Allsop v. Allsop In the Exchequer, April 25, 1860. Reported, in 5 Hurlstone & Norman, 534

Declaration.—That, before the committing of the grievances, the said Hannah was the wife of the plaintiff, William Allsop; and the defendant, on divers occasions, falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff Hannah the words following (to the effect that he had had carnal connection with her whilst she was the wife of the plaintiff, William Allsop): “Whereby the plaintiff Hannah lost the society of her friends and neighbors, and they refused to, and did not, associate with her as they otherwise would have done, and she was much injured in her credit and reputation, and brought into public scandal and disgrace; and, by reason of the committing of the grievances, the said Hannah became and was ill and unwell for a long time and unable to attend to her necessary affairs and business, and the plaintiff, William Allsop, was put to and incurred much expense in and about the endeavoring to cure her of the illness which she labored under as aforesaid by reason of the committing of the said grievances; and the said William Allsop lost the society and association of his said wife for a long time in his domestic affairs, which he otherwise would have had.”

Demurrer and joinder.

Pollock, C. B. We are all of opinion that the defendant is entitled to judgment. There is no precedent for any such special damage as that laid in this declaration being made a ground of action, so as to render words actionable which otherwise would not be so. We ought to be careful not to introduce a new element of damage, recollecting to what a large class of actions it would apply, and what a dangerous use might be made of it. In actions for making false charges before magistrates, for giving false characters, and for torts of all kinds, illness might be said to have arisen from the wrong sustained by the plaintiff. The case of Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wendell, 210, is the only authority that has any tendency to throw light on the argument; but we ought not to act upon the authority of that case, opposed as it is to the universal practice of the law in this country. The courts here have always taken care that parties shall not be responsible for fanciful or remote damages, or, in fact, any that do not fairly and naturally result from the wrongful act itself. It is only lately that a clear and distinct view of the subject of damages was taken, in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, in which it was held that a person whose duty it is to deliver goods to another is not responsible for any damages resulting from the non-delivery, unless they are the damages which would result immediately and naturally, that is, according to the usual course of things, from the breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made contract. Slander may be repeated, and the repetition may cause mischief. In one sense nothing is more natural than that such should be the case. So there are many other consequences which may follow in libel and slander in respect of which there is no remedy. This particular damage depends on the temperament of the party affected, and it may be laid down that illness arising from the excitement which the slanderous language may produce is not that sort of damage which forms a ground of action.

Judgment for the defendant.