to the jury. Before a person can be charged with negligence, it must be shown that there is a duty on him to take care. But here there is no such duty. The defendant did not bring the thistles on to his land; they grew there naturally. [He was stopped by the court.]

R. Bray, for the plaintiff. If the defendant’s predecessor had left the land in its original condition as forest land the thistles would never have grown. By bringing it into cultivation, and so disturbing the natural condition of things, he caused the thistles to grow, thereby creating a nuisance on the land just as much as if he had intentionally grown them. The defendant, by entering into occupation of the land with the nuisance on it, was under a duty to prevent damage from thereby accruing to his neighbor. The case resembles that of Crowhurst v. Amersham Burial Board, 4 Ex. D. 5, where the defendants were held responsible for allowing the branches of their yew trees to grow over their boundary, whereby a horse of the plaintiff, being placed at pasture in the adjoining field, ate some of the yew twigs and died.

Lord Coleridge, C. J. I never heard of such an action as this. There can be no duty as between adjoining occupiers to cut the thistles, which are the natural growth of the soil. The appeal must be allowed.

Lord Esher, M. R. I am of the same opinion.

Appeal allowed.

GALVESTON, H. & S. A. R. CO. v. SPINKS Court of Civil Appeals, Texas, May 28, 1896. Reported in 13 Texas Civil Appeals, 542.

Williams, Associate Justice. This case is submitted upon the facts found by the court below, upon an assignment which questions the correctness of the conclusion of law based upon them. In brief, those facts are, that appellant owns in fee a strip of land upon which its railroad is laid, and on each side of which lie cultivated lands owned by appellee. Upon the land owned by appellant there stands a natural growth of tall trees which shade and injure the crops upon appellee’s adjacent land, and also saps such land of its fertility. For this injury to crops and land the judgment appealed from was rendered. No act of defendant is shown beyond the construction and maintenance of its road and its omission to cut down its trees, it having removed only such portion of them as was necessary to permit the repair of its road and the operation of its trains. We know of no principle of law which authorizes the judgment. The land and the trees are the property of appellant, and it has the same right to them that appellee has to his land and crops. The exercise of one right is not an invasion of the other. If the presence of the trees impairs the productiveness of appellee’s land, or if the cultivation of the latter would injure the trees, these results would constitute no wrong by one owner to the other, but would only be the incidents of their ownership. No breach of any duty owed by appellant to appellee is shown. It is not stated that the roots or the branches of the trees penetrate or overhang appellee’s land. If they did, appellee had the right to remove such roots or branches as entered or overhung his land, or if damage was caused by them, it may be true that he could maintain an action for such damage. Wood on Nuisances, 112, 113, 306.

But no such case is made here either in the statement of the cause of action or in the facts found by the court. It is not shown that appellee has not kept its right of way in proper condition for the safe and proper operation of its trains, but the contrary is inferable from the findings. Had it failed to do so, this might be a breach of the duty which it owed to those interested in the manner in which it conducted its road, but not of one due to appellee to protect his land and crops from such damage as that of which he complains. It is urged that as there is no statement of facts, we should presume that enough was shown to sustain the judgment. But the conclusions of the trial judge show affirmatively the facts upon which the judgment is rendered, and the conclusion of law based upon those facts was excepted to by appellant in the court below and is erroneous. It is not a case where there is an omission to find some fact, but one in which a ruling erroneous in law is grounded upon facts found.

Reversed and rendered.

BACHELDER v. HEAGAN Supreme Judicial Court, Maine, July Term, 1840. Reported in 18 Maine Reports, 32.

The action was trespass on the case, to recover damages, alleged to have been done to the plaintiffs’ land, and to the fences and growth thereon, by the negligence of the defendant in setting a fire on his own land, near to the land of the plaintiffs, and in not carefully keeping the same.

At the trial before Emery, J., evidence was introduced by both parties. The counsel for the plaintiffs requested the judge to instruct the jury, that the plaintiffs were entitled to a verdict, if they were satisfied from the evidence, that the damage was occasioned by the defendant’s fire, unless he satisfied them that it was not through negligence or mismanagement on his part. The judge instructed the jury, that the burthen of proof was upon the plaintiffs to satisfy them, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the damage was occasioned by the defendant’s fire, and through the carelessness and negligence of the defendant in keeping the same; such carelessness and negligence being alleged in the plaintiffs’ declaration, and it not being contended by the plaintiffs that the fire was wilfully and maliciously set by the defendant. On the return of a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiffs filed exceptions to the ruling of the judge.

The opinion of the Court was by

Weston, C. J. By the ancient common law, or custom of the realm, if a house took fire, the owner was held answerable for any injury thereby occasioned to others. This was probably founded upon some presumed negligence or carelessness, not susceptible of proof. The hardship of this rule was corrected by the statute of 6 Ann. c. 31, which exempted the owner from liability, where the fire was occasioned by accident. The rule does not appear to have been applied to the owner of a field, where a fire may have been kindled. It may frequently be necessary to burn stubble or other matter which encumbers the ground. It is a lawful act, unless kindled at an improper time or carelessly managed. Baron Comyns states, that an action of the case lies, at common law, against the owner of a house which takes fire, by which another is injured, and adds, “so if a fire be kindled in a yard or close, to burn stubble, and by negligence it burns corn in an adjoining close.” Com. Dig. Action of the Case for Negligence, A. 6.

In Clark v. Foot, 8 Johns. R. 421, it was held, that if A. sets fire to his own fallow ground, as he may lawfully do, which communicates to and fires the woodland of B., his neighbor, no action lies against A., unless there was some negligence or misconduct in him or his servants. And this is a fair illustration of the common law, upon which the action depends. Negligence or misconduct is the gist of the action. And this must be proved. In certain cases, as in actions against innkeepers and common carriers, it is presumed, by the policy of the law, where property is lost which is confided to their care. But in ordinary cases, of which the one before us is not an exception, where the action depends on negligence, the burthen of proof is upon the plaintiff. This is common learning, and applies to all affirmative averments necessary to maintain an action. The defendant’s fire was lawfully kindled on his own land. It is an element appropriated to many valuable and useful purposes; but which may become destructive from causes not subject to human control. Hence the fact, that an injury has been done to others, is not in itself evidence of negligence. The party who avers the fact is bound to satisfy the jury upon this point, before he can be entitled to a verdict. In our opinion, the direction of the presiding judge was correct as to the burthen of the proof.

Judgment on the verdict.

HEEG v. LICHT Court of Appeals, New York, April 6, 1880. Reported in 80 New York Reports, 579.

Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant, entered upon a verdict. (Reported below, 16 Hun, 257.)

This action was brought to recover damages for injuries to plaintiff’s buildings, alleged to have been caused by the explosion of a powder magazine on the premises of defendant; also to restrain the defendant from manufacturing and storing upon his premises fire-works or other explosive substances.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Miller, J. This action is sought to be maintained upon the ground that the manufacturing and storing of fire-works, and the use and keeping of materials of a dangerous and explosive character for that purpose, constituted a private nuisance for which the defendant was liable to respond in damages, without regard to the question whether he was chargeable with carelessness or negligence. The defendant had constructed a powder magazine upon his premises, with the usual safeguards, in which he kept stored a quantity of powder which, without any apparent cause, exploded and caused the injury complained of. The judge upon the trial charged the jury that they must find for the defendant, unless they found that the defendant carelessly and negligently kept the gunpowder upon his premises. The judge refused to charge that the powder magazine was dangerous in itself to plaintiff and his property, and was a private nuisance, and the defendant was liable to the plaintiff whether it was carelessly kept or not; and the plaintiff duly excepted to the charge and the refusal to charge.

We think that the charge made was erroneous and not warranted by the facts presented upon the trial. The defendant had erected a building and stored materials therein, which from their character were liable to and actually did explode, causing injury to the plaintiff. The fact that the explosion took place tends to establish that the magazine was dangerous and liable to cause damage to the property of persons residing in the vicinity. The locality [legality?] of works of this description must depend upon the neighborhood in which they are situated. In a city, with buildings immediately contiguous and persons constantly passing, there could be no question that such an erection would be unlawful and unauthorized. An explosion under such circumstances, independent of any municipal regulations, would render the owner amenable for all damages arising therefrom. That the defendant’s establishment was outside of the territorial limits of a city does not relieve the owner from responsibility or alter the case, if the dangerous erection was in close contiguity with dwelling-houses or buildings which might be injured or destroyed in case of an explosion. The fact that the magazine was liable to such a contingency, which could not be guarded against or averted by the greatest degree of care and vigilance, evinces its dangerous character, and might in some localities render it a private nuisance. In such a case the rule which exonerates a party engaged in a lawful business, when free from negligence, has no application. The keeping or manufacturing of gunpowder or of fire-works does not necessarily constitute a nuisance per se. That depends upon the locality, the quantity, and the surrounding circumstances, and not entirely upon the degree of care used. In the case at bar it should have been left for the jury to determine whether from the dangerous character of the defendant’s business, the proximity to other buildings, and all the facts proved upon the trial, the defendant was chargeable with maintaining a private nuisance and answerable for the damages arising from the explosion.

A private nuisance is defined to be anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another. 3 Bl. Com. 216. Any unwarrantable, unreasonable, or unlawful use by a person of his own property, real or personal, to the injury of another, comes within the definition stated, and renders the owner or possessor liable for all damages arising from such use. Wood’s Law of Nuis., § 1, and authorities cited. The cases which are regarded as private nuisances are numerous, and the books are full of decisions holding the parties answerable for the injuries which result from their being maintained. The rule is of universal application that while a man may prosecute such business as he chooses on his own premises, he has no right to erect and maintain a nuisance to the injury of an adjoining proprietor or of his neighbors, even in the pursuit of a lawful trade. Aldred’s Case, 9 Coke, 58; Brady v. Weeks, 3 Barb. 159; Dubois v. Budlong, 15 Abb. 445; Wier’s Appeal, 74 Penn. St. 230.

While a class of the reported cases relates to the prosecution of a legitimate business, which of itself produces inconvenience and injury to others, another class refers to acts done on the premises of the owner which are of themselves dangerous to the property and the persons of others who may reside in the vicinity, or who may by chance be passing along or in the neighborhood of the same. Of the former class are cases of slaughter-houses, fat and offal boiling establishments, hog-styes or tallow manufactories, in or near a city, which are offensive to the senses and render the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. Catlin v. Valentine, 9 Pai. 575; Brady v. Weeks, 3 Barb. 157; Dubois v. Budlong, 15 Abb. 445; Rex v. White, 1 Burr. 337; 2 Bl. Com. 215; Farrand v. Marshall, 21 Barb. 421. It is not necessary in these cases that the noxious trade or business should endanger the health of the neighborhood. So also the use of premises in a manner which causes a noise so continuous and excessive as to produce serious annoyance, or vapors or noxious smells; Tipping v. St. Helen’s Smelting Co., 4 B. & S. (Q. B.) 608; Brill v. Flagler, 23 Wend. 354; Pickard v. Collins, 23 Barb. 444; Wood’s Law of Nuis., § 5; or the burning of a brick kiln, from which gases escape which injure the trees of persons in the neighborhood. Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568; S. C., 20 Am. Rep. 567. Of the latter class also are those where the owner blasts rocks with gunpowder, and the fragments are liable to be thrown on the premises and injure the adjoining dwelling-houses, or the owner or persons there being, or where persons travelling may be injured by such use. Hay v. Cohoes Co., 3 Barb. 42; S. C., 2 N. Y. 159; Tremain v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 163; Pixley v. Clark, 35 id. 523.

Most of the cases cited rest upon the maxim sic utere tuo, etc., and where the right to the undisturbed possession and enjoyment of property comes in conflict with the rights of others, that it is better, as a matter of public policy, that a single individual should surrender the use of his land for especial purposes injurious to his neighbor or to others, than that the latter should be deprived of the use of their property altogether, or be subjected to great danger, loss, and injury, which might result if the rights of the former were without any restriction or restraint.

The keeping of gunpowder or other materials in a place, or under circumstances, where it would be liable, in case of explosion, to injure the dwelling-houses or the persons of those residing in close proximity, we think, rests upon the same principle, and is governed by the same general rules. An individual has no more right to keep a magazine of powder upon his premises, which is dangerous, to the detriment of his neighbor, than he is authorized to engage in any other business which may occasion serious consequences.

The counsel for the defendant relies upon the case of People v. Sands, 1 Johns. 78; 3 Am. Dec. 296, to sustain the position that the defendant’s business was neither a public nor a private nuisance. That was an indictment for keeping a quantity of gunpowder near dwelling-houses and near a public street; and it was held (Spencer, J., dissenting), that the fact as charged did not amount to a nuisance, and that it should have been alleged to have been negligently and improvidently kept. It will be seen that the case was disposed of upon the form of the indictment, and while it may well be that an allegation of negligence is necessary where an indictment is for a public nuisance, it by no means follows that negligence is essential in a private action to recover damages for an alleged nuisance. In Myers v. Malcolm, 6 Hill, 292, it was held that the act of keeping a large quantity of gunpowder insufficiently secured near other buildings, thereby endangering the lives of persons residing in the vicinity, amounted to a public nuisance, and an action would lie for damages where an explosion occurred causing injury. Nelson, C. J., citing People v. Sands, supra, says: “Upon the principle that nothing will be intended or inferred to support an indictment, the Court said, for aught they could see, the house may have been one built and secured for the purpose of keeping powder in such a way as not to expose the neighborhood;” and he cites several authorities which uphold the doctrine that where gunpowder is kept in such a place as is dangerous to the inhabitants or passengers, it will be regarded as a nuisance. The case of People v. Sands is not therefore controlling upon the question of negligence.

Fillo v. Jones, 2 Abb. Ct. Ap. Dec. 121, is also relied upon, but does not sustain the doctrine contended for; and it is there held that an action for damages caused by the explosion of fire-works may be maintained upon the theory that the defendant was guilty of a wrongful and unlawful act, or of default, in keeping them at the place they were kept, because they were liable to spontaneous combustion and explosion, and thus endangered the lives of persons in their vicinity, and that the injury was occasioned by such spontaneous combustion and explosion.

It is apparent that negligence alone in the keeping of gunpowder is not controlling, and that the danger arising from the locality where the fire-works or gunpowder are kept, is to be taken into consideration in maintaining an action of this character. We think that the request to charge was too broad, and properly refused. The charge however should have been in conformity with the rule herein laid down, and for the error of the judge in the charge, the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.

All concur.

Judgment reversed.

DILWORTH’S APPEAL Supreme Court, Pennsylvania, October 9, 1879. Reported in 91 Pennsylvania State Reports, 247.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Allegheny County.

Bill in equity by Robinson and forty-seven others against Dilworth, to restrain Dilworth from erecting a powder magazine upon his lot in Penn Township, Allegheny County. The case was referred to a master, who recommended that an injunction should be refused and the bill dismissed. The facts are set forth in the opinion of this court. The court below thought that the public interest would be subserved by refusing the injunction; but in deference to the authority of Wier’s Appeal, 24 P. F. Smith, 230, a majority of the court entered a pro forma decree for an injunction. Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.

Trunkey, J. [After stating general principles and quoting from the statement of the facts in Wier’s Appeal.]

After a careful revision of the master’s report by the court below, the facts found in this case, and which are well sustained by proof, are as follows: This magazine has been located so as to endanger as few persons and as little property as possible, and yet be reasonably accessible as a point of supply and distribution; it is more remote from population than the magazines generally in use throughout the United States, and it is doubtful if a better location could be made in Allegheny County. It is situated about two miles from East Liberty, the nearest closely built-up district, and is separated therefrom by intervening hills and ravines. It is in a sparsely settled locality, for the vicinity of a city, and land near it has not been, nor is it likely to be for some years, in demand for building purposes. That portion of Lincoln Avenue which terminates at a point five hundred feet from the magazine is very little travelled, very few people travel it within considerable distance of its terminus, having no occasion to do so; it was the wildest of the many absurd enterprises undertaken in Pittsburgh to carry city improvements into wild rural regions, expecting population to rapidly follow. The other public road, passing within twenty-two feet of the magazine, has for some time been almost abandoned by the people in the vicinity, and is used by about three farmers. The magazine is so situated that the force of an explosion would be down the ravine and away from the road. The greater distance of this magazine from a borough, or closely built-up district, the absence of demand of land for building purposes, and the unlikelihood of such demand in the vicinity, the little travel on the public road which passes near it, and the ravine opening from the road, are the chief points wherein this case differs from Wier’s Appeal. The dwellings and families near the magazine number about the same in one as the other. None will deny that the law protects the small and cheap home as it does the large and costly mansion, and the rights of a tenant are as sacred as those of his landlord. But it is equally undeniable that if a tenant hold by lease at will, or by month, and his landlord grants that a lawful and necessary, yet offensive or dangerous factory or magazine may be erected, the tenant has not a right of action for its prevention. If such structure were placed near tenant houses occupied by miners, where the mines are likely to be worked for considerable time, it would be a material fact to be weighed with others—almost of like weight as if the houses were owned by the occupants. Here the mine is nearly exhausted, a fact to be considered in reference to the probable increase of population in the neighborhood.

It was urged that the location being only two hundred and fifty-five feet from the boundary line of Pittsburgh, and five hundred feet from the end of Lincoln Avenue, is dangerous to life and property in the city. The facts, as we have seen, are that that end of the avenue is very little travelled, and is remote from the population of the city; and, without question, “the region of country in which the magazine is located is wild and broken as to its general surface, it is traversed by numerous ravines and hills, and altogether possesses a romantic and secluded aspect.” It is the real character of the location, with its surroundings, which determines its fitness, and not a city line two miles from city life, nor the unused and useless part of a graded and paved street extended beyond the visible city.

Confessedly, the demand for and consumption of powder in Pittsburgh and vicinity are very great, and it is indispensable in carrying on important branches of industry, and it would be inimical to the business interests of the community to trammel the sale of it with unnecessary restrictions and burdens. Besides the magazine at the United States Arsenal there are no others in Allegheny County, except those of a single company, and the Dilworth. In view of the whole case the master, and one of the judges of the Common Pleas, thought the injunction should be refused. The majority of the court, in a considerate opinion, concluded that the public interest would be subserved by refusing the injunction, and that the complainants were not entitled to an injunction, but for the ruling in Wier’s Appeal, on the authority of which they felt constrained to grant it. A decree was entered, with direction that it would not be enforced until the defendant could be heard on appeal. We fully agree with the court below, except that we do not think the principles in Wier’s Appeal, applied to the facts in this case, require an injunction to be granted.

Decree reversed. Bill dismissed.